

comrades are not aware that comrade Serrati was compelled to confess here at the last Congress that he was in the wrong in Livorno and that the Comintern was right. Should the Norwegian comrades maintain their present attitude, the events which happened in Italy will be repeated in Norway.

Hoeglund (Sweden)

Comrade Radek wanted me to substantiate my criticism of the attitude of the Executive upon Scandinavian questions, and I am going to gratify his wish. We recognise that certain mistakes had been made in the Norwegian situation by both sides, which called for intervention by the Executive. The mistakes of the past and present Executive may be summarised as follows:

1. Expulsion of Lain, chairman of the Norwegian Trade Union Executive.
2. Publication of the first letter of the Executive to the Party Executive was first made in the *Pravda*, and the Norwegian Party got it only after it had already been published in the *Sozialdemokraten*, which had reprinted it from the *Pravda* for demagogic purposes.
3. The second letter of the Executive, of the 22nd September, was drawn up without either consulting or negotiating with the Norwegian Party Executive.
4. The so-called magazine articles by comrade Tranmael were represented as though he was in favour of organic fusion with the right wing socialists, which was not the case.
5. The second letter so sharply and scathingly attacked the Tranmael following that it really aggravated the conflict instead of allaying it.
6. It was a mistake when the Executive appointed a representative of the Norwegian Party minority to a seat upon the Executive.
7. Comrade Bucharin preferred grave charges against the Mot-Dag group, pointing to fascist tendencies of some individual parts of this group. Then again, Comrade Shatzkin in the *Klassenkampen* incited the Communist Youth against the Party, although the Norwegian Party strife was declared liquidated at the last Party Congress. In the Danish question it was a mistake to negotiate with the semi-anarchist "putschists" who had committed a grave breach of discipline. Finally, Comrades Hellberg and Ernst Christiansen were expelled, although they had rendered great services to the International in hard times. Comrade Hoeglund went on to deal with the comments of Radek and Bucharin on his article "Religion and Communism", pointing out that he was not against educational work in this matter, but he merely wished to prevent any blunt anti-religious propaganda detrimental to the Party, in order not to estrange the honest religious workers and peasants. He believed that in spite of everything the discussion has shown unity upon the principal questions.

Laursen (Denmark)

Comrade Hoeglund seems to resent the fact that the E. C. acted as mediator in the Danish Party dispute. The attitude of the Executive was correct. At that time it would have been possible to reestablish a united communist organisation in Denmark, in spite of the small group imbued with anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. After the rejection of its proposal to mediate, the Executive once more approached the Danish Party and demanded that the dispute should be settled at any cost. When the Executive realised that Hellberg had caused the rejection of the proposal made by the Scandinavian Commission, it decided quite rightly that this obstacle must be removed. In the Danish Commission,

which was appointed by the Enlarged Executive, we will once more do our utmost to bring about the unification of all the Communist elements in Denmark. However, we are justified in expecting that all our Scandinavian brother Parties will do their utmost to bring about such a unification.

Aoki (Japan)

In Comrade Zinoviev's references to the Japanese movement he expressed the opinion that a legal political labour party should be formed. The Japanese comrades were not afraid of persecution or imprisonment. They had put up with suppression for the last thirteen years. But in his opinion it would be premature to form a legal political party. They needed the support and sympathy of the militant elements among the working class. These elements were indifferent to politics. They were inexperienced and had a narrow outlook on politics. Even the present leaders of the Yuaikai were losing their influence because of their reformist tendencies. Should we form a party at the risk of losing the militant elements of the working class? The syndicalist workers were opposed to the communists merely because they were political. If they formed a party they would suffer great loss, at least for some years.

Tranmael (Norway)

When considering the differences between the Norwegian Party and the International it was necessary to take into account the structure and traditions of the Party. It was organised 36 years ago mainly as a federation of Trade Unions without definite political opinions or socialist aims. Its radicalisation into a Socialist Party and finally into a Communist Party has been a long process. Its transformation into a Communist Party had begun long before its affiliation to the Third International.

On the question of the United Front, the situation in Norway is rather different than is the case in most other countries. Four-fifths of the workers follow the Communist Party, and those who are influenced by the social democrats can be reached through the Trade Unions. Under the circumstances, our appeal to the Social Democratic leaders would only serve to strengthen that Party.

The second letter of the Comintern was also sent without previous discussion with the Party Executive and was based upon incorrect and incomplete information.

The Fourth Congress decided upon a sharpening of centralisation. This was serious for a Party with the traditions of the Norwegian Party, especially in view of the experience they already had of the manner in which it was likely to be carried out. The Executive Committee made some concessions and there was no doubt that it had, in some measure, altered its views in regard to the questions at issue, among those the time required for reorganizing the Party. There was, after our Congress, reason to believe that the conflict was over. But the strife was again opened by the article by Schatzkin, reprinted in Norway, stating that if the choice rose between the Executive Committee of the Party and the International, the choice would be with the International. Such remarks pre-supposes that the strife is still to continue. Zinoviev's speech at this meeting also gives us reason to fear that the conflict has again re-opened.

There is strife in the Trade Unions which the socialists are exploiting. There are also proclaimed large strikes, and lockouts. It would, under these circumstances, be folly to induce the Trade Unions at this particular time to send a delegation to the Conference of the Profintern.

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The Enlarged Executive Fourth Day of Session

June 15, 1923.

The session opened at mid-day. Comrade Boettcher was in the chair. A statement was read by Comrade Schatzkin in which amongst other things it was said: My article was printed in the *Jugendinternationale* and was reprinted without my knowledge in *Klassenkampen*. The article criticised the resolutions of the Norwegian Party which were opposed to the decisions of the Fourth Congress, and it furthermore stated that the Norwegian Young Communists were entitled and even bound in the disputed questions to give preference to the decisions of the Communist International rather than to the majority of two votes of the Party Congress.

The Chairman then called on Comrade Zinoviev to reply to the discussion.

Concluding speech of Comrade Zinoviev

"Hoeglund complained that in my speech I overlooked a great deal. That was only natural. We have 50 Parties and there are so many problems to be discussed. It was not my intention to give a catalogue but only to deal with the most important matters. And of course there was also a written report distributed. Why did Hoeglund raise his criticism? Because he would have preferred if I had not dealt quite so much with the Scandinavian questions. But it was these very questions that were most important. The discussion on religion will prove to have been useful. Hoeglund is now putting the best face he can on the matter: he says he is satisfied, he had won the argument. It would appear that we were proposing a grand campaign against religion. It is not we who are conducting a campaign but the bourgeois who are attacking us because we have presumed to punish counter-revolutionary priests. We know very well that in Germany, in England and in Ireland, there are broad sections of the proletariat who are still religious. At the Fourth Congress, arising out of the debate on the Workers' Government, we declared that we were prepared to co-operate even with Christian workers. We therefore do not stand in need of instruction. But the Russian Party has to adopt a different policy toward religion than the other parties. And not on the question of religion alone. Frequent purgings of our Russian Party are undertaken; in other countries, where the Communist Parties have not yet come to power, it is not necessary to adopt such drastic measures. There was no question of workers who are still religious being excluded from the Party; there was no question of a grand campaign against religion.

Hoeglund complains that I criticised him without quoting him. I did that, so to speak, out of friendliness, but I shall now quote a passage of his article which involved a question of principle. Hoeglund writes:

"The Party is not concerned whether certain Communists carry on religious or anti-religious propaganda. As a Party, we demand only that our members should adhere to our political program and our statutes."

This point of view is wrong. Lenin, as early as 1905, bluntly stated that religion as far as the State was concerned, was a private matter, but not as far as the Party was concerned. Our Party cannot be indifferent to religious questions. We must demand of our members something more than the acceptance of our political program and statutes; we must demand what Lenin demanded,—a scientific outlook. Was Lenin in favour of a sect? He has aroused greater masses than Hoeglund has, not only in Russia, but throughout the world. The Communist Party, as a party, says what Marx said, that religion is an opiate for the people. Of course, it is very important how your anti-religious propaganda is conducted, whether it is done shrewdly or crudely; but Hoeglund did not put it this way. He merely says that the Social-democrats will exploit our discussions. Unfortunately, we have to take that risk, but Hoeglund must not forget that the Social-democrats will also exploit his article against us. I therefore repeat that we are prepared to co-operate with any honest religious worker; we have no intentions of starting a grand campaign against religion. We hold with Lenin and Marx, but we expect that the work of education should be carried on in a reasonable manner.

Passing to the Norwegian question, I must admit that Falk and Tranmael spoke in a very comradely manner. I note their desire that an understanding should be reached. But we must not overlook the facts. In 1921 we were already engaged in conflict with the Norwegian Party. Two years later the Central Committee decided to leave the Communist International. These are very serious facts. The Communist International is not a wayside inn, through which one can pass in and out, but a sacred fighting fraternity, whose members are bound together for life and death.

Hoeglund defended the periodical "Mot Dag". Hoeglund demands that we should be loyal to the Norwegian comrades. Of course, we must be loyal to comrades, but what must we be to people who use such shady weapons against us as the "Mot Dag" group. But perhaps this is also a private matter? All honor to the Norwegian proletariat! But how can we tolerate it when certain individuals write thus in its name?

We are reproached with having expelled Kajol from the Party, although he has never been a member of the Party. The reproach rebounds upon the Norwegian comrades, since Kajol was the editor of the Central Party paper. Comrade Traumael says, only give us time and all will be well. Yes, that is right. We must give them time. But these are questions that have not sprung up over night. Three years elapsed before the name of the chief party paper, the "Sozial-demokraten" was changed to the "Arbeiderbladet", and before the reorganisation of the Party was begun. Schatzkin is perfectly right when he says that it is the duty of the Young Communist League to submit to the discipline of the International. We must object to the contemptuous manner in which the Youth Movement was referred to. The Youth Movement is the best section of the Communist International; and that is as it should be because they are the heralds of the future.

