


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AFRICA IS ON THE MARCH

by
Julius Sago

EDITORIAL

WE CANNOT TAKE IT

WE have devoted our inside pages to publish the presidential address of Mr. J. H. Mensah on the problems of development in Ghana at this year's conference of the Ghana Economic Society together with our views on Mr. Mensah's arguments taking them one by one and dissecting them in some detail.

Mr. Mensah's main view is that in developing countries the only way left to maximise accumulation and to industrialise is through the process of "motivation", which, according to Mr. Mensah, is "the desire for private profit".

Amid a welter of confusion he quotes Marx and cites the accumulation of capital in 19th century Britain to justify his stand.

It is the view of THE SPARK and the vast majority of the people of Ghana who voted at the recent referendum for socialism that developing countries cannot in a world of monopoly capitalism develop in the same way that Britain and other capitalist countries developed in the 19th century by the slow accumulation of capital in the hands of private capitalist entrepreneurs and the concomitant turning of self-employed farmers into exploited wage-workers owning no means of production.

In our epoch, and especially in the concrete conditions of Africa, there is no reason why one should dogmatically assert that socialism cannot be built except on the ruins of indigenous capitalism. We agree that capital must be accumulated. Every developing country needs to add as fast as possible to its stock of means of production as a necessary condition for ending poverty. But unless that stock of means of production is under social control there is no guarantee whatever that those means of production will be used to "conquer the poverty" of the mass of the people.

What is really interesting in Mr. Mensah's address is that having rejected European socialist experience as not sufficiently "African" he draws his model from economic development which is neither African, nor of the 20th century, nor socialist. In fact, he draws on European capitalist experience of an epoch already dead for more than half a century.

There are many reasons why we have devoted our precious pages to discussing Mr. Mensah's address.

For sometime now it has been the policy of the Government of Ghana to mobilise the best brains of this country in a way that projected a new image of Ghana. It looks as if the cynical, double-faced elements have been replaced by honest, hardworking, responsible and open-hearted men ready to defend what the country stands for.

Right through the periods of counter-revolutionary activities in this country, we have held the conviction that nearly all men of honour heading the soft spots of the people's power are devoted to the people's cause. But Mr. Mensah's effrontery in defying the wishes of the people expressed at the referendum should be interpreted from two angles.

First, Mr. Mensah is entitled to his views, but then the nation expects him to resign his post if he sees in our policy only "the failure of the exist-

CAIRO marks an upsurge in the African Revolution. The decisions of the second Summit of African Heads of State and Government point to a growing realisation of the inevitability of taking the road of revolution in the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, neo-colonialism and apartheid. And the violent reaction of the imperialist press, more especially the hysteric and vitriolic attacks on radical African leaders in general and Kwame Nkrumah in particular, also confirm the view that Cairo has struck fear into imperialism and its agents.

Addressing a mammoth crowd at the Accra International Airport on his return from Cairo, President Nkrumah said:

"Already some sections of the British press, especially the imperialists and neo-colonialist agents among them had begun to fabricate lies and futile propaganda against the impressive achievements of the Organisation of African Unity in Cairo. If only they knew the depth of solidarity and understanding created at the Cairo Conference among the Heads of State and Government, they would be less vocal and more discreet. Africa is on the march".

To fully appreciate and correctly evaluate the decisions of the Cairo Conference, there is need to review the period from last year's Addis Ababa Conference to the eve of the Cairo Conference.

AFRICAN RIVAL GROUPINGS

Addis Ababa formally eliminated rival groupings of African states. In the place of these groupings was set up the Organisation of African Unity. The new organisation embraces every independent African state. In addition, it has assumed full responsibility for helping the struggle for national liberation in those parts of Africa still afflicted by colonialism and white minority rule.

This amalgam which embraced the radical Casablanca states, the pro-Anglo-U.S. states of the Monrovia group and the pro-French group of states known as U.A.M. (Union of African and Malagasy States) theoretically was capable of moving forward in one or other of two directions. It could move all Africa into a rapprochement with imperialism. It could, on the other hand, lead Africa into a continental struggle against imperialism. The decisive factor would be the balance of forces between the radicals and the so-called moderates within the O.A.U.

The strategists of imperialism were quick to see this point. And they acted

swiftly. The basic element in their strategy has been to manipulate the "moderates" within the O.A.U. in a way to compel all Africa to follow the path of collaboration with imperialism. The result of such a strategy would be threefold. First, the remaining colonial territories would be confidently transformed into regimes of neo-colonialism. Secondly, the neo-colonialism in some African states would be strengthened through economic development being made to follow the path of orthodox capitalism. Thirdly, the states of radical African nationalism and socialism would be isolated and gradually undermined by a policy that combines aid-with-strings and coup d'etat.

It has to be admitted that the strategy of imperialism has chalked up some gains in the past twelve months.

COMMITTEE OF NINE

The Dar-es-Salaam based Liberation Committee of Nine has operated more or less according to a pattern set for it by imperialism. Through the manipulation of the Liberation Committee and under the cover of U.N. operations in the Congo, the liberation struggle in Angola has slowed down and events there have taken a line largely in accord with U.S. strategy. In addition, every national liberation movement in the territories still under colo-

nia rule has reported an ebb in revolutionary activity due to unsatisfactory handling of affairs by the Committee of Nine.

The position of neo-colonialism has grown stronger in a few but important African states. All the indices of national activity show that in the economic, cultural and military spheres the grip of imperialism has been tightened in countries like Congo (Leopoldville), Nigeria, Tanganyika and most of the French-speaking African states. An even more ominous aspect of this imperialist drive has been the tendency to create blocs of African states which could be jointly operated in two directions—towards mutual assistance between the states involved and towards giving effect to imperialist designs everywhere on the African continent.

BLOCS WITHIN O.A.U.

Gradually, two unannounced blocs of states have been rigged up within the O.A.U. framework. One is simply a projection of the U.A.M. while the other is quite new. The French-speaking states have tended to operate as a phalanx of French presence in Africa. The other unannounced bloc which is growing in importance is very closely attached to Anglo-U.S. imperialism and revolves around the Lagos - Leopoldville - Dar-es-Salaam axis. Through these two groups of states imperialism has largely succeeded in pushing its policies under an African label.

Despite the sleek performances of this well-oiled diplomatic machinery of imperialism, some events in the past twelve months have tended to work in favour of radical African nationalism.

Growing political instability in the French-speak-

ing states, usually generated by ineffective economic policies, has tended to expose the hollowness of the view that economic progress can come only by way of abject dependence on the former colonial power.

The reactions of some Heads of State and Government to popular demands in their countries for better living standards and greater personal freedom have shown up these African leaders as leaning more on the side of imperialism and less on their own peoples. These episodes have unmasked as collaborators with imperialism some African leaders who were once thought to be or regarded as true nationalists.

