



PROGRESSIVE LABOR MAGAZINE

PLM



SPRING 1981
Vol. 14, No. 1
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
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
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Spring 1981

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The power of U.S. imperialism continues to decline and the strategic advantage of Soviet imperialism grows stronger. For U.S. bosses, the only chance to stay in the race is war. For workers, the only choice is to build a movement to turn imperialist war into revolution.

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The articles appearing in PL Magazine are published because the Editorial Board believes they are generally useful in the ideological development of the international revolutionary communist movement. Only the editorial and PLP National Committee documents represent the official policies of the Party.

notes and comment

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
On Feminism and Communism

To the Editors:

It was especially good to read the article "Smash Sexism with Socialist Revolution" in the Fall 1980 **PL Magazine**. Sexism is a problem that has received too little attention from the International Communist movement—and from our Party in particular. As the article graphically pointed out, bosses in garment, food, communications and dozens of other industries make billions of dollars every year from super profits stolen from women workers. And sexist ideology — which pits women against all men rather than their true exploiters; capitalists—is one of the major problems facing the working class today. We will have to consider additional sides of this issue in the future as the working class movement grows and the contradictions posed by sexism are further revealed.

The article was not without weaknesses, however. I thought that the attack on the sellout feminist leaders of the "women's movement" could have been much sharper, and that it could have been better integrated into the article as a whole. Tacking a paragraph on the end of the article titled "Feminism Divides Workers" is no substitute for a historical discussion of the ways in which feminists have divided the working class movement and sold working women out in the past. The historical material that the article did present, moreover, helped to perpetuate a number of myths about the women's movement which serve to legitimize feminist leaders today.

One such myth has to do with the relationship of the "old" women's movement (the suffrage movement of the early 1900's) and working women at the turn of the century. This was a period when tens of thousands of women were pouring into the labor force, principally in the garment and textile industries and other "sweated" trades, where they faced miserable, debilitating working con-



Women working in a garment sweatshop in New York, about 1915.

ditions and starvation wages—along with every kind of sexist harrassment from male bosses. The first major break in this situation—as indicated in the article—was the famous "Revolt of twenty thousand" shirtwaist makers' strike in New York in 1909. But contrary to what the article indicates, feminist organizations—like the women's Trade Union League (WTUL)—did not organize and sustain the strike. The middle and upper class women who led the WTUL were forced to support the strike, but went along with the ILGWU and other trade unions when it came time to send women back to work and limit the gains of the strike. And within three years the WTUL was working against any further strike activity among women garment workers. (They defeated an effort to organize another strike in 1913.) Rather than leading working women to the left, as suggested by the article, the WTUL functioned like a host of other reactionary capitalist institutions: holding back the struggle and dividing the working class movement by propagating feminist ideology among women workers.

Feminist leaders also crow about how women in the past overcame racism and nationalism while building the old women's movement.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to what the article indicated, racism and nationalism were the biggest weaknesses in the struggles waged by women workers in the early 1900's. This was even evident in the shirtwaist makers' strike in 1909. The strike was critically—perhaps mortally—injured when a substantial block of Italian women returned to work after being out just two or three days (they may have numbered 10 to 12 thousand, over a third of the strikers). The core of the strike—and trade union organizing among women workers—was in the Russian Jewish community. Nationalist and racist ideas were constantly used by petty garment bosses to whip working women "into line" in this period (shops were small, and often were dominated by one immigrant group)—and their ability to separate Russian and Italian women was a critical factor limiting the success of the strike.

One important factor in this was the absence of any sustained effort to fight racism and nationalism among working women. The WTUL and other feminist organizations played on these divisions among women in opportunistic attempts to organize them. They circulated pamphlets with vicious stereotypes of Italian, Russian and black women, and tried

notes and comment

to bring women workers to events staged to make them conform to middle class feminist ideas.

In reality, the leaders of the WTUL had nothing but contempt for working women. Most were involved in the "movement" simply to try and bring more women into the general women's movement (which was almost totally absorbed in the "revolutionary" struggle for women's suffrage), or as a form of charity—a means of helping poor, exploited working women and thereby easing their own consciences. The demise of the WTUL as an effective force came when some feminist leaders became alarmed even with the halting, conservative efforts the organization was making to bring women into the trade unions, and denounced it as "socialistic." In fact, the most famous "working class organizer" the WTUL had, Rose Schneiderman, was virulently anti-communist and helped to deliver tens of thousands of working women into the clutches of big time union bosses like David Dubinsky (ILGWU) and Sidney Hillman (ACWA) in the 1930s. The old feminists were just as reactionary, racist, and devious as their contemporary counterparts. Like feminists today, they had absolutely nothing positive to offer the working class.

Fortunately, the WTUL and other feminist organizations had virtually no influence among women workers. They never succeeded in winning any substantial number of women work-

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From the Editors

Once again, we are appearing behind schedule. This is partly due to the late availability of some of the Soviet Studies articles, and partly to the need for more comrades and friends to assist in the production of the magazine.

In the months ahead, we will attempt to make up some of the lost time. This is a serious question—a publication that does not appear on a regular schedule is a publication that comrades and friends can't plan on selling regularly, and which bookstores and libraries will not stock.

To correct this problem, we need more articles, more editors, proofreaders, and production staff. If you are able to spend a bit of time reading and commenting on proposed articles, proofreading typeset galleys, or pasting up the magazine, please let us know, now! The

magazine is always in need of articles, both on the Party's work and development and on Marxist analysis of world trends, culture and science.

This magazine must be a mass organ for the working class. It is not printed only for students and faculty; it is not meant to sit in car trunks and basements. It is for selling constantly, along with all our other literature. If we don't sell it, we won't write for it, and in the end, we won't even publish it. **If we do write for it and use it, we will have a potent tool for spreading our ideas in the working class.**

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notes and comment

(continued from page 3)

ers to join with them in organizing other women into the big unions. In fact, one of the WTUL's biggest problems was finding working class women who were willing to organize for them. And this in a period of considerable spontaneous class struggle by working women (it wasn't unusual to walk through New York's lower east side in 1910 or 1912 and run into groups of working women spontaneously picketing a sweat shop—without a union but conducting their own strike. These struggles occurred on a day to day basis in this period—most of them unrecorded). The WTUL lacked influence because of its ideology. Working women then—as now—generally recognized that middle and upper class feminists offer them nothing but exploitation under a slightly different guise (today they are demanding women bosses!). This does not, however, mean that we as communists can choose to ignore the reactionary feminist movement. We must attack it sharply as we go about the business of building a revolutionary movement that brings all workers together, men and women, black, latin, asian, native american and white.

A final note has to do with the article's treatment of the Communist Party (CPUSA). The article is correct in suggesting that members of the CPUSA were generally on the left in struggles concerning women workers. The CPUSA blasted the WTUL and other feminist organizations as being misleaders, and called upon women workers to support the working class movement for revolution. Yet it would be a mistake to acknowledge the work of the CPUSA uncritically. In the early thirties a period of tremendous class struggle for working women, the CPUSA published most of its treatment of women's struggles in a separate newspaper for women, *The Working Woman*. This was a concession to feminists in the CPUSA and reflected a misestimation of the influence of feminist organizations—which by that time was virtually negligible. In a sense the CPUSA seemed intent upon establishing its own legitimacy as a "feminist" force—and ended up reinforcing divisions in the working class in the process.

4 This was a reflection of a larger weak-

ness in the CPUSA throughout this period—not having the confidence that workers will oppose bourgeois ideology, whatever its form, and recognize the fundamental unity of working class interests (the CPUSA also supported the racist idea that black people should form "their own nation" in the American south in this period). This mode of thought eventually led to the demise of the international communist movement in the mid 1930's, when the "united front against fascism" line was resolved as the best way to defeat Hitler and the international fascist movement. In PLP we have to soundly reject this "unite with the progressive bourgeoisie" approach to building a revolution. In the struggle against sexism the CPUSA reproduced many elements of day to day sexism under capitalism—separating men and women workers in much the same way that the bosses did.

There is obviously a great deal more to be said about the history of women workers and their struggle against racist, sexist super exploitation. I haven't even touched on the history of black women workers, who

were almost always excluded from the women's movement (although black women workers are living testimony to the real equality of men and women in the world of work!). The point, however, is that we have to be aware of these and other points as we develop our analysis of sexism and the way in which it serves to reproduce capitalism—holding workers back from the task of making a revolution.

Our Party has contributed a great deal in developing a critical understanding of the errors of the old international communist movement. We are moving toward a new appreciation of the historical role that racism and nationalism play in the development of capitalism. We must now turn our critical historical faculties to other issues that we address—to develop a truly revolutionary analysis upon which to base our practice. I don't think there's much danger of PL uniting with the sellout leaders of the feminist movement, but if we want to crush these misleaders and win women workers to revolution, a sound historical analysis is indispensable.

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Editorial

US and Soviet Bosses Head for War

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major imperialist power makes World War III inevitable. There is never a day when the rivalry between U.S. imperialism and Soviet imperialism is not in the forefront of the news. There are few places on the face of the earth not touched by this life and death struggle between the two imperial powers.

However, millions of workers and others around the world still view the Soviet Union through "rose colored glasses." Many people view the Soviets as new capitalists, but better than the imperialists of the U.S. Others view the Soviet Union as a socialist country which is occasionally in error. Still others view the Soviet Union uncritically. This uncritical view maintains the fiction that the Soviet Union today, as it was from the heyday of the Russian Revolution through the defeat of the Nazis in World War II, is the center of world socialism and a beacon for world revolution.

The U.S. rulers help perpetuate the myth that the Soviet Union is still a socialist land. The U.S. bourgeoisie pictures the fight between the U.S. and Soviet systems as a struggle between capitalism and communism. This dodge has at least three values to U.S. bosses. First, it is able to deepen cynicism about socialism, and whip up anti-communism. This is possible because the Soviet Union has nothing in common with socialism and workers around the globe are able to see that there is not much difference between the Soviet bosses and their own bosses. Second, using this cynicism and anti-communism, the rulers of the U.S., and other capitalist countries, are better able to organize their own workers to gird for battle against the "red menace." Finally, the U.S. bosses and their system are able to come off favorably in comparison to their Soviet counterpart by portraying the U.S.

capitalist version as a more highly developed industrialised society. This is demonstrated by the huge consumer-oriented society, if not for all, for many, and what is left of bourgeois democracy makes U.S. capitalism seem more palatable than the open fascism of the Soviet Union.

However, the fortunes of imperialist battles are turning against the U.S. rulers. Since World War II the star of the Soviets has been rising. The steep decline of the U.S. ruling class vis-a-vis their so-called allies in Western Europe and Japan, and their Soviet enemies, is forcing the U.S. bosses to the wall. U.S. capitalists have fallen so far behind that small wars, not-so-small wars, and general war are the only options the U.S. moguls have in trying to restore their lost status of number one imperialist.

Not too many people realize the current strategic strength of the Soviet imperialists. Their tentacles stretch from the broad regions of the Soviet Union itself to the south of Africa, to Central America, to the Indian sub-continent and to the English Channel. What was weakness for Russian leaders in years past is today's strength for the Soviet rulers. For centuries Russia's vast terrain was easily accessible to European and Asian rulers. Russia was large but politically, economically, and militarily weak. For centuries Russia was worked over by various feudal, capitalist, and then imperialist empires, but the Russian Revolution ended this!

After the Russian Revolution the Soviet Union was transformed from a poor, largely agricultural economy to a modern industrial giant. This development spanned the past sixty-five years, a period of socialist development that regressed to capitalism. During this time the Soviet Union, first under socialist and then capitalist leadership, was able to build the world's most powerful military machine. In the past, Russia was easily open to penetration from four continents. Today, the Soviet masters sit astride four continents. The difference today is that the Soviet Union, despite serious internal contradictions, is a powerful imperialist country which can operate all over the globe.

The Soviet Union has borders with many important, strategic countries. It borders Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkey, Finland, Poland and Rumania. The Soviet military can toss a rock and hit Saudi Arabia. The Soviets now threaten Mideast waterways and the precious oil they carry. Soviet imperialist tentacles have edged other imperialists out of parts of North Africa. Now it is the Soviets who have close ties to Algeria and Libya, giving them maneuverability in the Mediterranean Sea. These ties help explain why the Egyptian bosses fear the Soviets.

Traditionally, U.S. imperialists and the French rulers viewed Africa as their exclusive preserve, but today Soviet expansion extends from Northern Africa to the South of Africa, from coast to

coast. The Soviets are in alliance with Ethiopia and Mozambique. Angola has fallen to the Soviets with a big assist from Cuban troops, and throughout the African continent Soviet influence is spreading.

In the past, right through the Russian Revolution, a galaxy of European countries took advantage of Russian weakness for their gain. Germany enabled Lenin to function during World War I and to cross Germany on his return to Russia because the Germans viewed the Russian Revolution in their interests, since it meant the end of Russian action in the war. After the Revolution, many European powers, and the U.S., invaded the fledgling Soviet state to "strangle the baby in its cradle," as Churchill loved to put it. This intervention was crushed by the Red Army. Later, Soviet military supremacy was confirmed when the Red Army smashed the Hitlerites. Hitler, like previous imperialists, invaded the Soviet Union on the assumption that the Soviets were still militarily inferior. Hitler's demise confirmed for once and for all the new, emerging relationship of forces in today's world.

Today, the Soviets are playing a strong hand in Europe. Despite the fact that Soviet control is faltering around its edges as in Poland, it remains true that Soviet tanks are only a few days from the English Channel, and there is no reason to believe the European governments want to, or can, do much about it. In spite of occasional noises from West Europeans about the menace of the Soviet Union, these countries are only seconds away from the severe atomic consequences of Soviet missiles. They realize that in a nuclear war between the U.S. and Soviets Western Europe is likely to be the main atomic battlefield—not too bright a prospect! Unless the Soviets go down the tubes, there is every reason to believe that West Germany and even France will accommodate themselves to Soviet power. This fact is bedeviling U.S. rulers who daily growl about this eventuality.

And then the Soviets sit across from Alaska in the Arctic. From the Chukchi Peninsula the Soviets are about a good sling shot away from the shores of the Americas. Soviet Arctic military strength makes the Chukchi and Bering Seas a new Soviet lake. Most people do not realize that Soviet missiles are only moments away from Seattle and other Northwest cities.


Soviet penetration has reached economically, and even militarily, into the heart of hearts of U.S. imperialism. In Latin America and Central America, the U.S. bosses' "back yard," the Soviets have made important inroads. Cuba and Grenada give the Soviets access to the Caribbean, previously used only for U.S. gambling, prostitution, and fruit interests. The Soviets also operate economically in Argentina. Lately, Central America has become a new center of Soviet activity. It is also interesting to note that in Latin and Central America, German

as well as Soviet economic interests have meshed. This has given a new dimension to the emerging German-Soviet alliance against the U.S. This phenomenon is especially true in El Salvador, where German and Soviet-backed political forces have come together in the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).

These economic, political, and military developments are only some of the inroads the Soviets have made across the globe. Soviet gains, coupled with advances made by the bosses of Western Europe and Japan at the expense of the floundering U.S. giant, have made war and more war the order of the day. As these battles unfold the seemingly secure alliances between the U.S. and its traditional allies in Western Europe and Japan will weaken and crumble. Even the recent alliance with the new Chinese ruling class may weaken and collapse.

Both the Soviets and the U.S. imperialists are

desperate! As Lenin pointed out a long time ago, imperialists fighting for a redivision of world markets make war inevitable. The articles in this issue show the true nature of Soviet society. These articles demonstrate the capitalist nature and the imperialist thrust of today's Soviet system. The Soviets are fighting for the world! Not for a socialist world, but for a capitalist world under their brutal domination.

Workers of the world have nothing to gain from the spread of Soviet imperialism. Workers have everything to lose by living under the yoke of any imperialist. This problem cannot be solved by siding with one or another imperial power. Imperialist oppression can only be ended by socialist revolution. Oppression can only be solved by the elimination of any new or old imperialist state, and by the building of a new society led by  the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The main articles in this issue were produced by a special Study Project on Soviet Capitalism, led by the International Committee of the Progressive Labor Party. They were circulated among members and friends of the Party for comment, and were in some cases substantially revised. We believe that they are a useful contribution to an understanding of the nature of today's capitalist rulers of the Soviet Union and the role they play in the world. These articles, however, do not represent the line of the Progressive Labor Party, at least in part because they do not explain how revisionism was able to triumph in the USSR and reverse the gains made by the working class under socialism. Study and discussion of that question is continuing, and future articles will deal with it. We invite comment, criticism and contributions on these articles from our readers.

The Bosses' New Clothes

The Concept of State Capitalism

For fifty years some elements of the capitalist class and their academic mouthpieces have been blathering about “creeping socialism,” by which they mean the gradual absorption of economic management, material production and political control in the hands of the capitalist state—the government apparatus.

This concentration of economic and political power in the state, which serves as the “executive committee” of the capitalist class, is a product of the change from competitive laissez-faire capitalism to monopoly capitalism. The big corporations—multinationals and conglomerates—under the domination of the biggest banks (finance capital) gradually penetrate and expand the functions of the state, using it to suppress workers’ struggles, indoctrinate the population with pro-boss ideas (racism, patriotism, religion, escapism, nationalism, sexism, etc.). They use it also to fight wars with other bosses for control of foreign sources of raw materials and profitable investment. As an imperialist power declines, these big bosses junk the trappings of “democracy” and move toward fascism—open, naked terror—to prop up their sinking fortunes, stem the falling rate of profit, and force workers to fight other workers in further imperialist wars.

Some bourgeois theorists contemplate the eventual “convergence” of the U.S. and Soviet systems in a “new” form of state-administered economy. These charlatans are “technological determinists”—they say that “modern technology” requires a vast bureaucracy, more control over personal and family life, a “military-industrial complex,” the institutionalized “welfare state”—no matter who holds power, and no matter whether a society calls itself “socialist” or “capitalist.” A superficial look at the growing similarity of life in the U.S. and the Soviet Union would seem to support this view.



These Soviet Red Guards of 1917 had no illusions about various brands of phony socialists. In photo above, they march with arms and, literally, the banner of "Communism."

At the same time, many self-proclaimed socialists identify "socialism" with abolition of private ownership of the means of production. These revisionists (phony leftists) say that the main feature of socialism is state ownership of the means of production. But by that definition, even such capitalist/imperialist countries as Sweden, Mexico, India and Egypt would be "socialist." Nothing could be further from the truth. The only thing converging here is the tendency of capitalists in all countries to move toward state capitalism and fascism as the preferred forms of exploiting the workers—and the tendency of bourgeois apologists and fakes to use any lie to cover up this fact.

There is nothing sacred about state ownership of capital, because the real question is which class owns the state. "If the taking over by the state of the tobacco industry is socialistic," Engels acidly remarked, "then Napoleon and Metternich must be numbered among the founders of socialism."

There should be no mystery about the capitalist nature of a state that is the vehicle for economic management of a capitalist class—capitalist in that it controls exclusively, for the benefit of a small minority of the people, the means of production and the surplus produced. This type of social formation, found today in the Soviet Union, China, Egypt, and in some aspects of all advanced capitalist countries, is properly called state capitalism. We use the term here for an economy managed through the state by a capitalist class, not in the sense Lenin used "state capitalism" (in *The Tax in Kind* and elsewhere) to refer to state enterprises, managed by the genuine representatives of the working class under the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) of the 1920's. We mean by state capitalism what Engels called "the state of the capitalists," their use of the state as an organizing tool to manage their affairs; we mean to refer to a

state that is capitalist, and a **system** that is capitalist. As Engels put it,

The transformation, either into joint-stock companies and trusts, or into state ownership, does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces. In the joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious. And the modern state, again, is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments, as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage workers—proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head.¹

We understand state capitalism to be that bringing to a head of capitalist property relations in which the state, in economic affairs as in protecting the **political** framework of the system, is more and more “the national capitalist.”

Our understanding of the concept of state capitalism is derived from the analysis begun by Marx in *Capital*, Volume Three, and carried further by Engels in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, and by Lenin in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. This article depends on, and should be read along with, the articles on the Causes of Social Change, and the empirical parts of the articles on classes in the Soviet Union and on Soviet imperialism, which accompany it.

This article will briefly outline the main forms of state capitalism that exist today; then, answering the question of why state capitalism is becoming so prevalent, it will study the process of concentration of capital as it was analyzed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The article concludes by repudiating the notion that state capitalism has anything at all to do with socialism and suggests how the revolutionary struggle for socialism must proceed in a world dominated by warring state capitalist nations.

The fully developed form appears today in the Soviet Union, where state agencies of various kinds juridically own and in fact control all the means of production, operating them not for the social benefit of the majority—the direct producers—but in order to accumulate, concentrate and expand capital. The form of these state agen-

cies has changed from time to time, but always to better serve this end. So the ministries of the late Stalin period gave way to Khrushchev's regional units of administration, which Brezhnev then broke up to form new industry combines, vertically integrated enterprises independent of region. There is now competition between combines, as formerly between ministries and regions for resources allocated by the state. But these changes in form, which may seem to reflect power struggles between blocs in the privileged ruling class, and also this competition between the agencies, have all in fact been reforms designed to better concentrate capital, to better expand capital. Soviet state capitalism does not consist in one monster agency managing every department of life, the monolith of Western economists. But its changing forms and its internal competition—like the competing divisions of the largest firm, General Motors, for example—both express the unity of state capitalism, and drive it toward bigger units of capital.

The state agencies in the Soviet Union, and all

This is a new capitalist class, not just a group of richer people.

positions of control in the production process, are exclusively staffed by the members of a new privileged class, a class produced out of the dissolution of socialism in the Soviet Union in the 1950's, a class defined by Party membership and reproduced as a class through the Party. This is a new **capitalist** class, not just a group of richer people, not, as Sweezy would have it, exploiters of a new, non-capitalist type. It exists to maximize profit. It superintends the “self-expanding value” which mastery of the exploitation of wage-work places in the hands of its members. These are **state** capitalists because they use the state as their method of organizing production; but also because the state is legally the owner of the production system. They own as a class, not through individual or corporate forms of ownership, but through what Marx and Engels already foresaw was to be the ultimate form of capitalist property, the state form. In spite of the difference in forms of ownership, the Soviet state capitalists are essentially the same as their counterparts in the imperialist West. They have the identical social function of ex-

¹Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 67 All Engels quotations are from this source.

exploiting the labor power of direct producers through the wage form, and thereby accumulating and expanding capital.

The Soviet form of state capitalism has also created a classical proletariat, a class of expropriated producers (expropriated, here, by their **political** defeat, their loss of control of the state power), divorced from all control or property in the means of production, possessing—apart from some basic needs supplied directly by the state—only their labor power to sell for wages. When hiring and firing, wage levels, the shutting down of plants, are all determined exclusively by the boss, as in the USSR today, it matters little to the worker whether these bosses own the production process as individuals, as corporations or as the state. The Soviet worker is in every way essentially the same as the worker of Western capitalism or the worker of the countries subjected by imperialism. With a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, the USSR is thus a capitalist social formation. Workers, revolutionaries and their allies should never—in our view—mistake the Soviet Union today for a socialist, or a non-capitalist, or a less capitalist society, especially when the third imperialist world war looms. Taking the side of the USSR—instead of striving to turn the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war for socialism, in all countries—would simply be betraying socialism, siding with the most advanced form of capitalism that has yet appeared in the world.

But the USSR, though the most developed example, is not the only case of flourishing state capitalism today. We take China, although the ruling class there may be shifting toward some Western-style corporate forms, to be the same as the Soviet case: a fully developed state capitalism deriving from the breakdown of socialism. Egypt is a striking example of state capitalism in the excolonial countries, many of whom show this form in one degree or another. In Egypt under Nasser, 93% of production was controlled by the state (the figure now is still around 75%)—more than was ever achieved in Poland, for example. Under Nasser more agricultural production was concentrated in state farms than is now the case in Poland, and in fact Poland sent experts to Egypt to learn from Nasser's success in establishing "socialism" in the countryside.

In a less complete fashion, "state interference" **approaches** the state capitalist form in the older capitalist countries as well. In Italy the government owns a substantial share of stock in nearly all large corporations. In Great Britain, the state owns major manufacturing enterprises like British Steel and British Leyland (auto), major transportation and communications firms like British Railways, British Airways, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, and operates the entire health care system of the country. France and

West Germany show similar patterns of state control, in television, for example. But probably Japan presents the clearest case of the trend to state capitalism in the older countries, in the form called by the U.S. business press "Japan, Inc." In Japan it is not state ownership but state control that dominates the capitalist economy. State loans and subsidies, decisions by the trade ministry, government dictation of wage settlements (after the annual Spring disputes between managers and unions, who regularly fail to agree), all guarantee that major decisions are taken by firms under the direct supervision of the state. Some few exceptions, like Honda, only prove this to be the rule.

The United States fits this pattern too. Two interesting cases of the trend toward "state interference" even in the U.S., bastion of the free market, are the recent deregulation of the airlines industry, and the currently planned deregulation of the trucking industry. Deregulation means the exact opposite of what it seems to say. It allows for, and produces, **more** concentration and centralization, notably in the merger of Pan Am and National. The business press was blunt in saying that was **why** the industry was deregulated. In the contemporary U.S., the government was not prepared to say openly, "National, you have to go out of business by merging with Pan Am." But the government stepped back and set up the rules in such a way that the intended merger appeared to be the result of the "free market." In fact, the merger was planned and carried through with government approval, managed by the state.

Deregulation of trucking also means state interference to advance the concentration of the industry's capital. At present the largest firm controls only 2% of the market. Most economists expect deregulation to produce two markets: in one, a lot of small firms will persist, but in the other, five or six firms will control about half the industry, a great increase in concentration. This might be called the "guided markets" approach to state capitalism, and it is being pursued by the main wing of the U.S. ruling class also in the energy industry, where there is a shift guided by the state from nuclear plants to coal. This shift to coal will concentrate energy capital even more in its masters' hands—big oil and the big banks, the real leaders of the U.S. capitalist class.

WHY STATE CAPITALISM?

Why is state capitalism appearing in all these countries—ex-socialist, ex-colonial, and old capitalist countries? The basic reason, we believe, is implicit in a law of capitalist development already explained in principle by Marx and Engels—the tendency to concentrate and centralize capital. The nineteenth-century developments of the system that led them to this conclusion have been continued, and their conclusion confirmed, in the

twentieth century. While this is not an "eternal law" of some "pure" economics, and is intimately linked to the politics of imperialism and to the revisionist destruction of socialism in the USSR and China, the tendency to concentrate and centralize capital—with its enormous advantages, both political and economic, to the bosses—is the fundamental reason for the movement to state capitalism in our day. This shift is needed by advanced capitalism and it is also a political shift demanded by decaying capitalism, which is coming to depend on imperialist war and fascism as its typical mode of survival.

Much as capital moved from individual owners to corporations, it is now moving to bigger and bigger units, the chief of which is the state itself. In the early nineteenth century, the typical firm was small and owned by an individual or family. But with competition between firms, the impact of crises (booms and busts), and, especially, the growing role of credit and banking in expanding the scale of production, these small privately-owned firms steadily gave way to the more "socialized" firm, the stock company or corporation with many owners acting jointly. We can see this process still recently at work in the U.S., in the beer and book industries. Beer is originally brewed by the individual tavern-keeper; the next stage is the regional beer produced by a small local firm; next the regional beers disappear into the large national corporation like Miller Beer; and finally the huge multiproduct, multinational firm, like Philip Morris, absorbs the big national firm. Book publishing in the U.S. has gone through the same process in the last ten years, so that most books are now sold by multinationals like RCA. The cries of woe from beer-drinkers and book-buyers, who complain that the process results in non-beer and non-books, only emphasize the truth that as capitalism advances, it decays: "We're in business to make money, not steel," Roger Blough, a president of U.S. Steel, once intoned.

Observing this process—and its further advances in the later nineteenth century—Engels noted, in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, the main stages in the movement of capital from individual private ownership to more socialized forms—the joint-stock company (corporation), the trust or cartel, the monopoly, and the state itself:

The period of industrial high pressure, with its unbounded inflation of credit, not less than the crash itself, by the collapse of great capitalist establishments, tends to bring about that form of the socialization of great masses of means of production, which we meet with in the different kinds of joint-stock companies . . . At a further stage of evolution this form also becomes insufficient. The producers on a large scale in a particular branch of industry in a particular country unite in a "trust," a union for the

purpose of regulating production. They determine the total amount to be produced, parcel it out among themselves, and thus enforce the selling price fixed beforehand. But trusts of this kind, as soon as business becomes bad, are generally liable to break up, and, on this very account, compel a yet greater concentration of association. The whole of a particular industry is turned into one gigantic joint-stock company; internal competition gives place to the internal monopoly of this one company.²

Why does capital move in this way to bigger and bigger units? First, Marx saw competition as in general the whip and spur applied to capitalists, driving them to swallow each other, the winners growing by cannibalizing the losers. Concentration and centralization of capital make a firm more competitive: 1) they make possible investment in ever larger machinery and factories which can produce at lower cost. The biggest firms can best afford to develop new technologies and then invest in these technologies (witness the current plight of Chrysler, compared to the success of GM). 2) They allow big firms to ride out crises. While a small firm might go bankrupt, a bigger firm can tighten its belt and survive, absorbing the smaller firms in the process. 3) Big firms can take advantage of monopolies in the market to maximize profits. These competitive advantages are obvious, as Engels implies, in business crises.

Second, the role played in the capitalist economy by banking and credit—a role constantly growing into the era of Lenin's "finance capital" where banks dominate every other form of capital—is the chief mechanism, after competition in general, which enforces the law of capital concentration. Credit, especially credit on a large scale, magnifies the effect of competition: precisely because the big firms have a competitive advantage and reap huge profits, banks are attracted to extend them credit; credit, in turn, makes it possible for big firms to grow bigger in gigantic leaps, much faster than if they had to generate all their capital internally from profits.

WHO RULES THE WORLD: MULTINATIONALS OR STATES?

