

# State Repression and Legitimation: The Disorganization of Labor in the Arizona Copper Industry in 1917

by Terry Boswell

## Introduction

Repression under state monopoly capitalism is an area of study which necessitates increased Marxist theoretical development, not only to understand changes in state policy, but also to guarantee our own survival. By applying theories of the state to concrete historical analysis we can develop an understanding of the events as well as an enhanced working knowledge of the theories. Of particular historical importance for building radical movements is how the state can repress radicals and still remain legitimate. This article analyzes a period of intense state repression during the formative stages of state monopoly capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

In January of 1917, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) began an organizing drive in the Arizona copper industry. By that summer every major copper mine in the state was on strike. The strikes were led by unions from the IWW or from the American Federation of Labor (AFL). America had entered World War I which resulted in a high demand for copper and low unemployment. The strength of the IWW in Arizona, and in the country in general, was approaching its zenith. But radical labor in Arizona met with a series of attacks, arrests, mediations and deportations—climaxing in the mass deportation of over a thousand strikers from one mining town. Through a process of repression and legitimation the state disorganized labor in the copper industry. As a result, by 1920 not a single union local of the IWW and only one AFL local effectively existed in the Arizona copper mines (Leaming, 1973:14). The events in Arizona were part of a national disorganization of the working class which decimated the IWW, the Socialist Party, and other radical organizations (Peterson and File, 1957; Murphy, 1979; Wolfe, 1973<sup>2</sup>) and at the same time utilized and expanded the liberal AFL (Weinstein, 1968).

In this article I intend to present a class analysis of state repression and legitimation in the four major strike centers

of Arizona in 1917. The process of state repression and legitimation used here is a dialectical one in that both structures operate at the same time, legitimation mediating and limiting the ability of the state to use repression, and repression mediating and limiting the legitimacy of the state. Understanding repression cannot be separated from understanding legitimation. They constitute together the process of state disorganization of the working class. State action which disorganizes labor operates in a context of class struggle. The factors considered here to have a determinant effect on the process of repression and legitimation are the organization and ideology of capital and labor, mediated by the level of state action (the theory of the state will be explained later).

In order to explain state repression and legitimation during the copper strikes of 1917, the argument made here is that the major capitalists in Arizona were unified under the hegemony of the copper industry. This unity reduced the relative autonomy of the local level of the state and restricted the state from acting outside the immediate interests of the copper industry. It is further proposed that where the workers were more unified, the interests of capital in repression was greater, and where the workers were more ideologically radical, repression by the state was least restricted by legitimation. Finally, it is proposed that the federal level of the state is sufficiently insulated from local capital to restore the legitimacy lost by the repressive actions taken at the local level of the state.

In order to analyze the propositions put forth here and the theoretical concepts of the capitalist state, the concepts of repression, legitimation, and relative autonomy will first be examined. This will be followed by an examination of the national context of labor, capital, and the state leading up to 1917. Next an outline of the development of capital, labor, and the state in Arizona will be presented along with case studies of the events in the four major strike centers. In the last section, the four cases will be classified into categories

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according to the theoretical concepts in a comparative analysis and conclusions will be drawn out.

## The Capitalist State

There has been a recent increase in Marxist theories of the state, each beginning with the author lamenting the lack of Marxist political theory. The theoretical orientation of this article draws primarily from the works of Poulantzas (1973, 1974), but also Althusser (1971) and O'Connor (1973). These theories will be outlined below. Althusser's and O'Connor's works are not explicitly theories of the state but such theories are contained within them. All three authors share a structuralist rather than an instrumentalist approach to Marxist analysis of the state.

Basically, according to Marxist theory, the capitalist state is defined and limited by the capitalist mode of production. The expropriation of surplus value from the working class by the capitalist class creates a relationship of class conflict, with a domination of the workers by the capitalists. This results in a capitalist state, since "it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers . . . which reveals the . . . hidden basis of the entire social construction and . . . corresponding specific form of the state" (Marx, 1909c:919). Therefore, in order for the capitalist state to reproduce itself it must guarantee the reproduction of capitalism.

The role of the state then is to overcome or displace the contradictions produced by class conflict in the capitalist system. Yet since capital's expropriation of surplus value is the basis of the capitalist mode of production, class conflict permeates capitalist society, creating contradictions at all levels: economic, political and ideological. The basic contradiction is between the ever increasing social nature of production and the continued private appropriation of the product, which creates recurrent crises of overpopulation and accumulation of capital (Marx, 1909c). But this contradiction also creates at a given conjuncture, political and ideological "crises" (in the sense of open, intense conflict) as the nature of capitalist production organizes the workers but leaves the capitalists at odds with one another. This leads us to the role of the state in overcoming these crises.

O'Connor sees the state as fulfilling two often contradictory but basic functions: accumulation and legitimation. The state must maintain or create conditions of both profitable capital accumulation and social harmony. Open use of its repressive powers to aid capital accumulation will result in a decrease in legitimacy, undermining loyalty and support for the state and the system. But, a loss of profitable capital accumulation will result in a decrease in the economic base of state power from taxing surplus production. Therefore, the state seeks to aid accumulation while mystifying or concealing its actions.

Althusser takes a more direct approach, stating that the basic function of the state is repression. The capitalist state must guarantee the reproduction of the productive forces and the relations of production of capitalism. This includes the reproduction of labor power through wages, reproduction of the material means of production, and reproduction of private property relations. It also includes reproduction of the knowledge of labor through education

(both the knowledge of labor skills and the rules of submission). The apparatuses of state power come in two forms: repressive state apparatus (RSA) and ideological state apparatus (ISA). The repressive apparatus primarily operates by violence and the ideological apparatus by ideology, though the two overlap. The ideological apparatus is dominated by the family and schools, but includes a plurality of public and private institutions which impart bourgeois ideology such as political parties, churches, unions, the media, and so on. The ISA is unified by the bourgeois ideology common to all the institutions. The limits of that ideology are defined by the state.<sup>3</sup> The relationship of the state and politics to economics is one of superstructure to base, with the economic being determinant in the last instance,<sup>4</sup> but politics maintains a relative autonomy. This final concept will be explained more fully as we look at Poulantzas' theory of the state.

For Poulantzas the function of the state is to organize the capitalist class and disorganize the working class. The contradiction between socialized production and private appropriation unifies the working class, but leaves capital divided into fractions with competing and contradictory interests. In order to guarantee the reproduction of the forces and relations of production (including capital accumulation, material forces of production and so on) the state must organize the capitalist class.

## Relative Autonomy

The ability of the state to organize the capitalist class is based on the relative autonomy of the state. Since the fractions of capital have competing and contradictory interests, the state cannot directly represent the interests of all fractions all the time. This dislocates the state from the immediate or short term interests of any one of the fractions. In order to maintain the long term interests the capitalist class as a whole, the state organizes capital into a power bloc around the interests of the hegemonic fraction of capital in the economy. It is the relationship of the hegemonic fraction to the state, that is, the ability of the hegemonic fraction to translate its economic interests into political interests, which secures the state's organization of the class. The ability of the hegemonic fraction to translate economic interests into political ones is primarily based on its dominant economic position, in that a crisis in the hegemonic fraction produces a crisis in the capitalist system as a whole. Therefore, it is in the interests of the other fractions of capital to maintain the interests of the hegemonic fraction.

While the hegemonic fraction dominates the power bloc, it does not exclude the other fractions of capital from affecting the state within the parameters of maintaining the long range interests of capitalism as a whole. To maintain the organization of the power bloc, the state uses its autonomous position to compromise and regulate the interests of the fraction within the bloc, with primacy given to the interests of the hegemonic fraction. But the autonomy of the state is relative, based on the unity of the capitalist class. The state's autonomy is only what is necessary to maintain the organization of the capitalist class around the hegemonic fraction.