U.S. IMPERIALISM EXPOSED

The performance of the United States in the Congo has exposed the U.S. as a thorough-going imperialist state before the eyes of the very African people whom Washington has striven might and main to persuade to the view that U.S.A. is a fairly god-father ready and eager to help (without strings) the emergent states of Africa. Furthermore, the Congo operations have shown how easily the U.N., as presently constituted, could serve as a cover for the machinations of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

In the midst of all the strains and stresses in Africa, the states of radical nationalism have made substantial progress in national reconstruction. The achievements of Ghana, U.A.R., Algeria, to name a few, have brought it home to the student of contemporary Africa that the line of relying on ourselves can yield rich dividends. Indeed these states, much as they still have a good deal more to do in raising the living standard of their peoples, have shown that they can generate and maintain a faster rate of economic growth than any other African state whether in the French or the Anglo-U.S. spheres of influence.

This then was the state of affairs when the Heads of State and Government met at Cairo. And while imperialism was expecting the O.A.U. to proceed along the course Western

strategists had mapped out for it, Cairo has turned out to be a shocking setback for imperialism. The decisions show that Africa is alive to the intrigues of imperialism within the O.A.U.; and that Africa is determined to move forward along an anti-imperialist path.

What is the evidence for this?

FIRST, the ineffectiveness of the Liberation Committee of Nine has been acknowledged by all and steps have been taken to rectify this. The pattern of expenditure of the Committee is now to be laid down, not by the Committee itself, but by a Budget Committee which is the Ministerial Council. By this one stroke the accountability of the Heads of State and Government through the Council of Foreign Ministers has been firmly established. The Budget Committee meets in February next year, but between now and its meeting seven months hence Ghana has volunteered to shoulder the financial responsibilities of the various liberation movements.


THE ANGOLAN SITUATION

The Angolan situation is on the way to being radically revised. American grip over Angolan affairs is likely to loosen. The incisive criticism of Roberto Holden by his Foreign Minister at Cairo, the exposure of the bitter truth that imperialist agents have infiltrated the training camps of the Angolan freedom fighters in Congo (Leopoldville), and the revelation that arms supplied by Algeria had not reached the partisans inside Angola—these facts have exposed the extent to which imperialism has had a hand in steering the affairs of the wing of the Angolan liberation movement recognised by the Committee of Nine.

A commission of three, made up of U.A.R., Algeria and Ghana has been set up with a clear mandate to reconcile the Roberto Holden and Augustine Neto wings of the Angolan liberation movement. This is clearly a defeat for the U.S. policy of keeping the revolutionary wing of the Angolan struggle out of the

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Which Path of Deve

'The Spark' and the People of Ghana: SOCIALIST

MR. J. H. Mensah's Presidential Address delivered at the annual conference of the Economic Society of Ghana might indeed have been entitled "How to pursue economic development through capitalism in a world without imperialism". For it is based on three premises, two stated, and one which is there simply by its deliberate or unconscious omission. The latter is simply that he poses the problem in a world in which Ghana has no imperialist past, no foreign property on her soil, in a world in which neo-colonialism does not exist. The two stated arguments are (amid a welter of confusion): first, that Marxism is irrelevant to Africa and therefore one can ignore all European socialist experience as having no bearing on African problems; second, and flatly contradicting the first, that experience of capitalism (which can only be European or American capitalism) has a great deal of relevance for Africa.

We intend to take the arguments he presents one by one and dissect them in detail, but it is necessary to state initially two things: first, that despite the parade of quotations from Marx, there is no consideration of—perhaps indeed no understanding of—Marxism as a living method which its founders as well as all practising Marxists have never tired of saying was "a method of study and a guide to action". Either Mensah is not aware of this, or deliberately conceals it. For no Marxist has supposed that the formulation of a road to socialism in Africa could ever be attempted without the most careful analysis of the actual conditions in particular African countries.

Despite all his attacks upon "dogmatic" Marxism, Mensah on his side nowhere even begins to consider actual productive forces and actual production relations in Ghana, and between Ghana and the world, for if he had he could hardly have failed to deal with the central fact, which all African socialists thought takes as its starting point, namely the existence of imperialism and especially its modern form, neo-colonialism.

MARXISM AND GHANA'S DEVELOPMENT PLAN

These relationships we intend to examine in some detail, and in so doing to show that Mensah's picture of Africa as entirely unlike (for example) the mid 19th century Britain which Marx considered in "Capital" from which Mensah quotes so profusely, or (for example) Russia before the socialist revolution or Eastern Europe before 1945, will not stand up for a moment.

This then is our second point, that while every socialist revolution has its own features because it takes place in a certain historical context, there are still features of the transition to socialism in other countries which it would be stupid not to study and learn from, even if the contexts were substantially different.

Differences there certainly are, and a presidential address might well have got down to a concrete examination of them instead of spending all its energies in showing the irrelevance of Marxism. For what the African countries and all hitherto occurring socialist revolutions have in common is that, with one possible exception, Czechoslovakia (Mensah forgets that while the Czech part was comparatively industrialised, Slovakia was extremely backward), they took place in economically underdeveloped countries which were the objects of foreign exploitation, and they all

took place during the period when capitalism had already entered its imperialist phase, and when therefore all countries were already within the orbit of capitalism.

Mensah returns time and time again to his thesis that Marxism, which it soon becomes apparent is what he means by "traditional socialist theory", is inadequate for assisting in the solution of the problems posed by the 7-Year Plan, because Marxism was "worked out on the basis of European experience", "Marxian theory, product of detailed examination of actual historical circumstances of Europe and especially Britain".

Of course, Mensah himself, is not so completely addicted to non-European economics as to reject such tools of thought as Marginal propensity to consume, or average value product, which are drawn from the teaching he received from Europeans based on the writings of the British Keynes and the American Chamberlin. We will let that pass. We are not so parochial, nor do we believe that either those who support Mensah or those who will attack him are so narrowly chauvinistic, as to think that the world has nothing to learn from Africa or vice versa.

TWO EUROPE: TWO AFRICAS

What is significant is that the Europe that Mensah rejects is (the Europe of Marxism and) the socialist countries of Europe, and the Europe he accepts is the Europe of the textbooks of academic economics which, without exception are supporters of some form of capitalist economy and opponents of socialism.

So he cannot be permitted to get away with pretending that he is for Africa and African thought, while those who reject him are for Europe. There are two Europe and two Africas. The Europe of the ca-

pitalists who built and maintain imperialism, and the Europe of the socialists who have always opposed it. We stand with the latter. There are two Africas, the Africa of those who compromise with imperialism, and the Africa of those who uncompromisingly oppose it. We stand with the latter.

Of course, to anyone who knows a little about Marxism, Mensah's comparative ignorance in this field will be apparent. A few pieces from the *Communist Manifesto*, a quotation or two from *Capital* (always called *Das Kapital*, though the quotations are always in English, and the English edition was called 'Capital' as he slips into calling it on the one occasion when he actually gives a chapter reference. And even then you would not know that there were three volumes of *Capital*. True, most people have never got beyond Vol. 1. Is the German title meant to create prejudice, or to show that Mensah knows it is a German work?) and that is all.