Höglund has accused us of being disloyal. It is not he who defends discipline that is disloyal, but he who over the acceptance of the 21 points breaks it. It is disloyalty when the Party retains elements in its midst who break its discipline. He reproaches us with the case of Lian; but Lian appeared at Genoa with Jouhaux at the Conference of the International Labour Bureau. We demanded his exclusion from the Party, but it turned out that he had gone there not on his own initiative but at the request of the Central Committee of the Party. He reproaches us with having adopted resolutions without having first discussed them with the representative of the Party. That is not true, we discussed matters at length with Comrade Fries; we repeatedly requested that Comrade Traumael should come here. It is not our fault if we did not discuss matters with this representative of the Party.

He reproaches us of having unjustly criticised the action of the Parliamentary fraction. But Traumael himself has answered this reproach. Höglund says it was an error to have appointed Schefflo and not Mayer as representative of the majority. But Mayer is only a recent member of the Party. Members of the Executive of the Communist International must be comrades who personify the movement. He further complains that Bucharin criticised "Mot Dag" too severely. Judging from what we now know of the paper, the criticism of Comrade Bucharin was entirely justified.

As to centralisation, even Ledebour laid down in the statutes for his International, that the principles should be issued by the International and their execution should be left to the individual parties. And this comes from a Social-Democrat. We are not to interfere in local questions. But is the Ruhr a local question, a question merely for the German Party, or a question merely for the French Party? Today every big question is of international significance. We have not interfered in really local questions; but was Lian's journey a local question? We understand very well what must and what must not be decided centrally. Höglund reproaches us with dealing with the Danish question, but in fact we left this question entirely to our Scandinavian comrades. Höglund has not behaved correctly. It is his right to draw our attention to incorrect conclusions, so that they may be corrected; but he is wrong when he invites the enemies of the Communist International to his Congress. That is disloyal. We shall do all in our power to come to an understanding with the Norwegian comrades. If real opposition exists, it must be fought out; if it does not exist, then we can arrive at unanimous decisions which must then be carried out.

Italy is the favorite child of the International; yet, it is the child that has caused it most pain. I did not say that the Central Committee alone was responsible for the fact that fusion was not achieved; I only said that it bore part of the responsibility. And that is had enough. It is to be hoped that we shall be able to adopt decisions that will be carried out.

Comrade Zapotockay said that the masses in Czechoslovakia could not be agitated up to the point of the final struggle. But an army, when it is not actually fighting, must be exercised, it must perform manoeuvres, and these manoeuvres must have definite aims in view. The statement is not quite clear. There is at present a severe crisis in Czechoslovakia owing to the artificial raising of the rate of the krone; there is great unemployment; there is a perpetual parliamentary crisis. The slogan of dictatorship does not therefore appear to be so very hopeless there; the only question is how it is to be presented. A Russian counter-revolutionary, Isgyev, wrote about the First of May demonstrations which he himself saw in Prague: innumerable demonstrations passed by belonging to the Communists, and only a small group whose members all seemed well clad and who belonged to the Social-Democrats. After this the speech of Zapotockay seems to me too pessimistic. As to the manoeuvres, they must not be too artificial.

One would have believed that the questions of unemployment and of the party and of the trade unions would have offered sufficient occupation. The contrast of manoeuvres and positive aims, as made by Comrade Zapotockay, is mistaken. The manoeuvres are undertaken solely to prepare for positive aims.

The news comes from Bulgaria that Stambolisky is preparing for a counterblow and that in Plevna, the Communists would have made an uprising, but that the Central Committee of the Communist Party opposed it. If this news is true, it was a serious error. Now we must ally ourselves with the accused Stambolisky. The Bolsheviks fought with Kerensky against Kornilov. The Bulgarian Party has the accumulation of 25 years behind it; it must now show whether this was an accumulation of Communist energy. There are now three possibilities in Bulgaria: The party can enter into the fight, in which case it might become a fight—for a Workers' and Peasants' Government. If the party does not fight, and the present government stands, then the life of the Party is at stake or the rot will set in. The third alternative is that the Central Committee of the Party remains inactive but that the rank and file are drawn into the struggle. This will lead to a split. We are far away from the source; we can give no lead from here. But we must draw the attention of the Bulgarian Party to the dangers.

Returning to the question of the Workers' and Peasants' Government, it has to be noted that the unanimity on this subject is so great that it is now possible to proceed to announce the slogan. Traumael observed justly that the new slogan meant no petty parliamentary coalition with so-called peasant parties, that in reality are bourgeois parties, but that we must approach the peasant masses.

What the national socialist paper "Das Gewissen" writes about the German Communist Party is the greatest compliment to the latter. The German C.P. is not national in the ordinary sense of the word; but it is important that a section of the bourgeoisie can now see that it is a party that is turning to the whole population of the country. This is a great success; it shows that the party does not conceive the class war in too narrow a sense. The German C.P. is a class party, but in the sense of its being a revolutionary party on the eve of the revolution. Episodes may still arise, but the issue of the struggle is indubitable, I do not underestimate the Second International: it is an International of treachery. I only say that we must not be a ceremonial International.

The most recent event in the labour movement, the alliance between the transport workers of the two trade union internationals for fighting purposes, proves that the balance of forces is in our favour. Decisive events may still occur before the Fifth Congress meets. Let our eyes be keen, our hands firm, let us be true to the International and our success is certain.

At the conclusion of Zinoviev's speech the chairman read the following declaration from the secretary of the Swedish Communist Party Comrade Ström.

"To avoid misunderstanding, we hereby declare that telegrams of greeting and also invitations to the Swedish Party Congress were duly sent to both Danish Communist Parties."

Ewert (Germany)

made the following declaration:

"The British delegation has brought forward the proposal on the subject of religion, in accordance with which the Enlarged Executive should regard the standpoint of Comrade Höglund on the question of religion as false and un-Marxian. The Executive must insist that religion, from the point of view of the Party, is not a private matter, but a subject for exposure and must be combatted by suitable means and methods. The German delegation supports this resolution, and the following delegations have subscribed to it: France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Holland, Austria, Switzerland and Finland. The German delegation, moreover, has introduced two resolutions on the question of the "Mot-Dag" group and the relations of the Norwegian Party to the International, which have been supported by the British delegates. The first resolution states that the Enlarged Executive regards the tendencies of the "Mot-Dag" group as absolutely incompatible with membership of the International. In the second resolution the attitude of the Norwegian Party Central Committee towards its relationship to the International, is characterized as wrong and harmful."

In the name of the Russian delegation Comrade Zinoviev proposed that the resolutions should be referred to the Com-

mission which should come to an understanding with the Norwegian comrades.

It was unanimously decided to hand the resolutions to the Commission.

Speech of Comrade Radek on the World Political Situation

New Phenomena have appeared in world politics since the last Congress. The situation has changed in many respects. It is our duty to draw the necessary tactical conclusions.

Lord Curzon called the Communist International a mischievous organisation, presumably because it concerns itself with questions of world politics. We have not studied world political questions at Eton College. We, as the objects of world politics, studied world political questions in the school of bitter experience. It may be we have not studied sufficiently, and that would be bad. If we are to be successful we must have an exact knowledge of the world situation.

The first important fact during the last six months is the Anglo-American pact on the question of England's debts. The second was the occupation of the Ruhr. The third, the Lausanne Conference, where on the question of Turkey, England and France exchanged parts. The fourth fact is the Anglo-Russian conflict, and the fifth, the liquidation of the Washington Treaty on the Far East.

All these facts are closely connected. Lloyd George also proposed an arrangement on the question of the debts according to which the burden of France was to be considerably diminished, but in return for which France was to reduce her armaments and her reparations demands on Germany. Had this proposal been adopted, it would have eased the struggle for the hegemony of Europe. A reduction of the burden of reparations would have increased the purchasing power of Germany and with the enlivening of trade relations between Germany and England, a decrease of unemployment in England, which is costing the State £100,000,000 annually, would have resulted.

Furthermore Lloyd George wished to draw Russia into world commerce as a capitalist state. Russia was to have renounced Socialist reconstruction and pay her former debts. This in practice would have led to her mortgaging her railways and harbours. Had the plan of Lloyd George succeeded, it would have led to the restoration of European capitalism. It was a great idea, the only defect of which was that, like Ario's horse, it was dead. Lloyd George had counted without America and without Russia. America did not intend to mix herself up with European affairs, and that is quite understandable. Since the beginning of the war she has doubled her output of steel and more than doubled her wheat area. America feels no necessity for intervening in European politics. Nevertheless there were circles who believed in intervention. The farmers were very anxious to export their products to Europe, and certain banks were very anxious to finance the export.

But owing to the prevailing prosperity in America, the influence of this group was minimized. America was more concerned with Eastern Asia than with Europe. American capital feared the revolutionary situation in the old world. On the other hand, Eastern Asia rendered an alliance between England and America impossible. Furthermore, England and America were competitors for sea power. In a struggle between America and England, France might become the ally of America. Therefore at Washington, in spite of the great talk about disarmament, no measures were adopted against the French armaments.

Lloyd George's plan revealed a slight error. He believed the new economic policy was a parachute with the aid of which we intended to lower ourselves to earth. We were prepared to make concessions for the sake of credits, but we were not prepared to hand over either our railways or our heavy industries to capital. At Genoa Lloyd George threatened that if we rejected his plans, and thereby made them impossible, we should lose our best friend. We, however, said to ourselves, God save us from our friends; with our enemies we know how to deal.

If one method will not do, we will try another, thought our enemies, and they changed their attitude towards Russia. Baldwin concluded the financial agreement with America on the question of the debts. On the subject of this agreement Lloyd George wrote that England experienced a cold shiver at the thought that for sixty years it will have to pay about 600,000,000 gold marks annually. Ten per cent of the revenue from taxation would have to be devoted to paying the debts to the Allies. The attempt at rapprochement with America was not the only result of the policy of Lloyd George. He brought up the question of future relationships with France. Speaking militarily, England had ceased to be an island. It consists now of nothing but Achilles'

heels owing to the overwhelming superiority of the French aerial forces. This disadvantage, England is seeking to balance by other means.