The relative autonomy of the state is not a constant across all institutions of the state. The executive branch of the federal government, for example, represents the nation as a whole, and thus capitalism in the nation as a whole. The executive branch is more responsive to the hegemonic fraction of capital and has a greater relative autonomy from the other fractions of capital than the legislature. The legislature includes representatives from areas dominated by only a few or even a single fraction of capital. The legislature was more suited to the needs of competitive capital and has been losing power to the executive since the transition in the economy to a domination of monopoly capital around the turn of the century.

The level of the state, from local to federal, has an affect on the relative autonomy of the state analogous to the variation in relative autonomy between the legislature and executive branches. Each increase in the size of jurisdiction of the state will increase the amount of capital and fractions of capital within that jurisdiction and therefore increase the relative autonomy of the state at the greater level.<sup>5</sup> The local government is highly dependent on a small economy which is often dominated by a few large corporations. Thus we have examples of the company town with complete domination of the state at the local level by a single corporation, or its converse, a social democratic government with a high degree of autonomy at the national level of the state. It is no accident that reactionary politicians constantly seek to transfer non-military authority from the federal to the local level of the state where the government is more directly affected by capital and there are fewer fractions of capital whose disunity could be exploited by labor.<sup>6</sup> The structure of federalism allows the local government to take action independent of the national government but still remain under federal jurisdiction. Therefore, legitimacy lost by coercive or illegal repressive action taken at the local level of the state can be restored through federal action due to its greater relative autonomy.

## The State and the Working Class

We now turn to Poulantzas' concept of the relationship of the state to the working class. In general, the working class under capitalist production has an increasing social unity. In order to counteract this tendency, the state's function towards the working class is to disorganize it politically and ideologically. The state does this through the dialectical process of repression and legitimation. Repression is used to the extent that actions of the working class threaten the interests of the capitalist fractions. Repressive action by the state has the immediate effect of stopping and disorganizing worker actions. But repression is limited by the maintenance of legitimacy of capitalism and the capitalist state. Open use of repression has a destabilizing effect on the legitimacy of the state and the capitalist system.<sup>7</sup> Eventually illegitimate state action can result in the opposite effect intended by unifying the workers in reaction to the state repression.

The legitimacy of the state is maintained by two ideological constructs. The first concept is that the state is the state of the whole people-nation. Rather than understanding the capitalist state as the state of a capitalist society, this concept defines the state as the state of all "the people" in a given national territory. The second ideological

construct is that all "the people" belong to one class, the bourgeoisie or middle class.<sup>8</sup> The middle class and "the people" are conceptually equivalent. Those outside this class, such as class conscious workers or the aristocratic wealthy, are considered aberrations. The small bourgeoisie are the idealized members of the middle class. They are the example of bourgeois values of which all "the people" are to accept, emulate, and desire to become (the American Dream).<sup>9</sup>

The twin concepts of the capitalist state as the state of the whole people-nation and the whole people belonging to the middle class mystifies class relations and correspondingly, class repression. Repression is legitimized to the extent that the repression does not violate the concepts of bourgeois legal rights, or that the repression is against people who are considered outside of the whole people-nation. Repression against "outsiders" to a great extent defines who does belong.<sup>10</sup> Nationalism, racism and sexism are the major ideological premises for excluding people from belonging to the whole people-nation. For example, the legal arrest of Hispanic undocumented workers will have a greater legitimacy than the illegal detention of white taxpaying citizens. When the state acts as if it was not the state of whole people-nation, by repression of a strike for instance, then the state will lose legitimacy. The same is true if the state does not maintain bourgeois legal rights for all classes. The reverse is also true. For example, if workers violate bourgeois legal rights by taking property or using violence, then the repression is seen as more legitimate. Legitimation of capitalism among the working class manufactures consent in the workers for their own repression.<sup>11</sup>

The ability of the state to maintain legitimacy depends on its relative autonomy from the capitalist class. When the state acts directly in the immediate interests of capital, it contradicts the ideological construct that it is the state of the whole people and thus loses legitimacy. In order for the state to grant concessions to the working class (such as welfare, voting rights, socialist parties, etc—won by the political struggle of that class, the state must be relatively autonomous from the immediate interests of capital. If capital is unified, the relative autonomy of the state decreases and so does the ability of the working class to win concessions. In the long run, such concessions are necessary in order to maintain the legitimacy of the state and the capitalist system. But the state will limit and modify working class movements for the benefit of the capitalist class.

A class conscious ideology among workers defines them as working class, demystifying class relations and the legitimacy of capitalism and the capitalist state. But the likelihood and intensity of repression against class conscious workers increases as they are an increased threat to the capitalists. Also the legitimacy of repression against the class conscious workers can be more easily justified by excluding them from the whole people-nation, especially since they explicitly reject the ideology of workers belonging to the middle class.

To summarize, in relation to the capitalist class, the state organizes the fractions of capital around the hegemonic fraction into a power bloc. The disunity of capital allows the state a relative autonomy to maintain the long term interest of the capitalist system rather than only the immediate interest of capitalists. In relation to the working class, the state disorganizes the workers through a process of

repression and legitimation. Legitimation limits the use of repression, but creates a consent among workers for capitalism. Repression limits the legitimacy of capitalism and the state, but has the immediate effect of disorganizing the workers. In analyzing the disorganization of workers in a given conjuncture, how the process of state repression and legitimation is used will be determined by the organization and ideology of capital and labor, with the relative autonomy of the state (which varies according to level and branch of the state) as an intervening variable. So far we have only considered the theory of the state, we now turn to the national level of the state during the "progressive" era and World War I.

## The Liberal State and the Progressive Era

The national state during the "progressive era" of 1900 to 1920 has been described as the beginning of the corporate liberal state. The development of the liberal state has been examined by Weinstein (1968, 1970), Wolfe (1977), Kolko (1963, 1976) and Williams (1961). Since the events in Arizona were part of a national repression it is important to describe the national context in which those events took place. An outline of Weinstein's theory of the development of the liberal state and of the national situation in 1917 is presented below. Weinstein's work is one of the more recent endeavors in this area, and it encompasses many of the ideas expressed earlier by other theorists, but it will be supplemented where necessary. An emphasis is given to the events which shaped the process of state repression and legitimation during this period.

In general, Weinstein's theory states that during the period from about 1900 to 1920 there was a massive concentration of capital and elimination of firms,<sup>12</sup> which transformed the economy in the US from one dominated by competitive capital to one dominated by monopoly capital. The change in the economy brought about a corresponding transformation in the dominant ideology and politics. This meant a decline in the ideology of laissez faire and a rise of corporate liberalism.<sup>13</sup> For the state, corporate liberalism meant an increasing intervention in the economy to regulate and stabilize production, including reforms and recognition for pro-capitalist labor and repression of class conscious workers.

It was the more sophisticated businessmen from the leading corporations and banks who were organized into the National Civic Federation (NCF) that were the primary orchestrators of the development of the corporate liberal state. The NCF served to translate the economic interests of the major corporations into political interests. Those interests were primarily greater state intervention in the economy to maintain the forces and relations of production. Popular support for economic and social reforms was channeled by the NCF towards reforms for regulation which guaranteed profits (such as the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve System) and reproduced the workforce (such as workmen's compensation and child labor laws). Also the NCF supported unionization by conservative labor<sup>14</sup> (labor leaders Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell were NCF members) in order to use the American Federation of Labor to stabilize the workforce by enforcing

contracts and suppressing class conscious workers.

The AFL was the largest organization of procapitalist labor. Since the turn of the century the AFL had dominated the US labor movement. The AFL leadership favored cooperation with liberal businessmen and politicians. Prior to the war, AFL growth had stagnated, but favorable government policy and war production led to a major expansion in membership. But the war advances were short lived. Union membership fell swiftly after 1920, not surpassing its wartime high until 1937 (Woytinsky, 1953).