LENIN'S STUDY OF SOCIAL FORMATIONS

No reference to the works in which Marx and Engels deal with pre-capitalist formations or the voluminous writings on historical materialism which are not confined to Europe, or (even within the volume of *Capital* actually quoted) the references to Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Arabia, as well as the writings of India and China, or the Peasant War in Germany, or Engels' study of the *Origin of the Family Private Property and the State* based on the latest anthropological studies that had been made of tribal societies among the Indians of North America. Perhaps even more, Mensah never mentions Lenin, whose voluminous work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, is a masterly study of pre-capitalist relations in the Russian agrarian economy (as we shall show, bigger in proportion to the total than is that of Ghana) and its beginning disintegration—a fascinating study for those who can see the disintegration of traditional economy in Africa under the impact of imperialist penetration. Contrary to Mensah, Ghana in fact knows all the social formations studied by Lenin—traditional agriculture based on common ownership of land, forms of semi-feudal economy, small scale industrial capitalism, and very large scale modern industrial capitalism.

But let us be quite concrete. Mensah says on many occasions that he is concerned with 'a non-modern society', 'a non-industrialised economy'. We are told that the programme which Marx and Engels outlined in the *Communist Manifesto* was for 'implementation in the most advanced countries'. Hence he draws on all the wealth of feeling which exists in an audience which daily reads about the advanced as against the non-industrialised economies. One might indeed not realise (and he does not tell us) that the *Communist Manifesto* was written in 1848 when, as we shall show, Britain was at about the same stage of development as Ghana is today. Mr. Mensah clearly has access to such statistics of Ghana (and probably many more) as are available to the present writer. He either has forgotten them or wants to ignore them. Let us make some comparisons.

BRITAIN IN 1855—GHANA IN 1960's

A simple calculation of per capita national income in Britain in 1855 (based on Deane P: *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* 1963) shows that in current prices it was £183 or, after adjusting to 1963 prices, about £91.5. This compares with Ghana's £70 per head in 1963. So much for Britain as an "advanced" economy. Certainly per capita income was a little higher than Ghana, but it was probably also more unevenly distributed, so that the mass of the population probably lived little differently from Ghanaians (We are not unaware that Ghana is richer than most African countries, but Mensah chose Ghana as his arena, and if he cares to take Africa as a whole, then some of his statements about land ownership in Ghanaian agriculture are clearly quite inapplicable in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, the Union of South Africa etc.). Not until the last quarter of 19th century as Dobb (*Studies in Development of Capitalism* pp. 263 ff) writes: "did the working class begin to assume the homogeneous character of a factory proletariat". In Birmingham metal trades in 1856, "most master manufacturers employed only five or six workers". Professor Clapham has pointed out that in 1858 only about half of the workers in the Yorkshire woollen industry worked in factories. "As late as 1870 the immediate employer of many workers was not the large capitalist but the intermediate subcontractor who was both an employee and in turn a small employer of labour". These pages in Dobb, or the corresponding ones in Clapham (*Economic History of Modern Britain* (Free Trade and Steel 1850-86) p. 33 ff) would make an interesting comparison with contemporary Ghana. One thing is quite certain: there were few enterprises which concentrated labour on the

scale and with the capital employed than do the gold mines of Ghana. However, more of them in a moment.

Next let us compare with Mensah's other example, Eastern Europe. Take Russia in 1900 (by 1917, and even more by 1920, after six years of war, the figure was much lower): Dobb, quoting Propokovitch, shows that national income per head in 1900 was "less than a quarter of England at that date". Per capita income in the U.K. in 1900 at 1963 prices was about £250 per annum. One quarter of that means £62.5 per annum, i.e. lower than Ghana. So much for the advanced country! We could quote the above pages (*Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, pp. 39 ff) at length, and the reader is encouraged to do so for himself (He can also check from the original Russian sources: Lyaschenko P. *History of the National Economy of Russia*. New York: American Council of Learned Societies 1949). A few points will suffice to show the similarities with Africa and Ghana.

"In its economic development... European Russia in the first decade and a half of the present century was intermediate between the underdeveloped lands of Asia and the industrialised developed regions of Western and Central Europe." Lyaschenko op. cit. p. 563 writes:

"30 million, out of a population of 140 million, had not yet entered the capitalist phase of development, did not have their own proletariat, and remained for the most part herdsmen living in an atmosphere of patriarchal-tribal customs, or just emerging from a semi-patriarchal and semi-feudal form of social existence."

P. 673... Its general economic backwardness remained an undisputed fact. A whole series of major industries were either completely non-existent in Russia... The overwhelming proportion of machinery for the equipment of domestic plants, especially the more complex types such as electrical equipment, turbine modern machine tools, and others had to be procured abroad. There was no automobile industry. Basic chemical production was very poorly developed and some phases of chemical production were never undertaken."

URBANISATION

One interesting comparison with Ghana is that of electrical energy per head. It is true, of course that electricity was not as well developed as other form of energy, but on the other hand neither was oil. In Russia in 1913 there were 14 KWH generated per head of population (USA 175.6). In Ghana in 1960 there were about .56 KWH per head.

Economic historians take the proportion of the population living in towns, and especially in towns of more than a certain size as an indication of degree of economic development. On this basis Ghana is more developed than Russia at the turn of the century.

In Russia in 1897 there were 5 towns with a population of more than 200,000, 9 between 100,000 and 200,000, and 30 between 50,000 and 100,000. At the same date 12.1 million out of a total population of 94.2 million (European Russia only), or 12.76 per cent lived in towns, but only 6.4 per cent in towns with population of 50,000 or more.

In Ghana in 1960, with a population of 6.7 million (or approx 7.2 per cent of that of European Russia in 1897) there were 2 towns with a population of more than 200,000, 1 between 100,000 and 200,000, and 4 with a population of 50,000 to 100,000.

In European Russia some 53 per cent of the urban population (or 6.75 per cent of the total population) lived in towns of 50,000 or more. In Ghana in 1960, of the urban population (defined as living in towns of 5,000 or more) some 65 per cent lived in towns of 50,000 or more. These large-town dwellers comprised 22.8 per cent of the Ghanaian population. Note that we have compared all Ghana with only European Russia. A comparison with all Russia (including the 30 million in the 'backward' areas) would make the comparison even more favourable to Ghana.

Clearly then, on the score of urbanisation—which is used by economic historians as an index of the degree of economic development—Ghana in 1960 is certainly not behind but, on the contrary, in many respects a little ahead of pre-revolutionary Russia.

DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION IN INDUSTRY

From reading Mensah, one would gather that Russia in 1900 was a modern industrial country. It is useful to quote authorities: Dobb op. cit. p. 35 writes: "In general it can be said that industrialisation had as yet touched little more than the hem of Russia's economic system; even if, where matured forms of industrial capitalism had taken root, this capitalism was of a fairly advanced type. The patches of factory industry in the Leningrad and Moscow districts were no more than industrial islands in a vast agricultural sea. Less than 15 per cent lived in towns and less than 10 per cent derived their livelihood from industry. The total numbers employed in factory industry lay between two to three million, to which are to be added a further million railwaymen and three quarters of a million

miners... Even many of the wage earners in the factories were only semi-proletarians, in the sense that they had economic links with the village, and often returned there in the summer to help with the harvest. According to an investigation in 1910, as many as two thirds of the factory workers of St. Petersburg, the capital, retained nominal ownership of some land, and nearly a fifth of them returned to the village every summer. In the mining industry of the South, the migration to the village in the harvest season was even more marked than it was in the factory industry of the Petersburg and Moscow districts... Capitalism in Russia still very largely took the relatively primitive form of the putting out system."

CONCENTRATION IN LARGE ESTABLISHMENTS

From the above we note many similarities with Ghana. In Ghana the number of workers in factory industry was in 1959 about 100,000. Out of a population of 6.7 million they formed about 1 1/2 per cent. A further 12,000 or so worked in the lumber industry. Russia's 2.3 million we shall count as 2 1/2 million. Out of 140 million this was also about 1 1/2 per cent. So far the same in both countries. For Ghana we add a further 67,000, or about 1 per cent who were employed in transport, storage, and communication, which we reduce to allow for the 16,000 employers and self-employed. Thus about another 0.8 per cent is added. For Russia the addition of the Railwaymen and miners would add about another 1.2 per cent.

Hence the aggregate figure for Ghana is 2.2 per cent, that for Russia about 2.5-3.0 per cent. Hardly enough difference to call one backward and the other advanced.

Lenin wrote (*Development of Capitalism in Russia* p. 562):

"In 1903 the large factories, those with more than 100 workers, constituted in European Russia 17 per cent of the total number of factories and works and concentrated 76.6 per cent of the total number of works and factory workers."

In Ghana, "according to the 1962 Census, there are about 102,000 small, medium and large establishments which belong to industry (as defined by UN to embrace four groups of economic activities: Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction, and Electricity, Gas, and Steam). The 2,470 medium and large establishments in the Directory represent about 3 per cent of the number of industrial establishments in Ghana, but engaged 47 per cent of the industrial labour force in Ghana" (Directory Oct. 63, p. II).

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Development Should We Take?

J. H. Mensah: CAPITALIST

(Paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Economic Society of Ghana by the President, Mr. J. H. Mensah)

GHANA and many other developing countries are committed to a socialist pattern of society. In the economic sphere, this commitment is interpreted in Ghana's 7-Year Development Plan as follows:—

- i. The economy must be developed rapidly and efficiently so that it shall within the shortest time possible assure a high rate of productivity and a high standard of living for each citizen based on gainful employment.
- ii. The income from our physical assets and from the labour of our people applied to these assets year by year must be utilised for socially purposeful ends. Never must public wealth and private affluence be allowed to co-exist in Ghana. And among the most important ends that the community must provide for out of its incomes should be the education and welfare of its children, and the continued expansion of the economy itself.
- iii. The community through its Government must play a major role in the economy, thus enabling it to assure the maintenance of a high level of economic activity, the provision of adequate employment opportunities, the equitable distribution of the nation's output, and the availability of the means of satisfying over-riding social ends. Accordingly the need for the most rapid growth of the public and co-operative sector in productive enterprise must be kept in the forefront of government policy.

ANSWERS FROM THEORY

To translate these policies into a concrete programme must be considered to be the main function of planning in Ghana. Such translation must be guided at each stage by a clear understanding of the meaning and the implications of socialism. Personal commitment, the moral attractiveness, or even the historical inevitability of socialism are not enough. It should be possible to deduce the correct answers to concrete problems from general theory.

In practice the Ghanaian planner finds that many of his theoretical and conceptual problems as well as many questions of social organisation are not satisfactorily dealt with by traditional socialist theory. The existing corpus of thinking fails him on many points as a guide to action. In this paper we are concerned to set the planner's practical problems against the existing theories. The hope is that the gap between theory and practical problem will be clearly seen and that more capable theoreticians will then proceed to devise satisfactory formulae to fill this gap.

To a great extent the failure of the existing socialist theory to provide a

guide to action in Ghanaian conditions is due to the fact that this theory has been worked out on the basis of European experience. Many elements in this experience are completely unknown in Ghana.

Marx himself had to deal with this problem of the transferability of political economy between countries during his life time. Part of his explanation for the backwardness of the science of political economy in the Germany of his day was that the German economists were using theories derived to suit British conditions. Not having direct knowledge of the social realities behind the theories they were unable to discuss it intelligently or to use it sensibly. Marx said of the theoretical works of the German economists:

MODIFY 'EUROPEAN' SOCIALISM FOR GHANA

"The theoretical expression of a foreign reality was turned, in their hands, into a collection of dogmas, interpreted by them in terms of the petty trading world around them, and therefore misinterpreted. The feeling of scientific impotence, a feeling not wholly to be repressed, and the uneasy consciousness of having to touch a subject in reality foreign to them, was but imperfectly concealed, either under a parade of literary and historical erudition, or by admixture of extraneous material...."

Similarly, socialism in Ghana cannot be content to follow the prescriptions of the political economy derived on the basis of European experience without substantial modifications.

It is necessary to insist that the Marxian theory is the product of the most detailed examination of the actual historical circumstances in Europe and especially in Britain. *Das Kapital* is firmly founded on the most exhaustive study of social and economic conditions in the Britain of the early 19th century. Engels was at great pains to point out in presenting *Das Kapital* to the English speaking world that Karl Marx was "a man whose whole theory is a life-long study of the economic history and condition of England, and whom that study led to the conclusion that, at least in Europe, England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful and legal means" (Engels 1886).

The application of Hegelian Dialectics to the economic history of Britain led Marx to the famous generalisation with which the *Communist Manifesto*

opens:

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another...."

The *Communist Manifesto* made it quite clear that the generalisation was based on the analysis of European history from ancient Rome through the Middle Ages and the period of the Enlightenment to the Industrial Revolution. To use Marx's own words he had had to examine "the capitalist mode of production to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society". Engels specifically added that the history of the primitive community did not exhibit this pattern of class war.

It is necessary to stress that Marxism was an attempt to predict by analytical methods the probable future development of the industrialised economies of Europe. The analysis led to the prediction that bourgeois capitalist society will evolve through the dictatorship of the proletariat to the communist state. This pattern of development will follow "laws... tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results".

PROBLEMS OF MARXISM

It is therefore the duty of socialist thinking in a non-modern society, in a non-industrialised economy such as Ghana to lay bare by means of rigorous objective analysis the economic law of motion of the non-industrialised African society. If the iron tendencies discovered by such analysis are seen to be different in detail from those at which Marx arrived through analysis of industrialised societies then that also should be accepted as being perfectly consistent with the work of Marx himself.