At the Paris Conference, England made a proposal on the question of reparations which it is true was not worse than the French plan, but which made no mention of guarantees. England's plan was a gigantic piece of provocation. She knew that she was not in a position to defeat French imperialism, and therefore planned to break its neck against the wall of German opposition. While the British Government in England was declaring its neutrality on the question of the Ruhr conflict, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Avernon, was encouraging the German bourgeoisie to resist with the promise that England would assist Germany at the critical moment. England speculated that after Poincaré had run his head against the resistance of the German miners and the German bourgeoisie, the turn of the iron and the coal trusts would come, at which point English capital would have an important part to play. This plan was nullified by the German bourgeoisie itself. Events in the Ruhr proved that the bourgeoisie is not only not in a position to rebuild capitalism, but that the defeated bourgeoisie is not able to subordinate its own individual interest to its class interest. Owing to the colossal support given by the German Government to the Ruhr capitalists, which was used by them for monstrous speculations, the dollar which at the outset of the Ruhr occupation stood at 7,000 marks, rose to 90,000 marks. Resistance was thereby broken.

Prices are rising so high that the workers ought to receive wages many times higher than they receive now. Nevertheless the German Government demanded a reduction of wages and in order to dam the strike wave that was spreading over the whole of the Ruhr and the whole of Germany, Lutterbeck, the German, appealed to the French General Degoutte for assistance to break the resistance of the German proletariat. When 14 days after this incident Cuno declared that the German resistance on the Ruhr was broken, it implied a "restitutio in integrum" which notoriously never succeeds. The German bourgeoisie were willing to capitulate on the backs of the proletariat. The German heavy industry proposed that an annual payment of 500,000,000 gold marks be made for reparations, which they would guarantee on the condition that the 8-hour day was abolished, that the railways were handed over, the repeal of the Tenants' Protection Law, and free exports. These points imply nothing more than that the German workers failed to confiscate the capital of the bourgeoisie, but that the bourgeoisie will confiscate in the literal sense of the word all the capital of the State. Poincaré's victory on the Ruhr is not formally complete. The German bourgeoisie who let loose the bounds of nationalism against the communists find that they have released a spirit which they cannot now control. It endeavoured to thrust the responsibility for the collapse in the Ruhr on the Communists, but the German Party kept its head and did not permit themselves to be provoked by this manoeuvre.

The occupation of the Ruhr by France was directed not only against the German bourgeoisie, but also against the British. As a consequence of the struggle in the Ruhr, Germany has been thrown back economically for many years. For England it implies that its most important customer has been rendered incapable of buying for many years. Consequently, for many years Central Europe will be so disturbed that it cannot be regarded as a market for the disposal of goods. The only outlet therefore is the colonies, and it was this that the Curzon Note to Soviet Russia expressed. It is remarkable that on the very same day a Note was handed to Germany in which the British Government called upon Germany to pay the reparations sum demanded by France. At the first glance it would appear to be madness to make both Germany and Russia enemies, but there was method in this madness. Britain was prepared to surrender Germany to France, in return for which France was to be set against Soviet Russia? On the one hand it was the failure of the Lloyd George plan, on the other the development of affairs in Russia and the East. Lloyd George, whose hopes of a Russian capitulation, had, in spite of the civil war and the famine, been dashed, found himself also deceived in his expectations of the results of the new economic policy. Instead of bringing a return of capitalism, NEP only strengthened the existing regime. Russia was able to export grain, and given a favourable harvest, she will be in a position to export grain to the value of 150,000,000 gold roubles. This will bring about a revival of the light and heavy industries, which in turn will consolidate the country. The developments in the East are also strengthening the position of Soviet Russia. In this England sees a threat to her communications with the colonies; and therefore Curzon counted upon bringing Soviet Russia to her knees now before it was too late. All the Western States were to renounce their relations with Russia; Russia was to be isolated from the sources of foreign currency and to be subjected to a new economic blockade. At the same time the passive opposition of the Border States was to be enlisted against Russia. In other words, the Petlura hands, the

S.R.'s and the Georgian Mensheviks were to be induced by British gold to unleash civil war in Russia. British policy counted also upon a Polish war against Soviet Russia. Another factor was the speculation upon the illness of Comrade Lenin. But England counted without the 25 years' history of our party. An American journalist, who came from London, and whom I asked why Curzon wanted war with Soviet Russia, replied: Curzon wants to test how strong you are without Lenin!

We did not give the response these people expected. The Government of Workers' and Peasants' does not want war, but if it is forced into war, it will see to it that the Soviet Government is maintained with a minimum of sacrifice. Throughout all the speculations, Curzon forgot one side—the Russian side. He committed a similar error in India. He was the unwilling founder of the National Movement in India and was obliged to leave the country like a man whose political back was broken. In Russia, where the working class is in power, national consciousness is a part of the dictatorship. Mirbach and General Hoffmann were the fathers of this national movement when they forced the Peace of Brest Litovsk upon Russia. And Curzon, with his notes, is playing a similar role. We will see to it that these notes are translated into popular Russian and brought to the notice of every worker and peasant.

Curzon is also underestimating the situation in the East. The peoples of the East know that the Russian representative, Comrade Vorovsky, fell in the fight for their emancipation and that we are what we always were.

Lord Curzon wanted a break with Soviet Russia, but he did not dare to enforce it because not only was the resistance of the Labour Party and the liberals too great, but also because there was considerable opposition to such a step in the ranks of the Conservative Party.

The first act is at an end; but the new act is about to commence. The disruption of capitalism in Europe is proceeding. The only power which knows what it wants in this situation is the first Proletarian and Peasant Government.

Russia is not the only enemy of England. It has another enemy in the uprising Mohammedan World which finds a rallying point in the Turkish State. Therefore England thought to throttle Turkey also by setting Greece against her. Her speculations failed and the Greeks were beaten. England then adopted the policy of Lord Beaconsfield: war with Russia and peace with Turkey. Turkey is too weak to win back the territories England deprived her of, and therefore the attempt was made to make Turkey a friend in order eventually to play her off against Soviet Russia. Hence, too, the sudden change of front at the Lausanne Conference. The Conference ended by France becoming the enemy and Lord Curzon the friend of Islam. But here, too, Lord Curzon made a serious error. During recent years important social differences have arisen in Turkey. Soviet Russia supported the revolution in Turkey not from confidence in any Pasha who called himself the Peoples' Commissary, and sent a telegram to Lenin, but from the conviction that the interests of the Russian peasant were in conformity with the interests of the Turkish peasantry. The result is that the mass of the Turkish population regard Russia not as an enemy, but as the only power which supported it in difficult times.

I must say a few words about the situation in the Far East. The Washington Treaty was intended to be the basis for the relations of power there. Russia was not recognized as a Great Power and was not invited because it was not interested in the Far East. Since then, we have marched into Vladivostok. Meanwhile, the Washington Treaty was concluded. It fixed a certain number of dreadnoughts for each of the participating powers, England, America, and Japan.

Japan understood that this was meant to crush her and although she submitted, she changed her strategic plan and counted upon the construction of fast cruisers and sub-marines. This provoked counter measures on the part of America and England. America responded by an extensive scheme for the construction of fast cruisers and submarines, while England, who saw her base in Hongkong menaced, built a great harbour in Singapore. This situation renders Japan to a great extent dependent upon Soviet Russia. She absolutely requires peace and good relations with Soviet Russia in order to leave her hands free against America.

What conclusions are to be drawn from this analysis? Firstly, the famous reconstruction of Europe has given place to a trust for the destruction of Europe. We are able today to perceive the great lines of cleavage which will batter the whole world. If today reconstruction takes place, it is only confined to certain regions, as in America and England, where capitalism is experiencing a temporary revival. The old continent, however, is faced with new conflicts. The magnitude of the budgets for military expenditures is today far larger than before the war and consequently the danger of war is greater than in 1914.

Secondly, the only proletarian power in the world is today in a position of great danger solely because it is stronger than ever before and because the hopes of counter-revolution are being shattered. Lausanne and Curzon are the danger signals. We shall not allow ourselves to be defeated, but it will depend upon you whether this new attack upon Soviet Russia is to be the signal for the attack of the proletariat against capitalism.

Thirdly, the German working class is in a perilous situation and with it the German revolution.

The need of the German workers is so great that the admonition, "comrades, don't allow yourselves to be provoked" is not sufficient. They will be forced to fight. Since Germany is a colony for French exploitation, and since it is impossible to exploit a territory where revolution reigns, the German proletariat will have to fight not only against German Fascism, but also against French Imperialism. It is the task of our French comrades to help our German comrades in this terrible struggle.

Fourthly, the revolutionary movement in the Orient is in danger. We have only just recently heard the news that in Teheran the National semi-Democratic Government has been overthrown and replaced by Anglophile elements. In Turkey also, the elements who are anxious for an agreement with the Entente are also the bitterest opponents of communism. The attention of our English Party must be directed to this question.

During the last month we have gone through an experience, the awful consequences of which have not yet been realised by us all. Prior to the occupation of the Ruhr and the Curzon notes, the representatives of millions of organised workers had gathered in the Hague and this assembly did not raise a finger against the dangers which menaced us, although it foresaw them. We passed through the year 1914 a second time. If the bourgeoisie so determined, we should have a new war and there would be no revolution. We should be too weak to prevent it and we must therefore draw the conclusion that we must pay more attention to world political problems, not as spectators, but as proletarian fighters.

After several business announcements made by Comrade Neurath with reference to the work of the Commissions on the Italian and Austrian questions, and the question of Centralisation, the sitting was adjourned.

Fifth Day of Session

Morning

June 16, 1923.

Comrade Böttcher opened the Session at twelve o'clock (noon), and called upon Comrade Neurath to open the discussion on the second item on the agenda.

Neurath (Czecho-Slovakia):

The Ruhr action is a question of more than local importance. It cannot be a matter of indifference for the Enlarged Executive what attitude the leading papers or the leaders of the German Communist Party take up towards it. The most important

task was either to win over or neutralise the best part of the petty-bourgeois and proletarian sections of the population, and to carry on a policy which would enable the French proletariat to conduct a vigorous struggle against French imperialism.

What efforts were made to solve this task? The question was: should one deal with the situation by making use of nationalist prejudices, or by combating them ruthlessly?

The International, the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of Germany, published an article entitled "Some Tactical

questions of the Ruhr War". This article contained the following paragraph.