## The Organized Opposition

The major organized opposition to the capitalist system during the "progressive era" came from the Socialist Party, and to a lesser extent from the Industrial Workers of the World (Weinstein, 1967).<sup>15</sup> Since its inception in 1901, the Socialist Party had grown rapidly from about 10,000 members to 118,000 in 1912. Socialist influence in 1912 was widespread with 1,200 socialist members in public office across the country. Socialist Max Hays received a third of the vote for president of the AFL in 1912. In the 1912 election for president of the US, Eugene Debs received 901,873 votes (6% of the total vote) on the Socialist ticket (Weinstein, 1967).

After 1912 the socialists declined in strength, dropping to 79,000 members in 1915 and receiving only 585,113 votes (3% of the total vote) in the 1916 presidential election. The reforms of Woodrow Wilson's first term such as direct election of senators, the income tax, the Federal Trade Commission, the Clayton Act, the Seaman's Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, the Child Labor Law, and the appointment of William Wilson as the first Secretary of Labor, had won a great deal of support away from the Socialists to Wilson. Many of these reforms had been advocated by the NCF which was at the same time urging cooperation of business with conservative labor, further cutting into Socialist support. But once the US entered the war, the Socialist Party emerged as a major proponent of peace and was able to maintain and even increase its strength. In 1919 the revolutions in Eastern Europe, in particular the Bolshevik revolution, led to a swell in membership to over a hundred thousand, but the party broke up that year into socialist and communist divisions.

The Industrial Workers of the World was founded in 1905 as a revolutionary industrial union to offer an alternative to the reformist craft organized American Federation of Labor (Dubofsky, 1969; Renshaw, 1967). Of the 51,000 union members represented at the founding convention of the IWW, 27,000 belonged to the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) a union of metal miners in the western US. But after three years the Western Federation withdrew from the IWW because of opposition to the IWW policy of direct economic action and to the leadership of Daniel DeLeon.<sup>16</sup> The split between the IWW and the WFM increasingly widened as the WFM espoused businesslike unionism and eventually rejoined the AFL in 1911. The IWW in turn raided WFM locals, increasing the hostility between the leadership of the rival unions, though the mineworkers often shared dual loyalties.

The IWW remained a small organization with slow growth and huge fluctuation in membership until the war

began. With the war, the IWW expanded to over 100,000 members and called strikes among the grain workers, lumberers, and miners in the midwest and west. The IWW opposed the war and saw the possibility of a general strike at that time which would bring about a revolution. This not only made the IWW an economic and ideological barrier to the war effort, but set it apart from the pro-war, liberal policies of the AFL.

The growth of the organized opposition and the development of the liberal state eventually collided. Wolf (1973) argues that as the state, in particular the national level of the state, began to increasingly intervene in the economy and the role of the state expanded, repression expanded since "repression is a function of governmental output" (Wolfe, 1973:208). With the expanded role of the national level of the state, repression and legitimation was organized and made systematic, since the national level set the limits to activity at the local level. Prior to the war (and afterwards until the New Deal) the liberal state was only partially established. With the war both the development of the liberal state and the growth of the organized opposition accelerated, as did the conflict between them.

## World War I

On April 6, 1917, the US entered the war. Throughout the "progressive" era the scaffolding for building corporate liberalism had been erected. The war fulfilled the ideal of corporate liberalism in the state (Weinstein, 1968:214-54). In order to conduct a massive war effort, the state had to organize the economy for wartime production. This included organization of production and organization of the relations of production. The organization of production embodied the ideas of corporate liberalism, and Wilson appointed several NCF members to administration posts. Regulation of production was administered primarily by the Council of National Defense and its subsidiary agency, the War Industries Board (WIB). Other important agencies were the Food and Fuel Administration, the War Finance Corporation, and the US Railroad Administration. The function of the WIB was to coordinate business in order to maximize war production and minimize disruption of production. Since the WIB allowed high profits it could rely heavily on the cooperation of business, though it did have economic powers of price setting, purchasing and labor arbitration (Cuff, 1973).<sup>17</sup>

The organization of the relations of production consisted primarily of promoting (and even coercing) conciliation of business and pro-war labor, and repression of anti-war labor—mainly the IWW and the Socialist Party (Weinstein, 1968). In exchange for a pro-war and no-strike pledge from the AFL leadership, the Wilson Administration supported the AFL's right to organize and bargain collectively, and federal mediation of strikes generally instituted situations favorable to the AFL. The unions were also given the impression that extensive wartime strikes would have been repressed as insurrection. President Wilson appointed Samuel Gompers (AFL president) and other members of the AFL leadership to the wartime economic agencies (Bing, 1921).

The ability of the state to use its repressive apparatus was greatly increased by using wartime patriotism to make

dissenters illegitimate (Peterson and File, 1957; Wolf, 1973).<sup>18</sup> Passage of the federal espionage and sedition acts along with court decisions and local laws increased the legitimacy of repression by making it legal. At the federal level, the promotion of patriotism and the illegitimacy of dissent was orchestrated primarily by the Committee on Public Information—the major government propaganda agency during the war. Pro-war AFL members and ex-Socialists were organized into the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, which was financed by the Committee. The Council of National Defense and the Justice Department also had direct involvement in promoting patriotism and limiting dissent.

At the lower levels of the state, the national agencies sponsored local patriotic versions of themselves. The Council of National Defense sponsored local councils, the Justice Department organized informers into the American Protective League, and the Committee set up a wide variety of local "Loyalty" organizations. Along with their ideological functions, these organizations extended the persuasiveness of state repression. Informing became a national obligation (the American Protective League alone reporting over three million cases of disloyalty to the Justice Department). Local Councils of Defense were given authority to "investigate and report on cases of disloyalty and seditious utterances [to] the Department of Justice" (Peterson and File, 1957:1a). Violent action was also used, primarily by the loyalty organizations. Violence was often authorized by the local officials, but not always. Unauthorized violence by the loyalty organizations still functioned as part of the repressive state apparatus, but its unsanctioned status allowed the state to retain its legitimacy.

The increase in state repression during the war took its toll on the Socialists and IWW. Arrests of the entire leadership of both organizations resulted in a pervasive disorganization of their activities. Neither organization effectively survived the war period (Weinstein, 1975).

In 1917, at the national level the war had exaggerated both the legitimation and the repression functions of the state. There was an increase in the size and the intensity of the ideological and the repressive state apparatuses. The AFL was being supported by the federal government while the Socialists and IWW were being extensively repressed.

## The Arizona Copper Industry

Having established the national context, we now turn to the local context of Arizona. An outline of the historical development of capital and labor in the copper industry and the development of the state in Arizona will be provided next,<sup>19</sup> followed by an examination of the specific events of 1917 in four case studies.

The population of Arizona in 1920 was 334,162 people (US Bureau of the Census, 1924). The major population centers were Phoenix and Tucson, but the major mining towns were Bisbee, Globe, Miami, Clifton, Morenci, and Jerome. Globe and Miami are very close together, one town running into the other. Both mining towns will be considered one mining area of Globe-Miami. The same is true for Clifton-Morenci. These were industrial cities with industrial workers who were almost entirely dependent on

production from the copper mines.

The general economic development of the copper industry in Arizona followed a pattern of individual prospectors and claims dominating until the 1880s. Then intermediate capital, generally local in origin, bought up the claims and concentrated them into the first mining operations. Copper mines and smelters require large amounts of capital, eventually requiring ownership by large corporations. The proven mines were bought up by absentee, large capital, mostly from the eastern United States and Britain. By the late 1880s, the mines were heavily capitalized and the mining camps were becoming industrial cities. The cities which make up the four case studies—Bisbee, Jerome, Globe-Miami, and Clifton-Morenci—mostly followed this pattern.

In Bisbee the largest mine was the Copper Queen. It was bought in 1882 by Phelps-Dodge, a New York mercantile and export company on the recommendation of chemist, Dr. James Douglas. Douglas also owned a part of the mine and became the first president of Phelps-Dodge when it incorporated in 1908. By then, Phelps-Dodge was primarily a copper company. The other major copper companies in Bisbee were the Calumet and Arizona Mining Company owned by Michigan capital and the much smaller Shattuck-Denn Mine which was locally owned by a consortium led by Lem Shattuck.

