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THE
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EARL BROWDER

N O T E

The contents of this pamphlet is the text of the speech of Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, delivered in Chicago on September 26, and in Gary, Indiana, on September 27, 1943.

On September 30 Mr. Browder issued the following statement to the press:

The newspaper reports and comment on my speech in Chicago and Gary on September 26 and 27, mark a new low in irresponsibility. The speech was an American opinion on the international situation and American policy to meet it. It was the opinion of an American working class party—the Communist Party—which is devoting all its strength and manpower to hasten victory, to smash Hitler Germany and militarist Japan. It was the opinion of a patriotic, anti-fascist organization of Americans which has given over 8,000 of its members to the armed forces of our country, many of whom are serving on the battlefields of Italy and the Far East.

Not a single newspaper of general circulation handled it on this ground. Hearst papers deliberately distorted it, and provocatively tried to present it as a declaration of the Soviet Union. Others followed the Hearst lead, without pretending to report the speech. Not one printed even a summary of the speech itself.

It would be a waste of time to attempt a detailed answer to this flood of falsehood and misrepresentation, behind which lie most sinister dangers to our American war effort. The speech itself answers all these slanders to those who will read it. Its full text was furnished to the press associations before delivery. It has clearly accomplished at least one minimum task; it exploded now a hidden political mine which the defeatists had calculated to set off later in order to interfere with the coming three-power conference. Let us hope it will also become a contribution to a sober discussion of realities in this dangerous world situation in which our country is only beginning to hammer out a clear policy.

MAKE 1943 THE DECISIVE YEAR

By EARL BROWDER

ON SEPTEMBER 25th the Soviet Red Army took Smolensk, the city which the Nazis had occupied since July 1941, entered the suburbs of Kiev, and approaches close to Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe. This is the climax to a 75-day summer offensive, in which the Soviet forces inflicted casualties upon the Nazis totalling about 2,000,000 dead, wounded, and prisoners; have driven back the Nazi line from one to three hundred miles along a thousand-mile front; and have regained practically all territory taken by the Nazis since the first two months of the invasion.

This grandiose achievement, without parallel in history, was won over the concentrated force of two-thirds of the Nazis' total armed forces, and their best, with equipment drawn from all the arsenals of Europe. It was won without the intervention of Anglo-American forces in the West of Europe, without the second front. It has proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that if the second front had been opened in the West this past Spring or Summer, Hitler would have been crushed to the earth before this day, that the war in Europe would already have been decisively won.

There is little profit in weeping over past opportunities which have been missed. But certainly it is time to draw some lessons from these mistakes, so that our country will not forever lag behind the march of history. Even yet we can make 1943 the decisive year—but we cannot do it with the formula of fighting a "safe" war, of keeping millions of soldiers in Britain idle while Nazis a few short miles across the

Channel consider France their vacation-land, of boasting that the casualties of our first year-and-a-half of war were smaller than our 1942 casualty list from highway automobile accidents.

If the Anglo-American forces should only do *half as much* from the West as the Soviet armies are doing from the East, the Nazi regime would crumble under the blows before the year is out.

Why are we not striking the Nazis from the West?

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in his report to Parliament in the past week, declared that no amount of clamor for the second front would bring it a minute sooner than he had planned it. Perhaps we cannot move Mr. Churchill. He is indeed a stubborn man, with a confidence in himself that survives many obvious mistakes. Our own General Eisenhower was unable to shake him, when in 1942 General "Ike" pleaded for the opening of the second front through France as the main action, with Africa as a secondary diversion. Our own General Marshall, American chief-of-staff, was unable to shake him in Quebec with the strongest military arguments for the immediate opening of the second front. And for more than a year it has been an open secret that Marshal Stalin failed to win Mr. Churchill to operate the basic strategy of the second front, the strategy of coalition warfare. If the combined force of argument of American and Soviet military experts—with which most British military experts agree—cannot move Mr. Churchill into action, then it is not probable that he will listen to our less authoritative voices.

There is one argument, however, that pierces even Mr. Churchill's sublime self-confidence and may force him to reconsider his decision to postpone the second front until 1944. That argument is the steady advance of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, the prospect that it opens up a decisive Soviet victory in which Anglo-American arms will have won no major share.