"Although the German bourgeoisie is in its inmost heart counter-revolutionary, it has been given the opportunity to appear outwardly as an objectively revolutionary factor, owing to the cowardice of the petty-bourgeois democracy (principally the social-democracy). It is outwardly (at least for the time being) revolutionary in spite of itself (as Bismarck was from 1864 to 1870), and for analogous historic reasons".

As a matter of fact, in this struggle, the German bourgeoisie has not played anywhere an objectively revolutionary role. Its role has been counter-revolutionary.

The German Party has taken the right view of the situation. In its political resolution, the German Party Conference made, among other things, the following statement:

"The only way out of the terrible situation (which grows daily worse) in which the German working and middle classes find themselves at present, and the only way to avoid the dangers which are threatening the very existence of Germany, is the establishment of a militant united front of the working class against its own bourgeoisie, and working class leadership of the nation."

This means that French imperialism can only be defeated by the German proletariat, if the latter will, in the first instance, carry on a relentless struggle against its own bourgeoisie. It is only thus that the Party helps the French proletariat to defeat the French bourgeoisie.

Comrade Thalheimer referred to Marx' and Engels' attitude to the Franco-German war. If a parallel is to be drawn at all, it must be this: just as Thiers arrived at an understanding with Bismarck concerning the slaughter of the revolutionary French proletariat, so has Lutterbeck (on behalf of the German bourgeoisie) arrived at an understanding with the French general concerning the slaughter of the German revolutionary proletariat.

In his reply, Thalheimer wrote, among other things, as follows:

"It must be one of two things: either the German working class must look upon its present defensive struggle against French imperialism as a revolutionary aim, or, if it does not do that, then in the latter case this struggle should not be carried on at all. I am of the opinion that the struggle of the proletariat against imperialism in general cannot but be a revolutionary aim. But the question is, what is the best way for the German working class to conduct this struggle. I reiterate, the best way for the German working class to conduct the struggle against French imperialism is to realise that it must first of all overthrow the German bourgeoisie or carry on a relentless struggle against it, in order to establish a united fighting front with the French proletariat".

Previous to that, in Nr. 5 of the International, Thalheimer said: "The defeat of French imperialism in the world war was not a Communist aim, but its defeat in the Ruhr is a Communist aim."

I confess that I do not understand this theoretical principle. I put the question: was the struggle against French imperialism in 1914—18 a Communist, and thus, a revolutionary socialist aim or not? If in 1914 the struggle against French imperialism was not a communist aim, the Entente social patriots were perhaps right in their assertion that the struggle against the Hohenzollern dynasty was revolutionary.

From the beginning of the war, the struggle against French imperialism, and every kind of imperialism, was naturally a Communist and a revolutionary aim. The proletariat of every State is under the obligation to fight against its own bourgeoisie, thus creating the pre-requisite for the overthrow of international reaction.

Such, then, was the situation between 1914 and 1918, and such it is today. Comrade Thalheimer pointed out that great changes have taken place since 1914. But what are these changes? Thalheimer wanted to know what German imperialism was, and where was its strength. But in his criticism he overlooked a small matter, viz. that during and towards the end of the war the forces of the German bourgeoisie were shattered, that its militarism is practically non-existent, and can therefore not be considered as a force, as was the case in 1914 and later. The German bourgeoisie being today the weakest, it is occupying at present the weakest position in the world's structure of capitalism. Overthrow of the German bourgeoisie, establishment of a Workers' and Peasants' Government, alliance with the Soviet Govern-

ment and after the victory of the working class—if it cannot be avoided—a repetition of Brest-Litovsk, some compromise with French imperialism, such is the way not only to carry on a successful struggle, but, by such direct methods, to bring large masses of petty-bourgeois proletarian sections of society over to Communism. This will not happen, if we attempt to compete with the German nationalists, but only if we maintain in this critical situation the strictest internationalism.

Roy (India):

Radek's review of the situation left little to be desired, but he wished to develop certain aspects and new tendencies of British Imperialism. The action of the International had not been properly adjusted to these new tendencies.

The British Government knew that the time was not suitable for war, that the Border States could not be driven to fight Russia. The whole manoeuvre was a piece of camouflage to terrify Russia. The curious thing was that what purported to be an ultimatum was based not upon European issues primarily, but upon propaganda in the East.

The relation of the British Party to the colonial movement was involved. The British delegation unnecessarily took exception to Zinoviev's remark. It was directed not against the British Party alone, but against the entire attitude of the International. Theory is not enough, we must define practical policy. The Communist Parties must help the revolutionary and nationalist movements in the colonies.

British imperialism has changed its policy to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. It finds it advantageous to come to some agreement with the bourgeoisies of these countries; and this will counteract the influence of the Russian revolution in the eastern countries. A tremendous import of British capital into India is commencing. This coincides with the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie and they see no reason for a struggle against imperialism. The plan of British imperialism is to encourage the Indian bourgeoisie and to terrify them with the cry of Bolshevik propaganda.

But the masses of India are affected for the worse. We must therefore study what are the social classes who stand in conflict with imperialism. We must build big mass movements of workers and peasants against imperialism, and thus prove to the colonial bourgeoisie that they need not come to terms with imperialism and play the part of a secondary partner, but that with the help of the mass movement they can make a bid for power.

(Böttcher (Germany):

Comrade Neurath dealt with the question of the tactics of the German Party in the national question. I will not enter into polemics with Comrade Neurath, but will deal with the main point of his speech. What role has the trend of history imposed on the German bourgeoisie in the Ruhr struggle, and what role has it actually played? The question is not, as Comrade Neurath put it, whether the German bourgeoisie is revolutionary, but that the German ruling class must now defend the German Fatherland against Poincaré, which means that it must do what is really the task of the Socialist Republic. The failure of the German bourgeoisie must be accounted for by the inner discrepancy between its function as a class and its role of leader of the German nation. The task of the German Communist Party, consisted in exposing this discrepancy, and to show itself to be the revolutionary leader of the class, which alone now is capable of reestablishing Germany's independence. This was done by our Party, which stood up for the national interest and thus exposed the treachery of the German Bourgeoisie and made it possible for us to attract to our ranks considerable petty-bourgeois and proletarian sections of the population. Comrade Neurath said, that the betrayal by the bourgeoisie of national interests did not concern us as a Communist Party, as we are intransigent internationalists. The German Party's answer was: The struggle against Poincaré is a revolutionary struggle! This does not of course mean that the struggle against Cuno is only of secondary consideration, but that the Party must conduct the struggle against Cuno and against Poincaré with equal vigour. Neurath's policy strengthened Fascism in Germany. The position of the German bourgeoisie became such, that it had to abate the nationalism which it had at first aroused as it was confronted on one side by the Fascists and on the other side by the Communists. There were three forces in the Ruhr struggle: Stinnes, the Fascists and the Communists. The

social-democrats and the trade union leaders played no part whatever in this struggle. They were not an independent force, but merely an appendage of the Fascists. If the German Party practised nihilism in the national question in the midst of this grouping of forces in the Ruhr, it would have suffered a catastrophic defeat, instead of co-ordinating the struggles in the occupied and the unoccupied territories. Comrade Neurath's conception was represented in Germany by Liebknecht at the Party conference of the Ledebour Group. His view is the same as the view of that group, namely, struggle not against Poincaré and Cuno, but solely against Cuno. In view of what Comrade Zinoviev said that we do not want a "craft" party in Germany now, but a Party whose psychology is such that it can lead the nation, Comrade Neurath's policy means really ten steps backwards in the tactics of the Communist International. It would not be an extension of the basis of the Party beyond "craft" lines, but rather a narrowing down. I think that there will be a consensus of opinion that we must positively refuse to be a "craft" party of intransigent internationalism. I declare that the Central Committee of the German Party are in full accord with Comrade Thalheimer's conception, and that the workers within the German Party have accented it as being absolutely necessary. These tactics are naturally not without their dangers. It would be ridiculous to deny the dangers of chauvinism and nationalism; but the best way of overcoming these dangers is—to throw ourselves into the situation with the correct slogans, to combat all deviations from them, and to see to it that all mistakes are quickly remedied. Comrade Neurath did not say a word about his views at the special conference held a few weeks ago in Moscow between the opposition and the Party majority. The resolution which was carried at that conference, contains the following paragraph on this question: "Defeated in the war, the German bourgeoisie is compelled to carry on a struggle against the victorious Entente capitalists and to tug continually at the fetters of the Versailles Peace Treaty. While determined to maintain its domination over the working class, and, with this aim in view, carrying on a counter-revolutionary policy, owing to its position, it plays, a revolutionising disintegrating role as far as the Entente capitalists are concerned". Another paragraph contains the following: "Owing to the hopelessness of its efforts at compromise the German bourgeoisie is compelled to carry on the above described revolutionary policy, but, unable to depend for support on the masses in the struggle against the Entente, it is compelled by history to repel these masses". At that time Comrade Neurath neither voted nor spoke against this conception. It is a mystery to me how a member of the Executive can bring up this question after the Executive has already decided on it. It is very important that the Communist International should know if Comrade Neurath's opinions on the national question have the backing of the Czech Party.

(Radek interjecting: The Czech comrades are for Czecho-Slovakian independence).

In his report Comrade Radek drew the conclusion that we must expect great upheavals, and that the German working class is in peril. This seems to me to be the crux of all further developments.

What are the possibilities now in Germany? Either a Workers' Government or passivity, viz, risk of Austrianization of the German working class, is very great, and every effort must be made to avert it. It is desirable that Comrade Radek should give us in his concluding speech a general analysis of the balance of power on an international scale.

and that he should give an answer to the question if the capitalist offensive is ended or if the problem with which we are faced is still as it was defined by the Fourth Congress—organisation of resistance to the capitalist offensive and creation of pre-requisites for the offensive of the proletariat. Lately we have been able to achieve considerable success in our defensive struggle as can be seen by the latest news received from Germany.

Jackson (Great Britain):

He clearly recognised the importance of Radek's exposition of the significance of British Imperialism in India and the East in the present world situation. The total effect of recent developments was to make the Empire a matter of life and death for Great Britain both for economic and military reasons.

The British Party recognised that its responsibilities were great. Its duty was to take advantage of and to support every

national struggle against the domination and exploitation of the British imperial system. Especially must it develop every tendency to class-conscious expression on the part of the workers and peasants within these movements.