The Clifton-Morenci area was the first to be developed by a major company, the Detroit Copper Company which began operations in 1875 and was bought by Phelps-Dodge in 1881. The other important companies were the Arizona Copper Company of Edinburgh Scotland and the small Shannon Copper Company owned by British capital.

In Globe-Miami, the major mine was the Old Dominion owned by Dr. James Douglas along with British capital. Also in Globe-Miami the Miami Copper Company was owned by the Lewisohn's of New York and the Inspiration Consolidated was owned by New York and Montana capital.

Jerome was different from the other cities; it had only a single major company, the United Verde Copper Company. The United Verde was created when claims were bought up in 1882 for a syndicate of New York capital. In 1888 the mine was purchased by Senator William A. Clarke of Montana.

## The Copper Industry: Capital

The mining cities were essentially company towns. In Bisbee for example, along with the largest mine and only railroad, Phelps-Dodge owned the largest hotel, the hospital, the library, a large general store, a movie house, plus other stores and surrounding farm and ranch land.

The overwhelming dominance of Phelps-Dodge prevented the corporate wars in Arizona that were found in the Montana copper industry. The Lewisohns and other Jewish owners were ostracized, and the smaller owners, in particular Lewisohn and Shattuck, generally had better working conditions and labor relations; but these were minor deviations from the overall pattern. Phelps-Dodge dominance extended into local financial capital since it controlled the state's largest bank, Valley National, and several others including the Bank of Douglas and the Southern Arizona Bank. Phelps-Dodge also had an

ideological dominance since it owned every major newspaper in the state.

Most of the economy in Arizona was dependent on the copper industry. For example, in 1915 90% of the railroad freight depended on the mines. But relations among the capitalists were not well organized politically. In 1914 a general domestic recession and a short interruption of copper exports due to the beginning of the war in Europe created a crisis in the copper industry which affected all of capital in Arizona. The industry rebounded in 1916 and the price of copper rose rapidly as the war progressed. During this time the industry was beset by a series of successful strikes which received noninterference, if not tacit approval, from the liberal Democratic governor, G. W. P. Hunt. Hunt's action brought about increased animosity toward the governor at Phelps-Dodge. A new strategy for transforming economic interests into political ones was adopted by Phelps-Dodge. Prior to 1915, Phelps-Dodge president Dr. James Douglas based cooperation in the copper industry on a policy of sharing technical information. The need for political action resulted in a change in the basis of cooperation, reflected in a change in leadership to Dr. Douglas' son, Walter.

Walter Douglas was elected president of the American Mining Congress in 1915 and became president of Phelps-Dodge in 1916. Douglas organized an Arizona Chapter of the Congress in 1915. Under Walter Douglas' direction the journal of the American Mining Congress was transformed from a technical to a political journal. The Congress also held its first convention outside a major city in 38 years when it met in Bisbee in 1916.

The Arizona Chapter of the Mining Congress served to organize the other copper companies around the political interests of Phelps-Dodge. In 1916 the political interests of the copper companies coalesced around the campaign for governor. The Arizona Chapter of the Mining Congress gained the political support of the railroads and utilities—the only other major corporations—to run T. E. Campbell for governor, a candidate who could more directly represent the interests of capital.

## The Copper Industry: Labor

Professional management eventually replaced the personal relations between small owners and the mine workers, as the mines were bought up by large corporations with absentee owners. Mechanization steadily de-skilled the mines, resulting in a largely immigrant industrial work force. The concentration of capital in the copper industry also concentrated the workers, as did the mechanization of mining. These tendencies increased the desire and need for unionization among the mineworkers. Until 1916, the workers were unable to form strong organizations which could win strikes or gain recognition.

Labor in the mines was segmented along racial and ethnic lines. This was partly due to racism among the workers and partly due to the policies of the companies which reinforced that racism. The supervisory positions were generally held by British immigrants or their descendents. East Europeans were concentrated in the underground jobs and the lower paying surface jobs were usually reserved for Mexicans.<sup>20</sup> Only a few Asians, Blacks and women worked in the mines,

and they too were probably restricted to surface jobs.

The racial and ethnic divisions of labor impeded unionization, but it still made erratic progress. The first mining union was formed in Globe-Miami in 1884. Many Arizona miners joined the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) when it organized in 1893, but it wasn't until 1896 that a sustained WFM local existed in the state in Globe-Miami.

Early strikes connected to the WFM were unsuccessful. A white-only local in Globe was locked out in 1896 and the strikers were replaced by Mexican workers. Lockouts and firings of striking workers were a common management policy. A 1907 strike in Bisbee resulted in the eventual release of 1600 workers. The history of local state action towards strikes included arrests of strikers by sheriffs, strike breaking by the Arizona Rangers, and occupation by the state militia and the military. Mass arrests and deportation of workers, used in several strikes in Colorado, were not found in any major Arizona dispute prior to 1917.

In 1915, a WFM strike in Globe-Miami won the "Miami scale" which tied wages to the price of copper. In early 1916, a WFM led strike in Clifton-Morenci won small pay increases and received support from liberal governor G. W. P. Hunt, and noninterference from the occupying state militia. These strikes were considered major victories for the workers, both economically and politically.

The Western Federation of Miners was a founder of the IWW in 1905, but split from the main body in 1906 and joined the AFL in 1911 (as described earlier). The IWW was a class conscious, anti-capitalist, revolutionary union. It also disregarded race or ethnicity in organizing unions. The Western Federation had been a militant organization but had become increasingly conservative since its split from the IWW. In 1916, the WFM became the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMMSW) and dropped all references to class conflict from its charter, seeking only better working conditions and higher wages. A strong animosity existed between the leadership of the IWW and the AFL, but the mineworkers often shared dual loyalties and even joined both organizations. Nevertheless, the unions raided each other and according to Byrkit (1972) the owners paid agent provocateurs to exasperate the conflict between the two.

## Arizona: State and Politics

Early Arizona politics was dominated by silver and statehood. Silver mining had been a major component of the Arizona economy and populist demands for free silver forged an alliance between miners and small farmers and merchants. The alliance was solidified in the Democratic party after the nomination William Jennings Bryan in 1896. Silver's importance in Arizona decreased and nationally the free silver movement diminished with an expansion of gold production (Hofstadter, 1948:186-99). Nevertheless, the alliance between workers and the petty-bourgeoisie remained until the war. It was held together by the populist tradition as well as a common antagonism towards the large corporations.

Statehood was seen as a way for the workers and merchants to promote free silver and to prevent eastern capital from dominating the state through the US Congress.

Ever since the Civil War Arizona had agitated for statehood but did not become a state until 1912. The state constitution reflected the political alliance of workers and the petty bourgeoisie. It contained progressive features such as referendum, recall and initiative.

The Socialists did have some small support in Arizona, particularly from the mine workers, but also from small farmers and others who supported the Socialists after the demise of the Populist party. The highest portion of the vote in Arizona for a socialist for president was in 1912 when Debs received 13.5% of the vote. But no socialist mayors or other major municipal officers, nor any state legislators, or congressional representatives were elected from Arizona between 1911 to 1920 (Weinstein, 1975:94, 116-18). No evidence indicates that the socialists were influential in Arizona politics or in the 1917 strikes. They were overshadowed by the IWW, especially in 1917.

From 1912 to 1916, liberal Democrat George W. P. Hunt was elected governor of Arizona. Support of Hunt by the alliance of the petty-bourgeoisie and labor (except the class conscious IWW and Socialists) facilitated enough relative autonomy of the state to maintain the legitimacy of electoral politics. For example, Hunt's administration enacted a series of corporate taxes. But after 1914 the weak alliance had begun to fall apart as the petty-bourgeoisie supported wartime production and profits.