At any rate, we are beginning to know where we stand. We know that the long refusal of effective coalition warfare, of the second front, is Mr. Churchill's decision. Hitherto this

fact has been obscured by the myth of "joint Anglo-American decisions," by the chatter about "leaving it to the experts"—the same experts whose opinions were being over-ridden, by the hypocritical talk about Africa and Italy being the real second front and about third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh fronts, as if the problem of the second front was one of numeration and not of coalition war strategy. Mr. Churchill says "his government" will decide when to open the second front, and the Americans will either agree or there will be no unanimity. Mr. Churchill has finally emerged as that "military expert" whose opinion prevailed over Generals Eisenhower and Marshall. And Mr. Churchill himself repudiated all the fashionable substitutes for the second front, with the most admirable frankness for which he must have the respect of all honest men, by admitting that the second front is and can only be the invasion through France, that there is only one possible disagreement among honest and intelligent men and that is on the question of when to strike that blow.

Let us review again the chief considerations in timing the second front, in deciding whether to open it now or to postpone it again until next year.

The full concept of coalition war requires that the three principal allied powers, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, shall simultaneously attack the common enemy's main forces from East and West, in order that the enemy cannot concentrate his full force in either direction, and in order that the full force of the coalition shall be exerted against that enemy to deliver the heaviest possible blows, to break his back and his spirit, to defeat and annihilate him.

It is still within that conception of coalition warfare to argue that the Anglo-American forces should withhold the invasion of France until it would coincide with a counter-offensive of the Soviet armies. Therefore, since the coalition was only finally consummated in June 1942, the invasion of France was definitely demanded only in November, when the Red Army launched its second great counter-offensive that culminated in the mighty victory of Stalingrad. Since Novem-

ber 1942, there has been a glaring failure of responsibility to the coalition on the part of Britain and America; we engaged in peripheral warfare, of secondary importance, in Africa, later in Sicily and now in Italy, but we did not engage the main forces of the enemy and have not done so.

It is true, of course, that Both Britain and the United States helped the Soviet Union materially by sending a growing and substantial flow of weapons and war materials. But that is no more than we did for Britain before the United States was at war, when we operated under our Neutrality Law. Surely we do not insult ourselves by calling such aid the limit of our ability as a military ally in a war we have accepted as our own!

Since November 1942, our failure to open the second front has been explicable only on two alternative grounds: Either the joint forces of Britain and the United States were *unable* to invade France due to military weakness, or we had given second thought to our commitment and become *unwilling* to fulfill the responsibility we had assumed. In either case we had failed to make good our part in the coalition war. We were not carrying any proportionate share of the fighting. Britain and America combined were not carrying a fifth part of the military burden of the war. The Soviet Union was carrying more than four-fifths of it. That default continues down to this day.

It is important to know if this default is the result of *inability* or *unwillingness* to meet our responsibilities. If one year ago a plausible case could be made for inability, which may be seriously questioned, it must be said that today such an argument is patently false. The combined British and American forces and equipment now in England are overwhelmingly superior to everything the Nazis can muster against them in France. The supply lines are open for an even more overwhelming replacement of anything lost in action. So far as men and materials are concerned the Anglo-American forces are at least ten times more favorably situated in relation to the enemy than were the Soviet forces at Stalingrad.

No, it is not military weakness that has prevented the Anglo-American combined forces from opening the second front. Some persons in position to determine the decision have been unwilling to have the second front opened. The weakness is **moral**, not **military**.

It is a heavy responsibility to attempt to assign this default to particular persons. The evidence, however, inescapably indicates that Winston Churchill made the decision not to open the second front, and that Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted to that decision because he was unwilling to have a public disagreement with Churchill. I feel sure that any time Churchill is ready to open the second front he will find no obstacles from the side of Roosevelt.

Does that mean that "the British" are holding up the second front while "the Americans" are all ready to go ahead when they obtain British agreement? No, it is not so simple. Mr. Churchill could not have imposed his will upon Anglo-American counsels by "British" pressure, for the British, civilians and military alike, are overwhelmingly for the second front immediately. Mr. Churchill has to hold back the British people from demanding the second front by telling them it is not "cricket" to make such demands of the Americans. But in America Mr. Churchill finds much stronger and effective support for delaying the second front. It is the American supporters of Churchill's position who have given him the strength to settle this question on the side of delay and more delay.