If competition between firms, accelerated by the growth of credit, explains the general tendency of capital to concentrate and centralize, through its various forms of corporation, trust, cartel, monopoly, multinational, we still need to explain why this is taking the primary form today of the state. Engels saw this state form growing naturally out of its predecessor, the monopoly, so that the state as ultimate capitalist was a necessary outcome of the general tendency to concentrate capital:

In the trusts, freedom of competition

²Engels, pp. 65-6

changes into its very opposite—into monopoly; and the production without any definite plan of capitalistic society capitulates to the production upon a definite plan of the invading socialistic society. (Note: We disagree with this implication that more concentrated capitalism is somehow socialistic; see the conclusion to this article.) Certainly this is so far still to the benefit and advantage of the capitalists. But in this case the exploitation is so palpable that it must break down. No nation will put up with production conducted by trusts, with so barefaced an exploitation of the community by a small band of dividend mongers.³

The state regulation of utilities everywhere today, where these are not nationalized outright, bears out Engels' comment here, though their barefaced exploitation of the community is hardly altered! But Engels also saw a need for state capitalism, independent of its birth from monopoly, to guarantee essential industries and services on a national scale (the framework or infrastructure of the profit system) for the bourgeoisie as a whole:

In any case, with trusts or without, the official representative of capitalist society—the state—will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production. This necessity of conversion into state property is first felt in the great institutions for intercourse and communication—the post-office, the telegraphs, the railways.⁴

We think this is still a cogent reason for the move today to state concentration. A British auto industry that can capture only 20% of its home market, a U.S. steel industry out-competed in the U.S. itself, **must** be saved by the national capitalist class and can **only** be saved through some kind of state intervention up to and including nationalization: loans, subsidies, tariff barriers, diplomacy and the like. A capitalist class cannot survive without its own steel industry, still less its own defense industry (hence state support for Lockheed and tank-producing Chrysler in the U.S.); and only the state can guarantee that survival. Capitalists may not be happy about it, especially since it raises the ante of competition with foreign capital (many of these devices are known as “trade war,” with the promise of the shooting kind in the offing). But they are forced into it, rationalize it as they can. Only the state can, in Engels' words, “support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments, as well of the workers as of individual capitalists” (in-

cluding, and in the age of imperialism especially, foreign capitalists).

In the U.S., the best illustration of this was the New Deal era, which coincided with the worldwide crisis of capitalism called the Great Depression. Roosevelt's reforms greatly enhanced the role of the state. Many smaller bosses resisted these changes as “socialism” but the big bankers who backed FDR knew all along that they had to use the state to reorganize U.S. capitalism in their own interests. They also granted substantial concessions to the workers—limiting child labor, extending the right to form unions, unemployment compensation and the eight-hour day, for example—over the resistance of the smaller bosses, for whom such concessions meant higher costs and lower profits. But the big bosses only allowed these reforms in a limited way to stem the rising tide of working-class struggle, led by communists. Unfortunately, the CPUSA was already a party of reformism—refusing to organize workers to rise up, seize power and smash the capitalist class and

**“We're in business
to make money—
not to make
steel.”**


its state. They based their refusal on the arguments that 1) workers weren't ready, and 2) liberal bourgeois “democrats” were preferable to fascism. This reformism paved the way for the CP's sellout of strikes in World War II and the total betrayal of even the pretense of revolutionary call for the dictatorship of the proletariat after the war was over.

The state as “national capitalist” is thus an outgrowth of the needs of the national capitalist class as a whole, a means of preventing or reducing crises, a weapon of internal discipline for the workers and managers alike of a British Steel or a Chrysler, a federal post-office or a state university or a city sanitation service. When the U.S. president drafts the miners to sweat out coal with the stars and stripes waving over the mine, or sends the army in to sort mail in a nation-wide strike, the bourgeoisie uses the **political** power of the state (that is, its armed force) to intervene in “economic” matters that threaten it as a class. We are saying, following Engels, that state capitalism institutionalizes, regularizes, gives an everyday **economic** form to this use of the state by the

³Engels, p. 66

⁴Engels, pp. 66-7

THE STATE



"All in the Family"

ruling class. "The capitalist relation is not done away with"—could any miner or postal worker feel their strike was being broken by a socialist or class-neutral government?—"it is rather brought to a head." As the state adds to its political function a direct economic function, its class character is more exposed as the "personification of the national capital." One corollary of this is to expose the pro-capitalist politics of those social-fascist union leaders and reformers who are always calling for the nationalization of an industry in trouble, a call to deliver its workers more securely into the hands of the bourgeoisie at its most powerful level of organization. Another implication concerns the ex-socialist countries. In the USSR and China the only thin screen the state capitalists can conceal themselves behind is the leftover socialist language they pervert; in China this language is heard less and less today, and in the Soviet Union it is also receding in favor of the aggressive nationalist ideology of an imperialist power, as shown in the article in this issue on Soviet Imperialism.

In other words, the state is an apt form for the most concentrated and centralized capital precisely because it concentrates political and economic power in one center at the disposal of the capitalist manager. The state is not merely national. Only the state has the extra-economic power to enforce its will on individual capitalists,

on workers, and (if it can) on foreign competitors. States control all activities within their borders and wherever their diplomatic and military arms can effectively reach. Only the state—no purely economic body, not the biggest conglomerate or the most inter-locked bank capital—can combine in a central planning and administrative body all industries, all capital, both financial and industrial, the production of things and the production of culture. Banks and corporations can raise capital and concentrate pools of workers, but only states can raise taxes and armies, can directly coerce the persons and property of the working class, for the disposition of the bourgeoisie as a whole. The peculiar virtue of the economic management function of the state (the root meaning of state capitalism) derives from its political, its repressive and coercive function, its very essence as a **state**, that "special apparatus for coercing people," as Lenin succinctly defines it in his pamphlet **The State**.

To understand why **state capitalism**, we need to be clear about, and to distinguish, the concepts **state**, **class**, and **firm**, to see that both state and firm, equally, are mere disposable tools of a social class. The prior term, logically and in historical fact, is **class**: because classes exist, the state exists, firms exist. Marxist-Leninist writing on the state, confirmed by the life experience of every worker, is very clear about this, as can be seen in

Marx's *The Civil War in France*, in Engels' *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, and in Lenin's *State and Revolution*. The state does not float above "society": "the state is a machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another" (Lenin), and never more so than under state capitalism, whose brutal image might best be evoked in the picture of the Nazi state locking workers captive into the factories, to carry on war production under Allied saturation bombing. The state, and the particular form it assumes (between bourgeois democracy and fascism), is always and everywhere in class society the instrument, apparatus, machine—the bludgeon, Lenin calls it—of the ruling class. From this basic communist thesis, demonstrated daily whenever workers cross the boundaries that the bosses set for struggle, it follows that if the state presents certain advantages over the firm as a form of ownership and control of capital, the ruling capitalist class will certainly be ready, willing and able to make use of the state for that purpose.

The bourgeois lives by controlling production, and is master of the state: why **not** use the state to control production? From this point of view, the state in all its inherited, ponderous majesty is just a tool, a means, like the crass money-making corporation, of the class that controls both for the end of accumulating capital. In practice, capitalists now use both the corporate and the state forms of economic ownership and control, switching back and forth between them in some cases, the better to maximize profit or seize the profits of some rival capitalist. But we think that the state form, as Marx, Engels and Lenin predicted, is everywhere becoming primary.

Against this view, it has been argued that it is rather the firm, the giant multinational combine, that is primary in our time in carrying on the process of the concentration of capital, that the multinational rules the capitalist world, dominating national economies, toppling governments at will, exceeding the state itself in scale and power. We think this is nonsense, and rests on confusing **firm**, in its huge multinational form, with **class**, the bourgeoisie itself. Granted, the multinational is an exceedingly impressive concentration of capital! And certainly, the multinational is an important contemporary form of the process of concentration. But, no matter its size, it cannot concentrate production like Nasser's state farms, like the Soviet defense industry, like Japan, Inc. Split between a parent and a host state, the multinational—far from rising above the state—is subject to the bidding of two capitalist classes, each acting through a state. The subsidiary of a multinational firm always risks expropriation by the local bourgeoisie: in World War Two, one third of Hitler's tanks were made by Opel, a wholly owned subsidiary of GM, and the Nazi army rode in jeeps made by German Ford. (Of course, this kind of state bludgeoning of multinationals is only

common in war, and if not in war then it can very well mean war! But that is the point: only the state is the war-making power.)

The depredations of the United Fruit Co. in Central America in the period 1910-1940 show how a powerful monopoly firm can act as if it were a state, or even as a "law unto itself"—a "state within a state," as revisionists call it. But it can only do so insofar as it has the approval and support of its "home" state and the collaboration and connivance of the dominant element of the ruling class in the "host" country. Such instances are, in fact, exceptions which prove the rule.

The state can do things for a capitalist class that no firm can do. A small bourgeoisie might be deterred from using its state power against a multinational; it might recall the ouster of Arbenz in Guatemala for the benefit of United Fruit, the removal of Mossadegh in Iran for the benefit of U.S. oil firms, the toppling of Allende in Chile to the delight of ITT. But those events show the superior might, not of the multinational firm, but of its parent **state**, and they show the willingness of the capitalist class behind the multinational to use its state power, to venture war if needed. When the power of the parent state or the policy of the class indicate otherwise, the biggest multinational is helpless before the smallest state, as the Cuban and Iranian expropriation of U.S. capital demonstrate. ITT paid bribes, it is true; but the overthrow of Allende was primarily an operation of the U.S. capitalist class's state power, not of one of its multinational firms. The power in the host state of any multinational is only as great as the power of its parent state.

The Chilean case proves not the omnipotence of multinational corporations, as the revisionists claim, but their weakness. Until the U.S. ruling class decided to step in **as the state**—on behalf of individual firms, but essentially on behalf of their class as a whole—Kennecott, Anaconda (a Rockefeller company) and especially ITT were relatively helpless to stop Allende's brand of Soviet-inspired and Cuban-supported state capitalism, so long as the Soviet-style model provided a useful vehicle for mobilizing the workers behind the program of Allende's Unidad Popular coalition. Of course, once the U.S. bosses' state put the screws on, the UP betrayed the workers, sold them out and disarmed them, literally and figuratively, in the face of a fascist onslaught. The fatal combination of imperialist state power plus the revisionist garbage that workers can "reform" the capitalist state and "liberate" the capitalist nation resulted in the murder of 50,000 Chilean workers and peasants.

One of the main reasons for the advantages now of the state capitalist form is current intensity of inter-imperialist rivalry. A bourgeoisie organized as a state capitalist class can devote itself more furiously to international competition, not least to its ultimate form of imperialist war, than

its less advanced competitors. State control of production puts production immediately on a war footing, subordinating internal competition and gaining unity and coherence from the state center. The extra-economic power of the state, its bludgeon power, is immediately to hand as an economic instrument (loans, tariffs, state-to-state deals) as well as a political and military instrument. William G. Perry, as head of research and development at the Pentagon, urged application of the War Production Act to U.S. firms like Boeing to speed up military items now, in peacetime. Perry was arguing for state capitalism in the new world circumstances of deadly threats to the U.S. bourgeoisie abroad. Some time ago **Business Week** made the same argument with great insistence in a special issue entitled "The Decline of U.S. Power." The U.S. bourgeoisie they said must get its state power engaged in foreign competition; the firms by themselves are losing out to European, Japanese and Soviet versions of state capitalism, in which the state moves together with the firm financially, diplomatically, militarily. This important article was a signal from the leaders of the U.S. ruling class to its lesser members that state capitalism is the direction it intends to take, and why. The new federal government militarism, and the budget for guns, not butter, are moves in this direction.

THE ONLY WAY FORWARD FOR CAPITALISM: STATE CAPITALISM

When the firm declines as a means to profit and power, the capitalist class will use the state. For the reasons we have mentioned, this is becoming the primary form. The ultimate form of capitalist concentration—state ownership—is the future not only of the ex-socialist countries or the not yet fully industrialized countries, but of the founding capitalist countries themselves. The future of capitalism is state capitalism. In **Imperialism** Lenin traced part of this process, the intimate connection between the export of capital by the finance capitalists (the economics of imperialism) and the role of the state (the politics, ideology and military activity of imperialism).⁵ Samir Amin, looking in our own day at the current imperialist world system as a whole, also echoes Engels' text of a hundred years before; "The only way forward for capitalism . . . is state capitalism."⁶ We think this view is correct.

In the USSR of course, state capitalism was not reached by this route, though it is maintained there for the same reasons as all capital tends to concentrate and centralize. The Bolshevik revolution took possession of the state power and, in

Engels' words, "turned the means of production into state property." But then it was the working class—the direct producers as a whole—who owned the state, so that state property was then also "social property": socialism was born.

We want to stress here again that the key aspect of socialism is not economic organization but political control; not a quantity of production or a certain set of productive forces, but class control—working class control—over the production process. If the state is to own and control the production process, then socialism must mean working class control of the state—the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the USSR, state capitalism emerged because the working class did not advance finally to a communist society. Soviet state capitalism is a result of the reversal of the revolutionary process. While the state itself remained, unchanged, as the owner of the means of production and the disposer of the surplus, there was a counter-revolutionary change in who owned or monopolized control of the state—a new capitalist class born out of the old communist party. The Soviet revolution never reached the state of communism described broadly by Engels:

The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished."

It dies out.⁷

The penalty for not moving ahead to communism (a colossal political tragedy for the working class, repeated in China) was falling back into state capitalism.

MARX ON STATE CAPITALISM

The writings of Engels, Lenin and later observers on state capitalism all rest on Marx's discussion of social property in **Capital**, Volume Three, Chapter 27: "The Role of Credit in Capitalist Production." Marx's analysis of the ownership form he called "social capital" in this chapter is the heart of our understanding of the concept of state capitalism. Speaking of stock companies (corporations), he says:

The capital, which in itself rests on a social mode of production and presup-

⁵E.g., Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), pp. 85-6: "We see plainly here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the divi-

sion of the world." Sections V, VI and VII discuss these links.
⁶Amin, *Unequal Development* (Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 68

⁷Engels, p. 70

poses a social concentration of means of production and labor-power, is here directly endowed with the form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) as distinct from private capital, and its undertakings assume the form of social undertakings as distinct from private undertakings. It is the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself.⁸

Marx here sees the corporation as "social" in the same sense as the industrial work process is "social": stock-owners in the firm combine freely and consciously, "directly associate," to share ownership of capital, to share freely in appropriation as the workers share (though not freely) in production. Property in the means of production is still capitalist property, of course, in the corporation; but in this form private property has already become group property (though only of a small, exploiting group), shared property, joint property—social property. This shift gives the

ists inherited their condition from socialist state property. In other societies the process of drift towards state capitalism occurs blindly and piecemeal, beginning with "the great institutions for intercourse and communication" as Engels noted. The process might include subsidizing a Lockheed here, a Chrysler there, Rolls Royces and airlines; it might include nationalization of this or that industry to form a British Steel, Railways, Airways or Broadcasting Corporation, a West German television or an Italian oil state monopoly; it might include the transitional form of a "Japan, Inc." But the logic of the process, the concept of state capitalism, is laid bare in this paragraph from **Capital**.

State capitalism is merely a shift in the form of ownership of capital, the ultimate shift away from individual private property in capital to the most social form of property in the means of production short of socialism itself. Marx saw this occurring in the forward development of capitalism ("It establishes a monopoly in certain spheres and thereby requires state interference"), not in the backward development of socialism, but again the essence of state capitalism as a system of management, stewardship, control, ownership, is the same, regardless of how it is arrived at historically.

The key aspect of socialism is not economic organization, but political control.

key to state capitalism, or state ownership by directly associated individuals, by a capitalist group. If the entire capitalist class were to enter into such an agreement, to cover the entire mass of the nation's means of production and its surplus, only the state could execute such an agreement, and that class would become in economic terms, as previously in political, a "state class" (Amin); its capital, state capital; its mode of production, state capitalism.

A particular capitalist class might never be collusive enough, unified and disciplined enough, free enough of its inherited prejudices, to work out and join in such an arrangement. The emerging national bourgeoisie in a not yet fully industrialized country might be able to approach this concept of state capitalism consciously and of set purpose (and be ready to do so because of its heavy reliance on the armed force of the state, politically); the Soviet and Chinese state capital-

Marx's discussion goes on to note that "social capital" (he is still speaking of the corporate form of ownership) splits the private capitalist in two: "Transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital, and of the owner of capital into a mere owner, a mere money-capitalist."¹⁰ If we carry forward this idea to a fully developed state capitalism like the Soviet Union, we see that state capitalism retains **only** the salaried employee of the state, its "actually functioning capitalist," abolishing the rentier, the "mere owner," altogether. This allows a spurious defense of the USSR as socialist because there are no private or corporate owners of capital. But we can already see in Marx's study of the nineteenth-century stock company that mere ownership is not at all the essence of a capitalist class, and why it is not. The "functioning" stewards of capital, are true capitalists, even where their coupon-clipping counterparts have vanished into the historical shadows. Capitalism will survive the demise of its stock exchanges; it will survive everything but a socialist revolution carried forward to communist society. In a less-developed kind of state capitalism, nationalization also "abolishes" the mere owners by compensating them, cutting them loose painlessly from that body of capital, perhaps keeping them on as salaried employees of the state enterprise.

⁸Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 436. All Marx quotations are from this source.

⁹Marx, p. 438

¹⁰Marx, p. 436

In the split between manager and owner Marx saw "labor entirely divorced from ownership of the means of production and surplus-labor."¹¹ The managers of developed state capitalism are camouflaged as workers, producers: they all merely draw a salary (however high) for their labor. They are only revealed as the class which appropriates the means of production and surplus-labor via the state when a direct class analysis of the society is made, (as in the article in this issue on classes in the USSR). If you consider merely their function as planners, managers, technocrats or if you see only their relative wealth and privilege as consumers, they do not appear distinctly as an exploiting class separate from the mass of the "associated producers" of Soviet or Chinese society. The paradox, even the humor, of this transformation was foreseen by Engels: "At first the capitalistic mode of production forces out the workers. Now it forces out the capitalists, and reduces them, just as it reduced the workers, to the ranks of the surplus population, although not immediately into those of the industrial reserve army."¹²

If we do not distinguish social property from state property, if we do not make a direct class analysis, the working class of the USSR and of China do appear to have achieved, through the state, what Marx described as a development of capitalism into socialism:

This result of the ultimate development of capitalist production is a necessary transitional phase towards the reconversion of capital into the property of producers, although no longer as the private property of the individual producers, but rather as the property of associated producers, as outright social property.¹³

But here the distinction between social property and state property is crucial. The means of production, and the surplus, of Soviet or Chinese state capitalism constitute "outright social property" only if the working class as a whole controls the state, legal owner of production. Only then would the state be, in Engels' words, "the representative of the whole of society." But this is not true in the Soviet Union or China, where control of the state is monopolized by the party class.

STATE CAPITALISM OR SOCIALISM?

Nor is this true of the Europe, U.S., Japan, Egypt, Nigeria, Vietnam or Brazil of the future, where unless there is a socialist revolution, the class that manipulates the transformation of the system into state capitalism will come into possession of the same class monopoly of the state functions. Capitalism will not develop into socialism, nor will state property become social prop-

erty through any such transitions, but only through violent conquest of the state power by the working class, led by its communist party. State capitalism, like the old stock companies that Marx studied, "instead of overcoming the antithesis between the character of wealth as social and as private wealth... merely develops it in a new form."¹⁴ The only sense in which this leads to socialism is that the new form can expose to revolutionaries and workers the purely political basis of their expropriation. The boss class becomes a state class; the struggle with the bosses over bread, wages, housing, racism, sexism or war becomes immediately and nakedly a struggle with the state, a political struggle transparently requiring revolution to win, to expropriate the expropriators.

Marx and Engels sometimes seem to say that the centralization of capital, the process that began with stock companies and ends with state capitalism, "constitutes the form of transition to a new mode of production"¹⁵ and is therefore a good

State capitalism poses to workers the same challenge capitalism has always posed.

thing. But we should remember this level of abstraction at which **Capital** is written. State capitalism is a "transition" to socialism only logically or conceptually, not in historical, political fact. State capitalism does seem to eliminate the capitalist, to suggest that the production and reproduction of human society should require no separate elite of the rich or learned, that "all functions in the reproduction process are converted... into mere functions of associated producers, into social functions."¹⁶ And in a grandly sweeping passage, Marx characterizes this "ultimate development of capitalist production" as a restaging of the drama of its earliest origins in a new style, a grand negation of itself:

Success and failure both lead here to a centralization of capital, and thus to expropriation on the most enormous scale. Expropriation extends here from the direct producers to the smaller and the medium-

¹¹Marx, p. 437

¹²Engels, p. 67

¹³Marx, p. 437

¹⁴Marx, p. 440

¹⁵Marx, p. 441

¹⁶Marx, p. 437

sized capitalists themselves. It is the point of departure for the capitalist mode of production; its accomplishment is the goal of this production. In the last instance, it aims at the expropriation of the means of production from all individuals.¹⁷

It might seem that Marx is saying here that capitalism aims at socialism, but as revolutionaries we remember that the history of class society is the history of people struggling in the classes that shape them, not the history of logical systems developing by themselves into other systems, or forces of production magically bursting relations of production. When Marx wrote that life "ceases to be" such and such and "can thereafter be only" so and so, we read him as assuming the conscious political theory and practice of a communist working class to bring this about. Marx was a revolutionary. His theoretical work, as well as his considerable activity as a revolutionary communist, was to serve and guide that revolutionary struggle, the struggle of his own adopted class. A Soviet worker cramped into her wretched apartment struggling with unpaid housework, or being shot at in the snows of Afghanistan, might well read that chapter of **Capital** and weep. But the implication for her, battling a fully developed state capitalist class, is the same as for the U.S. workers who fought the giant "trusts" to win trade unions at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, or for all workers everywhere today, whatever the form of capitalism they face in its history of uneven development: **this** is the world you have to win, **these** the chains to strike off, if the international working class is to become in fact what it more and more clearly **should** be—quite simply, the human race. State capitalism poses to workers the same challenge capitalism has always posed, from the first creation of an agricultural proletariat in England; the challenge to conquer state power and liberate ourselves, to end class history and begin human history.

Like imperialism, with which it seems inextricably linked, state capitalism is undoubtedly a "higher" stage of capitalism. But because it expropriates individual and corporate owners, because it centralizes production in the state, because it increases production by leaps and bounds, it does not in any way become socialism, or even move us any closer to socialism. State capitalism is not socialism. From its beginnings capitalism—be it competitive, monopoly or "state monopoly" capitalism—has presented the material prerequisites for socialism, namely, a working class facing a capitalist class. From the time of the development of scientific socialism and the Leninist revolutionary party, the working class has armed itself with the political prerequisites for socialism. But the transition to socialism is a class struggle

capitalism under its own laws of motion. For instance, more advanced capitalism creates larger units of capital, which throw together thousands of workers in one workplace, or unite millions of workers internationally under the same boss (the multinationals), and so make it easier to organize, easier to see the need for socialism. State capitalism, so long as revolutionaries do not confuse it with socialism, exposes the class character of the state, making revolution more obviously the solution for workers. But more advanced capitalism creates greater means of repression—the very reason for the shift to **state** capitalism—making revolution harder. The period of state capitalism we are entering promises to be the bloodiest in the history of capitalism, and while it does open the door to world-wide revolution, it will also give rise to widespread reactionary ideologies of all sorts.

In fact, the political form of state capitalism appears to be fascism: corporatist ideology, nationalism in an extreme form, severe repression—the sum of that expropriation of life, of living labor, that Marx saw as the beginning and end of capitalism, its "swindle" and its "prophecy."¹⁸ Fascism fits the ideological and military needs of state capitalism, a society geared for continual warfare with others like itself, much better than bourgeois democracy. The Trilateral Commission report, **Crisis in Democracy**, written by Samuel Huntington and others, recognizes this to be true and shows the ruling classes know it.¹⁹ Since state capitalism is the logic of the system in our time, we should expect fascism to be its normal or typical form, as indeed it already is, numerically, in the 150 or so nation-states that exist today. Fascism is not the exceptional state of modern capitalism; bourgeois democracy is the exception.

Similarly, peace will be the exception, and war the norm, in a system that intensifies international rivalry at the same time that it develops the power of the state to higher and higher levels of control over all aspects of life. State capitalism is military capitalism. This type of capitalist combine competes with more fury because it has modified its internal competition, because it has gained the advantage of state control of production (already the rule in wartime, before the state capitalist formation began to rise on the scene). Imperialist war for the redivision of economic territory is the next stage of the process of the concentration and centralization of capital—not the peaceful rationality of "ultra-imperialism" that Kautsky dreamed of, but continuous warfare marked by all the barbarism of anarchic capitalism. The immense concentrations of capital armed by fascist states that will rule us until we destroy them by socialist revolution threaten what the headlines are beginning daily to announce, all-out war.



¹⁷Marx, p. 439

¹⁸Marx, p. 441

¹⁹Huntington, et al., *Crisis in Democracy* (New York: NYU Press, 1975)

Class Struggle or Technology


What Causes Social Change?

If we want to create a new form of society—a socialist society—we must have a clear idea of how to go about it. That is to say, we must understand what causes historical change: why does one form of society (such as capitalism) disappear and another form (socialism) appear. People hold many ideas about what causes social change. One common concept is that change is produced in our own minds, that the key to happiness is to think happy thoughts. This view, called idealism, is pushed by religion, by most psychologists, and by other fakes. No matter how hard we think happy thoughts, there is no way that society can be pleasant as long as we have the threat of imperialist war and fascism, or the crushing reality of racism and oppression. Marxists reject idealism in favor of materialism, which is the view that social change is based on material reality, especially the reality that we must work for our living. How people make their living is the key to their lives. There has been much debate among people who call themselves Marxists about exactly what is the Marxist theory of social change. This article will look at that debate, and it will explain how we in PL think social change takes place.

If one reason to study the causes of social change is to learn how to change society, another reason is to evaluate the claim of some societies that they have already made a fundamental change. In particular, we want to look at the claim of the present leadership of the U.S.S.R. that Soviet society has made a basic change from capitalism to socialism. We think that the claim of the Soviet leadership is wrong and that the U.S.S.R. is now capitalist. We will explain why we reject the Soviet view. First, let us look at the theory put forward by the Soviet leaders and many others who call themselves Marxist—the “theory of productive forces.”

THE THEORY OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES

The theory of productive forces has recently been summarized quite well in a book by Gerald Cohen called **Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense**. We will draw some on Cohen's book to explain this theory, and we recommend reading the book if you want a fuller version. The essential idea of the theory of productive forces is that social change is caused by the advance of technology. Thanks to the advance of science, technology is said to be growing all the time. Each form of society is said to allow a certain growth in technology, but there comes a point when the old society is a barrier to the expansion of technology; at this point, pressures build up which lead to a new form of society emerging. The process can be pictured in a diagram, where the expansion of technology runs into barriers and is temporarily constrained until bursting through:



Notice that in this theory, progressive social change is defined as the increase of technology. People who hold this view argue that what fundamentally makes humanity better off is the ability to have more goods produced with less labor. Technology is our aid in this effort to make ourselves better off. The best form of society, according to this theory, is that society which allows technology to advance the most quickly.

Cohen argues two points: 1) the theory of productive forces is the correct description of how social change occurs, and 2) the theory was developed by Karl Marx. Obviously, the first point is more important, but the second point is also interesting. Let us look in more detail at Cohen's argument, including some quotes.

Cohen draws on Marx's terms "mode of production," "Relations of production," and "forces of production." A mode of production is com-

posed of a combination of forces of production and relations of production. The forces of production are the material instruments used by people in order to produce, including the ways in which these instruments are designed and organized. Examples would include: computers, assembly lines, airplanes, etc. The relations of production are the relationships among people in the process of production, such as the relation of boss to worker, or of boss to boss and worker to worker. Other relationships of production have been: slave to master, feudal lord to serf, etc. Modes of production, which combine forces and relations of production, have included: capitalism, feudalism, and slavery. Now on to Cohen's more specific definitions and his use of them, drawn from his book.

Productive forces, in Cohen's view, are facilities for creating or making usable material goods, facilities which are necessary to meet the physical demands of the production process. Raw materials, tools, labor power, scientific knowledge and organizational knowledge all qualify, if employed for appropriate reasons. A foreman's organizational knowledge is a productive force if used to cope with the physical necessities for making steel, but not if it is used to cope with the social necessity of maintaining labor discipline. The level of development of the productive force is the productivity of labor power when those forces are used most efficiently.

History, in Cohen's interpretation, is most basically the story of correspondence and conflict between material productive forces and social relations of production. These production relations are "relations of effective power over persons and productive forces," governing processes of production. A person's class is determined by his or her production relations. For example, control over one's own labor power, combined with the lack of control over means of production or the labor power of others, is the basic determinant of proletarian status. The sum of production relations in a society is its economic structure. Economic structures are classified according to the production relations in which the direct participants in production (eg., slaves, proletarians) stand. The "dominant relation binding immediate producers" such as wage-labor under capitalism, determines the basic type.

After refining and illustrating these definitions, Cohen uses them to present his version of Marx. "The productive forces tend to develop throughout history. Basic changes in the productive forces are largely, though not entirely, independent of influences stemming from the relations of production. Their main source is the desire of rational people to overcome natural scarcity."¹¹ Thus, there is no "zig-zag dialectic between forces and relations, with priority on neither side."

"Forces select structures according to their capacity to promote development." "The nature

of a set of production relations is explained by the level of development of the productive forces embraced by it (to a far greater extent than vice versa)." In a relatively stable society, "production relations have the character they do because, in virtue of that character, they promote the development of the productive forces." In such a society, non-economic institutions are largely part of a superstructure which "has the character it does because in virtue of that character, it confers stability on the production relations." Or, in any case, the most important features of the economic structure and its superstructure are primarily to be explained in these ways.

As the level of the productive forces rises within an initially stable economic structure, a point is reached at which the old production relations "do not suit the development of the forces." Because of this, those relations change. "... (T)he right economic structure comes to be in response to the needs of development of the forces." The superstructure follows suit. More precisely, this process of adaptation to expanding forces is the source of major social change from internal causes, as against such external causes as invasion.

Cohen does not draw out the political consequences of this theory of productive forces. The theory has been used to argue that socialism can only be built in advanced countries, that only in the advanced countries have the productive forces developed enough to allow for a new form of society. In less developed societies, it is said, socialism is not yet possible—so communists should not try to make a socialist revolution in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. According to the theory of productive forces, capitalism must be allowed to develop in the less developed areas before we can think of socialism. Therefore, the slogan of the Communist International under Stalin was "two-stage revolution"—first, a revolution to get rid of the imperialists so that capitalism could develop locally more quickly and thoroughly, then in the future, a socialist revolution. The task of communists is to make sure that the proletariat leads the first stage—the pro-capitalist revolution—so that it can be democratic (Mao's "New Democratic Revolution," for instance). A twin of this theory is the Trotskyite concept of "permanent revolution," which also says that only advanced workers can make socialist revolution and that therefore revolution in the less developed areas can succeed only if there is a revolution in the advanced countries. Trotsky's line was rather like that of Rosa Luxemburg, who did not think workers in less developed areas could make a revolution:

It is precisely the workers of the advanced capitalist countries who have the historic mission to carry out the socialist transformation. Only from Europe, only from the oldest capitalist countries, can the signal come, when the hour is ripe, for the social revolution that will free humanity.

Only the English, French, Belgian, German, Russian, and Italian workers, together, can lead the army of the exploited and enslaved of the five continents. They alone, when the time comes, can call capitalism to account for the centuries of crimes committed against all the primitive peoples." From the **Junius Pamphlet**, more precisely known as **The Crisis in German Social Democracy**.

