

The Proposed C. P. Changes

By Robert Minor

"Please explain the significance of Russia's recognition of the Badoglio government in Italy."

What Russia recognized is that the Badoglio government is the government of Italy. What it recognized further is that the business before the world is fighting the war.

The war is at its climax. The military actions on the Russian front exceed in power and velocity, and in their effect in transforming the relationship of world forces, any other actions that have ever occurred. The course of civilization is being shaped by the destruction of the German armies. Whatever contributes to this is good, whatever detracts from it is bad.

The United States and Great Britain, though they have no ambassadors officially accredited, have recognized and continue to recognize the government of Badoglio and Victor Emmanuel. The three Allied powers jointly accepted the surrender from the Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel government as the government of Italy. To Italy under this same government the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia jointly accorded "co-belligerent status." From it we accepted the surrender of the Italian Navy, its transfer to the Allied powers.

The Allied Advisory Council for Italy, composed by representatives of the three great allied powers, set up in November, decided on December 17 to turn over to the present Italian government jurisdiction over all Italian territory south of the northern borders of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, as well as Sicily and Sardinia, without committing themselves to this government after the capture of Rome. General Eisenhower stated on November 19 that "we look to the Italian government to broaden its political composition," and that "the United Nations are converting Italy into an effective instrument of war against Germany," and three days later, November 13, Badoglio promised to resign as soon as Rome was taken by the Allied armies.

This trend toward self-government for Italy and the mobilization of Italy for the war was broken when the Allied Advisory Council was not permitted further to function. Instead, the AMG, based upon the opposite policy, proved to be decisive. The Russian member of the AAC was withdrawn. The AMG supported the Badoglio government, but only to the degree that it could be used as an instrument against the popular movement.

All of this spelled inaction and lack of all effectiveness of Italy's mobilization in the war. Everything waited for the "fall of Rome" with the fall of Rome still an event of the indefinite future.

Meantime the biggest military actions of all time—on the eastern front—required liquidation of all obstructions to the military action in southern and western Europe.

The United States and Great Britain had no lack of connections with the Italian government because they were running the affairs of the country through their military establishments. The Soviet Union, having no military establishment in Italy, was by oversight left out of the deciding councils, and had no connection or means of communication with any authority in Italy. Since it was only a matter of formality, the Soviet Union in its characteristic way remedied the situation by the most simple means.

No-one who understands these facts will be excited about the matter unless he wants to weaken the collaboration of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union at this crucial moment of the war.

It is evident that the Soviet government acted on evidence that its exchange of ambassadors with the Italian government recognized by all of the Allies was the best course to follow under circumstances not of its own making—necessary for the coming decisive blow.

It goes to show that all problems regarding Italy can best be solved by the joint actions of the three

Allied powers under the Tehran and Moscow agreements.

"Should we support Badoglio and Victor Emanuel, or should we support the position of the Italian Communist Party?"

We support the position of the Communist Party of Italy.

We support the war effort of the Italians and we support the Italian Communist Party in its remarkably effective work in helping the mobilization of the whole mass of the Italian people for the war. Its great success in all parts of Italy, including especially the northern industrial regions behind the German lines, is due to its correct policy of supporting national unity of all patriots of all classes. The Italian Communist Party believes that the abdication of the king and discarding of Badoglio are necessary to the unification of Italy for the patriotic war and its splendid record gives us confidence in its judgment. We do not know whether a new situation is being created as a result of the pressure of the three great Allied powers. But the Italian Communist Party has shown itself capable of judging each stage of this supreme struggle.

We support the Italian Communist Party. And, does it occur to you, it would have been impossible to give the fullest support to the war, on the Italian scene, without supporting the position that has thus far been taken by the Italian Communist Party?

"How would you reconcile the recognition of the Badoglio government by the Soviet Union with our hope of truly democratic governments in all the countries of Europe?"

The hope of truly democratic governments in all the countries of Europe lies first in the military destruction of the Hitler machine.

There are some who wish to make the Soviet government responsible for the reluctance and hesitation in Great Britain and the United States to discard the ill-smelling ruffraff of royalty and the rotting remnants of those political forces that sent armed forces with Hitler to fight the Soviet Union after June, 1941.