Who are the American supporters of Churchill's strategy of delay? They range all the way from the State Department within the administration, through the Wheeler and poll-tax sections of the Democratic Party, through the Republican Congressional representation, to the whole camp of the America Firsters headed by the *Chicago Tribune*, Father Coughlin, and Gerald L. K. Smith.

It is a fact the British people should ponder well that it is the rabid British-hating *Chicago Tribune* which most vociferously endorses Churchill's policy of delaying the second front.

In fact, at moments the *Tribune* seems to be almost ready to plump for "Union Now" if thereby they can secure Churchill's leadership to replace that of President Roosevelt.

The *Tribune* says that the second front is a special Russian interest, that those who advocate the second front in this country "do not think as Americans," that "their devotion is to Russia first," that "they call for the sacrifice of American soldiers for the greater glory of Russia," that "they are scarcely distinguishable from traitors."

Those are strong words to apply to Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, who favor the second front, as well as to the tens of thousands of prominent citizens of all walks of life and all parties who have expressed themselves for the second front. But then the *Tribune* has even denounced Tom Dewey in equally severe terms, though Dewey would never dream of breathing a word for the second front; and to Col. McCormick the amiable Wendell Willkie is perhaps even more seditious than his hated Bolsheviks because he bores from within the Republican party, and once, long ago in a moment of rashness, called for the opening of the second front.

The *Tribune* is important, even though it represents the lunatic fringe of the reactionary camp, because it reveals the most logical development of the opposition to the second front, which is opposition to fighting the war at all, and advocacy of a negotiated peace with Hitler.

In its editorial denouncing the second front, the *Tribune* revealed its true soul when it inferred that the American Army could not stand up against the Nazis. I wonder what the American soldiers and officers thought about Col. McCormick's opinions of their fighting abilities, when he said that to send American forces into France would be merely to hand some new victories to Hitler! Allow me to read the exact words of the *Tribune* on this point so that you may get its full flavor:

"We cannot doubt that the German people are weary of war and bitterly disappointed in their hopes. After a series

of great and cheap victories they have in recent months known only bloody defeats and reverses. Hundreds of thousands of their sons have fallen in battle and many of their proudest cities are in ruins. Their spirits might be revived by a victory or something that could be advertised by them as a victory. The chances of their getting it in Russia are none too good, and there isn't any place else they can achieve it unless this summer we obligingly toss the American army to them to be torn by their cannon and machine guns. We can force a landing, no doubt, but only anti-Americans would demand our taking so great a risk if it can be avoided."

So, the Russians can defeat the Nazis even with inferior forces and equipment, but the Americans, even with overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment, would only be torn to pieces by the Nazis cannon and machine guns, and hand the Nazis a victory which they can not get anywhere else! That is what the *Tribune* says! But anyone who believes what the *Tribune* says nowadays must be as lunatic as the director of that paper!

Of course, if I had such an opinion about the American army I would also be opposed to the second front. It would certainly be a big mistake to open up the second front with soldiers who cannot fight, or who are afraid to fight. We can go farther, and say that it is a big mistake for a nation to be at war if it has not soldiers who are anxious to fight, and ready to die if need be, to bring that war to the earliest possible victorious conclusion. If the United States is such a nation, then it is just too bad, and we have all been making big mistakes. But it is a vile pro-Nazi slander to say that we are that kind of nation, or that our army is that kind of army.

The American Army has proved, everywhere it has had a chance to fight, that it is the equal, man for man, of any army in the world. Its leadership has proved its ability to solve in brilliant fashion the technical problems of modern warfare. Against the already half-defeated Nazis there is not the slightest reason to doubt that the American Army would score most heavily.

To say, as does the *Tribune* and all opponents of the second front, that the second front is a special Russian demand, is only another way of proposing that we back out of the war, that it is really not our war anyway, that it is the Russians' war and let them fight it while we stand by, send some lend-lease supplies, give them a little cheering, but keep out of the line of fire, play it safe.