Just as the theory of productive forces says that socialism can not be achieved in less developed countries, so it says that the difficulties in building socialism are a result of the low level of industry and technology. According to this view, the reversals in Russia and in China are the product of the backwardness of those countries before the revolution. The political line of the communist parties is seen as irrelevant: the reversals were inevitable. In an advanced country, such as the U.S., socialism could be easily achieved, according to this view. Since socialism is the product of the development of the productive forces, we should expect that successful socialist revolutions will occur primarily in the advanced countries, not in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Furthermore, these revolutions will be pretty much automatic: the decay of capitalism (its inability to develop the productive forces further) will lead to social contradictions and will bring about socialism. So the theory of productive forces downplays the importance of conscious revolutionaries organized into a communist party.

THEORY OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES: REACTIONARY TO THE CORE

The theory of productive forces is totally reactionary. It well deserves the label "revisionist" because it revises Marxism by gutting Marxism of its revolutionary essence. Nowhere does this theory speak about **class struggle** and about the crucial role of **force** in history; certainly, there is nothing about the need for **revolution** led by class conscious revolutionaries. The key forces in social change are precisely those elements left out of the theory of productive forces; namely, class struggle, force, and revolution. We can not understand history unless we begin from the basic premise set out in the **Communist Manifesto** by Marx and Engels, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." The most basic aspect of our society is that it is divided into classes: a working class and a capitalist class. These classes have fundamentally opposed interests. The capitalists, who rule now, are always pushing for more and more profit—which means that they always seek new ways to exploit workers more (by paying us lower wages, by making us work harder and faster, by cutting out social



The Paris Commune of 1871 marked the first seizure of state power by an armed working class. Although the Communards were defeated, their example is part of the heritage of our class and our movement.

services, and so on). These capitalists must use force, organized through the state, to keep workers from rebelling and demanding that we get a share of the fabulous wealth which we create and which the capitalists steal. **Nothing** about capitalist society can be understood unless we begin from this fundamental point: the existence of classes and the struggle among classes. Cohen and his ilk do not understand this, and relegate classes to the background (if they mention classes at all).

Just as class struggle is key to understanding society, so revolution is the essential ingredient for any fundamental social change. Capitalism could triumph fully only after the victory of the bourgeois revolutions, such as the U.S. Revolution (1776-81), the French Revolution, and so on. The bourgeoisie had to seize state power in order to consolidate their rule. The transition to socialism depends even more on the victory of the revolution, for unlike the capitalists, we can not begin building our society (socialism) until **after** the revolution (Capitalism could emerge to a greater or lesser extent in the economic realm before the capitalist revolution; socialism can't). The theory of productive forces ignores the role of force in bringing about social change. As Marx said in

Capital, the history of the origins of capitalism "is written in the annals of mankind in blood and fire."

Revolutions do not occur spontaneously as the automatic product of the advance of technology. Conscious revolutionary forces are necessary. In the U.S. revolution of 1776-81, there were conscious bourgeois revolutionaries, such as Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson, who fought the old feudal principle of divine right of kings with the bourgeois concept "all men are created equal" (except slaves). We can not expect socialist revolution to spring up out of nowhere. The decay of capitalism—the intensifying of all its ills, such as racism and imperialist war—does not necessarily lead workers to communism. True, people become more politicized and more open to new ideas. But our analysis is not the only one around: the bourgeoisie will redouble their efforts to give people false explanations for the problems they face. If we communists do not actively organize and spread our views, then fascist, racist, and nationalist ideas may win out temporarily. The productive forces theory overlooks the essential role of ideology and of a party which can spread communist ideas and organize workers. This theory therefore disarms workers: it tells them to

sit back and wait for the eventual decay of capitalism rather than to organize to fight. The theory of productive forces is therefore an aid to the bosses in their struggle to keep us passive. Revisionist so-called Marxists are aiding the bosses, no matter what their intention. We must expose revisionism as the form which bourgeois ideas take within the workers' movement; we must fight the revisionists with as much vigor as we fight other parts of the bourgeoisie.

Cohen wrongly implies that communists' goal is to increase the amount of material goods people have. The good society that technology is supposed to bring us is a society where we all wallow in material possessions while doing nothing but contemplating our belly-buttons. This is a thoroughly bourgeois concept of the good life. The TV and other bosses' mouthpieces tell us every day that the solution to our problems lies in more possessions. Feel depressed? Buy a new TV. Love life unsatisfactory? Buy a new toothpaste or mouthwash. This sick attitude reflects the character of bourgeois society: possessions are prized above all else, and everything is oriented around the individual.

Communists recognize two essential facts about humanity that the bourgeoisie hides: 1) we are social creatures. We do not live alone. Happiness comes from good social relations, including a loving family and strong friendships, as much as from possessions; 2) we are creatures who are active and creative. We do not get pleasure from being sloths all the time; we want to do productive and creative things. From these two points, we can conclude that socialism is not the fulfillment of the possessive individualist's dream—socialism will allow us to have creative and enjoyable relations with others in the process of producing the goods we need to sustain life. Under capitalism, we hate our jobs not only because the pay is lousy (which it certainly is!) but also because we have to do the bidding of some tyrant, the boss and his lackeys. Under socialism, we as a collective will make the decisions that influence our lives—we won't be under the thumb of some rich asshole. That's what we mean, we say that socialism will eliminate exploitation. The end of exploitation will create a whole new healthy basis for human culture based on co-operation and on creativity, rather than cut-throat individual competition and single-minded pursuit of the dollar.

IS THE USSR SOCIALIST?

The present Soviet leadership claims that their society is socialist because it has allowed for a much greater expansion of the productive forces than have the societies of Western Europe and the U.S. In other words, the Soviets claim that the essential feature of a socialist society is that it grows faster and has a higher productivity than does capitalist society. These are silly criteria by

which to judge the claim of a society to be socialist. The key questions are: has exploitation been eliminated? Does the working class control the state, and through the state, society? These issues are addressed in the article in this magazine about classes in the USSR (p.). Claims about growth rates and about the standard of living simply are not relevant here. When China was socialist (until the early 1970's), China had a more advanced social system than the U.S. The material standard of living in the U.S. was much higher of course, but in the U.S., there was brutal exploitation and all that goes with it—racism, sexism, nationalism, decadent culture, dog-eat-dog competition, etc. In China, where workers were in control, life was fundamentally better than in the U.S.

The theory of productive forces presents an all-round false picture: a false image of what causes social change, a false picture of what is socialism, and a false concept of the role of technology and science in society. To understand this last point, we need to look more closely at the real meaning of the concepts "relations of production" and "forces of production." Through these concepts, Marx presented his theory of how society works—including his theory of the role of natural science. Marx emphasized that the forces and relations of production are closely linked. The forces of production reflect the relations of production, and the forces also reinforce the relations. For instance, take a capitalist force of production: the assembly line factory. The technology of the assembly line is designed to force workers to work at a pace controlled by the boss (through the machine), for the boss knows that the workers would never work fast were they not compelled to. It is the nature of capitalist relations of production that the direct producers, the workers, have no interest in seeing that the job gets done, so the boss must design the technology to force workers to do the job. In turn, the assembly line reinforces the capitalist relations in that the worker is completely divorced from any control over the process of production. The worker does not even learn a skill which she/he could use to set up shop on her/his own—so that the worker remains tied to the factory, unable to exist except through wage labor.

Similarly, the relations of production influence and are influenced by the forces of production. For instance, take slavery in the U.S. South. The slave owners found that they could not introduce the more efficient plows used in the North because these plows were too easy for the slaves to break. In other words, the slaves did all they could to sabotage production, and this influenced the technology that could be used.

The forces and relations of production embody the basic contradictions of any given mode of production. For instance, take the contradictions of capitalism, which are primarily: 1) the conflict between workers and capitalists, and 2) the conflict




At the barricades in Berlin, 1848

among capitalists (which leads to what Marx called 'the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall'). These contradictions force capitalists to continually develop new technologies—first, to get ahead of the competing capitalists and second to eliminate the power of skilled workers who, because they can not be replaced easily by scabs during a strike, demand higher wages. The capitalists are then forced to continually 'revolutionize' the forces of production. Feudalism, on the other hand, saw much less change in the forces of production.

The development of the forces of production, then, does **not** depend on the ideas of great scientists. The bourgeoisie teaches us the nonsense that the industrial revolution occurred because some bright men came up with some nifty inventions. Actually, the development of new forces of production is a reflection of the contradictions with a mode of production. Sometimes, these contradictions are so acute that a new mode of production emerges with a new kind of forces of production. Science has developed greatly under capitalism because capitalism requires the continual development of new forces of production. Under feudalism, on the other hand, there was little support for science—indeed, in many important areas, science went backward under feudalism, compared to Greek and Roman times. In the classical world of Greece and Rome, the contradictions of the slave societies prevented many of the scientific discoveries from being applied in production. We can say that science, by itself, determines little about production.

Besides being an inaccurate description of how reality works, the theory of productive forces also is an incorrect account of Marx's theory of social change. We are much more interested in how the world works than we are in what Marx said, unlike academics like Cohen whose main joy in life seems to be proving who believed what when. But Marx



Armed slave rebellion in Virginia, 1855

was a great thinker and the founder of scientific socialism, so we should not let Cohen's slanders go unchallenged. There is a grain of truth in Cohen's book. Marx was not perfect, and he did occasionally err on the side of technological determinism. This is not surprising, for Marx was mostly concerned with combatting the idealist theories which were common in his day. We can learn from the history of the communist movement, however, that technological determinism can be as great an enemy as idealism. For instance, in China, after the revolution, the right-wing argued that there was no longer any role for class struggle—the task was to expand production. This 'productive forces' theory was a convenient cover for the activities of the new bourgeoisie, for it justified privileges for the technicians and managers on the excuse that they were helping production more than the unskilled workers were (a false claim). From the Red Guards, the left which emerged during the Cultural Revolution, we can learn much about the criticism of the "theory of productive forces." The Red Guards pointed out that Marx was no technological determinist, and that the bulk of Marx's analysis contradicts the quotes that people like Cohen pick out of context.

Marx wrote a great deal, but he considered his main theoretical work to be Volume I of **Capital**. There, he spends many pages on how capitalism replaced feudalism. So we can look at this section of **Capital** to see what Marx stressed as the main factors in the change from one basic type of society (feudalism) to another (capitalism). The pages of **Capital** are not filled with accounts of technological change but with the forceful dispossession of the feudal serfs. Serfs had certain rights, such as the right to work the land in return for giving up part of the produce to the lord, which the emerging capitalists wanted to do away with. As feudal society in England decayed, the old nobility is "devoured by the great feudal wars." It is replaced by a new nobility, of mercantile supporters of the competing dynasties. With the new

nobility taking the lead, large landowners respond to Continental demand for wool by expropriating their tenants, converting peasant holdings to sheep pastures. This change does not occur because it makes farming more efficient. Quite traditional methods of sheep-herding have simply become more lucrative for landowners. The influx of gold from the New World causes long-term inflation, increasing agricultural prices and decreasing the real rents of relatively well-off peasants with long-term leases and the power to defend them in court. The latter become aggressive capitalist farmers. In manufacturing, "the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins (hardly: "the development of improved forces of production") signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production." Rich merchants who benefitted from this pillage use their new financial resources to set up manufacturing enterprises, often employing desperate refugees from the rise of capitalism in the countryside. Large financial resources are needed, at this juncture, for quite non-technological reasons: the risk of setting up enterprises of a new kind, serving new markets, together with the need to employ many wage-laborers in order to retain an attractive total surplus after each has been paid at least a subsistence wage.

So Marx's analysis of the rise of capitalism does not rest on the role of technology. He does not tell us that new tools of production made possible a new system, capitalism. But what about his analysis of capitalism itself. Here, too, we find that Marx emphasizes how the key change is the new relations of production (boss-worker) and not the "industrial revolution." Bourgeois propaganda tells us that the "industrial revolution" created modern society. Actually, as Marx shows, modern industry was only possible because of the new capitalist production relations. Only when workers were brought together into one place did it become possible to reorganize the labor process so that machines could be used to advantage. This opened up more and more possibilities for using machines, and there was an enormous increase in the number of machines used. When Marx describes the changes in production that began the process, he is almost entirely concerned with the spread of the new capitalist work relations—a change which is not based, in turn, on the technological innovations which are fundamental for Cohen. Production by craftsmen in small, independent, specialized workshops is replaced by "manufacture," production by many interdependent craftsmen of many specialties assembled in one place. Farming of diverse crops on small, family plots is replaced by one-crop farming on large plots. Technological change is scarcely men-

tioned. Indeed, Marx's general descriptions of the role of technological change, as against changing work relations, in the rise of capitalism are explicitly anti-technological. He says in *Capital*,

With regard to the mode of production itself, manufacture, in its strict meaning is hardly to be distinguished, in its earliest stages, from the handicraft trades of the guilds, otherwise than by the greater number of workers simultaneously employed by one and the same individual capital. The workshop of the medieval master craftsman is simply enlarged. (I, p. 305)


In the *Manifesto*, Marx's summary of the change from feudal ways of producing things to capitalist ones is a description of how commercial activity produced changes in work relations:

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by the closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labor between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labor in each single workshop. (pp. 110f)

III. The material Prerequisites for Socialism

Some revisionists have mis-characterized our position as: "socialism is possible anywhere, anytime—even in the days of the Pharaohs of Egypt—if only people have the right ideas." That position would be gross idealism, and we reject it utterly. There are material prerequisites for socialism, and without these prerequisites, socialism can not be built. For instance, it would have been impossible for the peasant rebellions of feudal Europe in the 7th or 8th century to reach socialism. Serfs hated the evil lords, but they had no conception of how to organize society on a classless basis—therefore the rebellions, even where successful, led to the return of an exploitative ruling class. With the rise of capitalist social relations—with the rise of a working class, in particular—the material prerequisites of socialism were established. The working class developed its ideology, the science of Marxism-Leninism, which shows how to reach a classless society. Once this class arose and once its ideology developed, there were no further material prerequisites for socialism.

It is idle speculation to ask if socialism could have arisen on the basis of some society other than capitalism. The historical fact is that capitalism has now triumphed on a world scale, and that therefore the transition to socialism will be from capitalism. There has been much debate on this question from the time of Marx's comments on going from the pre-capitalist Russian village semi-communist (primitive communist) society direct to socialism. The debates may be useful for



The material prerequisites for revolution in Russia, 1917—class-conscious workers and soldiers armed not only with guns, but with communist ideas.

shedding light on the methods of historical materialist analysis, but they are no longer of any political practicality in the immediate sense.

The struggle for socialism—both the struggle for socialist revolution and the struggle after the revolution—will take different forms in different societies, depending on how advanced industry is in those societies. For instance, in a materially backward society, a key question after the revolution will be to guarantee everyone enough to eat and to raise the amount of material goods people get (the “standard of living” will rise under socialism due to the end of class exploitation—the question being asked here is what will happen to the material goods people receive). In an industrially advanced society, after the revolution, there will be a big problem in ending the ridiculous forms of consumption and production characteristic of capitalism; these run the gamut from unsafe factories to unhealthy food habits.

There does not seem to be any basis for saying that the struggle for socialism will be easier or harder in more materially backward societies (the 3rd International was wrong to say it would be harder; Mao was wrong to say it would be easier). History shows that sometimes it is easier to build on a fresh foundation than to have to overcome decades of capitalist ideology or to rebuild an industrial infrastructure based on capitalist requirements. Certainly, history shows that socialist revolution can be made in industrially backward countries. While on the one hand the development of capitalist industry creates a more concentrated proletariat (easier to organize, more immediately aware of its potential as a class), on the other hand the rise of capitalist industry in a non-industrial society forces workers into such horrible condi-

tions that they are open to revolutionary ideas.

The material prerequisites for socialism exist everywhere in the world today. Capitalist relations of production dominate the entire world. Even though in some less materially-developed areas there are some remnants of pre-capitalist forms of production, the essential character of production everywhere is capitalist, even though sometimes the capitalist essence is hidden under a pre-capitalist form. Since the possibility of transition to socialism exists everywhere, capitalism is no longer a progressive force anywhere in the world. Therefore, alliance with capitalists is not progressive anywhere there is no material basis for revolutionary communists to support any form of a “bourgeois revolution.” The theory of two stage revolution (and its twin, the Trotskyite theory of permanent revolution) is bankrupt. Socialist revolution can be made by agricultural workers as well as industrial workers, by workers in less modern industry as well as workers with ultra-modern equipment. The idea that workers in the less materially developed areas can’t make a socialist revolution is elitist and racist, for this theory says that only we intelligent communists and only we workers in the advanced countries are smart enough to make a socialist revolution. The Chinese revolution, which brought socialism to one of the most materially backward societies on earth, shows up the racist character of the theory of productive forces. We reject any theory of a need to ally with the bourgeoisie. We don’t want a ‘reformed’ capitalism, a ‘more productive’ capitalism—we want the dictatorship of the proletariat.

A Brief Look at Soviet History

(Note: This section is meant to provide a brief summary of the Bolshevik Revolution for those who know little about the subject. It summarizes the existing Party position; it does not present any new analysis. As we say in several places, this Bulletin on Soviet capitalism today does NOT analyze how and why socialism was reversed in the USSR)

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was an historic victory for the world's working class. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party (the communist party in Russia), the working class seized state power. The workers used their control over the state to transform society for the benefit of the workers. The handful of rich capitalists who had owned the factories and the land had their wealth confiscated. The educational and cultural systems were made accessible to the workers and put forward pro-worker ideas, like co-operation and struggling for a better life (instead of the capitalist ideas of dog-eat-dog competition and of passivity). The construction of the world's first socialist society was a great inspiration to workers around the world. It was the basis for the formation of the Communist (Third) International which united communist parties in all lands.

The socialist Soviet Union was a bright beacon to the workers of the world. It showed that ordinary workers could run society, that bosses are unnecessary parasites. While millions in the capitalist countries went hungry during the great depression of the 1930's, the Soviet Union industrialized—demonstrating the superiority of socialist planning over capitalist economic anarchy. While the bosses turned the KKK loose in the USA and supported Hitler's racist gangs, the working class in the USSR made great strides to-

wards eliminating racism: anti-Semitic attacks stopped, minority languages were taught in schools, and the incomes of the oppressed peoples of Central Asia soared. Education and culture flourished in a way never before seen. Books and movies glorified workers instead of portraying them as louts; the bourgeoisie were shown as the leeches they are. The shining example of the Soviet Union inspired tens of millions on every continent.

The reversal of socialism was a bitter defeat for the world's workers. The triumph of a new capitalist class under Khrushchev's leadership led to a world-wide wave of cynicism which still affects the working class. The great goal of socialism was tarnished. Millions who know that capitalism stinks are now skeptical about the possibility of building a better society because of the triumph of the new capitalists in the USSR. Revisionism (capitalist ideas masquerading as communism) is therefore our bitter enemy. The Soviet revisionists have given new life to capitalism by embittering the working class. We hate the revisionists for the dirty work they have done and dedicate ourselves to their early overthrow.

Below, we briefly summarize our Party's view of the great achievements of the Bolshevik Revolution. For more detail, see our 1971 essay, **Road to Revolution III**.

Making the Revolution

Under the leadership of Lenin, the Bolsheviks in Russia were able to build a revolutionary movement that took state power in November 1917 from the Provisional Government that had replaced the Czar when he was overthrown in Febru-



"Down with the capitalist ministers! All power to the Soviets!" reads the banner in this mass demonstration of St. Petersburg workers against the Kerensky government on the very eve of the October Revolution.

ary 1917. We can learn much from the experience of the Bolsheviks. Their success was based on winning the working class to communist ideas. They understood the central importance of the industrial working class, which has the might to transform society—without workers' labor, nothing is produced. The Bolsheviks were actively involved in reform struggles among the workers **with the goal of winning the workers to support socialist revolution.** The Bolsheviks carefully explained how the particular problems faced by the workers in each plant were symptomatic of the evils of capitalism and how reforms—which leave the system unchanged—are at best a temporary and partial solution. By placing the reform struggle within the context of the greater goal of socialist revolution, the Bolsheviks were able to win masses of workers to join in the revolutionary movement in 1917.

From the experience of the class struggle, the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership drew many important lessons. Lenin emphasized that revolutionary theory must guide practice, and that this

theory must advance and develop. The experience of the socialist movement (the Social Democratic Parties, organized in the Second International) convinced Lenin of the need for a party of a new type, based on the principle of democratic centralism. The discipline and unity of the Bolsheviks were key to the victory of the revolution. Another advance made by Lenin was his analysis of imperialism. When World War I broke out, most of the socialist parties abandoned revolution and moved rapidly to the right, supporting patriotism. Lenin and the Bolsheviks moved to the left. They called for no support to either side and for turning the guns around on the real enemy—the capitalists of all lands.⁵

We in PLP have carried on the Bolshevik tradition. We apply the lessons of the Bolshevik experience, such as revolution in place of reform and no support for any imperialist. We also continue, as best we can, to advance revolutionary theory to the left, unlike the revisionists who in every generation abandon the revolutionary essence of Marxism. For instance, based on the experience

since Lenin's day, we have analyzed the reactionary role of nationalism. The Bolsheviks are a great source of inspiration for us and for the entire international communist movement.

On the Road to Socialism

After the 1917 Revolution, the working class under the leadership of the Bolsheviks won many great gains. These victories rested on applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism, especially on winning the masses to support communism. For instance, the victory of the Reds (the Bolsheviks) over the Whites (the counter-revolutionaries and the armies of the 7 capitalist countries including the U.S. that invaded Russia) in the war from 1917 to 1921 rested on the support for the Bolsheviks from the workers, industrial and agricultural. The power of the old capitalists was destroyed and their wealth, especially their wealth in land, was confiscated. During the reconstruction period from 1921 until the late 1920's, the Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Stalin (after Lenin's death in 1923) rallied the workers to defeat the handful of Trotskyists and other oppositionists, who opposed the construction of socialism in the USSR (The Trotskyists often used left-sounding phrases to cover up the basic fact that they opposed the advance towards socialism on the grounds that Russia was "too backward.")

While the capitalist world was in the grip of the Great Depression of the 1930's and workers in every capitalist country were on the brink of starvation, the Soviet Union industrialized. Thousands of new factories were built during the Five Year Plans, beginning in 1928, producing more and more goods for the working class. The workers took control over production, organizing the labor process along more rational lines (in what was called the Stakhanovite movement). The new industrial might helped the Soviet working class in the historic fight against fascism. The Hitlerites invaded the USSR in 1941 expecting quick victory; instead they faced the bitter resistance of the armed working class that stopped the massive German war machine and defeated the Nazis in 1945.

Concessions to Capitalism: The Background to Defeat of Socialism

In spite of the many great victories of the Bolshevik Revolution, eventually the working class lost state power and the new capitalist society, described in this Bulletin, emerged. A major reason for this bitter defeat was that the Bolsheviks were not sufficiently thorough-going in applying their own principles. The Bolsheviks owed their success to winning the masses of workers to communist ideas—and the defeat came in good part from the lack of struggle to win workers to communism. The Bolsheviks were tempted to try the "short-cut" of allying with one section of the bosses rather than building a base among the

workers. This weakness showed up in the "New Economic Policy" period (1921-6), when the old capitalists and Czarist military officers were given back some of their privileges. Fortunately the left under Stalin defeated the right-wingers such as Trotsky who proposed extending this system.

Many Bolsheviks were infected with the theory that the advance to socialism depended primarily on increasing production instead of on the class struggle. This theory of "productive forces" was used to justify top-down management (in which the workers in a factory had little say in running the plant), material incentives for the technical experts, and other capitalist practices. Under this theory, the Party did not devote sufficient attention to winning over millions of workers. In the countryside, the agricultural workers became infected with pro-capitalist ideas. The result was that the Party had to launch a bitter struggle to stop the rural capitalists (called 'kulaks') from taking over the countryside in the late 1920's; the collectivization of agriculture was a bloody struggle. Also the Party was open to sabotage by the new capitalist elements, who were not satisfied with their material privileges—they wanted state power as well. The Party launched a series of big purges in the late 1930's against these pro-capitalists. Some innocent people were killed. More importantly, the murderous capitalist ideas were not rooted out because the campaign focussed on a few individuals rather than on revisionism as a system of ideas.

The Bolsheviks also made concessions to nationalism, especially during World War II. They allowed Russian nationalism and they allied first with one imperialist (the Germans) and then with another (the U.S. and British). They encouraged communists around the world to join with so-called 'lesser evil' bosses. All of these concessions to bourgeois ideas laid the basis for the defeat of socialism. After Stalin's death in 1953, the new capitalist elements consolidated their control under Khrushchev and made the USSR into the capitalist power it is today.

The defeat of socialism in the USSR promoted cynicism about the possibility of socialism anywhere. The correct lesson to learn from the reversal of socialism in the USSR (and in China) is the need for greater militance. We must win the masses of workers to socialism, with no alliances with 'lesser evil' bosses.

Forward to the Victory of Socialism in the USSR

We are sure that the evils of capitalism—the economic exploitation, the blatant racism, the imperialist wars—will lead the Soviet working class to revolt. The task of the international communist movement is to help build a new communist party in the USSR which will lead the working class to overthrow the current Soviet bosses and once again put the USSR on the road to socialism.



Old Bolsheviks

How strange!
a black hole where the volcano
of events in history should glow
but they, in staging of the play,
would have us make believe
there were no old Bolsheviks.

Except Lenin.
Between Lenin and Leonid
nothing.
Only a chattering wind
and a chilly steppe
under a winter crust.

No cocktail
to greet the enemy,
no steel to nail in the grave
the White Guards outside,
high on their cossack horses,
storming the red city;
no steel to cool
with the calmness of intent
the gray tribunes of fear
hiding in the soul.

No red star,
no rose of spring or summer,
Maxim and Maiakovskii gone,
no longer the peasant blouse,
the cap, the boot,
the worker's roughened shoes.
Now
only business suits
and studded uniforms,
the skin embracing masks
of comedy and death,
own the Kremlin walls,
the ivory marbled mausoleum,
high on the wall,
where every day,
with the black hole
of forgotten time,
they murder Lenin.

Who in life,
musing, head in hand,
on the hungry, ignorant peasant,
the hard and backward worker;
musing on the bristling, fevered
world of living wounds,
where dialectics
is more complex than
any theory,
knew
that if the peasant in the field,
the stoker at the open hearth,
the smith at work before
the fire
are, in name and fact, to be
the iron sovereign of the state,
each the master of the self,
and comrades in a stateless,
rose and apple-blossomed city
a thousand chains
of backyard time
need cleaving from the
heart and soul.
A slight man, in plain suit,
with unassuming air.

Now only ministers
of foreign trade,
of international affairs,
at home,
the managers of industry
and Lenin nothing but
a sacred oracle
and sloganeer.




Gone the blood
raging through the bone,
the dream bursting with buds
and littering the mind
with blossoms
of time to be achieved.
Gone the rags of revolution,
the old outrageous lover
inspired by visions
and steeled by anger.
Now Leonid instead of Lenin,
the blood cool,
the sleep blank.
Now history collapsed,
a caved-in mass,
a grave so dense
that all illumination
is trapped inside the
baffled heart:
because they would
have us all believe
there were no old Bolsheviks.

But stave
and steel knife,
strong back and steady mind,
unnamed seeds, the red rose
and thorn-spiked stem,
under the winter crust,
prepare the season,
prepare to pierce the cold,
hard surface of the
winter ground
and through its shattered dikes
to flood the world with streams
of light,
and finally prepare
with calloused hands
to cast into the flood-
although with tender fingers set
to sculpt another day
another world-
the deadly, comic-opera stars
who,
in their strange black-hole
mystery play,
would have us believe
there are no old Bolsheviks.

With Tanks and Rubles

Soviet Imperialism



Soviet military power has been more aggressively displayed in recent years—the airlift of 36,000 Cuban troops into Angola in 1975 and 12,000 Cuban troops into Ethiopia in 1981, support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1979, and invasion of Afghanistan with 80,000 plus troops in late 1979. Soviet imperialism has led to the deaths of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of workers in each of these countries. Tens of thousands starved to death in Kampuchea while the Soviet-backed Semrin government deliberately slowed the pace of food distribution to guarantee that only their supporters got adequate rations. The Soviet bosses are furiously preparing for a war which will inevitably lead to an incredible slaughter: World War III, in which hundreds of millions will die to further their aim of greater profits. But the worst crime of all is the fact that the Soviet imperialists have done all these things in the name of socialism, in the name of the world's workers and their thirst for a revolutionary change in society. The betrayal of socialism, the restoration of capitalism, the conversion of a workers' government into a hideous fascist state, and the transformation of the Soviet Union from a shining example of what workers can do, a beacon for people all over the world, to an aggressive, blood-thirsty profit-greedy empire—these things help the capitalists by giving socialism a bad name, fostering cynicism among workers and helping the bosses build anti-communism and nationalism.

Soviet military interventions are not a mistake or a temporary policy which the Soviet leaders have blundered upon. Soviet aggression is an inevitable consequence of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Just like any other imperialist power, the Soviet Union needs raw materials, markets, and investment outlets, and it must

secure these by force. We will show that the Soviet bosses are **forced** to be imperialist in order to keep up with their capitalist competitors, mainly the U.S. bosses.

The Soviet economy is increasingly dependent upon foreign trade. The USSR has gone from a major exporter of grains such as wheat and corn (average exports of 5.5 million metric tons 1956-60) to a major importer (7.5 million metric tons average in 1971-5)² The Soviets imported in 1975 35% of their sugar, 21% of their wool, 24% of their tin, and 49% of their bauxite (the raw material for aluminum).³ The big story of the Soviet economy for the 1980's is the increasing expense of procuring raw materials, especially energy. While the Soviet bosses earned over \$15 billion from sale of oil and gas in 1977, by 1985 they will probably not be able to export any oil or gas without importing an equal amount. (The CIA claims that the USSR will import several billion dollars worth of oil in 1985, but that seems unlikely). Since the Soviet bosses are determined to maintain their oil exports to Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam in order to control those economies, the Soviet capitalists have a real problem of oil supply. Investing in Siberian oil fields will take tens of billions, and it would be a dubious proposition at that (Western banks think the Siberian oil fields won't be profitable until the late 1990's). Does anyone think the Soviet oil problems are unrelated to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, which exports several hundred million dollars of gas to the USSR each year (see box) and on the Iranian border? Iran exports several billion in gas to the USSR, and the figure may rise as high as about \$10 billion by 1985.