Specifically it is to be expected a priori that the detailed prescriptions of Marx will have to be varied in the circumstances of Ghana and other non-industrialised communities. It is to be hoped that theoretical discussion in Ghana will make a distinctive contribution towards the discovery of the probable future pattern of the African economies through the analysis of the present pattern of these economies.

The social organisation of a country must be designed to assist with the solution of the leading problems of that community. In the Marxian system the change from one form of social organisation to the next is necessitated by the

inability of successive economic systems to contain the productive forces of society. The transition from bourgeois capitalism to socialism is needed in order to allow industrial technology to be applied faster than competitive capitalism will allow. Private bourgeois capitalism, as a form of social organisation, corresponds to the technological stage of the Industrial Revolution: "technology reveals Man's dealing with nature, discloses the direct productive activities of his life, thus throwing light upon social relations...." (*Das Kapital*). And in the *Critique of Political Economy*, Marx wrote:

"In the social production of the means of life, human beings enter into definite and necessary relations which are independent of their will—production relations which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their productive forces.

"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with existing production relationships, or, what is but a legal expression for the same thing, with the property relationships within which they have hitherto moved. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relationships turn into their fetters. A period of social revolution then begins."

PURPOSE OF SOCIALISM

In the history of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the purpose of social transformation was different. The economic system in those countries was rearranged in order to consolidate the position of Communist Parties after they had overthrown rival political parties. There can be no question that the social re-organisation of the present socialist countries was necessitated by an incompatibility between the forces of production and the economic system. Specifically, in none of these countries had capitalism reached the stage of monopoly capital and imperialism which, according to Lenin himself, is the last stage of capitalism before the dialectical revolution will inevitably take place.

For developing countries like Ghana the purpose of social re-organisation must again be different. The economic system must be re-organised in such a way as to promote to the maximum degree the accumulation of capital and the growth of national output. These are the processes that will conquer poverty. And the conquest of poverty is the leading problem of the developing countries.

Will the same economic system, which serves to remove the contradiction between productive forces and production relations in a Marxian revolution, also be the best way to buttress the position of a socialist political party after a successful

coup d'état and at the same time promote the maximization of economic growth in a developing country? Or would different types of new economic system better serve these different purposes?

Marx dates the establishment of capitalism from the creation of a class of wage labourers. The capitalist is the man who hires wage labour. The agrarian revolutions and the breakdown of the Guild system were at the core of the beginning of capitalism.

THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL

"all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but above all those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 'untethered' proletarians on the labour market. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process". As Marx explains in *DAS KAPITAL*, "Capitalism originates in the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers.... the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of production. The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter sets free the elements of the former.

... the historical movement which changes the producers into wage workers, appears on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, ... on the other hand, these new freedmen become sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence offered by the old feudal arrangements."

(Capital, Cap. 26, on The So Called Primitive Accumulation).

Once the capitalist process starts, accumulation continues under its own momentum. But its purpose is not the economic development of the society. Its purpose is the increase of the value of the capital assets of the capitalist. Capital is accumulated through the expropriation of the so-called "surplus value"—the difference between the productivity of a worker and the wage rate of the worker. This surplus value is spent by the capitalist on the employment of more labour, by investment either in fixed assets or in circulating capital. The capitalist invests his surplus rather than consume it because only through the investment of capital can his surplus—his profits—be further increased. Only by keeping up with compe-

ting capitalists in the modernisation of his methods of production and in his sales effort can the capitalist maintain or increase his share of the market. Since however the rate of profit on invested capital falls with the increase in the aggregate amount of capital, the capitalist is under the contrary inducement to spend the expropriated surplus rather than to reinvest it.

This in brief is the Marxian explanation of who accumulates capital in a bourgeois economy, how they accumulate it, and why they accumulate it.

The accumulation of capital is not only necessary to the capitalist process. Its inevitable end result is the under-mining of the capitalist process itself. For the increasing "organic composition of capital" on the one side and the concomitant, organised militancy of a proletariat which becomes ever more impoverished on the other side are the dialectical opposites which eventually destroy capitalism.

In the practice of the Eastern European countries, capital accumulation is a function of the state. The nation under a system of state capitalism is the owner of surplus value. A maximum proportion of surplus value is reinvested in productive enterprises. This serves further to strengthen rather than to undermine the economic system. Whether the ratio of surplus value to the wage rate is increasing or decreasing does have something to do with events like those of 1956 in Eastern Europe. But in general a high marginal propensity to save is a source of strength rather than of weakness to the contemporary communist regime.

AIM OF POLICY

In the developing countries the multiplication of the means of production accompanied by an increasing organic composition of capital, must be positive aim of policy. A high marginal propensity to save is what will maximise the multiplication of the means of production. In the Marxian system the capitalist stage during which bourgeois accumulation supplies the means for the maximization of the rate of economic development is presented as a necessary step in the evolution of society. It is the successor to the feudal agrarian system. Its overthrow in favour of a socialist system takes place after it has served to accomplish an Industrial Revolution. The profit motive under the bourgeois system generates the savings which build the material basis for a socialist society. Should a developing country then harness capitalist motivation as a necessary intermediate stage in its progression towards socialism?

Would a system of state capitalism such as that of the contemporary socialist states lead to a maximization of accumulation in a

developing country? It is notorious that state enterprise in developing countries usually leads to a minimisation rather than a maximisation of the margin between wage rate and productivity. One has only to look around Ghana, at all the state enterprises in which surplus value is emphatically not being generated—all the enterprises which instead of yielding a surplus steadily yield deficits—to see that in practice state capitalism tends to overtax the managerial capability which is at the disposal of the Government of a non-industrialised country.

The motive for accumulation in bourgeois society, the desire for private profit, is the central force in the industrialisation process as described by Marx. If a developing country needs to maximise accumulation and to industrialise then we must ask: Can this process be accomplished in the absence of this motivation?

WHEN IS PRIVATE PROPERTY CAPITALIST?

Private property in Marxian theory is not necessarily capitalist. Private property only becomes capitalist when it employs wage labour and appropriates surplus value. In a developing country where the aim of economic policy is to promote a maximum growth of national output it is to be presumed that capital which employs labour and generates productivity over and above the subsistence wage rate is preferable to private property which does not employ labour. For the latter, which is passive property, neither produces itself nor contributes to an increase in the national income.

In the Ghanaian context one might say that the man who invests £10,000 out of his savings from work in an enterprise which employs other Ghanaians at a profit is socially more useful than the man who invests £10,000 of his savings in a house. But the first is a capitalist, and the latter is not. If the aim of a developing country is both economic development and socialism then we are led to a paradoxical situation: the capitalist is both to be preferred and not to be preferred to the holder of passive property.

There is an even more painful contradiction. The man who employs labour but does not make a profit does not by definition exploit labour: there is not surplus value for him to expropriate. But the capitalist who makes a profit does exploit labour by definition. Further, the success of the owner of the profitable enterprise leads to an increase in the material means of production as well as in the current national income for the economy as a whole. The unsuccessful capitalist consumes his capital and does not add to national income. What then

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'The Spark' and the People of Ghana:

SOCIALIST

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In Ghana in 1959, for all industries (1961 Statistical Yearbook, Table 44, p. 40) 90,598 workers were employed in establishments with more than 100 employees, out of a total employed in establishments of all sizes (all here means employing six workers or more) of 98,956. The numbers in establishments employing more than 100 thus comprised just under 92 per cent of the total labour force.