If the United States wants to take that position, then we should already now calculate what the consequences will be. It means that we write ourselves off as a world power. It means that we will cease pretending that we have any interests in Europe or Asia that anyone is bound to respect. It means that the Americans are safe from molestation only so long as the rest of the world is exhausted from the present war, but no other nation need fear challenging us, since we welched in one war and would therefore probably do the same thing in the next. That may be an agreeable prospect for Col. McCormick and his friends, but I am sure that the American people will never accept it. Once the people begin to understand the full import of the second front issue, they will never forgive those responsible for bringing our country into default of its most sacred obligations.

Our national honor and our national interest are tied up in the issue of the second front.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we allow the Soviet Union to win the war without our major military participation. Do you think for one moment that then we can expect the Soviet Union to turn around and lick Japan for us too? And then we, the great and wise and rich and beneficent Uncle Sam, will step in and tell all the naughty boys and girls of Europe and Asia where to get off and what they should do and whom they should put in charge of affairs?

The cold hard truth is this, that unless we get down off our high horse, unless we, the United States, consolidate the alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union on the basis of equality all around, which means everyone doing something like his part in fighting the war, and treating each other with

full respect in reorganizing the world after the war, there is not the slightest prospect for us to emerge from this war with anything that can properly be called victory. For whatever else victory may mean, it is entirely meaningless for the United States as we know our country unless it brings a prolonged period of orderly relations between nations. We have a national interest in peace, and it is our greatest national interest. And we cannot win peace unless we are capable of playing our proper role in this present just and liberating war.

Of course, we cannot gain even those illusory material advantages the *Tribune* promises us, by renegeing on our obligations in the war. All attempts to do so will only prolong the war, and make it more costly than it need be in both lives and money. The cheapest road to victory is the shortest road—and the shortest road is that of the full blow against the enemy's main force, the second front through France.

The key to victory is the full consolidation of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance. This requires full coalition warfare, at least to the extent of the Anglo-American side in the West engaging half as many of the Nazi forces as the Soviet Union takes on single-handed. That would mean that Britain and the United States would each carry one-fourth as much of the military burden of the European war as the Soviet Union carries. Without such a minimum assumption of the common task by Britain and America, we cannot expect that the Soviet leaders would or could accept the coalition as the basis of the re-establishment of world order. If we renege on our specific obligations in a life-and-death war to which we are fully committed, what confidence can other peoples have in the most specific general promises we might make for the future?

There is much talk today about an exclusive Anglo-American alliance. This is put forth as a substitute for consolidation of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance, to make us Americans feel that we can be careless of a deterioration of our relations with the Soviet Union. That is a dangerous and

reactionary illusion. To follow that path will not even bring us into closer relations with Britain, but will raise up a horde of vexatious difficulties in our relations with all other countries, Britain included. It is not a healthy relationship for the United States to hand over its relations with the Soviet Union to be handled by the British as intermediaries, in the fashion that the American Federation of Labor has handled its relation with the Soviet trade unions. That is bad for everyone concerned, but it is especially bad for the United States.

The only way to closer alliance with Britain, on any stable long-time basis, is through simultaneous closer relations with the Soviet Union, through the full three-power, Anglo-Soviet-American, alliance. That is true because, whatever the momentary aberrations of British policy, the British people as a whole, the British nation, is irrevocably set upon a long-time policy of alliance with the Soviet Union which nothing can break. That is the significance of the Twenty Year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Aid formalized between Britain and the Soviet Union. That Treaty is not directed against the United States, but specifically envisions the prospect of being broadened to include the United States, whenever our country is ready for such a step. But if the United States should direct its policy toward undermining or superceding the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, by an exclusive Anglo-American alliance, as was specifically set forth in great detail in the article of Forrest Davis in the *Saturday Evening Post* last week, then it must be said in utmost seriousness that the most terrible dangers are ahead for us. Such a course would in all likelihood save Hitlerism from complete defeat in Europe; it would create bad relations between all three of the great powers; it would destroy the basis of confidence upon which alone Europe can be peacefully reconstructed; and it would probably bring into power in the United States a new reactionary and imperialistic regime such as would be close to the heart of Col. McCormick and his cronies. It would be the complete bankruptcy for all the high ideals proclaimed as the guiding

policy for this War of National Liberation. It would mean that victory has eluded our grasp, at the very moment when it was within our reach, when we had everything necessary for victory—except the *moral strength* which is the final requisite for victory.