But the extraordinary difficulty of the problem must be stressed. No one could know this who had not studied the great complexity and haphazard illogicality of the structure of the empire.

Of Ireland and the changes of policy that are required, it was unfortunate that owing to the absence of a part of the British Delegation the material relative to the Colonial question was not to hand.

Although recognising its obligations, the British Party was very small, and faced with an old, experienced and cunning bourgeoisie. A beginning had been made. The Oriental Seamens' Union had been formed to link together the sailors and port-workers of all the Oriental Colonies. Contact had been made with the Indian students in England. Wherever it was possible in the press or by propaganda to educate the British worker as to the true situation, this was done. But the extraordinary ignorance of the British worker, and his indifference to the empire must be remembered. It was, curiously enough, owing to this ignorance that Lord Curzon failed recently to arouse enthusiasm for an attack upon Soviet Russia, on the plea that the empire was in danger. There was, however, the section in the British Labour Party, who, because they hoped one day to take power, were concerned about the danger to the empire. But the masses of the workers were indifferent.

The British Delegation was conscious of its inexperience and would welcome the advice of the more experienced members of the Congress.

Hörnle (Germany):

Comrade Neurath gave the impression that we must not enter into competition with nationalism but that we must represent intransigent internationalism. This method of dealing with the question shows what dangerous conclusions one can arrive at when dealing with it abstractly instead of from the point of view of the actual relation of forces. In 1914, nationalism was a means used by the bourgeoisie to play its imperialistic game. The question stands quite differently when taken in conjunction with the occupation of the Ruhr. Here it is no longer a chess game that the German bourgeoisie desires to play at the expense of the German proletariat. The German bourgeoisie is prepared to betray the national interests of the masses of the population if by this means it can protect its own private interests. At the present moment the German bourgeoisie is acting not as the leader of the nation but as its betrayer. The task of the German Party is to prove to the masses that the salvation of the German nation cannot be achieved under the leadership of the German bourgeoisie but under the leadership of the German revolutionary proletariat. Contrary to 1914 the question of the proletarian revolution today is not merely a subject for propaganda, but an actual aim of the struggle. The central point of Comrade Neurath's argument was that the task was to fight Cuno and not Poincaré. But in order to overthrow the Cuno Government the Communist Party must have the broad masses on its side, and to achieve that it must imbue these masses with its own psychology. The success which the Party is achieving in this connection is indicated by a communication which was received today. In connection with the Ruhr strikes, a brigade of 1,000 Fascists was mobilised in South Germany to be despatched to the Ruhr. As a result of our propaganda only 600 men reported, and when Lutterbeck's letter to the French general, together with the manifesto of our Party was made known, the majority of these mutinied and declared that Communists were in the right and that it was the Government that was betraying the national interest. This is evidence of the revolutionary effect our attitude has upon the non-class-conscious masses. The question of the defence of the German revolution is not a question of the defence of the frontiers of Germany, but it is a question as to whether the revolutionary German proletariat is to be smashed up by French imperialism and its best section, the Ruhr proletariat, be torn away from it.

The Poincaré menace to the German nation is in fact a menace to the German revolution. Thus, the national question presents itself in an entirely new light and therefore should not be confused with any question about the advocacy of "intransigent internationalism". We must apply live inter-

nationalism in the manner in which it has been applied by the Communist Party of Russia.

The situation in the colonies is somewhat different. There it is quite possible that the rising bourgeoisie may conduct an active struggle against the imperialism of the mother-country and therefore the communists must take a step further by supporting the bourgeoisie in the national struggle while at the same time advancing the movement of the workers and poor peasants.

Trachtenberg (U.S.A.):

Speaking for the American delegation, he was of the opinion that Comrade Radek had not covered the whole field. He had left out American imperialism. It was the duty of the International to take American imperialism into account. Radek dealt with American imperialism only in relation to Europe, but American imperialism extended to the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and Central and South America. American imperialism was young, but like everything American it grew rapidly and was very brutal.

The revolutions in South and Central America were engineered by American imperialism. The National City Bank of New York, which represented big American finance, was extending its activities into South America. Mexico was also a sore point. These places are small but they are suffering from exploitation as much as the big Asiatic peoples. And they are fighting alone. Recent revelations of the brutal excesses of American capital in the colonies had at last aroused the interest of the American workers. The American Federation of Labour was obliged to summon two congresses on the subject, but Gompers, instead of offering the support of labour, lauded the action of American capital.

It was time for the Comintern to devise ways and means for exposing American imperialism. Our Comrades should be got to take greater interest in the matter. A conference of parties of the countries involved should be summoned. Profintern, too, could perform important work.

Brand (Poland):

I would like to develop the description of the world situation given by Comrade Radek in connection with Poland. In spite of the fact the Poland has absorbed Upper Silesia, Vilna and East Galicia, it is not an element of stability, but, on the contrary, a standing menace of war. Only 62 % of the population of Poland is purely Polish, the rest is made up of other nationalities against which the agrarian capitalist Government is conducting a savage policy of exploitation and oppression. For three years from 60 to 70 % of the expenditure of the state has been covered by note issues, whereas in Russia, this has been done only to the extent of 20 to 30 %, and lately even less. Germany alone comes within the Polish ideal. Poland has much territory. In the East and South, in the North and the West it has conquered new territories, but for all that it feels that it is weak. It has a tremendous fear of Germany and therefore desires still further to weaken her. The Polish Stamboliski, and leader of the rich peasants, Witos, has come to an understanding with the large landowners and capitalists to betray the peasants. The Polish peasants must now give up their age long dream of legally acquiring land. The constantly rising prices have reduced the standard of living of the Polish workers and office employees below that of Russia. The situation there in this respect is somewhat similar to that in Germany and Austria. The apparent internal stability is made possible by a ruthless police regime. Poland has become a great prison for Ukrainians, White Russians, Jews, Germans and all the Polish workers and peasants. At the same time Poland is a great military camp. For three years the average sentences on communists have been twenty convictions to 70 years imprisonment per month. During the last few months this greatly increased and the monthly

average has been 120 convictions to 400 years severe detention. The present Government is a tool in the hands of the Entente capitalists, particularly of France. The reason why a sharper tone is not adopted towards Soviet Russia today is because Poland's master France is engaged with Germany. It is certain that at the command of France it will march against Soviet Russia in spite of the fact that the economic position in Poland demands a rapprochement with Soviet Russia. In the present situation, when the peasants have lost all hope and the oppressed nationalities have abandoned all hope of assistance from the Entente, the communists alone point the way to these masses. For that reason, we particularly welcome the watchword of Workers' and Peasants' Government for Poland. For Poland it signifies, down with war, down with militarism, land for the peasants, rapprochement with Russia, down with the alliance with France, freedom for the oppressed nations.

Katayama (Japan):

Japanese policy has changed since the Washington Conference. Japan formerly looked to England, and in return for her alliance, played the watchdog over India. But England was compelled to give up her alliance with Japan, and Japan was therefore forced to change her foreign policy. Japan achieved a diplomatic victory in the case of China at the Washington Conference, but she has since realised that without China she would be isolated and has therefore recently begun to make advances to China. By her intervention in Russia, which in the end turned out to be unsuccessful, the Government made enemies amongst its own people. The militarists became unpopular. As a consequence Japan was obliged to change her policy also as regards Soviet Russia. The visit of Joffe has inspired a great movement amongst the industrialists for a trade agreement with Russia.

He believed that the revolutionary movement in Japan would make greater strides in a few years than the European movement has made in as many decades.

Malakka (Dutch Indies):

I would like to speak of a few new phenomena in the international world situation. These new phenomena may be divided into two groups: those that are against us, and those that are in our favour. Against us is the occupation of the Ruhr and the influx of American capital in the East. The occupation of the Ruhr will terminate in a compromise between German and French capitalism, which may result in unprecedented development of capitalism in Europe, and become a strong menace to the German revolution. The second point is the migration of capital from Europe to the East. In 1870, the English textile industry was still dominant in the world market. Today the market is in Anglo-Indian hands. This situation is made even more acute by the appearance of America upon the world arena. America invests untold millions in the East. The danger now arises of a possible compromise between the liberal revolutionary bourgeoisie of the East and American capital. Such a compromise would mean a step backward in the political and economical world situation. Among the points favourable to us we note the competition between Japan and America in the East which is bound to lead to grave complications between these two countries. We also note the rising power of Islam, which contains many revolutionary elements. It should be the main task of our movement to see to it that Germany should remain a barrier for Russia, and to organise the scattered nationalists and proletarian parties of the East and co-ordinate them and bring them into line with the European proletariat. In this respect I would particularly urge our English comrades to give their utmost attention to the events imminent in the East in consequence of England's efforts to create a strong naval base at Singapore.

Evening

Newbold (Great Britain):

The British Delegation agrees with Comrade Radek in his criticism of Lord Curzon and the policy pursued by Lord Curzon. But they have reason to believe that Curzon is acting as the tool and mask of the King of England. There is a well grounded belief that the late King Edward bequeathed to his son and grandson large interests not only in Canadian railways and land, but also in Persia and the Middle East. And the threat to these is one of the reasons for the attack upon Soviet Russia.

On the other hand, the Baldwin group reflects the interests of the great English banking corporations, and it does not wish to have the credit system of England still further disorganised. The policy is to threaten Russia into giving concessions not only to the Urquhart group but to another group with 20,000,000 pounds at its disposal, and at the center of which is one of the chief organisers of the Conservative Party.

Radek expressed surprise that in Britain, the most advanced of bourgeois countries, the aristocratic nobility should have such a large influence in the government. But the British aristocracy is not a feudal, but a financial aristocracy, who mostly originated in the Sixteenth Century by the plunder of the monasteries. Certain King's cousins are shipowners, and one is a manufacturer of artificial butter and soap. The British aristocracy is permeated by bourgeois interests.

The Communist Party was unable to rouse the British workers on the question of the Ruhr because the stoppage of steel, iron, and coal exports terminated the competition of Germany, France, and Belgium, increased the European demand for British coal and thus reduced British unemployment in the coal fields and in the metal industry. But a settlement of the Ruhr, whereby it will become internationally owned, will enable England to secure cheap coal from the Ruhr, which will mean a lowering of the economic standards of the British workers and will permit more successful agitation for international mass action.