In 1916, capital was unified behind Thomas E. Campbell for governor. With the shift in alliance of the petty-bourgeoisie from the working class to the capitalist class, the election was close with Campbell winning by 30 votes.<sup>21</sup> The relative autonomy of the local state correspondingly decreased. After the US entered the war on April 6, 1917 the allegiance of the petty-bourgeoisie to capital was cemented by patriotic ideology. In Arizona, the state organized the new alliance through the local Council of Defense which was composed of corporate leaders, merchants and law enforcement officials. The Council promoted surveillance of dissidents, maintenance of war production formation of local loyalty associations, and general patriotism.

At the municipal level, the relative autonomy of the state was even less than at the state government level since these were essentially company towns. As functionaries of the state, local officials had to carry out the repressive functions of the state. The worker's political strength limited repressive state action, but this was diminished after the breakdown of the alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie. Also, the state militia was incorporated into the army during the war, making municipal law enforcement officials—sheriffs and their deputies—the only local instruments of (legal) state repression. The sheriffs had to create, to an extent, new armies made up of deputies.

## The Strikes in 1917

The events in Arizona in 1917 are not part of the popular history of America and have remained relatively obscure, even in the southwest. Histories of the IWW at least tend to cover the deportations, especially the one from Bisbee. The deportations are usually explained as part of the general repression of the IWW during the war, a repression exaggerated by the vigilantes and copper barons of the west.<sup>22</sup>

By 1917 the conditions for unionizing in Arizona were the best ever. The war had brought about high demands for labor and low unemployment, but also high inflation. A "new blood" movement had brought more aggressive leaders to both the IWW and the AFL. Buoyed by the recent successes in the Miami and Clifton-Morenci strikes, the new IUMMSW of the AFL set out to organize the state. In January of 1917 the IWW also began an organizing drive in Arizona for its Metal Mine Workers Union. The demands of the AFL were generally: (1) "Miami" scale wages; (2) union recognition, end to union discrimination; (3) closed shop and union contract; (4) grievance committee; (5) dues check off. The IWW opposed the closed shop, contracts, and the "Miami" scale. They proposed: (1) abolition of the physical exam; (2) two men on machines; (3) no blasting during shifts; (4) flat wage of \$6.00 per day underground, \$5.00 surface; (6) no discrimination; (7) no contracts and open shop.

In essence, the AFL union was seeking more money and an institutionalization of the union; other non-economic demands were to be solved through the grievance procedure. By tying wages to copper prices with the "Miami" scale, the AFL union accepted the idea of common interests of capital and labor. The IWW wanted more money without tying it to the interests of capital. It rejected institutionalizing the union through legal bureaucratic means—contracts and the union shop—as undemocratic.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the IWW had to include safety and other noneconomic issues into the strike which made it popular with the workers, but more difficult to win the strikes. Also, almost all IWW strikes were solidarity strikes and were fueled by an apocalyptic vision of revolution through a general strike. This, too, made settlement and consolidation of strikes difficult.

## Case Studies

Each of the strikes in the four cities constitutes a separate case study. Instances of state action and evidence of the organization and ideology of capital and labor connected with the strikes were selected for analysis.<sup>24</sup> In general the strikes of 1917 followed a pattern of demands being presented by both unions and rejected by the companies, resulting in strike calls. The strikes were supported by both unions with varying degrees of cooperation and were quite successful in stopping production. State mediation with the AFL followed, along with some form of armed force against the IWW. Finally, the President's Mediation Commission instituted a settlement in the mines.

### Jerome

The first copper strike of 1917 was at Jerome on May 24. It was called by the AFL's IUMMSW and supported by the IWW's MMWU (to simplify matters, just AFL and IWW will be used from now on). Relations between the unions were poor, with the AFL accusing the smaller IWW of being agents of the owners. But the unions respected each other's picket lines. On May 28, mediation began between United Verde and the AFL only. It was led by governor Campbell and federal mediatory John McBride. The company offered the "Miami" scale of tying wages to copper prices and no discrimination. The AFL accepted the company offer by a

slim vote. The IWW opposed the deal, but also went back to work.

Work resumed at Jerome, but during the latter part of June strikes were called in the other three mining centers. On July 6, the IWW called a strike for Jerome which the AFL rejected and then endorsed strikebreaking. The AFL wanted to maintain the position it had received through the mediation. On July 10, two hundred "emergency volunteers," including many AFL members, organized to break the strike. They first jailed 104 strikers. Then at an unofficial trial by corporate and AFL officials, 67 strikers were sentenced to be deported from the state for belonging to the IWW. These men, which included most of the IWW leaders, were sent to the California border and ended up in the custody of the Kingman sheriff. The sheriff released them on request from governor Campbell. The deportation from Jerome was endorsed by the Mayor and local officials, but the armed volunteers were never deputized.

### Globe-Miami

The IWW upstaged the AFL in Globe-Miami by calling a strike on July 1, the day before an AFL strike was to begin. In the early part of the strike the unions co-operated and picketed in conjunction, although the IWW kept its separate demands. The strikers picketed in mass and several confrontations occurred. On July 2, strikers stopped and searched a train for strikebreakers. They also blocked supplies to pumpmen at the Old Dominion mine which was in danger of flooding. The strikers blocked the sheriff and even the governor, at first, from bringing in supplies.

On July 3, Governor Campbell along with federal mediator McBride began mediation of the strike. Campbell also requested that federal troops be sent to the city and all other mining cities (only Globe-Miami received troops<sup>25</sup>). On the same day, the local sheriff deputized 400 citizens. The governor convinced the AFL to agree to supply the pumpmen despite IWW opposition.

Federal troops arrived in Globe-Miami on July 5th. The troops cleared the entrance to the mines and drove an IWW meeting out of the streets, though without violent confrontations. The AFL welcomed the troops, but the IWW condemned them. The AFL also welcomed, and IWW condemned the appointment of former Governor Hunt as a special mediator by President Wilson. At the same time, a Loyalty League of about 500-600 citizens was formed. One of the expressed functions of the League was to differentiate between the AFL and IWW. A week later a federal and state investigation resulted in eighty strikers, including most of the IWW leadership, being arrested for interfering with the US Mail and rioting when they had stopped the train July 2nd. One prominent AFL leader was also arrested for rioting as were several other AFL members. The organization of the IWW was disrupted and discredited by the arrest of its leadership, but the IWW membership continued to strike along with the AFL.

In mid-October the President's Mediation Commission, created to deal with wartime labor disputes, held hearings in Globe-Miami. The AFL agreed to settle for the Miami scale and no discrimination against AFL members, but wanted only US citizens to be hired. The Commission rejected a ban on foreign labor, but added a grievance procedure (independent of the union), federal arbitration, and a no



strike pledge until the end of the war. The owners at first refused, but Sam Lewisohn broke the owner front due to a personal appeal from Commissioner Felix Frankfurter. The other owners reluctantly joined in, but they reserved the right to rehire only "loyal" workers which was used to exclude most IWW members.

### Clifton-Morenci

The Clifton-Morenci strike was the most sedate of the four. The IWW was virtually nonexistent there and the AFL had widespread support. The strike began June 30, but without the threat of a radical alternative, the companies refused to negotiate with the AFL until a federal mediator was sent in. Nevertheless, the strike continued for four months without change or major event. Finally in late October, after the Globe-Miami hearings, the President's Mediation Commission held hearings in Clifton-Morenci. The commission dictated the same settlement as it had in Globe-Miami.

### Bisbee

IWW influence was greatest in Bisbee; even the leadership of the AFL local belonged to the IWW. The strike, called on June 27, closed the mines despite attempts by businessmen to escort strikebreakers past the picket line. Also the Sheriff deputized the 240 member Citizens Protective League. Because of the IWW dominance, Charles Moyer, president of the AFL's mineworkers union, revoked the Bisbee's local's charter and endorsed strikebreaking. This resulted in some AFL members joining the Loyalty League. Both of the Leagues joined in a large 4th of July parade which was used to rally the city against the IWW. Nevertheless, the strike remained peaceful aside from occasional fist fights, and the IWW spread its organizing to a local laundry.