If one considers only the employees in the very large establishments, the following comparison emerges between Ghana in 1959 and Russia in 1903:

PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS EMPLOYED IN ESTABLISHMENTS OF DIFFERENT SIZES (LARGE ESTABLISHMENTS ONLY)

Establishment	Russia 1903	Ghana 1959
Employing		
101-500	36.7%	19.5%
500-1,000	21.9%	80.5%
more than 1,000	41.4%	
	100.0	100.0

(Lenin op. cit. p. 563. The Russian figure had risen only to 65% by 1908, so it is hardly likely to have approached the Ghanaian figure even by 1917). It should be noted that though the Ghanaian figures do not give establishments employing more than one thousand employees separately, the average size of establishments in the group employing more than 500 was for Ghana 1,460 employees and in none of the industry groups did it fall below 1,000. Indeed, in mining the average was nearly 3,000. The average size for the establishments employing more than 500 in Russia in 1903 was 1,250 workers, or rather less than Ghana's. We do not want to lay overmuch stress on small differences one way or the other. But what these figures do show is that the picture of Russia as a country of large scale enterprises, and Ghana as one of small is entirely erroneous.

OWNERSHIP BY FOREIGN CAPITAL

Dobb writes (Op. cit. p. 36) of Russia: "The factories that existed were frequently foreign importations, foreign owned, foreign financed, and staffed by foreign managerial and technical personnel" do, p. 38:

"... nearly half of the capital invested in the Donetz coal basin prior to 1914 was foreign, and over 80% of the capital in iron-mining, metallurgy, and the oil industry... Of the basic capital of 18 leading joint-stock banks some 42% was in foreign ownership." Lyaschenko op. cit. p. 535:

"It seems clear that foreign capital comprised somewhat more than one third of all corporation capital in 1890 rising to nearly half in 1900. Franco-Belgian capital formed almost 60% of the total."

Dobb writes: "... with regard to her trade relations Russia represented an economic system that was dependent on the West. As an exporter of raw and agricultural products and an importer of finished manufactures... She led the world as a grain exporter, and supplied nearly a third of the wheat imports and nearly a half of the imports of grain into other European countries. Cereals and other foodstuffs

accounted for more than half Russia's total exports in 1914. Annual indebtedness on foreign loans exceeded the annual import of new capital (in the first two decades before 1914) and hence accounted for part of Russia's surplus of merchandise exports over imports in her annual trade balance."

In the first quotation substitute cocoa for wheat and grain, and you have Ghana!

No one could possibly imagine from the way Mensah speaks of Ghana that he must have been introduced to Bauer's *West African Trade*, and seen the figures quoted there of the share of a handful of foreign mono-

polies in the trade and industry of the Gold Coast. We shall quote only the summary in Newlyn Rowan's *Money and Banking in Colonial Africa* (pp. 12-14): After pointing out that other writers have put the share of West African import trade in expatriate hands at 90%, they write: "(trade) ... conducted in the main by large firms of which UAC is the largest... its share in the import trade is probably between 35-40%."

The result of historical development and government policy is an economic organisation in which (a) expatriate enterprise is confined to a few fields, and dominates the export and import trades, wholesale distribution, mining, shipping and banking; (b) most expatriate enterprises are organised on a large scale, with head offices and buying organisations in Europe.

The largest lenders in West Africa are the large expatriate trading enterprises which perform the bulk of what would, in many countries, be bank lending."

The Ghanaian picture will be too well known to our readers to require more than a reminder. One would not gather from Mensah that this was the picture in Ghana at all.

Doreen Warriner in *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (London 1939 p. 20, 46) gives the following picture: (the majority of the data are for the 1920s—with the Great Depression of the thirties, plus later German 'neo-colonialism' in the Balkans after 1936, the situations were, if anything, worse than in the twenties):

Proportion of population engaged in Agriculture (Ghana, according to the 7-Year Plan—approx. 60% Hungary (1930) 50.8% Poland (1921) 72.3% Bulgaria (1926) 80.0% Yugoslavia about the same as Bulgaria. Rumania 77.2% USSR (1926 i.e. on the eve of the First Five Year Plan of industrialisation), 83.2%

"In Eastern Europe the numbers on the land in 1931 were much greater everywhere than in 1921 or 1910 (p.45). Agric. population has almost the same proportion as in the pre-war period. (p.47)

"Of the total peasant population of Eastern Europe of 60 million, probably about one-quarter do not produce enough to satisfy their need for food, in the sense of bread (i.e. about 15½ million) the proportion ranging from 80% in some regions to 15% in others". (p.87).

CONCLUSION OF THIS SECTION

We have elaborated these points in order to show the following:

1. That Mensah's picture of Eastern Europe before socialism as so unlike Africa as to be not worth discussing is clearly quite false. Perhaps the figure of 83 per cent of the Soviet population engaged in agriculture on the eve of the First Five Year Plan will give some pause, and the vast majority, we expect and hope, tremendous encouragement and confidence in tackling Ghana's Plan in much easier international conditions.

2. Mensah's picture and method of presenting it is not marked by any great interest in facts, and appears to be motivated primarily by desire to assert a predetermined viewpoint. We have gone into great, sometimes almost tedious detail in order to show that other assertions about what Marxists are supposed to believe cannot be treated with any great degree of trust.

3. A cautionary word is necessary. We are not for a moment asserting on our side that nothing is necessary but to study the experience of earlier socialist countries. Far from it. While no serious scientist is too proud to learn from anyone, there is no substitute for African Marxists to getting down to the task of examining African reality. But just because African countries have been among the main victims of imperialism, and because their struggle for development cannot forget for one moment the continuing existence of imperialism as well as the legacies of its past, and because the struggle for socialism has some common features everywhere, it would be unwise to tie one's hands behind one's back at the outset. May we once more repeat that what Mensah appears to want to reject as irrelevant is not European experience in general (he is quite interested in the virtues of private capitalist accumulation as a factor in industrialisation) but European socialist experience.

"If a developing country needs to maximise accumulation and to industrialise, then we must ask: Can this process be accomplished in the absence of this motivation? (This motivation is "the desire for private profit")."

MENSAH'S PATH TO SOCIALISM: CAPITALISM

This passage comes immediately after one in which he has dismissed the state enterprises as incapable of generating the necessary accumulation. Hence one is forced to the conclusion that he sees private capitalism not as some supporting and subordinate activity with the main emphasis on a state (socialist) sector (which is what Ghana's Seven-Year Plan postulates) but as the main vehicle of growth.