All these considerations of the war in Europe constitute the framework within which we must deal with the war in the Far East.

There are a few simple facts about our war with Japan which are too often forgotten. Briefly, they are:

Japan was a second-class power which would never have dared to challenge the United States and Britain but for the rise of Hitler in Europe. It was Hitlerism in Europe which gave Japan the opportunity she never gained through her own strength to strike for her Asiatic Empire, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

From the rise of Hitler in 1933, until 1941, it was not the power of the United States and Britain that held some check over the Japanese militarists, but the colossal might of the Soviet Union, which the Japanese had tasted in two years of warfare along the Manchurian border to their great discomfiture. In that warfare, both the Soviet Union and Japan suffered much higher casualties than have the United States and Japan suffered in the war since Pearl Harbor.

Only when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and engaged the Soviet forces in a life-and-death struggle, did the Japanese feel free to strike at the United States, and into the South Pacific.

Even throughout its deadly struggle with the Nazis, the Soviet Union has immobilized the best troops of Japan on the Manchurian border, in numbers far surpassing all those used in active service in China and the South Pacific.

If we do not crush Hitlerism in Europe, the military defeat of Japan will be a most costly and protracted task; the quicker we defeat Hitlerism, the sooner and the more cheaply Japan can be defeated; the road to victory over Japan lies first of all through the second front in Europe which will break the

backbone of Hitlerism. The more we delay the second front in Western Europe, the more time we give Japan to entrench herself in her new Empire.

The effectiveness of China as an ally in the war against Japan has been largely negated by the rejection on the part of the Kuomintang of unity with the Chinese Communists, and the use of a million of the best Chinese troops to blockade the so-called Communist armies in the Northwest Border Regions instead of both groups unitedly fighting against the Japanese. In spite of this, the Soviet Union has long given far more effective aid to the Chungking government than has the United States. It is impossible to mobilize the Chinese people effectively against Japan unless and until we help dissolve the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet phobia within the Kuomintang government in Chungking. We can best accomplish this by a clear and unequivocal policy, in cooperation with the Soviet Union. At present no one, least of all the Chinese, knows where the United States stands on this issue.

Since the Soviet Union, in the best of cases, will have borne two-thirds of the military burden of defeating Hitler, and in the worst case up to nine-tenths, it is an illusion for the United States to expect that she will be able or willing also to undertake the burden of the military struggle against Japan. All chatter about the Soviets giving us "bombing bases" in Siberia is harmful nonsense with only one aim and end, to try to give the Soviet Union similar tasks in the Far East which she has performed in Europe, namely, to win the war for us. That is not good politics, good sense, nor good faith. What would the American people think about political leaders of our country who would accept such plans for the United States to assume the major burdens of all our allies' war problems?

While we must stop all childish thinking about the Soviet Union fighting our Far Eastern war for us, it still remains a basic truth that our close friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union is an absolute necessity for the final and satisfactory solution of the Far Eastern phase of the war, especially

in terms of the stabilization of East Asia and her peaceful inclusion into the modern world. But if we want that invaluable cooperation of the Soviet Union, we must so shape our policies that they bring into harmony our own national interests with those of the Soviet Union. There is such a broad base of common interest, obvious to all men of good will, that intelligent men of whatever ideological trend should be able to work out such common policy, given the will to do so.

All constructive policy, for Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, finally comes back, however, to the crucial issue of the battle of Europe, to the second front.

We can open up the second front in France now, throw our full force into the task of crushing Hitler, making 1943 the decisive year. Or we can miss the hour of decision, we can hesitate and falter again, and pay the penalty of having to reconstruct all our relationships with the rest of the world, in the light of the new relationship of forces that will be created by our default.

For the honor and interest of our own country, the United States of America, let us march forward on the clear road to victory. Let us open the second front in Western Europe now!

Have you read EARL BROWDER'S book

VICTORY — AND AFTER

Presenting the Communist position on the most vital problems arising from the war, it is a splendid guide for a more vigorous and effective prosecution of the war to total victory. In it the author deals at length with questions of national and international unity; the strategy required for victory, the colonial problem as it relates to China, India, Africa; production and the role of labor in a war economy; and relations between the United Nations for winning victory and for post-war reconstruction.

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