On the night of July 11, a meeting of corporate officers, sheriff Wheeler, and prominent local citizens planned a deportation for Bisbee. At midnight the sheriff deputized by phone 1200 citizens, mainly from the Protective and Loyalty Leagues and similar organizations in nearby Douglas. Teams were formed, the telephone and telegraph offices were censored, and at 6:00 a.m. the roundup began. Deputies arrested all the pickets, and during house to house searches any other known IWW members or sympathizers were collected. One deputy and one IWW member were killed in an exchange of gunfire as the latter refused to leave his house. By 12:30 p.m. 1187 strikers were loaded on a Phelps-Dodge train and deported to an army camp in Columbus, New Mexico.

The Army at first refused to take the deportees and they were left at the small village of Hermanes, New Mexico. The next day the army escorted the deportees back to Columbus and had them build a refugee tent city. The status of the deportees was unclear until July 23rd when the army declared them free to leave. Yet few left because the refugee camp was seen by the IWW as a way to continue the strike and they planned to stay as long as the Army fed them. Most of the deportees stayed until September when the Army tore down the tents and stopped the provisions.

Few, if any of the deportees were allowed back into Bisbee. The Protective and Loyalty Leagues manned checkpoints at all entrances to the city. Even the President's Mediation Commission was momentarily detained when

they arrived in Bisbee in early November. The Commission imposed the same conditions on the mines in Bisbee as the other towns, despite the lack of strike activity there and the small AFL organization. Bisbee remained a heavily policed city for several months with a citizen's court regularly deporting "undesirables."

Several court cases followed the Bisbee deportation. A local jury acquitted merchant Harry Wooton of kidnapping in a test case on the grounds of the law of necessity.<sup>26</sup> One of the major contentions of the defense was that the federal arrest of the IWW leadership in Chicago indicated the severity of the IWW menace and justified local action. A federal case of kidnapping was thrown out by the Supreme Court since no federal laws had been broken.

The aftermath of the strikes of 1917 continued to plague the copper workers. Copper prices fell drastically after the war ended and the "Miami" scale resulted in correspondingly low wages. The grievance procedure instituted by the President's Commission was used by the companies to bypass the union, and the procedure was eventually dropped due to disuse by the miners. The IWW called one last strike in 1919 in Jerome which failed entirely. And by 1920 the Miami local was the AFL's only viable mineworkers union.

## Comparing State Actions: Repression and Legitimation

Having reviewed the four case studies, we can now compare the differences in state actions across cases and the factors which affected those actions. In order to do this, we need to translate the theoretical concepts into categorical indices of the events which apply to all cases. According to the theory of the state presented earlier, the state's function towards the working class is to disorganize it through a process of repression and legitimation. The variables which were considered here to have a determining effect on state repression and legitimation were the organization and ideology of capital and labor, with the relative autonomy of the state as an intervening variable. These are conceptual variables which are used to explain the underlying structures of the state. Therefore, they are not empirically obvious or directly observable, but can be indicated through their observable manifestations.

For this analysis, only direct state action concerning the strikes will be considered. The context of these actions—a war economy, rampant xenophobia, and so on—have been outlined in previous sections. Basically then, seven different categories of state actions in response to the strikes can be defined. These categories will be used to classify state actions during the strikes:

(1) *Arbitration*. This was done by the President's Mediation Commission.

(2) *Mediation*. Only what was done by official mediators, United States mediators, Governor Campbell, special presidential mediator Hunt, and military mediator White was counted.

(3) *Arrests*. Most arrests were by sheriffs, but a few were done by agents of the federal government. These arrests are not from official arrest records, but instead only what showed up in the data, that is "sensational" arrests.

(4) *Armed Occupation*. This includes the military

occupation of Globe and extensive deputizing by sheriffs. The hundreds of deputies created on armed camp situation at the local level.

(5) *Detention*. Included here is the illegal holding of prisoners without due process.

(6) *Leadership Deportation*. This refers to the deportation of the strike leadership from Jerome.<sup>27</sup>

(7) *Mass Deportation*. This refers to Bisbee where not only leaders were deported, but everyone on strike or supporting the strike.

All the state actions were repressive actions. Some may quibble with referring to arbitration and mediation as repressive actions, but the purpose of these acts were to disorganize the working class and displace class conflict. The other five actions were clear uses of state repressive force to divide the workers and break the strikes.

The legitimacy of the state actions can be best indicated by the legality of the act. The detentions and the deportations lacked due process and were generally outside of the legal process. Other less explicit indicators of a loss of legitimacy are the use of armed force, identification with the mine owners, and a lack of differentiation between the IWW and AFL. The use of force and identification with the mine owners expose the class nature of the repression and thus reduces legitimacy. The state used armed force in the deportations, detentions, occupations, and arrests. The mediations and army occupation were identified with Governor Campbell who was politically tied to the mine owners. The use of company buildings, trains and guards during many of the arrests, and especially in the detentions and deportations, closely tied those actions to the owners. On the other hand, the President's Commission was relatively insulated from the mine owners. Concerning differentiation, since the IWW was a radical organization and included many non-whites and recent immigrants (especially from East Europe) differentiation between it and the AFL increased the legitimacy of the state due to racism, nationalism, patriotism in the dominant ideology. Differentiation was most astutely practiced during the arbitration, mediation, and leadership deportation.

## **Factors Affecting State Action: Labor and Relative Autonomy**

The organization and ideology of capital and labor, mediated by the relative autonomy of the state were argued in the theory of the state to have a determining effect on state action. As described earlier, after 1915 there was a high degree of unity in the Arizona cooper industry, organized around Phelps-Dodge. The ideology and politics of the copper industry was shown as one of constant opposition to unionization and support for direct action on their behalf (also see Cleland, 1952).

A comparison of the mining cities shows widespread capitalist unity except for slight deviations in Globe-Miami and Bisbee (there was no deviation in Jerome despite the absence of Phelps-Dodge, indicating this was an organizational unity, not a personal one). Lewisohn in Globe-Miami and Shattuck in Bisbee had better labor relations, though both opposed unionization. Shattuck did not approve of, nor participate in the deportation. Lewisohn was somewhat ostracized for being Jewish, and he was

convinced to support the arbitration. After his capitulation the other owners were at a disadvantage in continued resistance to arbitration—indicating how the disunity of capital increased the relative autonomy of the state. All together, the organization and ideology of capital could generally fall into categories of unified, or unified with slight deviation.

Allied with capital was the petty-bourgeoisie.<sup>28</sup> As described earlier, this was a national alliance based on the desire of both to maintain wartime production and profits, and the intense patriotism and xenophobia of the war. The alliance was politically organized primarily by the Committee on Public Information and the Council of National Defense, which promoted surveillance, patriotism, and local loyalty organizations as previously noted. In Jerome, the petty-bourgeoisie, along with many AFL members, became "emergency volunteers" but had no formal organization other than the local Council of National Defense. At Globe-Miami, the Loyalty League was primarily a businessmen's organization. A similar organization was contemplated in Clifton-Morenci, but never came about. Bisbee had two organizations: the Citizen's Protective League which was composed of businessmen from saloon keepers to Phelps-Dodge president Walter Douglas, and the Loyalty League which was an expansion of the company guards to include strikebreaker who were anti-IWW and probably hired-gun thugs.<sup>29</sup> The membership of the two Leagues overlapped to some extent.

If one turns to the workers, one finds two competing organizations and ideologies. While there were many radicals in the AFL and some miners held dual loyalties, as organizations the AFL and IWW leaderships were very different. As an organization, the AFL accepted the capitalist framework and sought amelioration within it. The AFL supported liberal politicians and the liberal state. It also supported the war.

The IWW refused to cooperate with liberal politicians and was militantly opposed to the war. The two organizations were in competition for the same workers, and generally one organization cut into the strength of the other. While there was evidence of cooperation, once the companies isolated the IWW, the cooperation broke down, as instanced by the events in Globe-Miami and the second strike in Jerome. In general then, one finds a breakdown in striker organization and ideology along union affiliation lines. The AFL as an organization was reformist and pro-war. The IWW was consistently militant. One can thus make ideological categories of mostly IWW, both IWW and AFL, and mostly AFL. Organizational categories can be established as simply a single union or both unions.