The British bourgeoisie maintained good relations with France superficially, but meanwhile entered on a campaign of aeroplane building so as to be prepared for war with France, which she was now too feeble to enter on.

The British bourgeoisie has managed to re-establish London as the credit centre of the world. It intends to rebuild the world supremacy of Britain on the basis of money power, acute diplomacy, and development of aeroplane power.

The British workers depend upon colonial produce for their food supply and the British bankers intend to break the economic and political power of the workers by the threat of stopping their supplies and imposing a hunger blockade. This threat was made to the miners by Lloyd George in 1919. It is therefore necessary for the British Communists to agitate under the rallying cry: British machinery and coal in exchange for Russian corn. This would make the agitation for Russia more easily understandable by the workers. The maritime workers must be organised to facilitate the corn transport and an agitation must be carried on in the fleet for the same purpose.

Newbold analysed the complex structure of the British Empire and the strategic points of British world power. He showed, in view of the vastness and complexity of the British Empire, how great the difficulties and responsibilities of the British Communists were. They looked for advice from the Congress.

Aparicio (Spain)

speaking on the colonial question, as it presents itself in his country, said: For many years the blood and the money of the Spanish proletariat has been poured out in Morocco in the interests of French and British capitalism. The Communist Party must make itself heard. If it had its way, this scandal would cease and we would succeed in widening the abyss between British and French imperialism.

Great Britain has Gibraltar, and France almost the whole of Morocco. Great Britain cannot tolerate France as mistress of the Mediterranean Ports just opposite Gibraltar. Imperialist France cannot tolerate Great Britain being their sole guardian. It is for these reasons that the insurgents of the Rif and the Spanish soldiers are killing each other in Morocco.

The Spanish Socialists are not able to solve this problem. They limit themselves to the question of civil and military responsibility for the recent failures in the Morocco war. The Communist slogan must be: The abandonment of Morocco.

Thibaut (France):

Thought it necessary to give some precise details about the situation in France and in the French Communist Party since the occupation of the Ruhr. The financial machine of the French State is completely upset. The deficit is enormous. The Poincaré Government came to power on the programme of carrying out the Treaty of Versailles which was to improve the situation, giving the people to understand that the occupation of the Ruhr would bring almost immediate results. Such were its hopes. It also hoped to profit by this occasion to deliver the decisive blow to the Communist Party which was on the way towards re-organization and reinforcement after its long crisis.

Upon this item of internal politics, Poincaré's fiasco was complete. The French Party has done its duty. After the Conference at Essen it started a huge campaign of agitation throughout the country, which neither Poincaré's imaginary conspiracies nor the consequent arrests could stop. On the contrary, in the midst of repression, we have come to an understanding with the C.G.T.U. The United Front has become a real possibility, in spite of the refusal of the Socialist Party to enter the United Front with us. After the Essen Conference, the French masses perceived clearly the dangers of the imperialist policy in the Ruhr; our agitation has met with great success.

There are still many workers in France who believe that if Germany would pay, their material conditions would improve, for they would have less taxes to pay. It was the duty of the Party to counter-act this frame of mind, particularly prevalent among the reformists. In this it was aided by the occupation, which had its sad effects on the economic situation. The cost of living has gone up, the exchange rate of the franc has gone down. The fight against wage reductions has become an urgent necessity. This was followed by strikes. It was easy for us to point out the disastrous effects of the policy of carrying out the Treaty of Versailles.

Thus the occupation of the Ruhr had its internal political effects in the anti-communist plot and in the fiasco of Poincaré, followed by the movement against wage reductions. In external politics it was the source of conflicts within the French bourgeoisie, as was demonstrated in the crisis of the Comité des Forges, which has shaken the Entente.

Concluding Speech of Comrade Radek

Most of the comrades who took part in the discussion directed their remarks to the tasks which their parties had to assume in the present situation and thus elaborated my own report. In my concluding speech I shall confine myself chiefly to the remarks of two of the speakers. The speech of Comrade Neurath in reality did not belong to this item of the agenda but to the report already made by Comrade Zinoviev, since the German Party has done nothing, except what the Executive considered to be right; or else it belongs to the report upon Fascism insofar as it dealt with the manifestations of Nationalism. When we read the article of Comrade Neurath in the Reichenberg Vorwärts we declared that we were not in agreement with it, since it transferred far too mechanically the events of the year 1914 to the year 1923. The article is based upon entirely incorrect premises. Comrade Neurath is fighting windmills. He says that the German bourgeoisie is reactionary and is not even able to carry on a national defense. We know all that very well without Comrade Neurath telling us. His speech was a speech against a truce with Cuno. But when and where has the German Party ever proposed such a truce?

Comrade Neurath does not understand the essence of the national movement of Germany, and therefore he does not understand what tactics ought to be adopted against nationalism. The outstanding fact in the whole situation is that a great industrial nation has been forced back into the position of a colony. This defeat of the German bourgeoisie gives rise to consequences of the greatest revolutionary significance. If the German bourgeoisie will not permit itself to be flung from the saddle by the proletariat and refuses to assume the burden of the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, then it must attack the Versailles Treaty. This indeed it has done. The Ruhr incidents, regarded historically, signify the attempt of the German bourgeoisie to pass from passive

to active resistance. It no longer declared that it is unable to pay, but now declares that it will not pay. When Poincaré, instead of stopping up the holes in the French budget, breaks new holes, when the bourgeoisie, instead of restoring German economy with the help of the Entente, flings it back for a number of years, these facts are of the greatest revolutionary significance. In order to carry on the fight in the Ruhr, the German bourgeoisie was compelled to unleash all the dogs of nationalism and it is now the victim of its own agitation. The case of the French government is the same.

Our position is naturally that we protest against every form of nationalism. But we must ask ourselves whether the victory or the defeat of Poincaré would be a step forward. The victory of Poincaré would strengthen the counter-revolution throughout the whole Versailles system, and it would therefore be a counter-revolutionary fact. Therefore the German Party must say that the whole German working class and the working class of the whole world, the French included, has an interest in the defeat of Poincaré. Can this be called social-patriotism? It is true the German Social-Democrats in 1914 said that the overthrow of Czarism would be a revolutionary fact. What conclusion did they draw from it? They supported the German government. The difference between then and now is that the German Social-Democrats were not able to draw the revolutionary consequences from the overthrow of Czarism. The Communist Party, on the other hand, declares that simultaneously with the fight against Poincaré it is fighting the Cuno Government and that it is holding itself ready for every revolutionary possibility. Comrade Neurath says that a wave of nationalism was passing over Germany and that we should oppose it instead of adapting ourselves to it. The Party has not only not adapted itself to it, but has sharply opposed every form of nationalism. The German Party has not forgotten what Comrade Neurath has forgotten, namely, the difference between the national and the revolutionary-national interests of Germany, which latter are covered by the revolutionary interests of the proletariat. The German Communist Party must not support a policy which would open a chasm between the German and the French proletariat. It must resolutely fight the criminal attempt that has been made upon the workers and peasants of the occupied area. But at the same time it must remember that every act that drags Germany down is a danger to the German revolution.

The Russian Bolsheviks before the seizure of power, passed through a similar period when the German fleet attacked Dago and Oesel. At that time we had a majority in the Baltic Fleet and knew that we were on the eve of taking power. And for the very reason that we knew that on the next day we should have to assume responsibility for the fate of Russia, we declared that we would take up the fight for the defense of Petrograd.

The masses of petty bourgeois and technical intellectuals, who will play a great part in the revolution, face to face with de-classed capitalism, assume the form of a national opposition. If we want to be a workers' party which desires to fight for power, then we must find a way of approach to

these masses, and we will best find it not when we show ourselves afraid to assume responsibility, but when we say that the working class alone can save the nation.

If, when the French marched into the Ruhr, we had declared that we would first defeat Cuno and then attack the French, we should very nearly have become the allies of Poincaré.

The Executive assumes full responsibility for the attitude of the German Party and only regrets that the German bourgeoisie, owing to its selfishness, submitted to defeat. We regard it as the duty of the German working class to take over this fight.

Let me say a word as to the remarks made by the French comrades. The occupation of the Ruhr seems an easier problem for the French workers and peasants. Either the Germans pay, or the burden of taxation in France will become intolerable. Of course, the Party cannot start an artificial movement, but the time for a movement will come in France when Poincaré either fails in spite of the abandonment of the German resistance, or else is unable to satisfy the masses, despite his victory. Victory will bring France nothing, since Germany for the next few years, even with the best will in the world, will be unable to pay her debts. The problem of the iron and coal trusts in the Ruhr is one of many years. If Poincaré was counting upon appearing before the electors in the 1924 elections with German payments, he has miscalculated. He will not be able to avoid a new taxation programme which will impose heavy burdens upon the French workers and peasants.

Later on in our discussions we shall have to adopt resolutions laying down a definite policy upon the important national questions. The intention of this debate was to bring the international significance of this matter clearly before the eyes of the comrades since the international situation does not permit us to adopt a national policy without paying consideration to the international situation.

Comrade Stewart, in moving a resolution for the foundation of a scholarship and the publication of a brochure in the languages of the East in commemoration of Comrade Vorovsky, said that the governing classes of the capitalist countries must be given to understand, that for every talented comrade removed by assassination or by any of the other weapons of capitalist diplomacy, we shall raise and educate and equip a hundred in the service of the world revolution for which our comrade lived and died.

The resolution of Comrade Stewart was adopted unanimously.

The Chairman then read an addendum to the proposal of the British delegation in which the British, French, Italian, Polish, Czechoslovakian, United States, and Japanese Parties undertook to bear the cost of the Vorovsky Scholarship.

After Comrade Neurath announced that Comrade Bucharin would probably make his report on Centralisation on Monday, the Session adjourned.

Sixth Day of Session

Morning

Monday, June 18, 1923.

The session was opened at noon, by Comrade Amter.

After a few business communications by Comrade Neurath on the work of the various commissions, the Congress took up the discussion of the third item on the agenda.