Besides problems with raw material supplies, the Soviet bosses are worried about the declining profitability of their industry. A classic solution to the capitalists' falling-rate-of-profit crisis is to invest overseas, and that is just what the Soviet bosses are planning. The most careful study of Soviet "aid" in the 1960's concluded that the rate of profit from that aid was a bit under 15% at a time when Soviet industry earned about 15% profit rate. Now that the Soviet profit rate has dropped at least several percentage points, "aid" becomes even more attractive.⁴ Soviet capitalists face increasing manpower problems—the reserve army of labor in the USSR is shrinking. The solution: shift factories overseas to use cheap Vietnamese, Cuban, etc. labor, or else import labor—Castro has volunteered to send 10,000 Cubans to cut timber in the USSR (NY Times, 10, Feb. 80).

SOME FACTS ABOUT SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

Before we explain how Soviet imperialism works, let's review some facts about the USSR's foreign trade. This section will be dry and dull, full of facts without much political analysis. But we

The USSR and Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the latest example of Soviet aggression, has solid economic motivations. A major factor behind the invasion was to put the USSR's bosses in a position to move into the Persian Gulf oil fields or into India if they want to. Besides these "geopolitical" reasons—which are actually based on long-term economic interest—the more immediate economic causes of the invasion were:

Afghanistan is an important source for raw materials, Afghanistan exported 250 million cubic feet of natural gas to the USSR every day in 1978, and that is expected to double in 1980. By contrast, the much-publicized pipeline to the USSR from Iran carried 1,000 million cubic feet. Also, the Soviets are building a 500,000 ton oil refinery, a \$600 million copper smelter, and a \$300 million fertilizer plant (to use natural gas as a raw material). And most of Afghanistan has not yet surveyed for natural resources! Don't worry—the Soviet bosses have several large geological teams at work.

Afghanistan is a useful trade partner. In 1978, the Afghans bought \$205 million in goods from the USSR, mostly machine tools and other capital goods that the USSR bosses couldn't have otherwise sold. (Soviet industry has excess capacity in simple machine tools.) In return, the Afghani capitalists exported \$110 million, mostly natural gas (at a price one-fifth what U.S. bosses pay Mexico for gas) and cotton. The expansion of the natural gas pipeline will substantially raise what the Afghani bosses sold to the USSR—and this gas all goes to pay interest and principal on the debts of the Soviet bosses.

Afghanistan is an important site profitable investment. The Soviet capitalists had extended over \$1.3 billion in "aid" through 1978. These loans were mostly for infrastructure: roads, electricity, etc. Now, the Soviet bosses are shifting to more directly profitable projects. They already have the natural gas pipeline. Plans call for the \$600 million fertilizer plant, and lots more factories—flour mills, bakeries, textile plants, and on and on. A dozen or so such factories have already been built.

TABLE I

SOVIET IMPORTS FROM LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(Millions of U.S. \$\$)

Year	Total Imports	Rubber	Hides, Skins, Leather	Coffee Tea, Cocoa	Nuts, Fruits, Vegetables	Jute bags, Packing cloth	Cotton fibre, yarn, fabric, clothing	Cereals, Sugar	Other
1955	210.4	25.5	11.7	15.3	7.7	45.2		57.8	47.2
1960	564.4	151.8	38.7	6.2	27.2	8.7	146.9	6.6	177.9
1965	814.9	137.1	34.4	119.8	65.7	45.4	209.7	47.7	155.1
1970	1215.6	140.6	66.9	156.5	122.3	38.3	356.6		334.1
1972	1613.0	77.8	52.2	166.8	149.2	66.2	342.6		808.2
1975	4280.2	141.4	124.1	469.1	292.2	86.3	551.9	676.6	1932.6*

Basic source: USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, *Vneshnyana Togovlya*, various years.

NOTES:

*In 1975, imports of petroleum products totalled \$802 million.

must go through the facts since there is a lot of nonsense printed on the subject of Soviet foreign trade and investment. This nonsense can be summarized in two lies:

1) The lie which claims that the USSR is basically self-sufficient and has no need to trade, so it trades only to help friendly governments. We will show that the Soviet economy depends on imported raw materials and on foreign markets. We will also show that the Soviets trade with any capitalist country, including their enemies, that has the goods or the market they want.

2) The lie which claims that the USSR loses economically from its trade and aid; that is, the lie that aid and trade are a burden on the USSR. We will show that the Soviet bosses gain enormous profits from their trade and loans (which are misnamed "aid"). We will also show that trade and loans have built up Soviet industry and Soviet technology.

Soviet imports from less developed countries fall into two major categories: on the one hand, there are raw materials (such as cotton, wool, rubber, hides, and jute); on the other hand, there are speciality foodstuffs (such as cocoa, rice, citrus fruits, oranges, nuts, tea and coffee). When the Soviet Union began to re-emerge on the capitalist world market after 1953, it was these raw materials and foodstuffs which were imported—before the Soviet Union had any political ties with countries exporting these commodities. As the USSR developed ties with a country, it indeed did step up trade with that country. Generally, however, the increased trade involved only a shifting of sources for commodities needed and already being purchased by the Soviet Union from other developing countries. In short, the USSR did not import whatever its political friends had to offer: it imported the commodities required by its industry, no matter whether this meant trading with political enemies or political friends.

When the Soviet Union imports raw materials from less developed countries, it is able to reduce

the more expensive expansion of domestic output of these raw materials. For instance, the import of long-staple cotton from Egypt and the Sudan is less expensive than the construction of extensive irrigation systems in Soviet Central Asia. By exporting manufactured goods in return for raw material imports, the Soviet Union is able to increase its rate of industrialization. Increases in manufacturing output offer the USSR the possibility of economies of scale. A broad industrial base helps the Soviet Union fund large-scale research and development. A rapid pace of capital accumulation allows for the constant introduction of new technology, so that the capital stock never becomes outdated. In other words, the exchange of Soviet machinery for "Third World" raw materials helped the Soviet Union become a major world economic power while preserving (if not reinforcing) the subordinate role of the developing countries.

In the last decade, Soviet imports have been shifting from unprocessed raw materials to semi-processed goods. For example, Soviet imports of cotton fiber from the Third World rose only slightly from 1960 to 1972: from \$145.9 million to \$181.2 million. On the other hand imports of cotton yarn and clothing went from \$1.0 million to \$122.3 million in the same period. Such a shift can be illustrated in the changing commodity composition of Soviet-Indian trade. While Soviet imports of Indian hides declined from \$16.3 million in 1966/7 to \$0 in 1974/5, imports of leather and leather goods rose from \$24.1 million to \$58.7 million. The 1976 Soviet-Indian trade agreement provided for a substantial expansion of non-traditional exports from India, including pig iron and steel.

The shifting import pattern of Soviet trade reflects the needs of the Soviet economy. Twenty years ago, the USSR was engaged on a large scale in the basic processing of raw materials and in the production of low-quality low-technology manufactured goods. The Soviet Union then required

imports of unprocessed raw materials. Today, the Soviet industry is shifting towards more advanced industries, using more sophisticated technologies. In order to expand the output of technologically advanced goods, resources must be shifted away from the production of semi-processed raw materials and low quality manufactured goods. For instance, the USSR used to import leather from India to manufacture gloves. Now, the Soviet Union is exporting plants to India to produce 1.6 million pairs of gloves for export to the USSR. Instead of producing gloves, the Soviets are producing glove-making machinery, a more technologically advanced product. This process is called the product life cycle. New products are developed in the advanced countries and are initially produced there. Eventually, the technology for making these products is standardized and routinized. The products are then made in the less developed countries. The high initial profits from the products pay for the cost of developing new technologies which are put into production in the advanced countries. Through the product life cycle, the basic character of Soviet-Third World trade is preserved. The Soviets export technologically more advanced goods, especially machine goods. The developing countries export less sophisticated commodities to serve as consumer goods or as industrial inputs.

Soviet imports from Third World countries, then, are profitable to the USSR. It is simply wrong to argue that the Soviet Union imports whatever its politically chosen trading partners have to offer. When necessary, the Soviet leadership is even willing to pay in hard currency for the commodities it needs. A good example is the Soviet Union's large hard currency purchases of Malaysian rubber. The Malaysian government is no friend of the USSR bosses. The import of Malaysian rubber,

which has been going on at a large scale for over twenty years, was \$79.5 million in 1975 while Soviet exports to Malaysia were \$0.9 million.

A principal barrier to the expansion of Soviet imports in the 1950's and early 1960's was the lack of foreign exchange to pay for imports. The Soviet exports were then largely raw materials; the demand for these in the Third World was limited (see Table 2). The Soviet Union ran up a cumulative deficit with the less developed countries of \$991.3 million from 1955 to 1962; the gap in 1960 alone was \$229.3 million. The Soviet deficit stemmed primarily from large hard currency purchases of raw materials from developing countries which were not markets for Soviet exports. If the Soviet Union were to continue its imports of raw materials, the Soviet leadership would have to find a market for some category of Soviet goods. The Soviet leaders were not satisfied with a bilateral exchange of raw materials; they wanted to increase the level of industrialization in the USSR. In other words, the Soviet leaders wanted to reinforce an international division of labor in which a few advanced countries export advanced technology, especially machine goods, while most countries become dependent on exports of industrial raw materials and some basic consumer goods.

The expansion of Soviet machine goods exports faced a major barrier: there was no demand for Soviet machinery in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, partly because of Cold War pressures but also partly because of the poor reputation of Soviet machinery. One of the ways to break into these markets was to offer loans to finance the purchase of Soviet machinery; another way was to finance purchases by state-owned corporations, which were denied access to Western credit. It was against this background of balance of payments difficulties that the Soviets began to extend loans to less developed countries—loans that were then called "aid." Khrushchev's declaration of "eco-

TABLE II
SOVIET EXPORTS TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(Millions of U.S. \$\$)

Year	Total Exports	Total	Machinery				Undistributed Regional Exports#	
			Subtotal: equipment for complete plants	Petroleum products	Foods, Lumber	Iron, Steel	Regional Exports#	Other
1955	210.4	5.4	1.1	31.9	21.2	20.1	*	132.1
1960	335.1	125.4	68.6	53.9	71.6	30.9	*	53.3
1965	1122.7	471.7	234.1	131.6	117.0	57.3	268.8	75.8
1970	2039.7	686.5	408.1	92.3	169.3	102.9	791.8	196.9
1972	2495.7	813.8	*	115.0	114.8	105.6	1069.2	277.5
1975	3173.0	1132.4	*	803.4	303.8	116.3	453.3	363.8

Basic Source: USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, various years.

Notes:

*Data in this category not collected by the USSR.

#This category is composed mostly of arms exports and includes most arms exports.

conomic warfare" against the U.S. did not reflect a willingness to take economic losses in order to make political friends (as was widely feared among U.S. business circles at the time). Khrushchev intended to break into U.S.-dominated markets by offering better credit terms, thereby consolidating the USSR's position as a major force in the world market. Soviet economists have gone so far as to calculate how much trade is generated by each extra ruble of credit.⁵

Since 1956 the Soviet Union has been extending credits on a large scale. According to U.S. government estimates, from 1954 through 1970

the USSR extended \$17.1 billion, over 95% of which was loans. Eastern European countries extended \$9.1 billion. 64% of the Soviet aid has gone to the Middle East broadly defined (including Afghanistan, North Africa, Iran and Turkey). 13% has gone to India and 24% to the rest of the world. The Soviet aid agreements—and also Soviet trade agreements—only **authorize** a certain level of trade. Prices, quantities, etc. are agreed upon later. The credits authorized in an aid agreement cannot be used until further agreements are signed; the Soviets must approve each project for which the funds are to be used. The


Soviet Imperialism in India

Soviet imperialism in India, which has been a major force for 20 years, has had 3 main effects:

—**Soviet imperialism reinforces the Indian state capitalists.** The Congress party in India (the party of Nehru and Indira Gandhi) has represented those capitalists who want the state to run the Indian economy. The USSR has provided nearly all the capital for the expansion of the "public sector" (state-owned industry). This sector, as distinct from the old private capitalists tied to Western imperialists (the Janataparty and their ilk), has grown from nothing in the 1950's to over 90 large industrial units which produce; 30% of India's steel, 50% of her oil, 30% of the refined oil, 80% of machine tools and 20% of the electricity. A good example of how Soviet imperialism has allied with Indian state-capitalists is in the oil industry, which was dominated for years by Western imperialists (Mobil, Texaco, and Shell) until the Soviets stepped in (the story of this bitter fight is in Sebastian, pp 117-121).

Who has benefited from the Soviet actions? One group of capitalists, **NOT THE WORKING CLASS.** The Indian state capitalists are the bitter enemies of Indian workers. Indira Gandhi has led a fascist movement which used brute repression to break a militant railroad workers' strike in 1975. She mercilessly crushed any left opposition, murdering and torturing tens of thousands from the Naxalite Maoist movement in the 1960's. Soviet arms were used for this slaughter, just as they are used now in India to smash strikes.

—**Soviet imperialism ties India to the USSR.** The Soviets provide loans only when they can dictate



Soviet-built Bhilai steel mill in India

what factories will be built with the loans (what is called "tied aid"). They insist on using their own engineers to design and run the factories. Datar in her Chapter 5 discusses how the Soviets refused to use the Indian designs for the Bokaro Steel Mill; at great expense and delay, they did up their own designs so that they could control the mill. Since the factories are based on Soviet design and use Soviet-built machines, Soviet spare parts are needed. This gives the Soviets a strangle hold over the Indian economy: if the Indians reject Soviet demands, the Soviets can stop shipping the spare parts. Also, the factories are designed to produce for the Soviet market. For instance, the Indians import cotton and hides to make into textiles and leather-goods for the USSR. Without the Soviet market, Indian industry would suffer.

—**Soviet imperialism sucks millions of dollars from India.** The Soviets are at least as bloodthirsty as Western imperialists. After a detailed study of Soviet-built steel mills and oil refineries compared to Western-built plants, Datar concludes (p. 257), "prices set by the USSR were higher than those offered by alternative sources of sup-

ply." After comparing Soviet and Western loans to India (in an article in *World Development* in 1975, p. 341). Chaudhuri states, "There does not seem to be any reason for holding the view that the East European countries have over-all offered particularly favorable terms to India." The Soviets are more clever than the Western imperialists at hiding their super-profits. For instance, the Soviets claim that they make less than the West because Soviet loans are in rupees (the Indian currency) not dollars and the rupee is losing its value (being depreciated). But there is a clause in the Indo-Soviet agreements according to the *Indian Economic Times* (cited in Mukherji, p. 58) which says, "The basis of the exchange rates of the rupee with the currencies of these [East European] countries is the 'gold content' of the currencies. The gold content of the rupee has been fixed at 0.118489 fine grammes of gold. The 'gold content' of the currencies of the East European countries is fixed unilaterally by them without a clearly defined basis." So the Soviets can increase the Indian's debt at any time by decree. When the rupee was devalued 35% in 1966, the Soviets upped the Indian's debt by 57% the next morning. Soviet imperialism is at least as cold-blooded as the Western imperialists in sucking India dry.

Sources: A. Datar, *India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe*, a pro-Soviet and very academic book; M. Sebastian, *Soviet Economic Aid to India*, a pro-Soviet popular book; and R. Mukherji, *Economics of Soviet Trade and Air*, an anti-Soviet popular book. The last two are published in India.

THE SOVIET BOSSES ARE FORCED TO BE IMPERIALIST

Profits from trade and 'aid' with less developed countries are more than a pleasant extra for Soviet bosses. These profits are vital to their continued existence, especially since Africa, Asia, and Latin America are major areas where Soviet capitalists plan on expanding their profits in the future. A basic law of capitalism is that each capitalist must always be out for the maximum profits he can get. If one capitalist falls behind the others in the race for profits, then pretty soon he is no longer able to afford new machinery. His factories become old and inefficient, his competitors put out a better and cheaper product, and he goes out of business. This law of capitalism (expand or die) is very clear with large firms, such as the U.S. auto companies which are having a rough time facing Japanese competition because the U.S. Big Three have not kept up in the race to invest and expand.

Soviet capitalists make a fortune off their trade with less-developed countries.

The same law applies to state capitalist societies like the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the main competition in the world is among states (since states have become the principle organizers of capitalist production). If one country does not expand production as fast as the others, then it can no longer keep up a big and technologically advanced military machine. With a stagnant economy and a weak army, the declining capitalist can not maintain its control over less developed countries. Pretty soon, its empire withers; it loses control over its sources of raw materials and its markets, which drives up its costs and reduces its profits further. In short, the state that falls behind in the race for profits will fall further and further behind until it becomes a third-rate power. As Britain discovered in the early 1900's, no capitalist power can ever rest on its laurels and be content with high profits—the capitalists must always go out for more and more profits. The U.S. ruling class is discovering the same lesson as their

credits must be spent on goods purchased in the USSR. In other words, Soviet aid is "double tied"; tied as to which projects it may be used on, and tied as to the origin of the goods. (Most Western aid is singled tied.) There is no guarantee that the credits authorized in a Soviet aid agreement will necessarily be used, nor that the level of trade called for in a trade agreement will be reached. There are only sketchy data on the actual deliveries of Soviet goods under the aid program to the Third World as a whole. The U.S. government estimates that a little over half of the credits have been used.

The figures above on Soviet aid do not include military aid. Soviet arms deliveries—equipment actually shipped—to less developed countries is estimated by the CIA at \$25.3 billion from 1955 through 1978, with \$3,825 million in 1978 alone. Over 70% went to the Mideast.⁷ Since 1973, 43% of these sales have been for hard currency; that is, cash (U.S. dollars) on delivery.⁸ That means the Soviets earned over \$1600 million from arms sales in 1978. Arms sales have been growing by leaps and bounds in recent years, to become probably the single largest category of Soviet sales to less developed countries.

There has been much debate about the prices at which the Soviets trade with the less developed countries.⁹ The question of prices is complicated. For instance, the Soviets correctly claim that they sell goods to the less developed countries at prices which are often lower than Western prices—but they charge much more for spare parts. Also, the Soviets offer lower interest rates on their loans; however, Western loans usually have a 'grace period' (repayment on the loan doesn't start until several years after the loan is made) while repayment on Soviet loans begins right away. Occasionally, but not often, the Soviets have even bought goods cheaply from a less developed country and then resold the goods on the Western market at a higher price. After all is said and done, the basic conclusion is that the Soviets charge just about the same prices as do the Western imperialists. Since the Western imperialists rip off the less developed countries through buying raw materials for a song and selling industrial goods for a fortune, so too do the Soviets.

We can conclude by saying that the Soviet capitalists make a fortune off their trade with less developed countries, just as do the Western imperialists. The USSR has been an imperialist power for only a short while (about 25 years), and its foreign economic ties are not as well developed as those of the U.S. The ratio of Soviet production to Soviet trade with less developed countries is about one-sixth of the U.S. ratio (Soviet trade—exports plus imports—with less developed countries was \$11.4 billion in 1977 while U.S. trade was \$111.6 billion; the Soviet GNP is about 60% of the U.S. GNP).

empire is in decline now.

The Soviet ruling class faces the same imperative to expand or die, and they are determined to expand. This capitalist economic imperative is at the root of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. The move toward World War III is not caused by crazy generals on either side, nor by some ideological conflict alone. A basic law of capitalism is competition among the capitalists. Sometimes the main aspect of competition is temporary cooperation and sometimes open rivalry. Ultimately, every capitalist is eager to swallow up his rivals when the opportunity presents itself. Among state capitalists, the most bitter form of competition is war. Now that the Soviet bosses see their power rising rapidly relative to the U.S. bosses, they are more aggressively challenging the U.S., stealing areas the U.S. capitalists had earlier stolen.

A major prize in the competition among capitalist states is control over the less developed countries. These countries play three crucial roles for the imperialist economy: 1) they provide a market for output that otherwise could not be sold, 2) they are a source of raw materials that could only be obtained at extremely high cost elsewhere, and 3) most importantly, they are a site for super-profitable investment, using cheap labor and raw materials. Let's see how the Soviet capitalists are **forced** to expand into the less developed countries for each of these three reasons:

1) **A market for Soviet output:** the Soviets have not been successful at marketing their industrial products in the West. The main products the Soviet bosses sell to the U.S. and to Europe are oil, lumber and paper, iron, gold, and other minerals. The Soviets have made some progress in setting up industry in these areas; for instance, they import bauxite (the metal from which aluminum is extracted) and export aluminum. Still, the main Soviet industries are the machine tool and metal equipment industries, and these products have found no market in the West. The only way that the Soviet bosses have been able to expand their markets in these areas have been to sell Soviet machinery in the less developed countries and in Eastern Europe.

Many Soviet industries depend on exports for much of their market; exports account for 30% of steelmaking furnace production in 1975, 28% of automobile production in 1977, one-sixth of electrical generating equipment production, and a sizeable proportion of armament production.¹⁰ By selling this kind of equipment, the Soviets also earn the cash to purchase other equipment from the West—principally computers and the new computer-controlled machine tools.

The less developed countries and the countries of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—East Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia) are eager for lots of machinery because they

are expanding output quickly and Soviet machinery is pretty well suited for their needs (it may not be the most advanced, but that does not matter too much). More importantly, the Soviets offer the capitalists in these countries a somewhat better deal than do the Western capitalists by offering financing for their sales. Either the Soviets make loans to cover the cost of Soviet machinery exports or else the Soviets agree to accept local products in return. This practice is so successful that other capitalists are imitating the Soviets, especially the Japanese. Third, the Soviet bosses sometimes use their brute military strength to coerce other bourgeoisies into buying Soviet goods.

2) **A source of raw materials:** As was seen earlier in this article, the Soviet economy is becoming increasingly dependent on imported raw materials. The most obvious example is aluminum, a vital component of airplanes and other industrial-military goods. The aluminum industry was singled out as one of the sectors to be expanded during the current Five Year Plan; it now depends for 40% or more of its raw material on foreign sources (increasingly, from a Soviet-built project in Guinea), and domestic Soviet production of raw material is slated to decline.

Probably the most significant industry in which the Soviets are dependent on imports is the grain industry. Soviet agricultural production has increased rapidly in recent years, much more rapidly than U.S. production. Average meat and poultry production rose 23% from 1966-70 to 1971-5 while egg production rose 44%. Feeding all those animals requires more and more grain; plus Soviet grain consumption has been rising rapidly. Soviet grain production has not risen as rapidly; it has grown at only about the same rate as U.S. grain production (37% from 1961-5 to 1971-5).¹¹ Soviet grain production fluctuates a lot from year to year because of the poor weather in the grain-growing regions (the U.S. press is very misleading—they give big publicity to the bad Soviet crops and never mention the big ones). The Soviets have had to import more and more grain in order to keep on expanding the food consumption of Soviet workers; Soviet bosses are afraid the workers will rebel unless they get better food, as Polish workers rebelled in 1970. The crisis in Soviet agriculture is that the Soviet bosses have not been able to import grain from a less developed country; they have had to buy from advanced countries (U.S., Canada, Australia). The Soviet capitalists are working hard at cultivating a relationship with the fascist Argentinian government so that they can import grain from Argentina.

Like any large country, the Soviets import some raw materials and export others. The U.S. does the same thing. The main U.S. exports are agricultural products, especially grain. U.S. bosses export more corn than computers, more soybeans than airplanes. Obviously, this doesn't mean that

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The USSR's relation with eastern Europe is an imperialist relation. The Soviets use military force to dominate the region, which is then converted into a source for raw materials and a market for Soviet industry. As in any imperialist relationship, there are certain peculiarities to the Soviet—east European connection. The most unusual feature of this relation is that the East European countries are about as well developed industrially as is the USSR. Normally, the imperialist power is more advanced industrially than the countries it rules over. The large size of the USSR, plus the historical situation, explain the Soviet rule.

The Soviets rely on Eastern Europe for many raw materials. For instance, Poland shipped 9.8 million tons of coal to the USSR in 1975. Hungary is a major source of bauxite, which is used to make aluminum. Much of the uranium for the Soviet nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs comes from Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Soviets also sell raw materials to the Eastern European countries. The Soviets supply these raw materials on an "if available" basis; that is, the Soviets disrupt deliveries if they need the raw materials themselves. The most important example here is oil and natural gas. As Soviet industry requires more and more of the petroleum the USSR produces, the Soviet capitalists have told the East European bosses to find other sources.



Warsaw steelworkers: Deep in debt to the Soviet capitalists

Eastern Europe is an important market for Soviet products. The Soviets have consistently forced Eastern European countries to assist the expansion of Soviet industry at the expense of their industrialization. As a result, the growth rate of Soviet national income has always been higher than that of the Eastern European countries. For instance, Soviet output grew 53% from 1965 to 1971 while East German grew 35%, Hungarian grew 48%, and Czech grew 47%. The Soviets have also begun to make big loans to East European countries; after the strikes in Poland, the Soviets lent over \$600 million on top of the \$2 billion they had already lent the Polish bosses.

Eastern Europe has been in the Soviet bloc since the end of World War II. During the 1940's, the USSR was a socialist country, where the workers were in power. Under the leadership of the communist party,

the workers defeated the Nazis. The Soviet communist party and the Soviet army helped communists come to power throughout Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, by then the communist parties in the USSR and in Eastern Europe had in them many people who wanted to use their party membership to become rich—people who were not communists at all. This group eventually took over the Soviet communist party after Stalin's death in the 1950's. Earlier, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the pro-capitalist group in the USSR got many policies adopted which were to the disadvantage of the East European workers. Bourgeois scholars claim that the Soviets took factories and supplies worth over \$20 billion from Eastern Europe in this period. We are suspicious of this claim, but we are sure from the limited amount we know that many serious errors were made (Stalin pointed out many of these errors in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"). Does this prove communists were exploiting Eastern Europe? No! It shows that the capitalists who had wormed their way into the communist parties were on their way to taking power away from the workers.

Source: Graziani, "La structure de dependance das le Comcion," *Communisme*, No. 2 (1978). He has a good bibliography.

the U.S. is an underdeveloped country or that the U.S. is self-reliant in raw materials. Rather, the U.S. bosses specialize in those products they can produce most cheaply. At the same time, they depend upon imports for many vital products. The same situation is true for the Soviet Union.

3) **A site for super-profitable investment:** Soviet bosses face many problems with expanding industry inside the USSR. The labor force is no longer expanding. As labor becomes tighter, workers can demand higher wages, increasing the costs to the capitalists. For instance, the Soviet bosses have to offer very high bonuses to attract workers to the new industries in Siberia, and even then most workers quit within a year. Plus, the logical site for new industry is near the remaining raw material deposits—but that is out in Siberia, where conditions are harsh and transportation costs are high. Faced with these unfavorable conditions at home, it is no wonder that the Soviet capitalists are turning towards more overseas in-

vestments. In 1978 alone, the Soviets signed agreements for \$3.7 billion in 'aid' (investment) in less developed countries. Naturally, the Soviet capitalists do not publish any figures on the profits they earn from their investments. We made some estimates in Section II about the profits the Soviets get. One additional figure which shows that these investments are paying off: in 1978, over 23% of the Soviet imports from less-developed countries—meaning more than \$1 billion—originated in Soviet-assisted enterprises.¹² Since a large part of the products of Soviet-assisted projects are shipped back to the USSR to pay for the projects, we can estimate that much of the \$1 billion was profits.

In order to secure markets, raw material sources, and investment opportunities, the Soviet bosses need the co-operation of at least some elements of the local bourgeoisie. Sometimes this co-operation is secured by massive military might, as in Afghanistan or Eastern Europe. More often, the

Soviet rulers receive willing help from the leaders of national liberation and other nationalist movements. The Soviet capitalists aid these national liberation movements so that the older imperialist powers can be kicked out, to be replaced by Soviet imperialism. The leaders of national liberation movements take Soviet aid for two reasons: 1) the Soviet Union has considerable prestige among the workers of the world, based on its socialist past. Many people around the world are misled by the claim of the new Soviet bosses that they are continuing this socialist heritage. Many in national liberation movements who refuse ties with Western imperialism, because they know Western capitalists want to co-opt them, do not see that ties with Soviet imperialism are just as deadly. 2) The Soviet bosses offer economic and military assistance on somewhat better terms than the West offers. As a new imperialist power, the Soviets face the problem of how to displace the older imperialists. A main strategy of the Soviet bosses has been to offer slightly better deals, especially by providing aid for heavy industry such as steel mills and by shipping heavy arms such as jet fighters and tanks. Much the same strategy was followed by the U.S. when it was displacing British and French imperialism: the U.S. bosses supported formal political independence for the colonial countries so that the U.S. could take control of their economies.

In recent years, the Soviet bosses have become much more aggressive about expanding their empire. They are building up their military might at a furious pace, especially the navy and long-range air transport—two vital elements for military adventures in Africa, Latin America or much of Asia. Soviet military strategy plans for Soviet and Soviet-aided aggressions, such as in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea (Cambodia), and Afghanistan. A major reason for the increasingly offensive character of Soviet imperialism is that the Soviet economy is more and more constricted by the limited boundaries of the existing Soviet empire. There are relatively few market opportunities left for the Soviet bosses in Eastern Europe. Raw materials from Siberia are available only at extremely high costs. Investment opportunities are limited by the growing labor shortages and other factors. Furthermore, the Soviet capitalists know that they can not allow their economy to stagnate, for stagnation means eventual death.

The Soviet working class is already extremely discontented; in spite of fascist repression, workers fight back against the capitalist exploitation in various ways (see the accompanying article in this issue.) To prevent more open rebellions, the Soviet capitalists have been forced to increase workers' living standards considerably, especially with better food. Any cutbacks in the availability of imported food would likely spark major rebellions on the scale of those in Poland in 1976.

Another reason the Soviet capitalists fear stag-

nation in their economy is that low Soviet growth rates would increase the relative power of the U.S. and other Western imperialists. The U.S. and West European imperialists keep a sharp eye open for signs of Soviet weakness so that they can step up their campaign to split off parts of the Soviet empire. Western imperialists are working under the thumb of Western capitalists. These schemes, plus similar ventures with Poland and other East European countries, have not gotten very far precisely because of the massive Soviet military and economic stranglehold over Eastern Europe. But were Soviet strength to weaken, the Western imperialists would be emboldened. Some circles in the U.S. ruling class have dreams that the Soviet Union itself could be dismembered. By encouraging nationalism and economic disorder, these circles hope to promote the secession of the Soviet minority nationalities. Less than 60% of the Soviet Union's 250 million people live in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; the rest are scattered among 14 other Soviet Socialist Republics (such as Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Uzbekistan...). Here is clear evidence of the basic capitalist law of expanded accumulation: the capitalist who can not expand faster than his competitors eventually faces extinction.

Soviet imperialism, like all imperialisms, is eventually doomed. The imperialist system brings misery to the workers of the world through super-exploitation of workers in less developed countries and through war after bloody war. The working class in the USSR is being used as cannon fodder by the Soviet bosses, who also exploit them mercilessly. While the USSR's capitalists may be on the rise at the moment, we can be sure we will eventually succeed in putting them and all capitalists in their grave. Already workers in many countries have learned the greedy nature of the Soviet system and are resisting the Soviet onslaught. We see signs of opposition to imperialist war in the USSR too. The first soldiers sent into Afghanistan were from Central Asia and spoke the local languages. They made friends with Afghans and discovered the Soviet bosses were out for conquering, not 'liberating' Afghanistan. So the Soviet generals quickly sent these troops home and brought in Russian-speaking soldiers (N.Y. Times, Jan. 1980).