In review, the propositions and conceptual categorizations were that the organizational and ideological unity of local capital reduced the relative autonomy of the local state and restricted it from acting against the immediate interests of capital. Categories for capital are "unified" or "unified with deviations." We further proposed that where the workers were more organized the interests of capital in repression was greater and where the workers were more ideologically radical, repression by the state was least restricted by the need for legitimation. Categories of worker organization are "single union" or "both unions" and categories of worker ideology are "IWW," "AFL," or "both

AFL and IWW.”

Concerning the relative autonomy of the state, it was argued that the structure of federalism creates a variation in relative autonomy according to the level of the state—local or national. The effect of the organization and ideology of capital and labor on state action would, therefore, vary according to the level of government performing the action.

## Effects of Organization and Ideology on State Action

The effect of the ideological differences of the unions on state action is most evident in comparing instances of AFL dominance with IWW dominance. Only highly legitimate state actions occurred where the AFL was dominant, indicative of AFL acceptance of the liberal state. The AFL aided in the repression of the IWW and unwittingly participated in its own demise by accepting the “Miami” scale, the company grievance procedure, and the no-strike pledge. While this is an exceptional example, it illustrates the concentrations and limitations of liberal activity.

In comparison, state action against the IWW was massive in scale and highly illegitimate. The ideological rejection of capitalism along with radical demands (such as no contracts and no closed shops) prevented the state from incorporating the IWW into a liberal resolution of the strike. Where the IWW was essentially the only union, the local government was largely restricted to repressive action. At the same time, racism, nationalism and patriotism made repression of the IWW more legitimate within the dominant ideology. Without a concurrent revolution, the IWW organizing practices resulted in short lived and easily repressible unions.

In regards to single union situations compared with situations with both unions, the findings are mixed. Where both unions were active, repression against the IWW was more coercive and illegitimate (especially in Jerome).<sup>30</sup> Also the arbitration included provisions for denying IWW members from being rehired. When only one union dominated—the AFL in Clifton-Morenci and the IWW in Bisbee—the ideological differences described above obscure the effect of organization.

The effect of the unity of capital on state action was limited. On the local level, the slight deviations from unity in Globe-Miami and Bisbee did not indicate any significant affect on state action. Even the refusal of one of the small mine owners (L. Shattuck) to participate in the Bisbee deportation, apparently had no discernable affect on local state activities. This suggests that in this instance, the disunity of capital was too slight or the local state was incapable or unwilling to exploit those deviations of capitalist unity.

On the federal level, the unity of capital in individual cities would be expected to have only a small affect on the formulation of federal policy for capital nationally. But the implementation of federal policy in those cities is affected by local capital unity. We have an example of this affect during the arbitration process when one owner (Lewisohn) broke the owner front of resistance, thus facilitating the capitulation of the rest. The organization of capital considered here only refers to unity within one industry. In considering the difference between capital on the local and

federal level, the resulting differences in relative autonomy of the state has a greater impact.

## Relationship of Relative Autonomy to Legitimacy

The relationship between the level of the state and the legitimacy of the state action is perhaps the most striking finding. The federal level of the state consistently acted with higher levels of legitimacy than the local level. This points out the theoretical importance of the relative autonomy of the state. The lack of autonomy at the local level of the state meant that it responded to the direct and immediate interests of capital.

The least legitimate actions, the mass and leadership deportations were conducted solely at the local level of the state. Also the local governments were most active in the other coercive actions—the detentions, armed occupation, and arrests. The use of force by the federal government consisted of the military occupation and arrests in Globe-Miami (only one federal action was possibly illegal<sup>31</sup>). While mediation was conducted at Jerome and Globe-Miami by the local government, federal mediators were later brought to those cities along with Clifton-Morenci. Also, all the arbitration was done at the federal level.

The increased autonomy of the state at the federal level allowed the federal government to maintain legitimacy through the practice of liberalism which sought to have the workers support the system by making capitalism and the state legitimate to them. The appointment of liberal ex-governor Hunt as a special mediator, and especially the work of the President’s Commission, can be seen as forcing a liberal resolution on the industry by the state which was in the long range interests of capital, despite the initial protests of some capitalists. Arbitration by the Commission shut the IWW out from participation and from being rehired. The arbitration did force a grievance procedure and higher wages through the “Miami” scale on owners. But this was in the long term interests of capital. Not only was the strike ended and copper production necessary for the war restored, local capital also benefited, since the wages later fell and remained a low constant in relation to profits. The grievance procedure eventually helped undermine the union, and the arbitration included a no strike pledge for the remainder of the war.

Highly legitimate federal action usually followed highly illegitimate local action, thus supporting the idea that the state at the federal level uses its greater relative autonomy to restore legitimacy lost from local action. The President’s Commission, for example, arrived after most of the coercive repressive action had taken place and then it investigated those actions. In doing so, the Commission sought to legitimate the legal system and the state. In this instance, the ability of the state to “prove the system works” was built into the structure of federalism, in which local government has autonomy from the national government, but is still under the jurisdiction of the national government. Autonomy allowed for local state repression, which the national government then declared illegitimate since it had the ultimate jurisdiction of authority. The frequency of this kind of restorative action at the federal level indicates that this relationship between the federal and local levels of the state needs further theoretical development.<sup>32</sup>

## Conclusion

A review of the analysis shows that the differences in the unity of capital had little effect on the local state action, due most likely to the minimal amount of deviation and the overwhelming dominance of a single corporation in each city. But the disunity of capital did have an effect on the federal level of the state, making the arbitration a more rapid process. The enhanced ability of the federal level of the state to make use of disunity in local capital is due to its general insulation from the copper industry. It was this variation in relative autonomy between the local and federal levels of the state which proved especially useful in determining the legitimacy of state action. Federal action was consistently more legitimate, and the federal level served to restore the legitimacy of action taken by the local level through the structure of federalism. Also, federal action served to recognize the industry in the long term interests of capital, despite protests of the local capitalists.

Organization of labor did not have an affect independent of the ideology of labor. Using unionized versus nonunionized as an indicator of organization might be more appropriate for showing these effects, but this information was not available in this study. Also the political power of each union was not reflected by its organizational power, since the IWW eschewed electoral politics. A separate political indicator (such as elected officials who were union members or union supporters) may have been useful in this analysis, especially since labor political power also has the effect of increasing the relative autonomy of the state.

The effect of the ideology of labor on state action is evident in the wide difference between the arbitration in Clifton-Morenci and the mass deportation in Bisbee. The radical ideology of the IWW made its repression more legitimate and restricted its inclusion in a liberal settlement. This is not to say that the state could only forcefully repress the IWW, or that the IWW was incapable of making any immediate gains, but that there were tendencies in those directions which became evident in this study.

On the other hand, the liberal ideology of the AFL allowed it to become an adjunct to liberal state policies. The arbitration, mediation, and leadership deportation graphically demonstrated how the state disrupted labor cooperation and used the AFL in repressing the IWW—and also used the AFL to unwittingly aid in the repression of its own members. If there had been no liberal union in Arizona, the state most likely would have created one as it did in a similar situation in the Northwest lumber industry (Dubofsky, 1969:412-14).

Since the liberal state originated during the progressive era, understanding the state now is aided by understanding the state then. The lack of a radical union movement and the existence of a liberal movement in America is now taken for granted. Understanding how the state maintains those conditions, is aided by understanding how the process of repression and legitimation brought it about in the first place. It is the application of Marxist theory to historical development which can bring about this understanding and others. Such application is a pressing task for Marxist scholarship today.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this article was submitted for a master's degree in sociology at the University of Arizona. I am grateful for comments from Diane Bush, Neil Fligstein, and Art Stinchcombe.

<sup>2</sup> See also Weinstein (1967), Dubofsky (1969), Gambs (1932), Lightfoot (1977), Preston and File (1957), and Goldstein (1978).