Report of Comrade Bucharin on the Limits of Centralism in the Comintern

The utterances made by comrades of the Norwegian Party created the impression as if the Executive of the Comintern had underestimated the Norwegian Party. I repeat once again that we consider the Norwegian Party a great mass party of the working class, as one of the best and most important of our parties. It is this very reason which makes it our duty to criticize the erratic standpoint of the Norwegian comrades.

The question of centralism in the Communist International, the most important point of concern for the Norwegian comrades is by no means a new question. It arose in its acutest form after the collapse of the Second International. The collapse of the Second International was also rooted in the fact that from the point of view of organization, it was simply a letter-box. It was not a militant unified organization, it was not out for international mass action, and it was always dominated by the national aspect. Pompous speeches were delivered at its Congresses, but whenever it came to real action, the organization was not in it. The Hague Conference presented a similar exhibition last Autumn, when resolutions were passed in favour of the general strike, but when the time came for action, all these high-sounding resolutions proved mere scraps of paper, owing to the fact that there was no central and unified organization. Thus it was not by any accident that this lack of proper organization was pointed out at the very beginning of the crystallization of the communist idea. This was already

stated at that time partly by us and partly by Rosa Luxemburg, in the following thesis:

The new International, which shall be founded, must be a unified organization, in which the national aspect is completely subordinated to the international, and *eo ipso*, the national decisions must be subordinated to the international decisions of the World Organization of the proletariat. Much was written about this subject in the Scandinavian press at the time. I was then living in Scandinavia, and I found complete understanding upon this question between the representatives of the Russian Party and the Scandinavian comrades. This thesis of the predominance of the international consciousness, of international decisions and of international opinion in the world organization of the proletariat, was, at that time, acknowledged everywhere in Austria and in Germany by the then left wing radicals, who were subsequently to be known as the communists. Taking a retrospective glance at the past history of the Third International, recalling the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences as well as the first Congress of the Third International, we may see the constantly growing realization of this fundamental principle in practice, and after the founding of the Communist International at the time of the victories of the Russian army and of the great offensive of the working class of Western Europe, we see the growth of this fundamental principle and its realization. It was at that time that comrade Bull, one of the ideologists of the Majority of the Norwegian Party, wrote in the "Sozialdemokrat" to the effect that: "either the new International was going to exist, in that case it would become the centralized head-quarters of the World Revolution, or else it would not exist at all". Thus we find that at the time of the great offensive of the working class, even the wavering elements were full of sympathy for the Communist International, and even the leading representative of the ideology of the present majority of the Norwegian Party recognized the necessity of centralization in our World Organization. Now, when the working class is on the defensive, all the wavering elements feel a revulsion from their pro-communist sentiments, and they begin to criticize. The social basis of these criticisms—economically as well as sociologically—consists of the remnants of petty bourgeois economy and ideology. In the arguments of the Norwegian comrades we may discover also Proudhonistic views, and this is conceivable because we have dealt here with representatives of parties who live in relative isolation in their petty bourgeois countries and are subject to these petty bourgeois views. A second reason is to be found in the mechanical application, to our own organization of methods that were quite proper with regard to the social-democracy. This gives rise to a certain historical "vis inertiae". The methods that were formerly rightly applied to destroy the influence of the social-democratic leaders are now used against our own organization. Also here in Russia, we frequently had to encounter this "vis inertiae" in the minds of our comrades who, after the conquest of power by the proletariat, were clamouring against centralization of the army. A third reason for the erratic standpoint of the Norwegian comrades, is due to the situation in Norway and in Scandinavia generally. The Norwegian comrades have not gone through the experiences of war and revolutionary upheavals. The Scandinavian countries, unlike the other countries of Western Europe, were not carried away by the great whirl of world events; they have their being and feel themselves—comical as this may sound—to be, to some extent, in the pre-war period. They have not learnt the importance of the centralized fight against the bourgeois state. They have not yet sustained the blows of the whole brutality of the bourgeois state, and therefore the remnants of idyllic ideology persist in their minds. Amid the disturbed ocean of world history they live upon an island, so to speak; they, more than any other group of our Party, were isolated from the entire movement of the proletariat. All these reasons combined to form the present ideology of the majority of the Norwegian Party.

I now come to the proofs. The "profoundest" of them, as is usually the case, comes from a professor, from Comrade Bull. Comrade Bull, himself well versed in theories, always attempts to substantiate his tactical attitude by drawing all the possible consequences. I will now let Comrade Bull speak for himself:

"There is a difference between the working class, (between its economic and social development and consequently also the revolutionary possibilities) in Russia, in the East, in South-Eastern and Western Europe. The Russian revolution was accomplished by a nation of illiterates, in a country where modern industry has hardly reached the age of manhood, where the working class is consequently quite new and without traditions; in a country where the autocracy had prevented the population from

taking part in politics, where the Trade Unions were an impossibility, and so forth. Substantially the same conditions prevail in the East and in South Eastern Europe. The conditions in Western Europe are the very opposite. Universal popular education, century-old industries, a working class with strong traditions, long participation in politics, old established and strong Trade Unions, free public discussion, and so forth."

And what tactical conclusions does he draw? He writes: "Naturally the most prominent leaders of the International can see these things clearly in theory. But in practice the consequences are either ignored or they are imperfectly drawn, and this happens for two reasons: 1. The most prominent leaders are practically all Russians, and in their ideas they are naturally influenced by their own Russian experiences; 2. The Executive Committee—having ceased to consider the revolution in Germany as an immediate task—now concentrates its activity upon the East and upon South-Eastern Europe. This is a policy which has a very great deal in its favour, particularly from the standpoint of Russian foreign policy, and so forth, and so forth."

Here we have the theoretical foundation of all the tactical questions. Bull asserts, in tune with the bourgeois press, that the Communist International is a tool of the Russian Government, and that the workers of the West should therefore not be compelled to adapt themselves to these methods which befit only the backward conditions of barbaric Russia.

I believe that already at this Session it will be demonstrated that the Norwegian and Swedish comrades are holding such views in complete isolation, in our ranks. There cannot be any talk of an isolation of the proletariat of Western Europe, including Sweden, from the Russian proletariat. The isolation of the Swedish comrades is due to the following reasons. We have gone through 3 revolutions, the Germans through one, Austria and a number of other countries have experienced tremendous oppression on the part of their bourgeoisie. With blood and iron they have been taught the necessity of international centralism. At first it was the theory of the Norwegians to unite with the rest of the West Europeans against Russia and to create another organization. When this failed, we heard the new version by comrade Falk, who said that the Norwegian Party was a Communist Party, but that it relied on its own traditions. This is something quite different, and it is true. I fully admit that the Norwegian Party has its traditions its specific features, and that its development has created a special form of organization. But how do we as the vanguard deal with these traditions? It is not our business to preserve them, but rather to overcome them by wise methods. By substituting a federation for the militant organization of the proletariat, we would knock the bottom out of our movement. Now we are accused of the desire artificially to radicalize the Norwegian Party, then we are said to be too opportunist. Thus, for instance, the totally wrong allegation is made that the opportunist dangers are centred in our centralisation. In an article in the *Arbeiderbladet*, for instance, the situation is depicted as though centralization was the cause of the collapse of the Second International. Whereas, the actual reason of the collapse of the Second International was because it was not a centralized International. Another instance. In Tranmael's article the statement is made that Moscow, i. e. the Communist International, is building from the top downwards. Among other things, we read in that article:

"This form of organization and membership, existent in Norway, is of paramount importance to the socialist movement, for it thereby penetrates into the heart of socialism, into the social economy. Thus the industries should be conquered from the workshops up, and through the workers employed therein; perhaps slowly, but surely and with ever increasing influence we will gain the control over industrial life and production."

Thus we see here the following idea: The workers are always to be won in the workshops, we take the control of production in a few factories at first, then in a few more, and eventually in all of them. The bourgeoisie—mind you—allows us to all this without any interference. This is a perfectly opportunistic postulate which can find a place in the heads of those who have never tried the capture of the industries, who have never experienced the blows of the bourgeoisie. Our postulate for the revolution is, that our fight for the conquest of the means of production shall be accompanied by civil war. Once we concede that the revo-

lution is civil war, then we must co-ordinate and guide all our forces, then we conceive entirely different necessities by way of organization. In these fights we will sustain the least number of victims if we will have these fights systematically centralized. The idea of the Norwegian Executive about the evolutionary course of events is based on the fact that the Norwegian comrades have not yet led in any real fighting; it is the syndicalist theory of "leaving the State alone". The Norwegian comrades should recollect that we have already seen a certain evolution among the French syndicalists. The experiences of the war and of the revolution have caused a part of the French syndicalists to overcome these views. We have a living testimony in the person of Comrade Rosmer. Of course, centralism has its dangers, and particularly in times of peace these dangers were great. But it is decidedly dangerous, in countries where the power has to be conquered by sanguinary struggles, to come along and say: We want no head-quarters, because this involves the danger of bureaucratization. The Christiania proposal, in which the concrete ideas on organization are presented from the standpoint of the Norwegian comrades, to put it briefly, would enforce democratic Wilsonism upon our Party. For instance, among other things it says that the deciding vote should be vested in the individual members. Does it mean that every member shall be absolutely autonomous, and subject to no discipline whatever? The fact is that Tranmael and Bull themselves enforce the most rigid discipline with regard to their faction. I believe that we would gain much more respect from the workers by telling them that there must be a central leadership, than by feeding them on illusions of self-determination, individualism and the like.