After saying, quite correctly that 'private property in Marxian theory is not necessarily capitalist', he goes on to give that statement a quite different meaning from what any Marxist, thinking about Ghana, would have imagined. What Marx meant of course, was two things: (a) that personal property in the form of articles of consumption, is never capital; (b) that private property consisting of means of production is capital only when it is used to employ wage labour.

The cutlass and hoe of the subsistence or self-employed cocoa farmer, the loom of the self-employed handicraft worker are not capital, and the improvement of the tools in the hands of such people is not 'capital accumulation'. But what Mensah apparently wants to turn it into is a contrast between 'passive' and 'active' capital. Capital invested in a house is not capital, he says. It therefore does not employ wage labour; it therefore produces no surplus, it therefore makes no contribution to accumulation. Capital invested in means of production and used to employ wage labour is, on the other hand, he says "puts his capital to productive use and manages it successfully".

ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS

We will answer that in a minute. It is interesting to note the implicit assumptions behind his picture of how this capitalist gets started. "In the Ghanaian context one might say that the man who invests £10,000 out of his savings from work (our italics) in an enterprise..." in an economy with a per capita income of £70 per annum, the way in which one saves, out of income from work, some £10,000, would bear further examination. In Ghana in 1958-59 there were less than 1,000 employees who earned more than £2,000 per annum, and clearly a considerable number of those were expatriates. In Ghana, as in 19th century Britain, the only people who started a business with £10,000 did not acquire that sum from savings out of their income from work at all. They either had it already out of other forms of private property (e.g. land-owning, house-owning, or from merchant capital). It was only when a very small capitalist began to employ wage-labour, i.e. to exploit the labour of others, that his capital could reach such a large amount. But then the £10,000 came not from his, but from their work. It was they who were producing the surplus.

Further, his point that houses are not capital seems quite erroneous in present day Ghana. True, a man may build a house for his own use. We may agree that £10,000 is rather an excessive amount for this purpose and that in Ghanaian conditions it could be better spent. One may also ask whether the accumulation of £10,000 was done in ways which are compatible with social welfare (e.g. corruption, profiteering from shortages of goods or housing, extortionate rates or interest in money lending etc.). But no socialist would quarrel with any man's use of his savings from work to build a house for his own,

or his family's occupation. But once houses are built to let to others, they become capital. For the rent will include a payment sufficient to compensate the owner for the receipts he might have got by putting his money to some other use (e.g. money lending, trade, or employment of wage labour). This is not only good marxist economics, it is good academic economics too.

PASSIVE, PRIVATE PROPERTY?

There is nothing wrong with mobilisation of private savings via state bonds and the payment of interest. Mensah spoils his argument here by assuming that such savings are put in their entirety to what he calls unproductive use (e.g. 'sporting facilities'). We would agree that such projects should be treated as collective consumption rather than accumulation of productive assets, and paid for out of taxation, though it may not always be correct to classify them as unproductive. Sports facilities can be an important factor in raising the general health of the population and therefore raising the productivity of labour. But if the savings are used for the accumulation of productive assets, we cannot follow the argument that this means the growth of passive private property. It would seem on the contrary, to represent the growth of public, active property. For the state bondholders do not, by bond holding acquire any rights that they did not possess before, or any rights that non-bond holders do not possess, to decide on the use of those productive assets. They are performing a public service by contributing to national growth, and they receive a modest reward for it. If their contribution is properly used, the state's employment of those savings in productive assets will yield a far greater increase in society's output than is required to pay the interest. No one would suggest that state bonds of this kind should play more than an ancillary role, canalising into productive uses resources which might otherwise go on consumption of an ostentatious kind. The main role in socialist accumulation must come from taxation initially, and increasingly, as the state sector and its productivity grows from the surpluses generated within the state enterprises.

Perhaps the crux of Mensah's difficulty is that he does not believe that such surpluses can be generated there. That point we have discussed elsewhere. In essence the question is one of finding methods of organisation and incentive which can fully utilise and develop, in a way that a capitalist system cannot and dare not, the talents of the workers.

Underdeveloped countries cannot in a world of monopoly capitalism, develop, in the same way that Britain and other capitalist countries developed in the 19th century, by the slow accumulation of capital in the hands of private capitalist-entrepreneurs, and the concomitant turning of self-employed farmers into exploited wage-workers owning no means of production. It is interesting, as we have already noted, that having rejected European socialist experience as not

sufficiently 'African', he draws his model from economic development which is neither African, nor of the 20th century, nor socialist. In fact he draws on European capitalism of an epoch already dead for more than half a century.

THE STATE—BEST CAPITAL ACCUMULATOR

We are not arguing here as to whether the African people who were the main force for independence, conducted that fight in order to become wage workers under African capitalism. They will decide that in their own way. What we are arguing is that the development cannot take place in the way that Mensah postulates. We believe that the vast majority in the 19th century has already accepted that the only agency capable of accumulating means of production in aggregates big enough to operate in the modern world of large scale monopoly capital is the state. Any new industries set up on a smaller scale will never get beyond the backyard industries which fit into the interstices of the colonial economy. Most economists agree that it is because every opportunity that presents itself for satisfying a large enough market is promptly snapped up by the large expatriate firm which has both the capital and experience to operate on a scale with which the small indigenous private entrepreneur cannot compete. It is just for this reason that such surpluses as have been accumulated by private individuals among the indigenous population have gone into real estate, or into money-lending. Even in a country as large as India, where the bourgeoisie is much more highly developed, they do not find it easy without the aid of socialist countries to build modern viable industries; and even where they do the wage workers whom they create and employ are not at all satisfied with the distribution of such growth in the social product as takes place. Many people have pointed the danger that on the basis of small scale privately owned indigenous industry, (given that a bourgeois controlled government were really able to enforce strict tariffs and keep out cheap foreign goods for a long enough period to get their own industry really up to the world competitive level) one is more likely in the present world context to finish up like Latin America rather than like Japan. There is no case of an ex-colonial country, on the basis of capitalism, achieving an independent and viable economic growth since the imperialist epoch began. There are examples only of socialist countries who have begun to follow that path (the semi-colonial countries of Eastern Europe, and in the Far East, a colonial country, China).

SOCIALIST GROWTH AVOIDS CLASS STRUGGLE

If the surplus is going to be amassed by the state, then sooner or later those whose sacrifices have made the accumulation possible (since production comes only from work) are going to ask, "Did we produce and eat less than we produced only in order to have some of the fruits of our labour taken from us by a minority?" The answer they will give is NO. Hence the only way to avoid class struggle is precisely to follow a socialist path where the increasing stock of assets provided from the sacrifices of the people belongs to, is controlled by,

and used for, the people. Any road of private capitalism will generate that class struggle which Mensah accuses the Marxists of insisting on. In fact it is he whose policies will lead to class struggle. It is these who advocate the socialist path who seek to avoid its development altogether. And in our epoch, and especially in the concrete conditions of Africa, there is no reason why one should dogmatically (in a way that neither Marx nor Marxists have ever advocated) demand that socialism cannot be built except on the ruins of indigenous capitalism.