III. THE IMPERIALIST CHARACTER OF SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

We have shown that the USSR's bosses benefit greatly from their trade and "aid" with less developed countries. It is interesting to know that the Soviet bosses profit from this trade, but we want to argue something much more. We want to prove that the USSR is imperialist. The classic analysis of imperialism was set forth by Lenin in

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin explained that capitalism had developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The major capitalist powers had become so big and rich that they were afraid they would not have enough markets or raw materials. The powers therefore each wanted to rule over less developed areas. They divide up the world—the way the U.S. and the USSR are fighting over who will get to dominate which country.

Another important part of imperialism, according to Lenin, is that the imperialist powers export capital to the areas they dominate. Before imperialism, capitalist countries exported only commodities to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. For instance, Britain exported clothes and cloth to Africa. With the beginning of the imperialist era in the late 1800's, Britain began to export capital also. British investors put up the money to pay for building railroads, for instance. This had a great impact on society in Africa, especially since the British forced the Africans to work on the railroads and in the mines.

Just as the British exported capital to Africa in the late 1800's, so now the Soviets are exporting capital to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In other words, Soviet economic relations with the less developed countries shows all the features Lenin laid out as defining imperialist. Many people who have studied the USSR's role in the less developed countries have been confused about this question of capital export, so we will look at it in detail in this section. We will show that the Soviets use a form of capital export which differs somewhat from the form which is most common in the West (although the West is shifting over to the Soviet style)—a state capitalist form.

What exactly do we mean by the export of capital? The bourgeoisie uses the term "capital" to refer to big sums of money or to the factories that the money can buy. Marx made fun of this view, because he pointed out that the essence of "capital" is the ability to force others to work for the capitalist in return for wages. A factory is capital only under capitalism, which is the system of running society based on capital—a system in which most of us are forced to work for a few capitalists. Under socialism, the factories will belong to the workers and we will run them. What makes machinery and money into capital under capitalism is that they are controlled by one social class (the capitalists), which uses its monopoly over the means of production to force the other social class (the workers) to work for the capitalists. In other words, capital is primarily a social relation which replaced previous social relations such as feudalism or slavery. Under feudalism, the serf might have had lots of money and quite a few tools (horses, ploughs, etc.)—but he was still bound to the soil, unable to leave. He still had to do whatever the lord commanded. That is because feudalism was based on the social relation of lord

and serf, determined by inherited status. Capitalism replaced feudalism with a new set of social relations. When Lenin writes about the export of capital, he is referring partly to this process by which capitalism transformed the world.

Many of us in the PLP feel that capital, as a social relation between wage-laborers and capitalists, was not dominant in most of Africa, Asia and Latin America before the era of imperialism. The expansion of European capitalism in the 17th to the 19th centuries had transformed these societies, introducing production of commodities for export, but this production was not necessarily capitalist (for example, production of gold in Latin America by slaves, production of cotton in Egypt by small commodity producers). We would say that the "export of capital" which is central to the theory of imperialism is the breaking down of pre-capitalist modes of production by the imperialists. This means the separation of the direct producers from their means of production and the formation of what Marx calls "doubly free labourers"—free to sell their labor power, free of any other means of making a living. When we talk about imperialism as the stage characterized by the export of capital, we mean that capitalism has entered a new period in which its expansion worked to dissolve pre-capitalist modes of production and to institute capitalist relations of production on a world scale. Imperialism is therefore not a matter of perfidious government policy nor a conspiracy by the monopoly capitalists; imperialism is rooted in the laws of motion of capitalism. Others of us in PLP are not sure imperialism brought a qualitative change to Africa, Asia, and Latin American society. All of us agree that capitalism has now penetrated throughout the world; our differences are about when this happened.

The form of capital export has gone through several changes since 1900. While the various forms of capital export each merit investigation, we must keep in mind that the export of capital has always remained in essence the export of a social relation. In Lenin's day, the principal form that the export of capital took was the lending of money-capital by capitalists (especially banks) in the imperial countries to governments and quasi-governmental agencies in colonial countries (although there was the secondary form of investment in plantations and mines). In the period following World War II, the dominant form of the export of capital has been the establishment of local subsidiaries (although bank loans persist as a secondary form which has undergone rapid expansion since 1973). These two forms of the export of capital are substantially different in appearance. The second form represents a higher stage in the process of expanding capitalism in the less developed countries in that multinational corporations develop capitalist industry and agriculture, creating a large proletariat, while bank loans had less impact on the local methods of pro-



Soviet engineers, with Egyptian workers during construction of the Aswan Dam. The Soviets can afford to grin—as the text below shows, Soviet profits on the job were not just water over the dam.

duction. In spite of all these differences, these two forms of the export of capital are that: two forms of what is fundamentally the same process of the internationalization of capital.

The Soviets have developed a third form of capital export. Their form relies on state capitalism. The Soviets grant a loan to a country like Egypt—a loan which is then called “aid.” This loan must be repaid with interest, which is where part of the Soviets’ profits come from. The loan is used to pay for the export of machinery from the USSR; that is, the Egyptians spend the loan inside the USSR to buy machinery. Not just any machinery the Egyptian government might want: the loan can be used only for the specific project the Soviets have approved. Take for instance the Aswan Dam. The Egyptians buy a lot of earth-moving equipment, electric generators, irrigation pumps, etc. from the Soviets, which creates a market for Soviet goods. Then the Soviet experts come to Egypt and boss the Egyptian workers who are building the Aswan Dam. When the Dam is finished, it belongs to the Egyptian government. **But** the Egyptian government must repay the loan. They do that by sending the Soviets products made with the electricity generated by the Dam and with the water provided by the Dam. Before the Dam was built, indeed before the Soviet bosses made the loan, an agreement was signed spelling out what the Egyptians would export to the USSR to repay the loan. In this case, the Egyptians exported cotton and rice (grown with water from the Dam) and aluminum (refined with electricity from the Dam). To summarize: the Soviets provide the money, the equipment, and

the experts; the Egyptians provide the labor and the raw materials; the product goes mostly to the Soviets. This is a good example of how the export of capital means the export of a social relation. Not only is money and machinery exported, but so is the system of capitalist production—because wage-labor on big irrigated farms replaced small producers on their own plots in Egypt. We could give many other similar examples: the Soviet loan for a natural gas pipeline in Iran, with the gas going to the USSR to repay the loan; the loan for a steel mill in India, with steel exports going to repay the loan; etc.

The Soviet form of capital export is quite different from the main Western form of capital export, which is the establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries by multinational corporations. The Soviet form possesses some significant advantages over the Western form. For one thing, Soviet capital export is more disguised than Western capital export. Since Soviet capital export can be pawned off as aid, the USSR is less likely to be the object of local popular struggles against imperialism. The Soviet form also allows for more participation by the local bourgeoisies. The bourgeoisies of less developed countries therefore often find Soviet capital more attractive than Western capital. Because Soviet-supplied factories belong to the local government, the Soviets don’t have to worry about losing their capital through nationalization or about limits on profit repatriation—problems which plague Western capitalists.

The main reason for the new Soviet form of

capital export is that it allows the state to be openly involved. Under the Soviet system, the Soviet government and the government of the less developed country are both directly involved: they both sign the loan agreement, they both agree on what will be shipped to the USSR in repayment. This state involvement is an advantage over the Western form, which is based on private firms (for instance, Ford of Brazil, GM of Mexico, etc.) As we show in the article on state capitalism, the state is becoming more and more involved in all economic decisions in modern capitalism. The bigger role of the state comes from the inability of any private capitalist to raise the huge sums needed for modern industry. Also, the risks of investing are much higher for a private capitalist; the government can directly apply military pressure to force repayment. For these reasons, as we show in the article on state capitalism, the general tendency of modern capitalism is towards more state involvement. The West European and Japanese capital-

Soviet foreign aid, furthermore, reinforces a division of labor on the world scale.

ists have already gone far down the state capitalist road in their capital exports. For instance, the French government has signed several deals with Arab oil producers, especially the Saudi Arabian government, on the pattern of Soviet deals—exchanging oil for arms. The Japanese government has been actively promoting Soviet-style trade agreements with many countries in Southeast Asia. The U.S. government has gotten into the act somewhat, through “orderly marketing agreements” which regulate trade with less developed countries. Under these orderly marketing agreements, the U.S. government signs a deal with the government of a less developed country dictating how much that country will send to the U.S. For instance, one agreement regulates the amount of TVs imported from Taiwan. All these deals represent increased state involvement.

The Soviets justify their capital exports on the basis of the fact that they are helping state-owned industry. They claim that the expansion of the

“public sector” (state-owned industry) reflects the growth of socialism. The experience of nationalized industry in the advanced countries shows that collective ownership of industry by the capitalist class as a whole (“nationalized” industry) does not lead to workers’ power. As we show in the article on state capitalism, there is no reason for communists to support the expansion of nationalized industry. The Soviets also claim that by helping build industry, they are creating the conditions for socialism. This ridiculous theory—that socialism can only exist in highly industrialized countries—is a variant of the theory of productive forces, which is criticized in the article on what causes social change. The simple truth is that Soviet-financed industry expands capitalism. It expands capitalist social relations of production at the expense of pre-capitalist relations.

The discussion about “who gains” from Soviet economic relations with less developed countries often overlooks the very foundation of Marxist theory; namely, that nations are divided into **classes**. Western scholars discuss at great length “the distribution of gains” from Soviet-Indian trade, Soviet-Egyptian trade, etc. It never occurs to them to ask which class gains, to ask whether either the Indian working class or the Soviet working class gain from trade. So too with the leadership of the USSR. They do not discuss how they will aid the working class in other nations—they talk about aid to the governments of those nations. The governments of India, Egypt, Syria, and other Soviet aid recipients are in the hands of the bourgeoisie: to aid those governments is to aid the bourgeoisie.

Soviet foreign aid furthermore reinforces a division of labor on the world scale in which a few countries produce technologically advanced goods (especially machine goods) while most countries produce semi-processed or standardized industrial inputs or consumer goods. By reinforcing this division of labor, the Soviet leadership is negating one of the major hoped-for benefits of industrialization. An industrialized country which has to rely on imports of technologically advanced goods and of machine goods remains economically dependent on the ruling class of the country which provides the technologically advanced and machine goods.

Rather than hiding how their trade reinforces the development of underdevelopment, the Soviet leadership lauds the emerging “international division of labor” (a phrase they frequently use). To quote Kossygin, “The importance of a stable division of labor between socialist and developing countries must be stressed”¹³ Through this economic mechanism, as well as through military, political and ideological mechanisms (which are often more important), the Soviet leadership has sought to tie the economies of less developed countries closer to the Soviet economy. The USSR has acted as would be expected from a class

imperialist power: it competed with the U.S. to see which one of them would replace Great Britain, a declining imperialist power, in such major ex-British colonies as India and Egypt.

While the Soviet leadership may have pioneered a new form of capital export, the Soviet leadership did not necessarily understand that Soviet-aid is another form of capital export to the less developed countries. The emergence of Soviet capital export did not depend on a conscious decision by the leaders of the C.P.S.U. to sell out the world revolutionary movement.

Although the changing nature of Soviet foreign policy did not depend upon the victory of an openly imperialist perspective in the C.P.S.U., it did depend upon—and it did call forth—a new theory of international relations. In the 1950's, the C.P.S.U. developed an elaborate analysis to justify the changing nature of Soviet economic relations with the Third World: the theory of "non-capitalist development," as distinct from the capitalist path and the socialist path of development. Before 1955, the Soviet press described the rise of nationalist leaders such as Nasser and Nehru as representing the decline of British imperialism (based on a formal empire) and the rise of U.S. imperialism (based on neo-colonialism). By the early 1960's, however, there had been a complete shift. Now there were many articles in the Soviet press on "non-capitalist development" and "national democracy" as the route by which Third World countries could break away from imperialist domination. In 1964, Khrushchev spoke of Egypt's "struggle for peace and the building of socialism" and wished the country "great success in the building of a new socialist life."¹⁴

Despite Khrushchev's enthusiasm, there was quite a bit of debate on the question of whether the non-capitalist path led to socialism. The conclusion was that it did but only if there was a vanguard party able to lead the non-capitalist stage, but it would have to transform itself into a vanguard party to lead the socialist stage.

The theory of non-capitalist development provided a justification for Soviet capital exports. Soviet aid to public sector industries was seen as reducing the influence of the capitalists. This assumes that the public sector is non-capitalist. The public sector industries are under the control of the class which holds state power—meaning the bourgeoisie in such capitalist countries as India and Egypt. State capitalist industries reinforce the rule of capitalist social relations every bit as much as do private capitalist industries. The Soviets also justified their aid on the grounds that it built up heavy industry, thereby increasing the numbers of the proletariat and therefore increasing the revolutionary potential of the country. The immediate identification of increasing numbers of workers with increasing revolutionary potential is a crass form of economic determinism. Revolution depends heavily on the class consciousness of the

proletariat and on the activities of a party. Soviet aid to capitalist states—aid which bolstered the capitalist state, such that the state could repress workers all the more—does little to build revolutionary consciousness or revolutionary parties. The "non-capitalist road"—which in practice means state capitalist development of heavy industry—has little to do with the workers seizing state power and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. The latter is the Leninist theory of socialism, which has been abandoned by the Soviet leadership in favor of the "non-capitalist road."

While these ideological transformations explain how the Soviet leadership perceived the rise of Soviet capital export and how they justified it to themselves, these transformations are secondary. The main question to be asked is: does the USSR export capitalist social relations or does its trade and aid reinforce the movement towards world-wide socialist revolution? The evidence presented here points overwhelmingly towards the former.

IV. SOCIALIST FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Soviet foreign economic relations are in essence identical to those of the Western powers, that is, imperialist. What would be the principles of socialist foreign economic relations, however? We can draw a few lessons from the experiences of the Soviet and Chinese revolutions and from Marxist-Leninist theory:

1) A socialist society would base its foreign economic relations on the principle of fighting for socialism world-wide. This would be the guiding light by which to see which actions to take. We would not be motivated by any narrow economic advantage into betraying our struggle—to accept a momentary bribe (such as foreign aid from the enemy) is the first step towards becoming capitalists or their agents. Our goal is to create a society free of exploitation, not to raise our income in the short-run. Just as we must make some financial sacrifices now (such as our contributions to the Party), so too after the revolution.

2) In relations with other socialist societies, we will work to dissolve national boundaries. Nation-states create artificial barriers that separate the workers of the world. We strive to create a world-wide socialist government led by a global communist party. This world-wide socialist society will ruthlessly stamp out racism against any group of workers or any kind of national chauvinism; it will actively promote working-class culture in all of the languages of the world, drawing upon the best of workers have created in every previous society.

3) A socialist society would work to overthrow every capitalist government. We would give no aid to the bourgeoisie in other countries nor to governments under bourgeois control. Our responsibility is to help communists take power, for that is the

**Growth of USSR's Goods Turnover
With Six Leading Capitalist Trade Partners
(in millions of rubles)**

	1970	1973	1975	1977	1979	1980*
West Germany	544.0	1,210.2	2,777.3	2,967.3	4,246.6	1,234.5
France	412.8	721.6	1,296.5	1,723.9	2,623.5	893.5
Finland	539.7	777.4	1,755.5	2,173.5	2,606.5	739.6
Japan	652.3	994.4	1,922.4	2,297.8	2,605.4	645.2
Italy	471.8	613.6	1,426.8	1,880.8	2,155.1	582.1
Great Britain	641.4	715.2	959.3	1,332.3	1,904.3	422.3

A Short Commentary on the Table

It is clear from the above-mentioned figures that détente led to a sharp increase in the volume of trade between capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. The USSR concluded long-term agreements with the majority of these countries on economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation, including a 25-year agreement with West Germany, projected up to the year 2003, and 10-year agreements with France, Finland, Italy, Austria, Sweden and other countries. During that time new forms of large-scale business contacts, an effective mechanism for promoting mutually advantageous exchanges, have come into being: bilateral commissions for economic, scientific and technical cooperation which, as a rule, have sessions twice a year, and a broad and sufficiently sound trade and economic infrastructure.

Trading is Better Than Feuding says an article in a recent issue of Soviet Life, a magazine published by the USSR government for US readers. The chart and caption reprinted here speak volumes.

only way in which the working class' interests can be advanced in the long-run. If people in Kampuchea (Cambodia) are starving under a capitalist government, a socialist government would give no aid to the capitalist Kampuchean government. Such aid would only reinforce the stranglehold of the bourgeoisie in Kampuchea—the aid would be withheld from communists and militant working-class elements, and the aid would be used to reinforce the myth that the bourgeoisie is the source of all wealth and power. Under such circumstances, a socialist government would multiply many-fold its assistance to the Kampuchean communist movement, small as it might be.

4) A socialist society would never base its economy on trade with capitalist economies.¹⁵ If we depend on trade with capitalists, then they will always have a stranglehold over us. Self-sufficiency will be more difficult if a socialist revolution occurs first in a small country. But the political determination to free ourselves from the domination of the capitalists can lead us to victory. We can learn much from the experiences of Albania in this respect. Albania is a very small country, the size of Maryland, with a population of only 2 million. Before the revolution, there was NO industry in Albania. Conditions were terrible: illiteracy of over 90%, few villages had running water, practically no one had electricity, etc. After the Albanians kicked the Nazis out in World War II, they set about building a socialist society. At this time, the Soviet Union—which had been a socialist country—was coming under the rule of the capitalist. When the Albanian Party of Labor criticized the new capitalists in the USSR, these capitalists, led by Khrushchev cut off trade with Albania.

Khrushchev figured the Albanians would not be able to survive without foreign aid and trade, since the country was so small and poor. But the Albanians fought back and built up their own industry, with some help from the Chinese. Even though Albania has no oil to speak of and has only rocky mountainsides to farm, it became almost entirely self-sufficient. The lesson we can learn is that trade between socialist countries and those capitalists we have not yet overthrown must be confined to a bare minimum (such as rare minerals or unusual medicines). Some trade may be necessary right after the revolution; for instance, if we communists took over Jamaica tomorrow, we would probably have to import oil for a while. But we would become self-sufficient as soon as possible. (By the way, now that capitalism is being restored in Albania, foreign trade is increasing enormously.)

5) No socialist society should ever take "aid" from the capitalists. If we are in dire economic circumstances, the capitalists will undoubtedly dangle their "humanitarian aid" in front of our noses, hoping that we will swallow the fish-hook of capitalism that is buried in the bait. It is a fundamental error to think that "aid" will preserve the revolution; "aid" will pervert the revolution and set it on the road back towards capitalism. When Cuba took "aid" from the USSR, this did not preserve the Cuban revolution—it converted Cuba into a colony of Soviet imperialism. A socialist Cuban government would have refused the aid. People's war (based on mass mobilization of the population behind the government that stands for their interests) would probably have defeated any U.S. intervention. In any case, refusing the aid and

being overrun would have done more to advance the cause of socialism world-wide than did accepting the aid and becoming a Soviet colony—for a war against U.S. imperialism in Cuba would have tremendously raised the level of class struggle internationally. Let us never forget that our goal is

the victory of the working class world-wide. Bitter sacrifices may be necessary along the route to our triumph, but **there are no short-cuts**. Our strategy must always be: rely on the working class of the world, refuse any alliances with any capitalists.



SOURCES

The basic sources for the study of Soviet imperialism are the figures issued by the USSR government. These figures are probably somewhat inaccurate, since the Soviet government (like every capitalist government) manipulates data to show themselves in a good light. The Soviet government's own figures show, however, that the USSR is imperialist.

The CIA translates a lot of the Soviet figures and publishes them in articles. We check the CIA articles against the original sources at some places, and everywhere the CIA translations were accurate. The two best places to find this CIA stuff is:

* an annual publication called *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*, put out by the CIA (they used to do it under cover of the State Department). This col-

lects all the news releases from the Soviets about their aid activities and compiles them into some tables and articles.

* a fat volume that comes out every three years from the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee. The latest one, in 1979, was entitled "The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change." Many of the articles in this 2-volume work are by CIA experts who basically present tables of data from Soviet sources. A major theme of the 1979 volume is the increasing dependence of the USSR on the world economy, especially for raw materials. (in the footnotes, this work is called "JEC 79").

Another good source is a U.S. government journal called "Problems of Communism." Many of the articles are factual and can be believed, but most articles are pure propaganda and must be read with scepticism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Data on the number of troops from Castro's speech of 27 December 1979.
2. From USSR government data cited in Goldrich, JEC 79, volume 2, p. 144.
3. From USSR government data in Dohan, JEC 79, volume 2, pp. 372-5.
4. Carter, *The net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid*. He called the profit rate 'the social rate of return on capital.'
5. It was 5.4 rubles of trade per ruble of aid. Cited in Kidron, *Pakistan's Trade with Eastern Bloc Countries*.
6. CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978*.
7. Cooper and Fogerty, JEC 79, volume 2, p. 661.
8. According to the CIA, Erickson and Miller, JEC 79, volume 2, p. 214.
9. The most careful and detailed discussion of Soviet Pricing is in R. Mukherji, *Economics of Soviet Trade and Aid: A Critique*, published in 1978 in India (by Subarnarekha, 73 M. Gandhi Rd., Calcutta 700009). He gives many examples, such as the following:
Average price paid by the USA and the USSR for imported sugar (price in U.S. dollars per metric ton) (calculated from the U.N. Yearbook of International Trade statistics)

1961		1966		1969	
USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR
\$114.50	68.25	130.30	136.20	145.70	134.92

which tells you a lot about the Soviet claim that they pay the Cubans a high price for their sugar!

Anyway, there is a lot of technical detail about the pricing question in the Mukherji book. He ends up endorsing the position of Carter, who wrote in 1971, "It seems realistic to assume that between 1955 and 1968, the Soviet Union probable paid an average of 10 to 15% less for its imports from the less developed countries than it would

have paid, had these commodities been purchased at world prices." (Carter, *The net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid*, p. 41). Carter also found that Soviets charged more for their exports.

The Carter and Mukherji conclusion is that the Soviets buy at low price and sell at high price. Others have disputed this; see the extensive literature cited in the Mukherji book. For instance, Datar, in her *India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe*, says that Soviet prices have been more or less the same as Western prices, or a little worse. (The Soviets claim they use average world prices ("The annual contract price for each commodity will be determined by averaging world prices for the Jan. 76, p. 83). The only scholar to claim that the Soviets give better prices than the world average price is f. Holzman of Tufts and Harvard; his opinion is pretty well disproved by the other authors cited by Mukherji.

10. Dohan in JEC 79, volume 2, pp. 359-60).
11. Goldrich in JEC 79, volume 2, pp. 133-9.
12. Soviet data cited in Valkinien, "The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979.
13. Cited in Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise"—a good article which appeared both in *Review* 1:1 (1977) and in *Economic and Political Weekly* (India) Feb. 1977.
14. See Penner, *The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension*, and Yodfat, *Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror*; two decent books on how the Soviets justified ally-ing with nationalists in the Arab world.
15. The Bolshevik Party under Stalin insisted on self-sufficiency. *Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation*, by R. Day (a careful bourgeois scholar), exposes how Trotsky approved subordinating the Soviet economy to the imperialists on the theory that this would promote growth and that growth would lead automatically to socialism.

No Classless Society

Classes and Class Struggle in the USSR

The study of the class structure of the Soviet Union is essential to understanding the nature of Soviet society today. This study makes no claim to be comprehensive. Instead, it examines a few important areas

concerning the class nature of the present-day USSR: 1) the class composition of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet state; 2) the differences in rewards based on class; 3) how the educational system reproduces the class system; 4) class rule at the point of production and 5) the resistance of the Soviet working class.

The working class (proletariat) and capitalist class (bourgeoisie) are defined by their relation to the control of the factories and fields (the means of production) and to the power of the state. Control, and not just legal ownership of the means of production, determines the distribution of wealth and power in capitalist societies. We have shown this elsewhere with respect to the United States.¹

In the USSR, many of the functions of control over how capital is created and managed are carried out by Party and state officials. In other capitalist societies, these functions are carried out by corporations, although there is increasing state intervention, including ownership. State ownership is not essentially different from private ownership when the state is controlled by a small elite who exploit the working class for maximum profits.

COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY

At the time when the likelihood of inter-imperialist war involving the Soviet Union looms ever larger, a clear understanding of the capitalist nature of Soviet society is critical if the people, and particularly revolutionaries, are not to fall into the trap of siding with any imperialist power against its rivals. Hopefully, this essay is a step toward that understanding.

Two important areas that ultimately concern class relations in the USSR are not fully treated here—the special oppression of women and minority nationalities. There is some detail available concerning racism. A few words should be said here about sexism.

Women are more than fifty percent of the Soviet work force, yet they are mainly in lower-paying jobs and their wages relative to those of men have been decreasing in the post-Stalin era.² Women are tracked into stereotyped education, continue to be inordinately burdened with family responsibilities and are subjected to the whole, familiar gamut of sexist falsifications. The marked advances made by women that characterized Soviet socialism are not the characteristic of the last quarter-century of Soviet history. Most tellingly, women are largely excluded from Soviet decision-making organizations. Women make up about 57% of the Soviet population over 25 years old. Yet, in 1972, women comprised only 24.7% of the CPSU. About 5% of women between the ages of 30 and 60 are Party members, compared to 22% of men. Neither any of the 23 Politburo members (members of the highest CPSU body) nor any of the 75 top government officials, is a woman.³ Only 3-4% of Party Central Committee (the second highest CPSU body) and republican (roughly, provincial or state) Party bureau members are women. Even in the regional soviets (government leadership councils), only 12.5% of executive committee members are women.

Marxism-Leninism, the science of revolution, has always held that rule of a country by its working class, led by a communist vanguard party, is a necessary condition for the existence of socialism. The practice of socialism has repeatedly shown the paramount importance of communist cadre in the development of society. An examination of the class composition of the USSR's leading cadre is therefore essential in determining whether or not that country is socialist.

For at least the first thirty-five years of its existence, the USSR was under sharp attack, externally and internally. It is understandable that its leadership would allocate the vast majority of positions of authority to its most trusted and enthusiastically revolutionary elements, namely, the communists. Most leaders would thus be communists, but most communists should not be those in a position of authority, but rather rank and file workers and peasants, if communists are not to form an "elite" set apart from the people.

In conditions of relative development and stability in a socialist society, the communist party should constantly expand among the rank and file workers. It should strive to expand the control exercised by production workers over every element of social relations, including the positions of the greatest authority. The changing class composition of the CPSU—as the USSR's leading body—is, therefore, a key indicator to be observed in determining whether or not the working class rules the Soviet Union.

By 1973, 68.5% of the CPSU's nearly fifteen million members had joined the party in the post-Stalin era. The top leadership of the Party (the Politburo) remained almost entirely in the hands of individuals who had joined the Party in the 1920's and 1930's. By 1970, over 10% of the obkom (Party leadership committee on the

Neither the conversion into joint-stock companies nor into state property deprives the productive forces of their character as capital. The modern state is only the organization with which bourgeois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external mode of production against encroachments either by the worker or by individual capitalist . . . the more productive forces it takes over as its property, the more it becomes the real collective body of all the capitalists, the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage-earners, proletarians. The capitalist relationship is not abolished; it is rather pushed to an extreme.

**Friedrich Engels
Anti-Duhring**

. . . as long as the wealthy classes remain in power, any nationalization represents not the abolition of exploitation, but only the alteration of its form.

Karl Marx

oblast, or large sub-republican level) first secretaries had joined since 1953. The percentage would have, of course, climbed during the 1970's.⁴ As the Party changes in terms of individuals recruited, it is changing in terms of their positions in society—in terms of class?

The CPSU claims that its percentage of worker and peasant members has not diminished, but in fact slightly increased in the period 1946-1973. At the former date, workers and peasants constituted 33.8% and 18.6% respectively, a total of 52.4%. At the latter date, these groups were 40.7% and 14.7% of the Party, a total of 55.4%, the remainders in both years being termed "intellectuals and employees."⁵

Of course, one does not know exactly who the CPSU considers to be a worker or peasant. It is known, however, that the social composition of the Party is calculated in terms of the class position of Party members **at the time that they joined the Party.** "Party members transferred to white-collar jobs after joining usually continue to be shown as 'workers' or collective farmers' in Party statistics (and that since) such members have always been numerous" there is a serious underestimation in the preferential representation of middle class and bourgeois elements in the Party that is reflected in Soviet statistics.⁶ It is quite conceivable that Brezhnev, who lives in a palace, has several other residences, owns fourteen cars, etc., is classified as a worker in Party statistics, since that was his social class when he joined the Party.

At any rate, workers and peasants remain underrepresented in the Party today. In 1972, workers equalled 59.8% of the population, while peasants equalled 19.3%, a total of 79.1% of the population. Meanwhile, important elements of the middle class are over-represented in the Party. While only 8% of the adult population of the USSR are Party members, half of agronomists, two-fifths of engineers, one-fourth of teachers and one-third of doctors are in the Party.⁷ Yet, if 28% of Party members are workers, workers are about 60% of the population and the Party is 8% of the population, then less than one in 25 workers is a Party member!⁸

These figures for Party membership among workers seem confirmed by a study of Party membership in Leningrad machine-building enterprises, places where one might expect Party membership among workers to be higher than the national average, in light of the long history of the Party in Leningrad's industrial plants. Among unskilled workers, 3.7% were found to be Party members, while between 12.9 and 16.2% of the skilled workers were in the Party.⁹ Only one of every twenty to twenty-five peasants is a Party member, although 19.3% of the population in 1973 were peasants.¹⁰

In the Leningrad factories referred to above, 54.4% of "organizers of production collectives," a

rather nebulous category which may refer to foremen and managers, were found to be Party members. A national estimate is that in industry, at least in heavy industry, as many as half the senior foremen and three-quarters of the shop heads must be Party members and its author adds "The leadership not only requires Party membership for top administrative posts, but also is eager that there be a large reserve of party members in the positions from which the top administrators are chosen."¹¹

It is difficult to estimate the overall number of people with "responsible jobs" in the USSR—the bosses of Soviet society—and to thereby calculate the percentage of this group with Party membership.¹² One estimate speaks of some 200,000 "responsible" full-time Party officials" and "about 300,000" enterprise managers or directors in the Party, for a total of about 500,000 individuals.¹³ If this figure is accurate, then all or virtually all of the Soviet bourgeoisie is in the Party, since a figure of 590,000 directors or leaders (dirigeants) of enterprises, services and organizations has been reported. Hough is quite specific about this. Between 99 and 100% of USSR and republican ministers and deputy ministers, chairmen of district, city and regional Soviets and heads of administrative bureaus of regional Soviets are Party members. Nearly all university presidents, directors of significant plants, collective farm chairmen and army officers above the lowest levels are also in the Party.¹⁴

Such a high correlation between membership in this class and Party membership is to be expected—it may, in fact, be impossible to become a "leader" of Soviet society today without benefit of Party membership and to be a Party member without eventually becoming a member of the "middle" or "upper" class. Perhaps this is what the CPSU means by the "party of the whole people" as opposed to the Marxist-Leninist concept of the Party of the working class. "The Party of the whole people" seems to mean that workers have one chance in 20 or 25 to be in the Party, while middle class professionals have one chance in two to five to be members and managers have every chance in the world.