With regard to the question of the imperative mandate, we find the standpoint of the Norwegian Party wrong again. Let us take the conflicts within the various parties. Here imperative mandates can have the effect of being predestined against the eventual decision of the Executive. Thus we would have here a cause of permanent conflict. How could we have solved the French conflict if the French delegates had come here with imperative mandates? Also with regard to the election of the Executive members, I believe that the Fourth Congress has acted quite properly. The World Congress of the Communist International, the embodiment of the whole Labour movement, can also choose a comrade who represents the minority faction. Naturally this can be done only in an exceptional case, when it is imperatively dictated by the situation. The demand that only such Executive delegates should be sent to national Party Congresses as are welcome to the parties concerned is technically impossible and also politically inexpedient. The same about the demand for the convening of a National Congress prior to the world Congress. In case the national sections would bind themselves by decisions of Party Congresses prior to the World Congress, this would unquestionably lead to conflicts. At the World Congress the experiences of all the sections are summed up, and, if the delegates come with imperative mandates, they are not in a position to change their attitude. Then again, the question of resignations, as to whether the Executive or the Party Executive shall have the right of vetoing such resignations, it has been shown in practice that in cases of emergency the Executive must frequently intervene. With regard to the question of the Youth, it is quite proper that the Youth organizations shall in all questions be subordinated to their respective parties; but when a conflict arises between the Party and the International, we cannot forbid the Youth organization from taking a stand as Communists. With regard to internal intervention, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between internal and external questions. For instance, the personal composition of a Party Executive may be of international importance. Our conflicts with the Norwegian Party originated in the criticism of the attitude of the Executive in the French question. Ask any French comrade, whether the World Congress acted rightly or wrongly, whether or no an improvement was brought about? In a similar manner we intervened in various other countries, lately in Germany, and all these parties are now in a much better state after the intervention by the Executive. A new mental attitude towards the Communist International must be created within the Norwegian and Swedish Party. The mistrust of the Communist International must be overcome. The comrades and the parties who really helped establish the International, know how to appreciate and trust it. This must be the case also with the Norwegian Party. I conclude with the hope that our fraternal Norwegian Party will overcome its defects in the spirit of our principles.

Ström (Sweden) Co-Reporter

There are no political and tactical differences between the Swedish Party and the Executive of the Comintern. We merely point out that account must be taken of the traditions and the psychology of the Swedish workers. By doing so, we achieved considerable successes. But such successes might be neutralized by an internal conflict. The workers would lose faith in the possibility of consolidating the Communist Party, and in the event of these internal conflicts causing new splits, the masses would abandon us. On organization questions, we are at one with the Comintern. We are by no means opponents of democratic centralism, but we want to introduce this centralism gradually. The last Conference of the Swedish Party unanimously adopted statutes which are in agreement with the Theses of the Comintern. It stands to reason that we must use wisdom and circumspection in applying these statutes. But these statutes must also be binding for the organizations attached to the Party, as for instance the Youth Organization and the Women's and Trade Union Organizations; otherwise, centralism will be a farce. We are fully aware of the necessity of centralism, and therefore we hold that the Communist International must have the last word in all international questions. But in special national and local situations, this centralism must not, of course, be manipulated in such a way as to do more harm than good to the Sections concerned. As to the attitude of the Swedish Party towards these questions, on the return of our delegates from the Fourth Congress, the Central Committee of the Party endorsed their attitude, as well as the decisions which were made. The decision to extend the powers of the Executive was also endorsed with the proviso, that the activity of the Executive must be such that it will not lead to over-centralization. In order to prevent such over-centralization, it is essential that the Executive maintain the closest contact with the various Communist Parties, making all its dispositions in agreement with the latter. Moreover, the Party Conference laid down the following five points on this question: 1) The attitude of the Central Committee of the Party was endorsed and declared to be binding for the Party. 2) The Party Conference expressed its approval of the energetic way in which the Central Committee of the Party maintained the unity of the Party. 3) As to the programme question, the Party Conference was of the opinion that the programme must be partly an expression of the theory of communism, its methods and aims, and partly also an expression of the general transition demands, due consideration being given to the conditions prevailing in the various countries. 4) The Party Conference emphasised its adherence to the tactical methods decided upon by the Third and Fourth Congresses. 5) It approved of the remarks made thereon by the Central Committee of the Party.

We desire to have a Revolutionary General Staff, but we must not allow ourselves to be separated from the masses through over-centralization. We are a vanguard, but without a rear guard, without the masses we cannot achieve anything. Therefore, we must not bring about centralization too rapidly.

We are not petty bourgeois illusionists, but old Marxists and with it, the oldest friends of the Russian comrades, which we consider a great honour. We have also achieved something, as shown by our actions in 1905, 1909, 1916, 1917 and 1918. But we hold the view, that one may even make tactical concessions to the masses, in order not to be separated from them. This is a lesson we learn from the Russian comrades.

As to the Norwegian question, we on many points are nearer to the Scheffo tendency than to the Tranmael tendency. Both these tendencies have made mistakes, and the parliamentary opportunism of the Scheffo tendency should have been criticised here.

Radek: You ask us to do this?

Ström: It should have certainly been criticised.

Radek: We will make a note of it?

Ström: Nevertheless we support the Tranmael tendency, because we do not want a split in the Norwegian Party. A split in the Norwegian Party would not only be a severe blow to the Swedish Party, but would also do great harm to the whole International. Knowing that the comrades here are also against the split, we hope to arrive at an understanding on this question.

One must put a stop to the attempts to play off the Norwegian and Swedish Young Communist Leagues against the Parties. I am sorry that Comrade Bucharin in a subjective manner quoted some paragraphs from an article by Hoeglund,

whom he regards (because of this article) as an avowed opportunist and petty-bourgeois. This undermines Hoeglund's authority in Scandinavia, which can only benefit our enemies. The fact that Hoeglund, as well as myself, twenty years ago, at the Conference of the Social-Democratic Party, demanded the arming of the proletariat, shows that we are no opportunists.

Falk (Norway)

said that he expressed the opinion of the leaders of his party and not his own. The opinion of the Norwegian Party as to the proper relations that should exist between the party and the International was laid down in the so called Christiania Resolution, paragraph 4, which said that internal and local matters should be the concern of the National Party, but that the authority of the International should be absolute on questions which transcend national limits.

The party accordingly resolved to propose certain changes in the statutes of the International.

They proposed to cancel the decision of the Fourth Congress to prohibit parties giving their representatives imperative mandates. Parties ought to be encouraged to discuss the question to be considered at the World Congress and to express their opinions, and the World Congress would thus reflect the views of the national parties. The intention was that it should be made a general rule to give the delegates imperative mandates.

Each party, too, should elect its own representatives to the E. C., and similarly representatives sent by the International to the Parties should be selected after conferring with the Central Committee of the Parties. The time of the party congresses should be altered so as to take place before and not after the World Congress; the parties would thus be able to discuss the agenda of the World Congress and have the views of their members expressed there. After the World Congress it should be for each party to decide, whether a further party congress was necessary. This was the basis of any organization which adopted the principle of democratic centralization.

It should be for the national parties and not for the International to decide whether members should lay down their mandates or not, although the opinion of the E. C. in such cases would necessarily be of great importance. Similarly, the right of excluding members from the party should belong to the national party and not to the International.

The intention of these proposals was not to weaken the International. They believed the International could be strengthened only by strengthening the national parties on which it was built up.

Bucharin said he recognised the peculiarities which distinguished the Norwegian Party, but the question was whether these peculiarities should be perpetuated or not. The Norwegian Party believed that the traditions of social-democracy that were inherited should be overcome, but the traditions that make the party a mass party should be perpetuated, and this was a question for the national party to decide. If it were possible for a large mass party to exist while the International maintained its present authority it might be desirable, but the majority of the Norwegian Party believed this to be impossible.

The question of the youth movement must be dealt with. It was not the intention that it should be controlled by the party leadership. It was to be expected that a live youth would display a certain amount of opposition. It should be given a considerable amount of freedom. But the Party asked what was the opinion of the International as to the relation between the Party and the youth movement. The situation became doubtful and difficult if the E. C. of the movement, or the E. C. of the C. I. organized the youth against the party. The struggle in that case would create the germs of two parties.

The party had drawn up certain premises for the resolutions it was proposing which would be laid before the congress.

Asked by a delegate from the body of the hall about the trade union question, Comrade Falk replied that to the best of his knowledge there was no conflict between the Party and the International on this question, although there was within the party.

Beuer (Czecho-Slovakia)

We, Czecho-Slovakian delegates, are decidedly in favour of strict centralism in the Third International. The international, economic and political situation, the international organization of capitalism, the fact that the social struggle goes beyond national frontiers all demand centralised leadership in the International Organization of the revolutionary proletariat. If the Comintern were to relinquish centralism, it would be tantamount to relinquishing international revolutionary mass action and even the world revolution itself.

We speak from our own experience when we emphasise the necessity of centralism. Until a few months ago our Party was torn by serious international struggles and upheavals. Even prior to the Fourth Congress, the Executive stepped in and dealt with this situation. Although its methods and measures were at first not to our liking, it became clear in the course of the subsequent discussions within the Party that these measures were adequate and to the point. Thus, we are able to say to-day that they have greatly contributed towards the consolidation of the Party.

But our endorsement of centralism is not only due to our direct experiences during our negotiations and in our relations with the Executive Committee, but also to the peculiar structure of our Party. The Czecho-Slovakian C. P. is an international Party, which unites within its ranks Czech, German, Slovakian, Polish and Hungarian workers. If the demand of the Scandinavian comrades for non-interference of the International in the affairs of the various parties were acceded to, the Czecho-Slovakian C. P. with its complex composition, would be deprived of any higher authority capable of settling these internal disputes. In this connection, I wish to draw the attention of those present to the position of the Social-Democratic parties of Czecho-Slovakia. Since the Hamburg Congress, the Czech and German social democrats belong to the same International. These parties are strongly opposed to each other nationally and politically, and fight each other with weapons which are only customary in a struggle between bitter political opponents.

As, according to the principles of the New Socialist International, the parties belonging to it are autonomous as far as the affairs of their respective countries are concerned, they are deprived of an international authority capable of settling this dispute between the two parties.

It goes without saying that erroneous application of the principle of centralism is fraught with dangers. But we can see already that it will not be at all impossible to overcome such dangers with the assistance of the future experiences of the various parties and of the E. C. In connection with this, I wish to draw your attention to a slight drawback. For instance, in March our comrades were of the opinion that the E.C. encouraged the parties to undertake more actions than they could possibly carry out with any amount of success. But of course, these are only trifles, which have nothing to do with the principle of centralism, and which can be easily remedied through the experience which will be gained. Moreover, Comrade Bucharin has already told us in his report that the Executive itself has taken measures to prevent the repetition of such trifling errors in future.

Correction.

An error occurred in the last Special Number of the *Inprecorr*: giving reports of the session of the Extended Executive. The heading on page 443 should have read "Third Day of Session".