The author of this question will doubtless agree with us that we can make no concessions to this effort.

"Can you explain Churchill's stand on Italy in connection with his support of the people's government of Yugoslavia?"

Necessity of war, both political and military, required Great Britain to support the Yugoslavia that fights the invader and the Yugoslav government that leads and unites the people to do this. Anything else, for the British, would have been suicide. But one must understand that the enormous consistency of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia plays a great part in stabilizing the general policy for the single aim of victory. Not to cooperate with the military leadership and government of Marshal Tito, and not to discard the Mikhaillovitch agents of Hitler would have been a policy leading to the downfall of Great Britain. That is why Churchill follows the present policy in Yugoslavia, and we can be absolutely certain that this will become a general European pattern. There is a different situation in Italy, a country having a different status in the war, but in the long run the general pattern will have to prevail there, too. A thousand cross-currents of corruption are at play, after 20 years of Fascism closely associated with the rottenest strata of our country and England, but there is no reason to fear that any remnant of fascism can stand after the victory.

Let us not underestimate military victories when they are won by the progressing forces of history. The right of universal suffrage (in all likelihood from 18 years up), together with freedom of speech and press, freedom of religion and freedom of trade-union organization, are guaranteed and will be assured by the military victory; the relationship of forces in Europe will not be such as to leave any fear that those rights can be denied. Who will be prime minister of Italy and whether

there will be any king will be decided by the majority of the people of Italy; and we will abide by the result, and they will have to.

"The Soviet Union has done a wonderful job in being the first country to recognize the people's committees of France and Yugoslavia. Under these circumstances I am a little confused as to the reasons for the recognition of the Badoglio government rather than the organized people's groups which if given arms would be an effective fighting guerrilla force."

In recognizing the French Committee and the people's government of Yugoslavia it is obvious that the Soviet government was actuated by the desire to recognize the most effective organizations for war against Germany. It clearly gave weight to nothing in the internal affairs of either France or Yugoslavia except as internal conditions might influence the course of these countries in war. The inclusion of Communists in these organizations could be useful solely as the inclusion of the most indefatigable patriots and men of ruthless warfare. In both cases the Soviet government gave its full support to patriotic military officers purely on the basis of their proven willingness and ability to fight Germany. In the case of France, patriotic military commanders are supported in complete disregard of the fact that some had been for a quarter of a century actively hostile to Soviet Russia.

The Soviet state is a state, not a political party. Its relations with the outside world are purely those between states. It has no duties that extend to the internal affairs of other states, except insofar as these affect such a state's capacity to have friendly relations and—now—to make war as an ally. Internal reforms in these countries—Italy or any other—are a matter for the people of the country and cannot be achieved otherwise. Soviet Russia did not fail in 1935 to demand a coalition to defend Ethiopia's national independence, though Ethiopia is an absolute monarchy and though Mussolini and Hearst pointed out that there was slavery there. The Russian government did not withdraw recognition from the United States this month when Congress deprived millions of fighting men of their right to vote, though it was an act of the moral category of the *coups d'etat* in Argentina.

The organized people's groups will be sufficiently recognized and given arms and will be an effective fighting guerrilla force. This war has raised to the highest degree the appreciation of the importance of guerrilla forces. Not only did they play an amazingly great role in Russia, influencing the outcome of the biggest military actions of all military history. In Yugoslavia a great national army of regular divisions arose out of the smallest beginnings of guerrilla operations and were armed by means of guerrilla raids. But we must not confuse this with the main necessity. This is a war of the greatest mass formations, the heaviest equipment and most highly organized transport and mass industry, and in such warfare guerrillas can be only an auxiliary.

In Southern Italy where the Allies have large, splendidly equipped armies and every means of building up regular Italian formations, to speak of making guerrillas a substitute for this would be a serious mistake.

The next questions, to be answered in Saturday's Daily Worker will be:

"Election laws handicap minority parties. Will not the rights of the minority parties be still more handicapped if the Communist Party no longer fights for its place as a minority party?"

"After outstanding successes in Ohio and New York especially in electing Peter V. Cacchione and Benjamin J. Davis, Jr. to the New York City Council as Communist Party candidates—why should we quit having Communist Party candidates and appearing on the ballot as a party?"

Answers
to
Questions