In the earlier, specialist era of the Soviet Union, the working class composition of the Party continuously increased, perhaps peaking in the early 1930's at about 65% of the Party. In 1932, 92.1% of all Party members were either workers or peasants or had been so when they entered the Party. Of these, 43.8% were workers by current occupation. In 1941, 44.4% of the Party were workers or former workers, about half in each category. No figures for that time are available concerning the percentage of workers in Soviet society, but it is known that in 1928 workers were 12.4% of the population and in 1939 were 33.5% of the popula-

THIS MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN A WORKER AND MANAGEMENT IS SETTLED WITH THE HELP OF THE UNION'S SHOP REPRESENTATIVE IN A LOCOMOTIVE BUILDING PLANT.



Photograph above, shown with original caption, is from an official Soviet magazine. Otherwise, you'd never know that the worker (left) getting screwed by his boss and the union leader is supposedly living under socialism.

tion. Therefore, workers were overrepresented in the Party of the 1930's. In 1936-1939, the rules that had favored admission of workers were dropped and the "proletarian bias" of the Party reversed. In 1929, the enrollment of workers in the Party was 81.2%, the enrollment of peasants was 17.1% of the total and the enrollment of "intelligentsia" was 1.7%. In the 1936-1939 period, comparable figures were 41.0%, 15.2% and 43.8%. By 1946, workers and peasants were thus already underrepresented in the Party.¹⁵

Finally, it is notable that one study of Party recruitment during the period 1959-1970 in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Kirgiziia, Tadzikstan, Latvia, Estonia, Perm and Moscow contains the following statement:

As for workers, we see that for every republic, the percentage of workers in the Party is far below their percentage in the republican population. Further, no republic except Kazakhstan shows a tendency to make the workers' proportion of the Party approach the population proportion. In almost all, in fact, the underrepresentation of this social class is increasing.¹⁶

WHO RULES THE STATE?

A few words should be added concerning class representation in the Soviet government appara-

tus. A very limited amount of data is available that show that elective state and Party posts (and "elective" is used advisedly) are disproportionately allocated to the bourgeoisie and middle class. For example:

- 99% of factory directors are also Soviet local government officials or higher officials, while only 18% of all workers hold one of these posts.¹⁷ Additionally, "some 40,000 nominally elective positions as member or candidate member of district, town and province party committees, are nominally taken up by "managers of industrial, transport, communications and construction enterprises and directors of state farms."¹⁸

- The important decision-making bodies are dominated by top officials. Workers are only represented in a token manner. For example, 81% of delegates to the 23rd CPSU Congress were from the 2.1% of the Party that one observer calls the "top level bureaucracy." Ninety-one percent of the 23rd Central Committee had higher educations, which full time production workers seldom, if ever, undertake, indicating that these Central Committee members were virtually all middle class or bourgeois. Indeed, in 1976, only 4.5% of the Central Committee members were described as workers or peasants, despite the fact that three-fourths of the population fell into one of these two categories!¹⁹

- The Soviet military officer corps is composed

almost exclusively of those with higher educations and thus probably of those of middle and upper class backgrounds, in contrast to the officer corps of the 1930s and 1940s, which was made up of workers and peasants.²⁰

• Other state bodies are led by the “well-educated” and hence middle and upper classes, e.g. the Secretaries of the Republic, **Oblast** and **Krai** (roughly, county) organizations in 1967 had a higher education rate of 97.6%. Even on lower level city and district levels, the rate of higher-educated officials was 91.1%.

Obviously, officials above the local level are chosen almost exclusively from among Party members with higher educations. Yet, the higher education rate for the Party as a whole is only somewhere between 12 and 16%. The average level of education of working people was 8.7 years in 1975. Even on the managerial level, the chairpersons of standing committees have been found to be all from the middle class and bourgeoisie.²¹

This disproportionality did not always exist. In 1947, 7.5% of the Party members had higher educations and 8.8% of Party secretaries on the primary level had such educations; 12.7% on the **Okrug** level had similar educations. That is to say, while in 1947 higher-educated Party secretaries were only slightly over-represented and state secretaries only somewhat more so, twenty years later, people with higher educations are over-represented on the **Okrug** level and higher by about 500%.²² Therefore, middle class and bourgeois elements are greatly preponderate in numbers in the state and Party leadership.

THE MASTERS OF THE WORKPLACE

In a socialist society, workers are supposed to be not only the holders of state power, but also should become progressively “masters of the workplace.” This is accomplished not by the anarchist mechanism of worker ownership of individual enterprises, but through the gradual breakdown of the division of labor. There is a narrowing of the differences between mental and manual labor and genuine worker control of all aspects of enterprise life not allotted to the central agencies of planning. Socialist society steadily restricts the operation of the capitalist law of value as production of commodities for exchange and profit gives way to production for use by the people as the criterion for what should be produced.

Soviet industrial and agricultural enterprises today are organized on strictly hierarchical principles, on ‘relations of subordination’:

... successively higher positions in the organization correspond to ‘functions... which are increasingly managerial’. Such functions are essentially those of planning, coordination and control... The authority of the foreman relative to the workers

under his supervision appears to be of the same order (absolute) as that of the shop superintendent relative to his direct subordinates... accountability is always structured ‘upwards,’ i.e., managerial personnel are always accountable to their superiors, never to those whom they manage, just as they are always appointed to their posts by a ‘higher level’ of management...²³

Proposals from some Soviet sociologists to “harmonize” management have done nothing to alter these relations of subordination, “. . . the exclusion of workers from significant decision making remains intact.”²⁴ Many such sociologists recognize that the legal aspects of property relationships in the Soviet Union are an ‘external cover’ for ‘real economic relations’—‘real’ implying collective control over the utilization and ‘disposal’ of property” by the bourgeoisie.²⁵

Soviet workers apparently also recognize this distinction. Soviet sociologist Artunian’s study of the rural population reveals that two-thirds to three-quarters of low skilled and unskilled Soviet collective and state farm and other rural workers perceived themselves as without influence over important decisions in farms and other rural enterprises. Artunian himself “did not hesitate to draw the obvious conclusion that differences in the legal form of property ownership in the Soviet setting had little impact on the distribution of control over the use of property.” Moreover, “recent studies of urban industrial enterprises . . . served to buttress Artunian’s conclusions.” In contrast, only 9% of high-level managers considered that they had no influence on decision making.²⁶

Under the conditions of the post-1965 “reforms” of the Soviet economy, managers have strengthened their authority in the enterprises.²⁷ These “reforms” were implemented with the purpose of increasing labor productivity. Eighty percent of increases in the quantity of production are now due to increases in labor productivity.²⁸ However, the much-ballyhooed increase in workers’ premia or bonuses that were supposed to accompany the “reforms” did not appear. What appeared was increased emphasis on “labor discipline,” the use of bonuses as a larger part of workers’ income and the increased ability of managers to fire workers and unilaterally allocate other social benefits, such as housing and vacations. These changes have clearly worked to further decrease the power of workers in the enterprises:

A decrease of workers’ rights vis-a-vis management in general is apparent from a look at Soviet statements on managerial authority over workers, on recent Soviet labor legislation and some of the actions of managers toward workers . . . The main spheres in which managers’ initiative has been enlarged are release from work (fir-

ing) and the application of punishments, including reduction in material incentives. The degree of freedom that managers have in this sphere shows the relative weights assigned in the political system to the goals of production and to workers' rights and concepts such as the 'state of the whole people'.²⁹

Since the reforms have increased the directors' leeway in establishing premia and distributing the material incentive funds, the director also seems to be able to unilaterally raise or lower an individual worker's bonus by up to 25% as a "disciplinary measure." At Moscow and Leningrad enterprises, a single unexcused absence or a dismissal means denial of bonus. Directors can thus reduce wage outlays by "adopting stricter policies with workers." The managers are thus generally in favor of "material incentives."³⁰

The trade unions and factory committees in Soviet enterprises are either appendages of management in instituting the "reforms" or are virtually powerless. Regularly, violations of collective agreements by management go unpunished and it "is not difficult for management to obtain the agreement of the union committee's chairman to the former's view on the proper expenditure of incentive funds. . . . In the drafting of production plans, capital investment plans and in the choice of new technology, the union has only a 'consultative' role. Its proposals are in no sense binding, and there is no pretense of joint decision-making. The same is true of any recommendation of the plant's production conferences. . . ."³¹

Both the trade union officials and factory committees not only "frequently do not bother to enforce the work conditions and welfare clauses of the collective agreements or indeed the legislation pertaining to working conditions" and often comply with illegal dismissals, but also say nothing concerning the distribution of bonuses accruing through the enterprise incentive funds." In any case, bonuses from these funds are limited to 3% of a worker's salary, while managers, engineers, etc. may receive bonuses of up to 20,000 rubles (about \$25,000) for "valuable innovation" or 50% of their salaries, if the enterprise wins a competition against other enterprises.³² The principal role of the unions seems to be to quicken the introduction of automation, new technology and "management methods."³³

There are many layoffs in the USSR, especially as the result of the Shchekino experiment. This involves retaining in an enterprise only those workers who are able to master several jobs, firing the others and presumably using the share of the wage fund thus obtained for higher wages for the workers who remain in exchange for productivity agreements.

Shchekino, a petrochemical combine in the Ukraine, began to dismiss workers in this manner in 1967. In 1969, the CPSU Central Committee

approved the experiment and it became an official part of the "reform." By 1973, 1,268 of the combine's work force of approximately 8,000 had been dismissed, including 243 engineers. Labor productivity went up 167% by January, 1973. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975), the "experiment" was spread to about 1,000 enterprises. In the chemical industry alone, 45,500 workers and 10,600 engineers and office employees were dismissed.³⁵

Overall, 10-15% of the work force at the enterprises adopting the "experiment" were dismissed, with one-third to two-thirds of the layoffs resulting from methods of 'combining occupations.'³⁶ The results for the remaining workers were meagre. A Pravda article reported:

. . . when enterprises began a mass shift to work according to the Shchekino method, the USSR State Committee on Labor and Wages, together with other departments, proposed new conditions for the experiment that differed substantially from the

"The exclusion of workers from significant decision-making remains intact."

initial terms. First of all, the point granting the right to transfer the bulk of the wage savings to the material incentive fund and leave this money in the enterprise's collective money box was eliminated. During the second stage of the experiment, nearly 4 million rubles was taken from the Shchekino workers, for example. It is no accident that since 1973 the chemical workers have had to go begging to the ministry every year to get it to pay the prescribed wage supplements. For the past two years, the collective worked virtually without bonuses, and the "13th month" payments workers received were between one-third and one-half what they had been in previous years. As a result, a considerable number of skilled workers and engineers left the enterprise 'of their own volition' in these two years.³⁷

Other Soviet economists reported that bonuses were "insignificant" or "very small" and that besides savings on wages, the "experiment" in-

creases the number of skilled workers in the 'manpower reserve.'³⁸ Small wonder that one observer refers to it as "a latter-day version of P. Stolypin's wager on the 'hardy and the strong',"³⁹ referring to the "reforms" of the arch-reactionary Czarist minister "credited" with accelerating the growth of Russian capitalism in the early twentieth century.

The Shchekino "experiment" and other mass dismissals have led to notable unemployment in the USSR. The increase in job seekers was perceptible almost immediately after the September, 1965 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that approved the "reforms." For example, in Rostov on Don, the number of persons seeking employment rose from 7,900 in 1965 to 10,100 in 1966, with an average of thirty days between jobs and much more time in re-training. A 1965 poll of recently hired workers in four large Gorky plants revealed that 12% had been out of work for more than a month and that 16% had not been employed for up to 30 days.

There is no unemployment relief in the Soviet Union, since its leaders do not publicly admit to the existence of unemployment. Yet, one observer estimates that "perhaps the number of unemployed would be as high as a few million if registration schemes similar to those in effect in Western Europe and the United States were adopted. Not content with not providing unemployment insurance, Soviet managers also often classify workers who are dismissed due to automation as those that have left 'at their own request,' thereby evading responsibility for placement in new jobs."⁴⁰

To deal with the unemployed, the Soviet authorities have established 'employment bureaus for residents' in all cities with a population exceeding 100,000. In the Russian republic and Kazakhstan, "several million" persons were said to have made use of these from 1969 to 1974 and altogether perhaps four to six million workers from Soviet industrial enterprises experienced some period of unemployment since 1970, on the average of 25-30 days.⁴¹

Aside from layoffs, there is considerable turnover in Soviet industry generally. Nearly 60% of all workers change their job every year, about 100 million people. About half of this movement 'is associated with the interests of the development of production and the work force,' perhaps meaning layoffs, transfers and reorganizations. In 1971, there was a 20% turnover in Kubishev oblast. A 25% turnover was reported in Azerbaidjan. One-third of workers in Moscow and the Upper Volga leave their jobs annually. "Often working conditions and safety practices are uppermost" as a reason for quitting." The difference between these figures and the figure of nearly 60% may be accounted for by the difference between inter-enterprise and intra-enterprise movement.⁴²

One reason for the high turnover of workers in

the USSR may be that younger workers attempt to "move up" to higher paying and "higher status" jobs. In general, the Soviet people seem to want to be anything but a worker or peasant. One survey of Soviet working class parents revealed that 78-96% did not want their children to be factory workers, the variation in the figures depending on whether both or only one parent was a worker. High school students surveyed rated steelworker 28th in their preference for an occupation, lathe operator 39th, tractor driver 1st, and carpenter 65th. As one author put it, "the pyramid of job desires is the reverse of the pyramid of existing jobs."

A recent survey of U.S. teenagers revealed that skilled workers' jobs such as electrician, mechanic, plumber and carpenter rated first choice as an occupation for males and secretary was rated first choice by females.⁴³ If these U.S. and Soviet groups are in any way comparable, then either Soviet youth have a low opinion about the conditions of life for a worker or have been taught to believe manual labor "inferior" to mental labor.

Clearly, the Soviet working class is discontented with its lot. A 1973 survey of young workers at a Ukraine locomotive factory found that 66% of the workers were dissatisfied with pay, 71% were dissatisfied with the factory's equipment and 70% were dissatisfied with plant sanitary conditions.⁴⁴ Overall, on the three indexes of dissatisfaction, the rate of dissatisfaction was 18% higher than the level revealed by a survey taken five years earlier. Apparently Soviet workers realize that the changes wrought in Soviet enterprises have adversely affected their interests:

It is evident that managers retain strong powers vis-a-vis workers and have some new ones... the reform has benefited management most; with the weight of the Party allowing this in deed, although not in word, it is just possible that the classic relationship between employer and wage earner may begin to reemerge... If the Soviet state is unable to solve the social problems caused by economic reform, pressure will be felt from at least some of the workers for institutional changes in the enterprise, and perhaps beyond.⁴⁵

WORKERS AND BOSSES— DIFFERENCES IN INCOME

The bourgeoisie is rich, but riches are not what make them into the bourgeoisie. After all, there are some small capitalists who are not as well off as a few skilled workers. What defines the capitalists as a class is not wealth but control over the means of production (the factories, offices, stores, farms, etc.). The bourgeoisie is forced by the laws of capitalism to use their monopoly over the means

Akchi: An Experiment in Socialist Relations of Production

Soviet journals in the late 1960's and early 1970's reported a unique, but short-lived experiment in the socialist organization of production. This was the experiment with relations of production appropriate to a developed socialist society that was carried out at the Akchi state grain farm in Kazakhstan, most probably in 1968-1970. It is of interest not because it had any lasting impact on the organization of productive relations in the USSR. It could not have, since it probably "was aborted (because of) the threat it posed to the power and privileges of 'professional' managers, both in the economic and political spheres." Rather, Akchi is of interest because it served as an example of how aspects of the Leninist principles of the transition to communism can be put into effect at the enterprise level. As Lenin said in *State and Revolution*, socialism will create . . .

an order in which the function of control and accounting become more and more simple—will be performed by each in turn, will then become a habit, and will finally die out as the special stratum of the population . . . Under socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing.

Akchi was an outstandingly successful state farm in terms of the usual Soviet measures of economic performance, namely labor productivity, production costs and profit per worker. Its success, however, was not attributable to any of the standard inputs that might increase economic success, such as a higher level of mechanization, longer hours of work or more educated or experienced personnel. Instead, its success was attributed by the leader of the experiment to the "ability to create a form of work organization in which 'the functions of production and management were not divided' between different occupational strata."

The basic unit of Akchi was the small work team. Its members were paid from the proceeds of the team's 'final output.' There were no individual output norms or piece rates. Working team leaders coordinated

team activities. All members of each team received equal incomes. "Management" consisted of only two people, farm director and book-keeper-economist, these two being called the "coordinating team." Their functions were mainly to maintain relations with the government ministry and supply organizations and to instruct in the new mode of work organization. This "administration" was deliberately limited to overcome "attitudes of 'dependence'" on authority among workers and to reduce overhead costs.

What is most interesting is that the jobs of farm director and work-team leaders were rotated. Directors were chosen from among team leaders, team leaders were chosen from among team members by an 'economic council' composed of the "coordinating team," team leaders and (in some unspecified fashion) the Party and trade union.

This form of organization obviously put into question the usefulness of the bourgeoisie and the distinct stratum of "specialists," denied that technological backwardness could be blamed for poor economic performance in the USSR and showed that successful work performance is compatible with a socialist distribution of rewards. "In short, the Akchi experiment, by moving from the 'judicial' socialization of property to its 'collective management,' projected a form of economic organization that could not help but raise serious questions about the prevailing distribution of power and rewards in the enterprise and in the society at large. This was undoubtedly the principle source of its undoing . . . Thus the only acceptable feature of the Akchi experiment was judged to be a system of payment based on a work groups' finished product ('value levers'). But its efforts to affirm the principle of collective management, to test the feasibility of rotating incumbents of leadership positions, and to reduce the role in the enterprise of privileged strata who were not 'direct producers' were all dismissed (by a sociological journal, *Sotsiolgraheskie issledovannii*, which evidently pronounced the official verdict) as a throwback to 'rudimentary' forms of democracy."



Harvest on a Soviet collective farm

Of course, no "island of socialist relations" can exist long in a sea of capitalism, as numerous utopian socialist experimentors found out in the 19th Century. It would be interesting to see the results of such an experiment in a factory, however, particularly one relying on "high technology." For that matter, it would be useful to merely know how the Akchi workers themselves appraised the experiment.

Akchi did not represent a communist ideal. For example, equal payment to individuals in a work team represents a sort of "egalitarianism" in keeping with neither socialist nor communist principles. Actually, it may have been possible to implement the communist principle of "to each according to his needs" in some modified form appropriate to the level of productivity of the enterprise in a setting like Akchi. Nevertheless, this experiment was one that revolutionaries can look to for a vision of socialism.

* Source: Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: six studies*. White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1977.

** Ya. S. Kapliash, "Public Opinion on Electing Managers" in Murray Yanowitch, Ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes: the issue of participation in management*, p. 69 asked those employed in industry the question "Is it appropriate to elect industrial managers?" One-tenth of rank and file workers and engineers were against such elections, but one-fourth of foremen were, one-third of shop superintendants were, and one-half of managers were.

Leningrad



Kazan



Almatevsk,
Tatar
Republic



Wage range for selected urban areas, 1972

of production for the purpose of expanding their capital. That is, each capitalist must make ever higher profits and plow those profits back into expanding the business and improving the technology, the bourgeoisie uses the profits it steals from workers mostly for accumulating more capital, not for diamond-studded underwear. Still, it is interesting to see how the bourgeoisie rewards itself generously and lives in high style. Certainly, the evidence we present below shows that the Soviet Union is not a socialist society. For under socialism, income differentials are quickly reduced and society works for the communist goal of 'from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.'

Today, the differences in material rewards that are allocated along class lines in the Soviet Union are not only great, but are being reproduced and are expanding. The Soviet Union's minimum wage in 1972 was supposed to be 60 rubles per month. It is now 70 rubles. The average monthly wage for those employed was 130 rubles per month.⁴⁶ However, the wages of workers and peasants were significantly lower: in the mid-1960's a laborer made 50-60 rubles, an office worker, 45-60, a nurse, 45, and a shop assistant 55 rubles. In 1967, the average salary of production personnel in industry was 112 rubles per month, while for state farm workers, the average was 84 rubles per month.⁴⁷

There were rises, in absolute terms, in the wages of Soviet workers in the late 1960's and 1970's, but these increases may have been consumed by inflation, which has been estimated at 4-5% per annum at the end of the 1970's, twice the rate existing at the beginning of that decade and contrasting with an average annual increase in wages of 3-4%.⁴⁸ By 1973, the average wage of workers in Soviet industry was about 146 rubles per month, that of state farm workers, 116 rubles per month, that of trade and service employees, 102 rubles per month and that of collective farmers, 87 rubles per month.⁴⁹

The above-quoted figures reflect only averages. In three studies of workers' income in the middle 1960's, almost 40% of workers were shown to have earned below 50 rubles per month. Wages were significantly lower in non-Russian areas. While in Leningrad in 1965, workers averaged 98-120 rubles, in Kazan, the range was 74-98 and in Almatevsk, in the Tartar Republic, among urban workers, it was 63-95 per month.⁵⁰ All in all, most Soviet workers' incomes in 1970 were probably in the 50-70 ruble range. Thus the proletariat hovers near impoverishment by Soviet standards. A study of one region showed that 32.6% of workers and employees had incomes below 50 rubles per capita per month and 31.2% had income between 50 and 75 rubles. Since the income of farmers is ordinarily lower than that of workers, the poverty

group within that segment of the population must be greater still. Soviet economists calculated in 1967 that a per capita income of 50 R. per month or 200 for a family of four was necessary to "satisfy their minimal requirements." Yet, the average per capita income for workers was then 54 R. per month.⁵¹

Above the workers and peasants in income are, of course, the engineers and technicians. The income gap between workers and these middle strata has, in fact, been narrowing, from a ratio of 1.65 in 1955 to 1.3 in 1970 to 1.27 in 1973.⁵² However, the differential between the lowest and highest pay grades in industry is apparently widening and because of the post-1965 "reforms" there has been a general increase in wage differentials.⁵³

What can be said about the rewards received by the top Party and State officials, the top enterprise directors and leading intellectuals—the highest rung of the *nachalniki*⁵⁴ or "executive class"—in short, the ruling class of the USSR?

"Earners"	Income/R. per month
Brezhnev	900
A Secretary of the Central Committee	700-800
A First Sec. of a Union Republic	600
A First Sec. of an Oblast	600
The Sec. of Partkom, Council of Ministers	500
A Director of a VUZ (research institute)	500-700
A Manager of a large industrial enterprise	350-650
A Manager of a large collective farm	270-300
A Marshall of the USSR	up to 2000
A Major General	600
A Colonel	500
An important Ambassador	500

It should be borne in mind that these are legal, basic "salaries" and by no means correspond to actual received incomes. To consider them so would be like taking the salaries of the presidents of large U.S. corporations apart from their income derived from stocks and bonds, real estate transactions and other "unearned income" and apart from their fringe benefits.

The bourgeoisie's basic income is supplemented by its access to the "nomenclature" system, which enriches it by providing further benefits to those in the most responsible, highly paid and prestigious occupations and "may almost be regarded as an official elite listing." Nomenclature positions are awarded by Party appointment or approval.⁵⁸

Some of the secondary benefits accorded the bourgeoisie through the system include: 1) "Thirteenth month" bonuses and "personal" salaries, perhaps doubling basic income for "outstanding individuals," 2) "Kremlin rations" of 16-32 gold rubles per month, worth several times their face value when used to purchase foreign goods, 3) Honorariums (100 R. per month, for example, for Supreme Soviet deputies) plus free travel, 4) 350-500 extra R. per month for the 2500 Academicians, 5) 100 R. per month for doctors serving in factories, 6) purchasing rights at "distributors" or highly restricted, camouflaged shops where prices are "low, sometimes fictitious"—and where there are no queues; at "restricted outlets," also camouflaged, but selling to occupants of privileged blocks of apartments at prices in some cases half the norm or at "certificate" (foreign currency) shops where some goods are sold at only one-fifth to one-fourth normal price, 7) access to restaurants for Party members, which sell food and "packed commodities" at low prices to special hotels and resorts where paid free vacation vouchers of 300 R. per annum and where family discounts of 25-50% are available, 8) access to dachas rented at a nominal price or given outright, 9) access to the closed system of superior hospitals, clinics and dispensaries of the

Private savings accounts (about 90 billion rubles) draw som 3-4 billion annually in interest for the bourgeoisie.

Considering the 250,000 top earners in the USSR (about one of every 470 employed persons, or some .5%), Party, state and trade union officials comprise 62%, managers 9%, intelligentsia 17% and military commanders, police officials and diplomats 12%.⁵⁵

This breakdown is markedly different from the breakdown provided by the U.S. Census Bureau of a roughly comparable number of top earning Americans (the top 238,000 in 1969). In the U.S., corporately employed managers made up 34.7% of the group; physicians, dentists, etc. made up 29.6%; lawyers and judges 10.4%, self-employed managers, 7%, etc.⁵⁶ This difference is attributable to the fact that the bulk of Soviet top officialdom performs many social functions that would be performed in the "private sector" in the U.S. These are decision making functions that touch upon every aspect of society. The Soviet bourgeoisie amply rewards itself for performing these functions. The following are some examples of basic bourgeois incomes around 1970:⁵⁷

4th Directorate of the Ministry of Health, 10) access to good standard, centrally located housing at nominal rates through manager-controlled enterprise of organization housing funds, 11) use of several thousand chauffeured vehicles, 12) appointment to 40,000 nominally elective Party positions allocated only to enterprise managers which carry ample opportunity for bribes.

The available benefits have been estimated to increase the income of the bourgeoisie by 50-100%.⁵⁹ This may be an underestimate.⁶⁰ At any rate, they "involve a vast increase in the real income of the recipients and, in extreme cases, formal earnings may seem puny besides them."⁶¹ Additionally, higher pensions are, of course, accorded to higher income earners. Also, higher earnings are not drained by a progressive direct taxation rate. For example, a manager earning 600 rubles per month would pay 12.2% of it in taxes, as compared to 23% of a comparable income in Britain. A childless Soviet worker with the average wage pays 15.5% of his or her income in direct taxes. Essential consumer goods are heavily taxed and therefore this tax bears more heavily on the poor. Wealth itself is not taxed and inheritance duties are only about 10%.⁶²

Comparing the U.S. and Soviet bourgeoisies, one finds that the top 5% of U.S. income earners have incomes 12-15 times the average U.S. wage. If the average bourgeois income in the USSR is 500 rubles per month in the USSR (and there are reasons to suspect that it is higher) and benefits add another 400 rubles per month, the average bourgeois income is about seven times the average Soviet income. If one compares this 900 ruble per month figure to a Soviet unskilled laborer's 70 rubles per month, then a 12:1 ratio is achieved. If one compares extremes, i.e. 4000 rubles per month for a Soviet marshall and 40 rubles per month for a poor Soviet peasant, then the ratio reaches 100 to one.⁶³

Obviously, the rewards received by the Soviet bourgeoisie are large enough that it is not exaggeration to state, as Katz has, that "for these top-most *nachalniki*, communism has apparently already arrived: they receive according to their needs." He adds that "In many cases the salary just piles up in a savings account, since they have no need for it."⁶⁴ Indeed, it has already piled up in private savings accounts to the tune of about 90 billion rubles, which draw some 3-4 billion rubles annually in interest for the bourgeoisie, according to one estimate.⁶⁵

However, it must be added that there is evidence that Soviet income differentials are continuously widening as a result of the institution of the "reforms" of the Brezhnev era. These "reforms" placed control of enterprise funds in the hands of managers who, expectedly, allocate larger bonuses, proportionately, to themselves

than to the workers. Soviet sociologist Sotoleva comments that the bonus system has functioned "chiefly to improve the earnings of engineering and technical staff and white collar employees" obviously including managers. In Kiev factories, this author determined that bonuses were 4.7-6.4% of workers' earnings, but 20.3-28.1% and 20.8-23% for engineers and technicians and white collar personnel respectively.⁶⁶

Another study,⁶⁷ shows that managerial income increased 10.3% while workers' income increased 4.1% in 1966 in "new style" enterprises. A 1965 survey of Moscow and Leningrad trucking firms under the "new system" showed that "wages for that year rose from (or decreased from) -9% to +30%, but wages for managers and engineers rose between 40 and 62%⁶⁸" A 1975 report indicated that a survey of 704 firms under the "new system" showed that workers got only 18.1% of profits allocated under the category of "day to day monetary awards," while managers and technicians received the remainder.

What are some of the immediate effects of the wide differential of rewards? Consider the areas of housing and consumer durable goods:


● **Housing**—Soviet sociologist Shkaratan's Leningrad studies of 1965 and 1970 reveal that "strata inequalities" in the distribution of housing have increased and at the latter date, workers had an average of 6.4 square meters per capita, while managers had an average of 8.8 square meters. As one commentator put it, "... (this measure) surely understates strata differences in housing characteristics" since "the provision of families with separate apartments (rather than communal apartments shared by more than one family, dormitory facilities or individual homes)" is seen "as the principal symbol of progress in solving the Soviet housing problem," which is acute.

Several studies indicate that the inequalities in this respect are striking, certainly greater than can be accounted for by occupational differences in many earnings or per capita income. Thus, a 1970 survey of typical cities found that more than four-fifths of engineering-technical personnel lived in separate apartments, while the comparable figure for manual workers was approximately one-third. In Shkaratan's Leningrad study of the same year, some one-fifth to one-fourth of manual workers' families lived in separate apartments of two or more rooms, while more than one-half of managerial families lived in such apartments.⁶⁹ Formerly, there were few class-based neighborhoods. This situation is changing, however:

In newly constructed developments, sponsored by individual organizations, differentiation by building and even by neighborhood is slowly increasing. Departments of ministries, the armed forces, the KGB, the Academy of Sciences, institutions of higher education, factories and

Wage Rates for Selected Groups, 1972

In Rubles, Monthly: 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000



other organizations construct blocks of flats for their employees and workers . . . Not only do those in higher-paid and more prestigious positions receive preference, but because they are well connected, they can use their influence to provide close relatives with flats, even though the latter do not work for the organization that built the house.