<sup>3</sup> The unity of the ISA does not prevent the workingclass from having its own ideology with corresponding institutions, or from having an affect on bourgeois institutions. Also the extent of the unity of the ISA will differ from country to country. The relationship of the church and media to the state is closer in France, where Althusser is writing, than in the US, for example. But in the US bourgeois ideology is also dominant and the state guarantees this dominance through a variety of mechanisms, starting with public education but ranging from anti-communist laws to "In God We Trust" on the currency.

<sup>4</sup> While the economic structure is determinate in the last instance, economic class conflict is not directly present in the political and ideological structures. Class struggle in the political and ideological structures is mediated by the requirements of those structures and by their own historical development, allowing for a relative autonomy. This autonomy results in differential development between the structures at any given conjuncture. Because the development of society is continuous, the last instance never comes. But the determining relationship of the economic structure remains, however mediated, since class location, class conflict, and class domination originate there.

<sup>5</sup> Poulantzas did not deal specifically with the level of the state, but the ideas expressed here are consistent with his theory and provide a useful operational application of relative autonomy.

<sup>6</sup> Reagan, Nixon, Goldwater and so on have all clamored for increased local control. Local control is not to be confused with what might be called community control. Community control includes social control over most of the local economy, preventing the need of state action to conform to the limits imposed by private capital.

<sup>7</sup> Repression also has negative economic effects such as a decrease in productivity and the expense of maintaining the repressive forces.

<sup>8</sup> At one time the bourgeoisie was a middle class, between the aristocracy and the peasantry. It may be more appropriate now to consider the petty-bourgeoisie, especially since petty-bourgeois ideology is beneficial to monopoly capitalism (Poulantzas, 1974). This is an area which needs further theoretical development.

<sup>9</sup> "We the People" in the US constitution included only white male property owners. They alone had full citizenship rights. Electoral politics and the enfranchisement of the working class is one of the primary instruments for maintaining the concept of the state as the state of the whole people (see Piven and Cloward, 1977).

<sup>10</sup> See Erikson's (1966) analysis of witch hunts in colonial Massachusetts for example.

<sup>11</sup> An excellent study of this process has been done on machine workers by Burawoy (1979).

<sup>12</sup> The most important of all American merger movements was from 1898 to 1902 with a peak in 1899 of 1208 firm disappearances by merger (Nelson, 1959).

<sup>13</sup> Under competitive capital, liberalism had meant noninterference of the state in free enterprise. With "monopoly" capital, liberalism came to mean state intervention to regulate the economy. The old idea of liberalism became a conservative ideology. Both forms of liberalism were tied to the needs of the dominant fraction in the economy and both have dominated the ideology of the oppressed classes (Weinstein, 1969:xii-xiii).

<sup>14</sup> See Foner (1970) and Weinstein (1970) for a debate on the sincerity of NCF support for unionization.

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<sup>15</sup>The Populists were another organized opposition to many of the excesses of capitalism, but not to the capitalist system itself. When W. J. Bryan was nominated by the Democrats and a free silver plank was added to the platform in 1896, widespread fusion resulted between the Democrats and Populists. The Populist vote for president went from 1,024,000 in 1892 to 124,000 in 1896, and after 1908 the Populists no longer ran national campaigns. The Socialists absorbed many of the populists and had a strong rural wing prior to World War I (Weinstein, 1968; Stedman, 1950).

<sup>16</sup>DeLeon was also the leader of the Socialist Labor Party and was known as the "Pope" for his inflexible doctrinaire approach. DeLeon was expelled from the IWW in 1908 and Bill Haywood took control. A rival IWW was formed by DeLeon, but it remained only a small overlapping adjunct to the SLP (Dubofsky, 1969).

<sup>17</sup>Extensive state organization of the economy as characterized by the WIB did not last past the war but it set a precedent for corporate liberalism in the state which was realized on a permanent basis in the New Deal (Weinstein, 1968).

<sup>18</sup>While imperialist struggles are important causes of the war, the need to legitimate repression and other domestic causes are perhaps of equal importance.

<sup>19</sup>The historical outline follows from Jensen (1950), Brykit (1972), and Leaming (1973) who emphasize labor and Peplow (1958:1-106, 173-273) who emphasizes capital.

<sup>20</sup>Segmentation of workers in the Arizona copper industry along nationalist lines created a status hierarchy which generally reflected the position of the worker's country of origin in the capitalist world system at that time. For an analysis of the position of Mexican workers in this segmentation process, see Jimenez (1981).

<sup>21</sup>Hunt contested the election and it was overturned in a recount with Hunt assuming office on Dec. 25, 1917. But for the duration of the strikes Campbell was governor (Peplow, 1958:37).

<sup>22</sup>General sources of interest concerning the 1917 strikes in Arizona are Dubofsky (1969), Renshaw (1967), DeCaux (1959), Cleland (1952), Byrkit (1972), Lindquist and Fraser (1968), Landau (1959), Thompson (1955), and Jensen (1950).

<sup>23</sup>Failure to institutionalize strike gains through contracts or organizational gains through closed shops are some of the internal reasons the IWW declined nationally (Gambs, 1932).

<sup>24</sup>The data used in constructing the case studies and comparative analysis comes from three sources: a daily survey of the Arizona Daily Star (June 27-July 17) and Arizona Republican (May 15-July 18) newspapers; documents and court transcripts from the University of Arizona Special Collections; and articles, books, and dissertations concerning the events. See Danzger (1975) on bias inherent in newspaper research.

<sup>25</sup>Campbell had requested troops for all of the striking mining centers. The state militia probably would have been sent to the strikes had it not been incorporated into the army. The army may have sent troops to the other cities if not for the war and war training (Peplow, 1958:55-70).

<sup>26</sup>This same principle of the "law of necessity" was used to justify the Japanese-American detention camps during WWII (Peplow, 1958:72-73).

<sup>27</sup>Deporting the strike leadership from Jerome requires qualification of being considered a state action since the guards were not deputized. It is still included for two reasons: one, even, unofficial repression is within the concept of the state (especially along the lines of Althusser's theory) and two, the action was not stopped by the authorities, nor were the guards prosecuted, but instead they were sanctioned and praised by the local officials.

<sup>28</sup>The petty-bourgeoisie has not been analyzed in this paper independently from its alliance with capital or labor. Within the scope of this paper, analysis of the alliance is sufficient to understand the petty-bourgeoisie. This is especially true since it is not in an irreconcilable position to the other classes (Poulantzas, 1979:237-70). This does not mean independent analysis of the petty-bourgeoisie is irrelevant for this or other research.

<sup>29</sup>The Loyalty League in Bisbee was analogous to the pre-fascist movements in Europe around the same time. Similar to the activity of the fascists, the Loyalty Leaguers repressed radical workers on racist and patriotic grounds. Loyalty Leagues were formed across the US but did not grow into a fascist movement partly because of the more positive war experience and the superior economic position in the US.

<sup>30</sup>In the cases where both unions were active, there was more evidence of violent acts committed by workers, usually against other workers. By making the AFL legitimate and the IWW illegitimate, the state convinced one labor organization that the other was its enemy. Nevertheless there was no evidence of extensive violence (other than state action) nor did violence have a significant affect on state action.

<sup>31</sup>The possibly illegal federal action was a detention of deportees at Columbus for ten days. This action is included with reservation since the Columbus camp served as a refugee camp for the deportees. They welcomed the Army and did not contest the detention in court or otherwise. Also the commander of the camp did not receive orders on what to do with deportees during those ten days (one suspects this was not accidental). But the failure of the Army to return the deportees or even release them during those ten days warrants its inclusion as an illegal detention.

<sup>32</sup>Federal retrials of local court cases to re-establish legal legitimacy is recently an increasing practice, as evidenced in the federal retrials of a local police brutality in Liberty City, Fla., a KKK trial in Chatanooga, Tenn., and three federal trials of the Hannigan borthers in Tucson, Ariz. (all of the summer of 1980).

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
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