Compare two Soviet "communities":

The poorest urban housing class in the USSR, the 'least favored,' are the millions who cluster beyond the limits of large cities. They are also the most segregated. Mainly semi-skilled and unskilled workers, many commute to the city to work, but not by choice. Large population centres are closed to them to prevent Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and others from becoming the Soviet-style Bombays. Beyond the city boundary, with the last high-rise structure still in sight, a harsh rural life-style prevails. Housing in these smaller settlements and towns consists mainly of small wooden huts which are equipped with electricity and some with propane gas to fuel the stove, instead of paraffin or wood. But water has to be drawn from a pump; and an out-house must suffice instead of a flush toilet. There is no central heating and very few have telephones. Shopping is difficult and

cultural and higher educational facilities are generally not available.

'Most favored' are those families living in or near the city centre. These are mainly the political, military, state security, economic, scientific, cultural, educational and worker elite. They are also the most heavily subsidized because they pay the same low rent per square meter as those living communally. Thus, the most advantaged become the beneficiaries of redistributed social wealth and even more so because they can pass it on to their children.⁷⁰

● **Consumer durable goods.** In a study in the Urals area in the late 1960's, it was reported that 20% of workers owned refrigerators, 57% owned washing machines and 11% owned vacuum cleaners, while among "Technical specialists," the figures were 56%, 82% and 37% respectively. A comparison of the ownership of certain durable goods in a city devoted to scientific research, Akademgovodk, which is "likely to understate the range of inequalities between urban strata in the society at large," reveals that, for example, among directors of research institutes, schools, hospitals and senior research personnel, 68% had vacuum cleaners, 45% had a piano or accordion, 22% had a car or motorboat, while for "low skilled workers and service personnel," the proportions were 10%, 8% and 8% respectively.⁷¹

The data cited above do not distinguish be-

tween the bourgeoisie and proletariat. If they did, one could expect much wider differences than those already significant ones shown.

CLASS REPRODUCTION THROUGH EDUCATION

Difference in incomes provide one basis for the reproduction of social classes in the USSR. There, as in other "developed" societies, class reproduction is to a great extent a function of differentiated access to educational opportunities. Katz notes, for example, that while an "able and politically loyal activist with very little education would have made it to the top in the early period of the Soviet system," today, just to be admitted to a higher Party school, one must be a university graduate.⁷²

The ability of workers and their children to acquire advanced education and skills, to move into positions of responsibility, is another determinant of a socialist society. The consideration of political criteria in the selection of candidates for such training is essential if society is to continuously undergo the revolutionization that marks the transition from capitalism to communism.

The use of such political criteria and a striking upward mobility of workers in terms of responsibility was characteristic of socialism in the "Stalin era." Educational opportunities for workers were mainly fostered through a parallel system of full-time educational institutions. These institutions were eroded during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, until in the 1970's, the "parallel" system consisted almost exclusively of part-time students chosen mainly on the basis of "educational capability." As we shall see, these institutions are part of a "tracking" system along class lines and, in that sense, function in a manner not dissimilar to U.S. community or junior colleges.⁷³

The tendency to "transmit economic and social inequalities across generations"—to reproduce a class structure via the educational system—begins with the end of the obligatory minimum of eight years of schooling, a stage, interestingly enough, attained by 85-90% of school-age Soviet children at the beginning of the 1970's.⁷⁴ At this point, 1) a child either goes into the 9th grade of a ten-year general education school (the main path to higher education at a VUZ), or university-level institute of technology, 2) enters a **tekhnikan**, or specialized secondary school to become a technician, semiprofessional or—increasingly in recent years—a skilled worker, with a slight chance of later advancement to a VUZ, 3) enters a **prof-tekhnuchische** or lower-level vocational school that prepares semi-skilled or skilled workers; with a very slight change of later entering higher education or 4) enters the work force full-time, perhaps with part-time schooling in the evenings or by correspondence.

85% of Soviet school age children in the early

1970's continued education full-time beyond eighth grade. A 1970 breakdown showed proportions of children taking the four different paths at the end of eighth grade: 1) 60.1%, 2) 11.1%, 3) 16.4% and 4) 12.5%. A study in Leningrad in 1968 is apparently the only one that differentiates between four occupational categories (the "highest" occupation being taken in case of mother and father having different positions). 25% of low-skilled workers' offspring entered ninth grade, 52% of skilled workers' offspring did so, 70% of the offspring of specialists in jobs requiring secondary specialized education did likewise and 86% of the offspring of specialists in jobs requiring higher education entered 9th grade. The contrasting figures for entering work or going to vocational skills school (which means entering work as a proletarian 12-18 months later), for the four groups were 50%, 21%, 15% and 3%. Studies in other cities in the 1960's and 1970's seem to confirm this pattern, but with a less exact breakdown categorically.

The differences in ability to continue education beyond eighth grade are not entirely related to educational performance. The 1968 Leningrad study showed that "at given levels of pupil performance, there are marked disparities in the proportions of youngsters continuing their general education, and these disparities are related to occupational status . . . The results provided unmistakable evidence of substantial social inequalities in access to advanced general education (and hence in future opportunities for higher education) among youngsters with similar levels of academic performance."

For example, only 19% of low skilled workers' children with "low" grades continued their general education, yet 77% of "upper-strata" children with low grades continued their general education. In fact, "the highest-ranking groups in the occupational hierarchy sent a larger proportion of their 'low' scoring children to the ninth grade than working-class parents sent on their 'high scoring' children." Moreover, "dropping out" of 9th and 10th grades occurs more frequently among the offspring of workers than among the offspring of the "intelligentsia" and "higher" families.

As Yanowitch put it, "as one follows the movement from eighth to tenth grade, one perceives a declining component of working-class children." Meanwhile, in some cities, workers' children account for 90% of the student body of vocational schools.

Of course, some of the disparities are, as in all capitalist countries, accounted for by differences in parental expectations—but this is a two-edged sword. Parents who live in relative poverty can hardly be expected to pass up the opportunity for a needed extra income from an early school leaver. They may also suspect that their children have been and will be discriminated against on a class basis. Also, they are not able to provide the

physical surroundings and constant attention to childhood needs that the "professionals"—not to speak of the bourgeoisie—are often able to provide. In fact, Katz presents evidence that one-quarter of young people who leave their studies do so because of material need.⁷⁵

Moving along to the area of access to higher education, it is first noteworthy that with the expansion of Soviet secondary education, a declining percentage of secondary graduates are able to gain full-time VUZ admission; 65% did in 1950-1953, 19% did in 1970-1973. This narrowing has had a marked effect on the percentage of working class students in the VUZ's:

In the earlier years, however small the number of working class and peasant youngsters completing secondary schools, a significant proportion could expect to gain entry to higher education. However, in more recent years, the failure of VUZ admissions to keep up with secondary school graduations, combined with a student selection process based largely on competitive entrance examinations, has cut into lower-strata graduates' opportunities for VUZ admissions more sharply than those of the typically better prepared youngsters from intelligentsia families.

There are extra-mural courses that were supposedly created to help working-class students gain access to higher education. However, the children of non-worker families also tend "to dominate extra-mural courses and use the channels created for workers and peasants to their own benefit."⁷⁶ A similar situation occurred where white applicants flooded New York City's "open admissions" programs to public colleges in that city, a program supposedly designed to benefit minority students.

Working-class students do, of course, apply to the VUZ's, but the share of those admitted is less than their share of applicants, since entrance is based on competitive exams. The higher the educational level of parents of exam takers, the more likely the applicant will be successful on the exams, just as with the U.S. Scholastic Aptitude Tests.

Just as in the U.S., "coaching" plays a considerable part in preparation for these exams. One study of Gorki State University entrants reported that of those from "employees" families, every fourth one had a tutor for the exams; among those from worker families, one in twenty had one, among peasant students, none at all. Another aid that many bourgeois and intelligentsia background students have in achieving admission to higher education is that they might have attended one of the elite boarding schools, which are mainly populated by students of such backgrounds and graduation from which is 'the best recommendation for admission to university.'⁷⁷

Just as has been shown with respect to secondary education, so too in admission to higher education, youth from the "intelligentsia" with inferior high school performance had greater opportunities for VUZ admission than children of unskilled workers with high academic ratings.⁷⁸ Small wonder then that in the late 1960's only 30% of university students were from worker or peasant backgrounds, despite the fact these groups made up more than 75% of the Soviet population. "Specialists" children made up almost 50% of the student body, 2½ to 3½ times the representation of "specialists" in the population. Almost all children of "elite groups . . . pass competitive exams into college and graduate."⁷⁹


Compared to other capitalist countries, the Soviet Union's "egalitarianism" does not exactly shine through. Working class students make up only 5% of the university student bodies in West Germany and the Netherlands, but 25% in the U.K. and Norway. Since Britain and Norway probably have larger middle classes than the USSR, the Soviet Union's inequality in this regard is all the more apparent. Additionally, it is suggested that university students in the USSR from the "privileged" groups have an even more favorable chance for graduation than they do for admissions, relative to working class students.⁸⁰ Another study by Gorki State University sociologists in 1970 has shown that youth of working class origins were declining as a proportion of the student population in recent years, yielding a "self-reproducing" intelligentsia and bourgeoisie.⁸¹ Matthews mentions a fall in the proportion of "production candidates" workers, nominated by their enterprises for VUZ admission, from 62% of total intake during the "educational reforms" of the early 1960's to 23% in 1973. Shkaratan states that 65% of the children of personnel in skilled mental work, highly skilled scientific work or technical work or executive work attain higher education, while only about 3% of the Soviet adult population has received such education. A study of high school graduates in Novosibirsk reveals that 82% of "intellectuals" children go on to higher education, while only 18% of peasants' children who graduate do so.⁸²

SOCIAL MOBILITY

During its first forty years, and particularly during the "Stalinera," the Soviet Union could justifiably boast that its leadership was of humble origins, in contrast to the leading elements of capitalist societies. Not only were managers and high Party officials of working class origin, but they were themselves former workers or peasants.⁸³ A study by Popov and Dzhavados showed that 70% of all ministers and heads of state committees began their working life as workers or peasants, while over 50% of the directors of the largest industrial enterprises had been workers.

SOVIET TOP EARNERS:
 1/2 of 1% of total population

% of Top Earners



% of Top Earners

U.S. TOP EARNERS:
 1/2 of 1% of total population

Fitzpatrick cites a Soviet study that states that by the beginning of the Second 5-Year plan, half the directors of industrial enterprises and their deputies were former workers and mentions that the policy of the Soviet leadership was to promote industrial workers and Communists of working class origin into jobs as engineers and professionals in administration, government and exchange. A policy of recruiting adult workers without a full secondary education into the universities and workers with a primary education into the higher technical schools existed.

While it will soon be the case, if it is not already, that most "leaders" in the USSR are not former workers—the second string of management is of higher social origins at present—it is increasingly also the case that most are not even the offspring of workers. Rutkevich and Filippov's 1970 study showed, for example that 100% of specialists between the ages of 20 and 25 at the wood-working factory "Ural" in 1967 were sons of "white collars"; Arutyuyan's study in Kazan showed that there has been a sharp increase in the number of managers of white collar origin since the mid-1950's.⁸⁴

There is no significant downward mobility among children of the intelligentsia; "individuals of nonmanual social origins predominate among the incumbents of... 'elite' occupations."⁸⁵ In one city, Ufa, studied in 1970, it was shown that only between one-fourth and one-third of working class children were "upwardly mobile" to so broad

a status as "non-manual specialist." In the rural environment, only 15% of children of the workers and peasants move into specialists' positions.

"The proportion of intelligentsia children attaining specialists' occupational status is some two to three times the comparable proportion among workers' children. Most intelligentsia parents are able to transmit their occupational status to their children, while the majority of peasant and working class parents... cannot reasonably expect to see them rise out of manual occupations. The opportunities for such children to attain intelligentsia status are also less than those of lower-level nonmanual employees. These are the broad features of the Soviet mobility patterns which appear in the Ufa study and which recur in whatever other studies are available."⁸⁶

Not surprisingly, it is also the case that most members of the "elite" draw their friends from the same groups.⁸⁷ The top bourgeoisie, of course, was not distinguishable as a group in any Soviet study, but Matthews has compiled a list of the occupations of many of the children and the spouses of children of Politburo members. None became workers or peasants. Virtually all are either in the bourgeoisie themselves or are in what would be called the "upper middle class" in the U.S., with most in the latter category.⁸⁸

In conclusion, it appears then that the pattern of class reproduction for both bourgeoisie and proletariat is similar to that in the U.S. and other capitalist societies.

THE "PRISON-HOUSE OF NATIONS"

The development of capitalist rule in the Soviet Union has brought with it a return to the policies of "Russification" and oppression of national minorities that marked the regime of the Tsars so strongly that Imperial Russia was known as the "prison-house of nations."

The USSR is a multi-national country, with an official count of 109 nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Jews, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Turkmenis, Kirghizis, Tatars, Azerbaidjanis, to name just a few. They are divided into Slavic and non-Slavic European groups, Caucasian and "non-European" nationalities. * Russians are about 53% of the population. Together with other Slavic nationalities, they total about 75% of all Soviet citizens although the proportion is declining as the Central Asian population increases.*

During Tsarist days, the regime followed a policy of ruthless imposition, by law and by force, of Russian culture throughout the Empire, and the suppression of other languages and cultures. The teaching of Russian was mandatory in the schools; other national languages were discouraged. The Russian Orthodox Church, with official support, proselytized vigorously, and pogroms against Jews were carried out by proto-fascist groups such as the "Black Hundreds," of which Nicholas II, the last Tsar, was an honorary member. Central Asia was essentially treated as a colony by the Russian imperialists, and Russians settled in great numbers in many non-Russian areas, dominating government and society there.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, they reversed this policy of national oppression and adopted a principled position of abolishing all national privileges and restrictions. They worked actively to promote political, social and economic autonomy among the minority peoples, and looked to a future state in which all national distinctions would disappear. To achieve these goals, the new government forbade new colonization by Russians in some areas, stopped enforced use of Russian in Soviet schools, and urged respect for local traditions that were not in conflict with socialism. Minority nationality leaders were encouraged to fill leadership positions.

Unfortunately, beginning in the late 1930s, and continuing through World War II, the fight against Russian nationalism was abandoned. This was in part because the leadership felt that this nationalism would aid in mobilizing the people against the fascist onslaught. It is ironic that many of the top Soviet leaders of the time were themselves non-Russian, among them the Georgians

Stalin and Beria, and Kaganovich, a Jew. Under the capitalist-readers who came to power with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the policy of Russification returned in full bloom, with widespread effects in education, health, housing and the economy. This reintroduction of oppression has taken place in spite of—or perhaps because of—the fact that non-Russians, especially "non-Europeans," including Central Asians, are an ever-growing portion of Soviet population.

NATIONAL OPPRESSION TODAY

Recent studies* of socio-economic developments have shown that the unequal development of European and non-European areas of the Soviet Union, which Bolshevik policies had narrowed sharply, began to widen again during the 1950s and 1960s, and probably continue to grow. The question may be raised as to whether the non-Russian, and generally, non-European areas were getting relatively poorer in spite of or because of the policies of the Soviet rulers. Zwick indicates that the non-European nationalities were losing ground relative to the European nationalities because of Soviet policy: "The data . . . indicate that the 'worse off' a union republic was socio-economically, the smaller its per capita socio-cultural budget, as compared with those of other republics, was likely to have been over the subsequent ten year period. This was equally true for both decades." This means that instead of pumping capital into the areas of the Soviet Union that were traditionally poorer, as the Soviets did under Lenin and Stalin, the new capitalist rulers had a "budgetary policy (that) appears to have exacerbated the pre-existing differences."

This is similar to what has been happening in the U.S. with respect to black-white socio-economic differences. Just as blacks here are becoming poorer relative to whites despite a short period of modest gains immediately after the ghetto rebellions of the 1960's, so too are non-Europeans in the USSR becoming poorer relative to Europeans—because of the reversal of working-class power in that country.

Looking at just a few of the comparisons that might be made among the Soviet nationalities, one finds that in 1970:

- "European" republics of the USSR accounted for the top half of a ranked order of national income per capita, while Caucasian and Central Asian republics were all in the bottom half. For example, the per capita income of Russians was twice that of inhabitants of Tadzhikis.

- "Trade turnover"—a leading economic indicator—in the European areas was generally 2-3 times higher than in the Central Asian republics.

* SSSR v tsifrah. Krothii statisticheskii sbornik. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Statistika," 1968.

* Helene Carrere d'Encausse. *L'Empire eclate: la revolte des nations en URSS*. Paris: Flammarion, 1978, p. 105.

* Peter Zwick. "Ethnoregional Socio-Economic Fragmentation and Soviet Budget Policy" in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXI, #3, July 1979, pp. 380-400.

A Revival of Official Anti-Semitism

Under the Tsars, anti-semitism had official sanction and the Tsar himself was an honorary member of the "Black Hundreds," the murderous proto-fascist group that carried out the infamous "pogroms." With anti-semitism returning to favor along with capitalism, the

Text translated from the Soviet Bulletin USSR, Paris, 9/22/72, p. 9:

(1) The world belongs to the sons of the Almighty Jehovah, but they may use any kind of camouflage. All the property of unbelievers belongs to them only temporarily—until the moment when they pass into the possession of the "chosen people." And when the "chosen people" becomes more numerous than all other peoples, "God will give them to it for final annihilation."

(2) Here are concrete rules which determine the relationship of the Jews to all other peoples, contemptuously called by them, "goys," "akums," "Nazarenes" [i.e., Christians].

(3) Akums are not to be considered human beings (Orakh-Khaiim, 14, 32, 33, 39, 55, 193).

Text by Rossov, Member of the Black Hundred—St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 15:

(1) The world, according to the doctrine of the Shulchan-Arukh, must belong to the Jews, and they, for convenience in taking possession of this world, may adopt "any disguise they wish." The property of the "goys" belongs to them only temporarily until its passing into Jewish hands. And when the Jewish people becomes more numerous than other peoples, then "God will give all of them to it for final annihilation."

(2) Here are literal rules from certain sections of the Shulchan-Arukh which define the relationship between Jews and goys, akums, and Nazarenes.

(3) Akums are not to be considered human beings (Orakh-Khaiim, 14, 32, 33, 39, 55, 193).

USSR's new bosses did not have far to look for anti-semitic material to publish, as is shown in the reprints below from a Black Hundreds leaflet claiming to explain Jewish law, and an official bulletin published by the Soviet Embassy in France.

(4) A Jew is strictly forbidden to save from death an akum with whom he is living in peace.

(5) A Jew is forbidden to treat an akum medically, even for pay, but he is permitted to test the effect of medicines on him (Iore-Deia, 158).

(6) When a Jew is present at the death of an akum he should rejoice at this (Iore-Deia, 319, 5).

(7) To allot anything good to an akum or to make a gift to an akum of anything is a great sacrilege. It is better to throw a piece of meat to a dog than to give it to a goy (Khoshen-hamishnat, 156, 157). However, it is permitted to give alms to poor akums or to visit their sick in order that they may think that Jews are their good friends (Iore-Deia, 151, 12).

(4) A Jew is strictly forbidden to save from death (if, let us suppose, he is drowning) even an akum with whom he is living in peace.

(5) In accordance with this, a Jew is forbidden to treat an akum medically, even for pay, but he "is permitted to test on him a drug as to whether it is useful" (or harmful) (Iore-Deia, 158).

(6) When a Jew is present at the death of an akum, he should rejoice at this event (Iore-Deia, 340, 5).

(7) To allot something good to an akum or make a gift of something to an akum is considered a great sin. It is better to throw a piece of meat to a dog than to give it to a goy (Khoshen-hamishnat, 156-7). However, it is sometimes permissible to give alms to the poor from among the akums or to visit their sick, in order that they may think that Jews are good friends to them (Iore-Deia, 151, 12).

● There were two to three times as many doctors per ten thousand population in Russia and the Baltic republics as in Central Asia. Over the period 1960-1971, the disparity grew bigger.

● There were about 4-9 books published per speaker of a Baltic language or Russian language. There were about one or two books published per speaker of a Turkic language.

● The per family revenues on collective farms in the European republics (except tiny Moldavia) ranged from 107 to 182% of the national average. The incomes in Central Asia ranged from 58 to 78% of the national average.*

The socialist policy of preferential treatment for minorities who were historically specially oppressed under capitalism has thus given way to a policy of "preference" for Russians. Thus, while Russians are about half the population, they are nearly two-thirds of the Communist Party membership. Except for Georgians, Armenians and, perhaps, Jews, all other national groups are under-

represented. The differences between the proportion of communists in the Russian population and the proportions among the Central Asians is particularly striking. For example, there were, in the 1970's, 74 Russian communists for every 1000 Russians, but only 35 Uzbek Communists for every 1000 Uzbeks. The Slavs are overrepresented in the Party by about 10%; the Turkic peoples are underrepresented by more than 50%. Moreover, in some Central Asian republics, e.g. Kirghizia and Turkmenistan, the underrepresentation of Communists of the Central Asian nationalities actually increased in the period 1959-1970.*

Russians participate considerably in the Party structures of non-Russian republics, while non-Slavs do not generally participate in Party work in republics other than their own. For example, while the first secretaryship of the republic parties is usually held by a "native," the second secretaryship is always held by a Russian, and the heads of the republican secret police, the chiefs of industry, agriculture and education are usually Russians.

Overall, the Slavs are disproportionately represented in the more influential and remunerative

* Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Harned. *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*. N.Y., Free Press, 1975, pp. 452-454, 458-459. Also, Carrere d'Encausse, p. 144.

* Carrere d'Encausse, p. 164, Katz, p. 449.

'Two Incidents in the Caucasus'

[From Grigori Svirskii, *Zalozhniki [Hostages]* (Paris: Les Editeurs Reunis, 1974), pp. 285-86.]

I was once walking through Ossetia with a group of hikers and mountain climbers. In a certain village an old man came up to us and said: "We are inviting you to a wedding. The whole village will make merry, but you"—and he pointed at me—"mustn't come." So I stayed behind to guard the group's baggage. I was sitting there, reading a book, and all of a sudden I saw that the main street of the village was filled with dust, as if Budenny's cavalry was galloping through, I was grabbed and dragged along. The bride and groom shouted: "Forgive us, dear friends!" They dragged me to the wedding, poured Ossetian liquor (araka) into a huge horn and gave it to me to drink. I asked my friend what had happened. Why hadn't they invited me previously but

now honored me as their most valuable guest? It turned out that my friend had asked the old man beforehand and he had explained proudly: "We do not invite Georgians!" My friend said that I was not a Georgian. Then the old man cried out that he had just mortally offended a person and he—that person—would take revenge. And then the whole wedding, in order that there would not be a vendetta, broke up and went after me... The next day the old man came to find out whether I had forgiven him for taking me for a Georgian...

When our trip was finished, we went down to Tbilisi. In the evening we went for a walk. Two tipsy citizens came up and said something in Georgian. I didn't understand. Then one of them brandished his fist and hit me in the ear. I fell. Someone in an entryway of the hotel called out: "Our people are being beaten up!"

The mountain climbers dashed out of the hotel and a fistfight began.

Now we are at the police station. There is conversation in Georgian. And suddenly the man who hit me rushed to my passport, which was lying on the table, studied it, and came over to me, saying: "Forgive me; we thought that you were an Armenian from Erevan. Let's go and party." I barely escaped from them.

In our group of climbers, half were from the Baltic area. They were excellent athletes. After this happened we became close friends, but when they were talking about something and we approached, they fell silent, and when I asked what the matter was, they answered: "After all, you're a Russian."

When I arrived back in Moscow, I found out that I had not been confirmed as a member of the editorial board of a literary journal because I was a Jew.

occupations. Two thirds of all scientists are Russians. It is also noteworthy that in the military, Central Asians are channeled into the less skilled construction corps, while the highly technical artillery divisions are 90% Slav. The officer corp is almost 90% Russian,

This gap is perpetuated and spread through the concentration of Soviet education and science in Russian cities, such as Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk, as well as by the preference given to Russian speakers in admission to schools and jobs. Most newspapers and books are published in Russian, and Russian-language schools tend to be much better equipped and staffed than those teaching in minority languages. In addition, most minority-language schools end at the eighth grade. Small wonder, then, that Russians are heavily overrepresented among university students and graduates—the "intellectual elite"—while most others are underrepresented.*

Alongside the growing gap in living standards is the official promotion of Russian nationalism, which often takes a violently racist form. The Russian "new right" ideology is really just a Slavophile version of fascist ideology. (See box p.65). Russian nationalism is promoted through the officially sponsored Rodina (Motherland) Club and the Society for the Preservation of Antiquities and Historical Monuments. Ostensibly these organizations study Russian "folk culture." Yet, their "intellectual" members carry out in

practice the anti-Semitic and anti-Asian chauvinism advocated by formerly "underground," but officially-connected "dissident" organizations, such as the Social Christian Union for the liberation of the People (VSKhSON) and the newspaper *Beche*. The ideas of these racist, Russian nationalists have been publicized through the journal of the Central Committee of the youth section of the CPSU, *Molodaia gvardiia (Young Guard)*.* The Soviet leaders have even taken to reprinting anti-Jewish texts of the Czarist Black Hundreds. (See box p.64) Of course, Russian nationalism, especially in its blatantly racist form has not failed to provoke a nationalist response among those who are its targets, but it has also been a fighting response, as seen perhaps through the clashes between Russian chauvinists and Uzbeks during the Tashkent football matches of 1969 and the Lithuanian protests of 1972-1973.*

What emerges from any detailed study of the interaction of the present Soviet government and minority nationalities is a picture of accelerating national oppression, particularly against central Asians and Jews. The universal adage that "where there is oppression, there is resistance" also applies in the USSR, however. Eventually that resistance is bound to crystallize and explode. The main question is whether the explosion will take a nationalist form and connect up with Western imperialism or will take a socialist, multi-national, and hence, truly liberating form.

* Katz, p. 456.

* Alexander Yanov. *The Russian New Right: A right-wing ideologies in the contemporary USSR*. Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978.

* Katz, pp. 19-20. Also, Frederick Barghoorn, "Four Faces of Russian Ethnocentrism" in Edward Allworth, ed. *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: the dilemma of dominance*. N.Y. Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 55-66.



Although working-class resistance in the USSR is relatively weak and unorganized today, the past holds a lesson for workers and a warning for the bosses. Soldiers at left, sent to break a 1917 strike rebelled and fraternized with the workers instead.

WORKING CLASS RESISTANCE

It is difficult to obtain the necessary information for gauging the degree of organized working class resistance to the Soviet regime because it is not wont to publicize such discontent or allow others to do so. However, one source⁸⁹ has compiled something of a record of known organized resistance, which is not unimpressive, considering the probability that much more organized resistance has escaped notice outside the USSR. A chronological record is here presented in tabular form:

KNOWN WORKING CLASS STRIKES AND REBELLIONS: USSR, 1956-1973

1956—"Stormy meetings" in factories connected with the results of the 20th Party Congress. Members of the Politburo hooted down as 'representatives of the new wealthy.' Uprisings in Tbilisi, Georgia over denunciations of Stalin by Khrushchev.

1959—"Riots" at Temiv-Tau metallurgical complex in Kazakhstan over pay cuts and food shortages.

1960—Demonstrations in Kemorovo, Kuzbas basin, Siberia over pay cuts and food shortages.

1961—Strike in Rostov on Don to protest "currency reforms" which lowered workers' living standards.

1962—Mass meetings, strikes and demonstrations throughout USSR, notable at Grosny, Krasnodar, Donetsk, Yaroslav, Zhadanov, Gorky and Moscow to protest price increases. Major rebellion in Novercherkassk, Donbas region. Regional strike committee apparently established. Strikes in Odessa and Kiev to protest food shortages.

1967—Strike at Kharkov Tractor Factory. Demonstrations in Chimkent after police shooting of worker.

1968—Demonstration of Crimean Tartars in Chirchik to demand restoration of national rights.

1969—Strike at Kiev Hydro-Electric Station over housing problem. Strike at Sverdlovsk oblast rubber factory over salary cuts, food shortages. Strike in Krasnodar, Kubas and Gorky over food and other consumer good shortages.

1970—Strikes in Vladimir. Strikes by workers in Ukraine and Byelorussia in solidarity with Polish workers' uprising.

1971—Strike at largest Soviet equipment factory in Kopeyske, Cheliabinsk oblast.

1972—Strikes and "riots" in Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzhezhinsk, Ukraine for better living conditions, provisioning and right to choose job. Uprisings in Kaunas, Lithuania against national oppression.

1973—Thousands of workers in machine building factory in Kiev strike. Demand higher pay. Salaries increased and top administrators of factory fired. Strike at Vytebsky's largest factory to protest 20% drop in wages through new work norms. Scores of strikes at Moscow and Leningrad construction sites.

A number of gaps are evident in the chronology (1957-58; 1963-1966). These gaps are more likely the result of the absence of reportage rather than the absence of resistance. It is, of course, difficult to discern the magnitude of resistance generally from the small amount of information provided above. Suffice it to say that a number of incidents reported there have involved genuine uprisings in which thousands or even tens of thousands of workers participated, most notably those in 1956 in Georgia, at Novbocherkassk in 1962, in Chimkent in 1967 and at Dniprotrovsk-Dniprodzhezhinsky in 1972. In all, hundreds of workers and a few police were probably killed in the fighting and repression and unknown hundreds or even thousands were arrested.

Most strikes and uprisings seem to have occurred over wage cuts, price hikes or consumer goods shortages. A few have been related to national oppression. That such strikes and uprisings, which could not have taken place without at least a modicum of pre-planning even if they were made to appear spontaneous to protect the identity of strike organizers, have taken place at all is a sign of the restiveness of the Soviet workers and a testimony to the combative spirit of those who must organize under conditions of fascist-like repression.

There has also been at least one report of restiveness in the Soviet armed forces.⁹⁰ Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov has indicated that armed forces recruits are 'not yet conscientious builders and defenders of the new society.' During the 1962 workers' uprising in Novocherkassk,

"Officers and soldiers refused to use their arms against the people and security forces had to be called out." An exiled Soviet novelist, Vladimir Maximov recalled "Soviet officers and soldiers asking after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: 'Why did the Czechoslovak army not oppose us? We would have sided with the Czechs.'" In 1968-72, Soviet occupying forces in Czechoslovakia had to be changed four times. In 1969, several naval officers were arrested for belonging to an opposition organization of unknown character and Soviet officers of a Baltic Fleet squadron visiting France in 1970 expressed opposition to the regime.

The crew of the guided missile destroyer **Storozhevoy** apparently mutinied in the Baltic in November, 1975. "According to Swedish monitors, the **Storozhevoy** was intercepted by Soviet naval units before it could reach the Swedish port of Gothenburg. Fifty Soviet sailors were reported to have been killed during the incident." No reason has been given for the mutiny and, of

...genuine uprisings
in which thousands
or even
tens of thousands of
workers participated...

course, with the exception of the defiance at Novocherkassk the outlook of Soviet military opponents of the regime is not obvious.

There are also reports of strikes and uprisings in the more than 1,000 Soviet "labour reform camps," where about one million prisoners are confined. The Chinese report that prisoners in a 6000 prisoner camp in Kazakhstan refused to work unless conditions were improved and troops were dispatched who fired on the prisoners. An "insurrection" against repression is said to have been launched in the Potma camp in 1970 and fifty prisoners may have been killed. Hunger strikes supposedly occurred in camps in Mordovia and Perm in 1973-1974.⁹¹

The concern of Soviet authorities with a rise in working class discontent is evidenced by a strengthening of the "security" apparatus in recent years:

Since 1965, and especially since 1967, many new organizations have been estab-

lished to reinforce the police and special agent departments. The power of police has widened, the number of policemen greatly increased and professional security officers, night shift police stations and motorized police units set up. Furthermore, a series of new laws have been put into effect to 'strengthen the social order in all fields of law.' Ordinances, decrees and laws such as the one passed in July, 1969, which emphasized the suppression of dangerous political offenders, mass riots and the murder of policemen, re-

The Soviet proletariat lacks an organization at present that could carry on the underground struggle with a Marxist-Leninist perspective and there is no evidence that any such organization is on the horizon. There are a number of objective and ideological barriers to the formation of such an organization. The police apparatus is highly practiced and, of course, can call upon innumerable "social organizations," including the CPSU and trade unions to ferret out *sub rosa* organizers. Additionally, the attractiveness of Marxism-Leninism has not only been marred by its association, however fanciful, with the Soviet rulers, but also by its corruption by the present day leaders of China, who, for a period, offered

flect a new emphasis on 'law and order.' There is also an unprecedented promotion of KGB security chiefs to positions in the central and republican politburos.⁹²

While vigorously breaking up groups of "neo-Leninists" and "neo-Marxists," the Soviet secret police has apparently tolerated the existence of Russian nationalist and even fascist publications.⁹³

The Soviet authorities also encourage alcoholism by making alcohol cheap and easily available. They hope that unhappy and militant workers will get drunk instead of fighting back.

this ideology, but have now thoroughly junked it in favor of an alliance with the world's worst imperialists and fascists.

Nevertheless, as the conditions of life for Soviet workers further deteriorate and the "hereditary" aspect of class formations in the USSR becomes more obvious, the Soviet workers will likely express their rebelliousness not only in strikes and uprisings, but also in the formation of an organization that intends to sweep away the Soviet capitalist rulers. If the Soviet and U.S. rulers drag the working class into a war, it is all the more likely that the Soviet working class and its allies will then end their oppression through a new socialist revolution.



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*Re-Examining the "Purges"***Cleaning House in the Bolshevik Party**

The "Great Purges" Reconsidered: The Soviet Communist Party 1933-1939
by J. Arch Getty

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1979. Available from: University Microfilms International, Dissertation Copies, P.O. Box 1764, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 (Thesis number 79-20473) Price: about \$20.00 soft cover, about \$25.00 hardbound.

This very readable thesis attempts to examine the major struggles within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during the crucial years of the 1930's. It deals in great detail with two things: the Party "purges," or reviews of Party membership; and the arrests, imprisonment, expulsions from the Party, executions, etc. which were related to the so-called "Purge Trials" of 1936 to 1938 and to allegations of sabotage and spying leveled against many high-level members of the Party in those years.

As such, it attacks the leading, most "expert" anti-communist accounts of this period and shows them to be nothing but crude lies. The hysterical accounts of the "Stalinist Terror" by such as the Menshevik Boris Nikolaevsky, the Rockefeller-KKKarter imperialist spokesman Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Harvard Russian Research Center's Merle Fainsod, and the British secret service agent Robert Conquest, among others, are shown to go exactly contrary to the substantial evidence available. Even the most so-called "scholarly" and "responsible" bourgeois studies are shown to be based entirely upon anti-communist preconceptions, and to completely ignore the facts. The myths of the "totalitarian" nature of the Soviet Union, "horrible suppression" of the workers, and of the "Great Terror" (Conquest's term), with its "holocaust" of "millions of innocent victims" to "Stalin's maniac thirst for power"—in fact, all the most sacred anti-Communist, Khrushchevite, trotskyite, etc. lies—are exploded, on the basis of

a thorough study of primary documents available to anybody.

These documents include, most importantly, the "Smolensk Archive." Tens of thousands of pages of files from the archives of the Western Oblast (province) of the USSR—the part centering on the ancient city of Smolensk, and bordering on Poland, the Ukraine and Latvia—were captured by the fascist German armies in 1941 and sent back to Germany. They were later seized by the American troops and microfilmed and they are available for study in the West. Using these archives, and coordinating them with Soviet publications during the period, Getty draws a completely different picture of the Soviet Communist Party during the 1930's.

Getty is not a revisionist "Marxist" or phony socialist, but a conventional bourgeois scholar. This is good, as far as it goes—for example, he insists upon studying and using the historical documentation and evidence available, and not on following some anti-communist myth or other. It is his thoroughness in documenting his conclusions by examining the primary sources which makes his study exciting and valuable.

On the other hand, Getty is basically trying to write an academic history. He does not look at the USSR and CPSU with a view to studying their successes and failures in fighting revisionism and building a workers' state. He does not focus on the political line of the Party, and on the concept of socialism it embodied, until the end of his work and even there only superficially. As a result he is,

if anything, too uncritical of the line and practice of the CPSU domestically during this period.

Nonetheless, Getty's work should be read widely by members of PLP, and should be shown to people in our base, especially intellectuals, who are the special target of the hysterical, anti-communist lies about "Stalin's purge of the 'Thirties'" (Conquest's phrase). Here are some of the points of great interest which Getty establishes:

THE PURGES

The "purges" (in Russian, "chistki" or "cleansings") were periodic attempts by the central CPSU leadership, the Central Committee and the Politburo, to find out who was in the Party, and to strengthen it organizationally. They never included imprisonment (much less executions), and only rarely resulted in many expulsions; the "purges" of the 1930's resulted in even fewer expulsions than those of the 1920's had. They were not aimed at rooting out oppositionists (supporters of Trotsky, Bukharin, or any of the other ex-opposition groupings of the 1920's), but rather at getting rid of the dissolute, drunks, careerists, and others who clearly had no place in a disciplined Communist party.

Although they began basically as accounting mechanisms, to find out who was and who wasn't in the Party, this confusion itself quickly made it apparent to the central Party leadership that the middle levels of the Party leadership were basically functioning in a bureaucratic way, ruling over the members and the areas entrusted to them with autocratic power, and often never bothering to even get to know the Party members they were "leading." The successive "purges" up to 1936 were basically meant to force the middle-level Party leaders to get to know the members under them, to stop "ruling" by means of "family cliques" of friends, which undermined the respect and authority of the Party among its rank-and-file and among the non-Party population as a whole, and made it impossible for Party decisions to be implemented.

As Getty proves, the Central Committee, and Stalin specifically, went out of their way to stimulate and encourage rank-and-file criticism of the leadership, and to foster criticism and self-criticism at Party meetings, in an effort to correct what they recognized was a serious problem of bureaucracy. Getty says, with evident admiration, ... the Central Committee sincerely wanted to encourage criticism "from below" ... this practice had never been advocated as strongly and relentlessly as in 1935. The C.C. had never before stopped a Party operation and denounced the local administrators before the rank and file. The Central Committee had never seemed to turn to the Party activists to complete an operation which had been

bungled by the regular administrators. As Getty points out, this went far beyond the kind of criticism allowed in bourgeois democratic countries.

Obviously, talk of mass participation and Party democracy didn't mean that major policy initiatives or changes originated "from below." It didn't mean that members could expect to remain in the Party if they stood up and advocated (oppositionist) sentiments to the effect that the Party was on a wholly wrong track, that the top leadership was totally wrong and should be removed, or that the Party's policy was a disaster for the country. It is doubtful that many political parties committed to any particular ideology would tolerate such antithetical behavior for long. **It is even more doubtful that many of them made a point of encouraging grassroots criticism of the leadership at all.** (pp. 252-253, emphasis added)

The "purges" culminated in the Party elections of 1936 and 1937, which resulted in a great turnover of lower and middle-level Party leadership by democratic vote of the Party membership. The new Party leaders thus elected were, on the whole, both younger, and closer to the working class in that they had more recently been workers than the older generation of Party leaders.

This is the aspect of Party activity which Getty stresses, and in which we, as Communists in PLP, can take pride. The Communist movement has always stood for the greatest possible democracy, and this is an important legacy of the "purges" of the 1930's. Nevertheless, Getty does not deal with the real heart of the matter: what had caused the estrangement of the Party leaders from the membership in the first place?

The Communist Party, in its attempt to industrialize the USSR, to prevent (as they thought) the defeat of the socialist state at the hands of the capitalist powers, largely identified this industrialization with socialism. Socialism was thought to mean, basically, political power in the hands of a Communist Party, plus an industrialized economy, provided that the Communist Party had close ties with the working class. In order to promote this last goal, the Party recruited preferentially among workers up through the early and mid-thirties, had mass recruitment drives among the workers during the collectivization period (1929-32), and made sure that workers were preferentially sent to technical training schools, so they could head economic units, factories, etc. This line of "relying on the working class" led to the great leaps in enthusiasm and production of the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1929-39), and built an industrialized economy. This was a feat absolutely unprecedented in the history of the world. Moreover, by 1939, the leadership of the

A Page from William Z. Foster

By virtue of the huge revolutionary tasks it has to perform, the Russian Communist Party must be an organization composed solely of clear-seeing, devoted, tireless and resolute fighters for Socialism. Within its structure there can be absolutely no place for waverers, sluggards, corrupt persons, and enemies of Socialism. So to free itself from such elements, who manage to seep in despite strict entrance requirements, the Soviet Party every several years carries out reexamination of its whole membership. These are called **chistkas** or Party cleansings.

One of my most interesting experiences in the USSR was in attending such a **chistka** at a Party unit meeting one night at a big Moscow electrical manufacturing plant in 1929. On the platform of the meeting hall sat the examining committee, and the body of the hall was crowded with factory workers. Most of these workers were not Party members, for the rule in the **chistka** is that all workers, regardless of Party membership, may appear to bring such charges or complaints as they see fit and to express their opinion as to whether or not any given individual is fit to belong to the Party. This is one of the striking features of Soviet revolutionary democracy.

The routine of this meeting was simple. One by one, the Party members were called upon to speak before the gathering, to tell who they were, what they did during the revolution, when they joined the Party, and various other salient features of their life history. In cases where a worker's record was good and no exception was raised against him, he was at once passed. But if objection

was made either from the floor or the committee he had to stand a grilling which he might or might not survive as a Party member. It was a long process. Sometimes the **chistka** would last several weeks in big Party units.

To listen to the workers recite their biographies was enormously interesting. Their life stories, covering the periods of Czarism, the two revolutions, the Civil War, the famine and the building of Socialism, were extremely colorful. For the most part the workers were well known to each other and they "got by" the **chistka** with nothing more serious than criticism for minor shortcomings. One man, however, did not fare so easily. He was a foreman in the plant. This man made a good statement of his life activity, but when he concluded several workers arose and sharply attacked him from the floor. It seems that he was somewhat of a bureaucrat and the workers deeply resented his curt methods. He faced an uncomfortable hour of cutting criticism from the workers, but managed to retain his Party membership, although with a strict warning.

The most interesting case was that of a Hungarian worker. In broken Russian he told his story. He was a Party member of long standing and had fought through the Hungarian revolution. He painted a vivid picture of the ill-fated history of the Soviet government in Hungary at the close of the World War and the part he had played in it. It was a blazing story of revolutionary struggle.

I thought the passing of this worker would be a mere formality; but when he had finished his story, another Hungarian worker exile arose

and began to question him in Russian. This worker, himself a veteran of the Hungarian revolution quizzed the speaker closely, and in only a few minutes he had involved him in hopeless contradictions. The speaker, who evidently had not expected this close checkup in far away USSR stood in open confusion at the conclusion of his grilling from the floor. Everybody was astounded at the unlooked-for turn of events, although many had seen Russian impostors uncovered at such **chistkas**. The man's case was held for further investigation by the committee. I was interested to learn what came out of it all and some time later I found out that the Hungarian speaker had been finally exposed as a spy.

In 1937, as I write this, a broad cleansing movement is going on in the Party, the Soviets, the trade unions and other organizations in the USSR. The growth of institutions of all sorts has been so swift and gigantic and the need for executives to lead them so overwhelming that during the course of the last years considerable numbers of self-seekers, bureaucrats and incompetents, not unnaturally, have been able to worm themselves into responsible posts. They act as a brake upon progress. They are now being removed by the double process of democratic action at the bottom and executive decision at the top. Their elimination from key positions is making for a big increase in efficiency in every department of Soviet life.

More pages from a Worker's Life by Wm. Z. Foster, NY: American Institute of Marxist Studies. Occasional Paper No. 32, 1979.

CPSU was basically in the hands of men and women of working-class origin, who had only rather recently gotten some technical higher education and who now ran Soviet industry and the Party itself. On this basis Stalin declared that class struggle, and classes themselves, had ended by 1936. The new intelligentsia was "red," mainly recent ex-workers. Surely they could not be any closer to the working class? But in fact the basis was laid for a new bourgeoisie to grow up out of the division between mental and manual labor, and the privileges for the former, which were retained. In fact, as many bourgeois economists partly recognized at the time, production was still organized in a capitalist manner, and thus would generate capitalist relations of production, habits,

discipline, and ultimately, after several decades, a new capitalist class. The Khrushchevs and Brezhnevs, who led the Soviet Union away from socialism, and the thousands of middle and upper level managers and technocrats they represent, were precisely those one-time "bench-workers" who had surged forward during the 1930's to take over the Party and Soviet industry.

Getty shows that the Soviet Union was the antithesis of a "totalitarian" society. Indeed the working class did hold state power—by the mid-Thirties, the Communist Party was overwhelmingly composed of workers and very recent ex-workers, who were answerable to the rank-and-file in direct, secret elections. He also shows that the Party was internally in disarray, almost in chaos,

and that bureaucratic, anti-democratic, and ultimately anti-socialist ideas and cliques were continually generated by the very way in which socialism was organized. This conception of socialism, advanced for its time, was far to the left of the concepts of Trotsky, Bukharin, and other ex-leaders, who advocated a much more obviously capitalistic model of the economy. But in the long run, it resulted in much the same thing. Getty's work can help us in developing the new, more correct and revolutionary concept of socialism, by providing factual data from which we can learn of the successes and failures of Stalin and the CPSU; but Getty does not approach those problems himself.

THE "PURGE TRIALS" AND THE "TERROR"

Bourgeois historians—and in this we include the whole band of Trots, Social-Democrats, and other phony socialists—have had a field day with the (mainly) post-Khrushchev accounts of Stalin's horrors. Getty demolishes this capitalist portrait of the Soviet Union in the 1930's. A good part of his work is devoted to this question, and it is useful to review a few points he establishes:

- Stalin had nothing to do with the assassination of Kirov, Leningrad Party leader, in Dec. 1934, as was hinted at by Khrushchev and now accepted as "fact" by anti-communists from Conquest (British agent) to the Trots to Medvedev (Soviet dissident now in exile).

- There is good reason to think that the accusations made in the three great "purge" trials (of Zinoviev, Kamenev & Co. in August, 1936; of Pyatakov, Radek & Co. in Jan. 1937; and of Bukharin & Co. in March 1938) were in the main true. Even the reputed links of all these persons to Trotsky are probably true: I. Smirnov did meet secretly with Trotsky's son in 1932 in Paris, and the rest probably knew of this.

- Most of the arrests and executions of Party leaders and others followed the uncovering of a plot by the military leaders under Marshal Tukhachevsky to collaborate in some way with the German army.

- The total number of expulsions from the party, and thus the maximum number of deaths, as a result of the panicky period of mass arrests which followed the Tukhachevsky trial in June, 1937, was most likely under 100,000, and perhaps far under it.

This part of Getty's discussion is useful in two ways. First, it shows how fantastically false the most "authoritative" bourgeois studies can be: Conquest, for example, talks of 7-10 million deaths because of the "purges," to say nothing of Solzhenitsyn's (and the *New York Times*'s) 20 million or so. The attentive reader will tell himself never to trust another anti-communist historian again; sound advice.

Second, it helps us understand how such a state of affairs could have come about—once again, due to what we must now recognize as a capitalist, bureaucratic conception of the Party. A Party membership card (literally, an ID card with a photo) was the key to promotion, advancement, trust, political reliability. The Party literally had no idea who was, and who was not, a "member." A bureaucratic, complicated, and ultimately futile system of keeping files and records on Party members was relied upon to verify political decisions and promote Party policy. Time and again, the attempts during the "purges" (or "cleansings") to tighten up this recordkeeping, and to force Party officials to get to know Party members personally, fell afoul of the main job these officials were supposed to perform—economic production and management. Ultimately, a good party member was one who produced economically. This concept led inexorably to a bureaucratic, hierarchical, and capitalist form or organization within the Party itself. In addition, a system of privileges, originally set up only for bourgeois specialists, who could not be induced to work for Soviet power in any other way, was extended to specialists who had joined the Party itself, and ultimately to the Party as a whole. This was in constant, sharp contradiction with the attempts of the leadership under Stalin to enforce an attitude of respect for the rank-and-file, and individual attention and close, comradely relations among Party members.

In this way, the uprooting of spies and saboteurs (whom Getty thinks quite possibly did exist) could be relatively successful, the Party leadership be made relatively much more responsive for a time to the rank-and-file, and the average Party leader could usually be a recent bench-worker—and still socialism could be undermined in the long run, due to the capitalist practices embedded in the conception of how to build socialism, which came to be reflected in the Party structure as well. In the short run, the Trials, arrests, imprisonments and/or executions of several tens of thousands of oppositionists—including perhaps some who were innocent—helped fend off external attack, from Germany or a military coup. But they could at best only postpone the ultimate reversion to capitalism.

There are many other interesting points made in this thesis. It is useful for its refutation of bourgeois historians' lies, and basically vindicates the portrait of the Soviet Union drawn by PLP in *Road to Revolution III* and elsewhere. Most important, it provides the raw material for a lot of serious thought about how we can build a socialist society on different, firmer foundations, thanks to a careful, Marxist study of the successes and, above all, the failures of the millions of workers and revolutionaries, led by Stalin, who made the October Revolution of 1917 and built the first workers' state in the Soviet Union.

By S.D.

Revisionism Ruins Medicine


Soviet Health— A Sick Story

Under socialism, the health of the workers in the U.S.S.R. improved enormously. There is no more dramatic demonstration of the impact of state capitalism on the people of the U.S.S.R. than its effect on the most basic quality of their life—health. The health of the Soviet working class is being sacrificed to the demands of maximum profit. No matter what volume of official proclamations pour forth from Moscow the truth of this assertion lies open in the light of day for all to see.

HEALTH AND THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

The health of the masses is a social phenomenon, determined by the nature of the social structure in any particular society. Certain individuals, of course, will be struck down by genetic disease and serious accidents will always occur, but the average health of the population is conditioned by the pattern of life made available by their society. All common or mass disease, therefore, has an environmental, i.e., social basis.

In the Soviet Union the working class held power for several decades. The Marxist theory of public health leads us to expect the restoration of capitalism to have had dramatic effects on the pattern of mass disease and we should be able to predict with great precision the health of the working class in the USSR in the period of state capitalism. As this article will show, Marxist theory explains the public health trends in the Soviet Union accurately to the last detail. Not only have the diseases of capitalism been introduced with an intensity experienced in few other countries in the world, the general level of health has deteriorated severely and death rates for both infants and adults have risen steadily over the last fifteen years.



In the early years of Soviet power great strides were made in health care and the eradication of diseases. Although equipment was sometimes in short supply, clinics like the one shown above were readily available.

It is often difficult to obtain detailed information about the economic and political mechanisms that operate within the USSR, and it is, therefore, difficult to 'prove' the existence of capitalism. Many left-wing groups hold the notion that the Soviet Union is a 'deformed workers state.' Most workers in this country are uninformed and cynical about the success of socialism. As part of the study of revisionism and the restoration of capitalism in countries which were once socialist the study of health has several advantages. The facts are undeniable and out in the open. The Soviet government does not publish all the data that would be useful to the expert, but the facts are so glaring and unequivocal that no one can question what has actually taken place. Revisionism is not a step forward for the working class but is, in fact, a new form of the capitalist system of exploitation. The only solution to the problems of the working class—health and otherwise—is socialism, workers' power. This is just as true in health as in foreign policy; moreover in health we have precise, objective measures.

HEALTH IN THE USSR

Russia was in a state of chaos after the revolution in 1917. Health statistics for the entire Soviet Union were not available until the mid 1920's. Beginning in 1926 the death rates fell rapidly in the USSR through 1964, as can be seen

in Figure 1. In the last 15 years, however, death rates have turned upwards. In Table 1 the age-adjusted death rates for the total population, men and women separately are presented (age-adjustment takes into account the increasing average age of the population) 2-4. This upward trend in death rates occurred in all of the republics with the exceptions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and was more severe in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Between 1964 and 1975, the overall death rate increased 18 percent for the whole of the USSR.

The effects of mass disease among adults are best seen in 'premature deaths,' that is, deaths before the average life expectancy. In Table 2 the death rates for middle-aged individuals are compared in 1960 and 1975. An increase occurred in each five year age group; this increase was much greater among men. Life expectancy fell for men from 66 to 63 years over this period and remained static for women. Changes in mortality rates for the two major causes—CV [cardio-vascular] diseases and cancer—are presented in Table 3. Most of the increase was accounted for by CV diseases although cancer rates rose as well. The death rates from the major categories of CV diseases and cancer are compared between the USSR and other industrialized countries in Table 4. The pattern of mortality in the USSR is very similar to that found in the U.S. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union is a very diverse

TABLE I

AGE, ADJUSTED DEATH RATES, USSR, 1960-1975 (Rate per 1000)

Year	Total Population	Male	Female
1960	7.5	--*	--
1961	-	--	--
1962	7.7	--	--
1963	7.3	--	--
1964	7.3	9.8	6.0
1965	7.4	--	--
1966	7.5	10.3	6.2
1967	7.6	10.3	6.0
1968	7.8	10.6	6.0
1969	8.2	11.2	6.4
1970	8.1	--	--
1971	8.1	11.2	6.3
1972	8.2	11.3	6.3
1973	8.2	11.3	6.3
1974	8.3	--	--
1975	8.6	--	--

*Data not available for these years.

TABLE III

DEATH RATES BY MAJOR CAUSE, USSR, 1960-1977 (Rate per 100,000)

Year	All Causes	Cardiovascular	Cancer	All Other
1960	713	247	116	351
1977	964	485	137	342
Percent change	+35%	+96%	+18%	-2%

TABLE VI

INFANT MORTALITY, USSR, 1965-76 (DEATHS UNDER ONE YEAR OF AGE) (Rate per 1,000)

Year	USSR	Slavic and Baltic Republic	All Other Republics
1965	27.2	25.1	31.9
1966	26.1	23.2	32.6
1967	26.0	22.9	32.7
1968	26.4	22.8	32.1
1969	25.8	21.2	32.2
1970	24.7	19.4	30.4
1971	22.9	20.4	34.1
1972	24.7	20.5	38.8
1973	26.4	--	--
1974	27.9	--	--
1975	29.4	--	--
1976	31.1	--	--

TABLE II

DEATH RATES IN MIDDLE AGE, USSR, 1960-1975 (Rate per 1000)

Age Group	1960	1975	Percent Increase
30-34	2.7	3.0	+11%
35-39	3.0	3.8	+27%
40-44	3.7	5.3	+43%
45-49	5.4	6.9	+28%
50-54	7.5	9.3	+24%
55-59	10.9	13.4	+23%
60-64	16.6	18.9	+19%


TABLE V

DEATH RATES FROM CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES, USSR, 1960-1977 (Rate per 100,000)

Cause	1960	1977	Percent Change
Coronary Heart Disease ("heart attack")	100.2	263.8	+163%
Stroke	69.9	152.6	+118%
Hypertension	42.0	82.0	+95%
Pneumatic Heart Disease	20.0	10.8	-46%

FIGURE 1

CRUDE DEATH RATE, USSR 1926 - 1975 RATE PER 1,000



country and if only the RSFSR were compared to the U.S. the similarities would be even more striking. The contribution of the Asian republics probably explains why rates from the older diseases—like cancer of the stomach—are higher. The primary cause of the rising death rates in the USSR has been the epidemic of coronary heart disease (CHD)—the most characteristic disease of the capitalist era (Table 5). Data are not available on deaths from violence and alcoholism—both reported to be on the increase in the USSR—but it is very unlikely that they approach the importance of CHD as a mass disease.


Not only are death rates rising among adults in

the USSR but infant mortality has increased as well. (Figure 2) In Table 6 the infant mortality for the whole USSR, and the European areas (Slavic and Baltic Republics), and the remaining portions separately, are presented. For the whole of the Soviet Union deaths of infants less than one year of age rose 36 percent, 1971-1976; for the Slavic and Baltic Republics the increase was six percent, 1971-1973, while it was 28 percent for the other areas (comparisons based on different years reflect the unavailability of data). Clearly, the minority areas in Asia and the Southern USSR have been hardest hit by the social changes which have led to this increase in deaths.

TABLE IV

AGE-ADJUSTED DEATH RATES FOR MAJOR CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE AND CANCER, USSR AND SELECTED COUNTRIES (Rate per 100,000)

Cause	COUNTRY				
	USSR (1973)	USA (1970)	U.K. (1970)	West Germany (1970)	Japan (1970)
Cardiovascular, Total	425.0	431.9	388.8	357.5	335.7
Coronary Heart Disease	239.5	287.5	189.9	118.0	44.1
Stroke	133.9	84.9	103.7	115.9	206.3
Hypertension	8.1	10.4	13.6	13.9	21.2
Neoplasms, Total	131.3	159.0	180.1	181.4	136.2
Stomach	38.8	7.1	17.6	26.6	52.9
Lung	21.3	28.3	43.3	23.5	11.5
Colon	4.8	15.3	14.2	13.8	4.4
Breast	5.9	13.4	16.2	12.5	2.6





The equipment and atmosphere is more up-to-date in this picture of a Soviet clinic of the late 1960s, but the decline in standards of health for workers had already begun.

WHY THE INCREASE IN DEATH RATES?

The health care system, of course, really has nothing to do with promoting health and only tries to ease the pain of dying or repair the damage that has been done; the impact on outcome is usually minimal. At the next stage higher in the chain of causation we can identify factors in the environment which expose people to risk and over the long-term are the 'cause,' in a biological sense. At the most basic level we should be able to identify social and economic forces which produce disease in the active sense that we described in the preceding sections. As Virchow pointed out "... the history of artificial epidemics is the history of disturbances in human culture."¹

An explanation of rising death rates in the USSR primarily requires an analysis of the epidemic of CHD and the increased rates of cancer. A high-fat diet, leading to elevated levels of serum cholesterol, in combination with cigarette smoking and high blood pressure are the main factors which cause CHD. All three factors are found commonly in the Soviet Union. The traditional diet in the Slavic and Baltic regions is similar to Central Europe, including generous use of high fat meats.

As one means of attempting to buy off the working class with consumer goods the Soviet rulers have made a concerted effort to increase the production of meat since World War II. Butter, cream, cheese and eggs are also staples, and the inefficient Soviet agricultural system has limited the supplies of fresh fruits and vegetables. Serum cholesterol levels in Moscow and Leningrad are similar to or slightly higher than those found in Europe and the U.S.⁵

Contrary to the reputation of the Soviet health system, efforts to treat hypertension have been very weak. Only about 10 to 20 percent of hypertensives are adequately treated in the USSR; in the U.S. the figure is closer to 60 percent.⁶ It is ironic that the pioneering scientific work in the field of atherosclerosis was done in the Soviet Union; it cannot be said that the simple acquisition of scientific information has been an obstacle to mounting a campaign against this disease.⁹ The most obvious example of how the new Soviet ruling class creates disease, however, is with cigarettes. The USSR is the fourth largest tobacco producer in the world; all the profits go directly to the central government.⁷ Smoking rates among workers in Moscow have been reported to be as high as 70 percent.⁸ The profit system has its own rules and the Soviet exploiters have learned very

quickly from the older capitalist countries how to amass fortunes through the production of consumer goods.

The cause of the rising infant mortality is harder to define. Racism against the minority populations appears to play a role. For example, infant mortality in Minsk, a modernized Russian city, was 15.7 in 1974, while rates were 51.8 in Dushanbe, capitol of the Asian Tadjik Republic with a predominantly Muslim population. Some authors have suggested that crowded child-care facilities play a role, or the high levels of pollution creating birth defects.¹⁰ Soviet officials claim the trend is a statistical artifact resulting from more complete reporting of deaths. At this point the data are too limited to provide a basis for any firm conclusions, as opposed to adult health where the picture is very clear. It is possible, but unlikely, that additional information will be forthcoming in the future to explain the cause of this disaster for the health of Soviet children. It is worth noting that capitalist development generally improves the health of infants but may have negative overall effects on the health of adults. That pattern is apparent in the USSR where capitalist development has proceeded most rapidly in the Slavic and Baltic Republics, with rising adult mortality, and least in the minority areas, with worsening infant vital statistics.

The historical limitations of the capitalist system become more apparent with each passing year. The growing threat of war and world-wide depression add a special urgency to our discussion of the need for working class power. Unfortunately, many people become cynical over what they perceive to be a lack of alternatives to the present system when they equate revisionist society with socialism. Enormous effort must be expended by the communist movement to explain the nature of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and China. Every important aspect of those societies must be studied in detail to lay the basis for a profound and far-reaching analysis

of the events surrounding the reversal of workers' power. A Marxist interpretation of the unfolding history of the social antagonisms under state capitalism, from public health trends to strikes in Poland, will help lay the basis for a political understanding of revisionism by masses of workers. The development of the commodity economy in the USSR has overwhelmed public health efforts at curbing the new mass diseases; only in a society where the law of value rules could these trends be observed. Although we do not yet have the historical experience of a socialist society which suc-

“The history of artificial epidemics is the history of disturbances in human culture.”

cessfully eliminated the new mass diseases, the ability of the working class to eliminate the earlier generation of diseases demonstrates its ability to organize society to solve public health problems. Without the need to produce for profit it would be possible to eliminate health-destroying commodities like cigarettes, and gradually transform home-life and the work environment to promote and preserve good health. Mankind is imprisoned within the capitalist system. Human history and the process of its full and complete development will only go forward when the majority of people—the working class—can determine its own fate.




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