At the same time, it would be an illusion to suppose that there is no class struggle between African workers and imperialist employers, or between African farmers and monopolist importers and exporters. There is. Mensah does not mention either of these at all: yet they are the main areas of class struggle in Africa. This struggle merges with the national struggle for political and economic independence just because these monopolists are foreign monopolists. It is in order to beat the foreign monopolists that one needs state enterprise. But it is also in order to stop the growth of any indigenous forces who as capitalist employers would inevitably find themselves with interests at least partly conflicting with those of the majority of their fellow citizens—it is in order to stop this development before it breeds forces that might want to compromise with foreign interests that one advocates state enterprise with the mass of the people in political control of those enterprises as the only guarantee against the return of political independence.

WORKERS AND OPPRESSION DON'T COMPROMISE

There is enough evidence to show that this happens where a powerful minority has interests different from, and privileges at the expense of the majority. There is no case where the majority, the working people, have compromised willingly with foreign oppressors. There are only too many cases which privileged minorities have done so if that seems a condition of the retention and extension of their privileges.

Hence, here one is not dealing with the question which of two alternative ways will lead to the fastest to economic growth. One is also dealing with the question which of those paths is a condition for national independence. Certainly one can be dependent and have growth. The National Income of Saudi Arabia must have multiplied manifold since the opening up of its oil resources. There is not much evidence that this growth has gone into the stomachs of the people. There is the universally noticed evidence that it has gone into Cadillacs, luxurious living, for a few, and private armies in order to maintain them against the anger of the people.

No one wants to repeat in West Africa the experience of South Vietnam, or of Iran and Iraq, or of Egypt before the national revolution, or of many of the South American Republics where private wealth of a tiny minority goes alongside the poverty of the many, where expatriate enterprises milk the country and intrigue in its internal politics, where in

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J. H. Mensah: CAPITALIST

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should a planner in a developing country do about private people who put their capital to productive use and manage it successfully?

As for idle property—the potential productive wealth that is put to non-productive uses—what should be our attitude towards it? Clearly, it does not exploit labour. But neither does it contribute to the economic development of the country what it could, contribute. However much of such passive property a man may acquire he does not become a capitalist in a Marxist sense—in spite of all that may be asserted to the contrary. Marx and Engels themselves wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*: "The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property."

But clearly such private property in the long run tends to undermine social equality which must be a cardinal element in any meaningful socialist policy. On what basis then should we set limits to the acquisition of passive property? Should a man be allowed only one house or two houses or three houses? Should the laws be made in such a way that after a man has acquired one house he is offered the maximum inducement to consume his income rather than to save it, even in the form of passive property?

SOCIALLY PREFERABLE MONEY

It is not enough to say that we will encourage the individual to save and then take his savings into investable funds in the hands of the state. Because when the state issues development bonds it has to offer an interest inducement. This enables private passive property, even in the form of state bonds, to grow. In any case it is not readily obvious why money lent to the state for the building of sporting facilities is socially preferable to money privately invested in housing or even more in a productive enterprise in a developing country such as Ghana.

For the solution of these

problems of policy Marx in fact offers a very ambiguous guide:

"Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation. A man may make as much money as he can and use it as he likes—as long as he does not use it to employ his fellow man."

We must remember of course that the society of which Marxism treats is a society that is established after the productive powers of the economy have been developed under capitalism. Communism is only supposed to come after a period during which the social, political, the legal and even the religious institutions have all been employed to the maximum degree in the promotion of private capital accumulation, whether in productive or non-productive uses.

THE WAGE SYSTEM

In the mature communist state society inherits an economic potential that has already been developed to such a degree that goods have lost their economic character, are no longer scarce. Wants can be satisfied irrespective of the individual's particular contribution to the production process. In the reinterpretation of this point in the socialism of Khrushchey and Mao Tse Tung, communism will already have been reached when just the basic needs of people can be assured them free of cost by the society. But in such a communist state there will still be need for accumulation—and for some way of rationing those thousands of other goods that are not minimally essential but are generally desired.

In the Marxian theory of value only labour creates value. The value embodied in a commodity is equal to the amount of labour used up in physical sense in its production. The labourer is entitled to be paid the cost of the physical wear and tear on his body caused by his work; in other words to be paid at a subsistence

level of wages. Surplus value is created by labour but at no "real" labour cost. Hence the labour theory of value:

"The owner of money busy labour power at its value, which is determined, like the value of every other commodity, by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (that is to say, the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is to set it to work for the whole day twelve hours, let us suppose. Meanwhile, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the labourer produces sufficient to pay back the cost of his own maintenance; and in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he produces a "surplus" product for which the capitalist does not pay him—surplus product or surplus value."

But surplus value—i.e. the exploitation of labour—is the source, the only possible source, of capital accumulation. What wage policy is then indicated by the theory of Marxism, by the practice of the contemporary socialist states, and by the capital needs of the developing country?

MARX'S POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Although in his revolutionary politics Karl Marx clearly opposed the exploitation of labour by capital, in his economic analysis exploitation has a much more neutral connotation. Writing in the introduction to the 1867 edition of *Das Kapital* Marx had this to say of the role of the individual member of a social class:

"My standpoint, from which the evaluation of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them."

In fact, the role of the

bourgeoisie in history is described in quite positive terms in the *Manifesto* of the Communist Party (1848):

"The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces, than have preceding generations together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry or industry, and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?"

This role could never have been played without, on the one hand, the conquest of political power by the bourgeoisie and, on the other hand, the creation of a property-less proletariat whose labour could be exploited for the accumulation of capital.

LABOUR, SURPLUS VALUE AND ACCUMULATION

If then labour is the source of value and surplus value the only source of accumulation, it follows that accumulation can only take place when there is exploitation of labour. In practice the question presents itself in such forms as for instance: What rate of profit shall a socialist enterprise make? How much of these profits should be distributed as a bonus? How much should the state charge on its capital, invested in public enterprises? What should be the relationship between changes in productivity and changes in the wages rate? What is the significance of a living wage or a minimum wage in a socialist economy? What should be the relation between the incomes of productive and non-productive workers?

In the practice of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries it has become well established that the State shall earn a return on its capital according to the nature of the enterprise. It

is also taken for granted that a high marginal rate of savings in the economy should accrue to the state as the owner of productive capital and as the holder of the power of taxation.

Looked at from the point of view of the supply of goods and services the contemporary socialist countries have planned the structure of their production in such a way as to maximise the production of capital goods and of means of production. In other words, the difference between the gross national product and the wage bill is maximised and expressed in the form of producer goods. This is not exploitation of labour by private individuals. But it is the exploitation of labour in the technical sense of the expropriation of the difference between the average value product and the average wage rate.

Moreover, in the reinvestment of the national surplus to produce further goods and services the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia have deliberately minimised the share of investment in consumption assets. It is perhaps the irony of history that housing, which was singled out by Marx as one of the worst features of the social conditions of the working classes in capitalist 19th century England, has also been one of those sectors most starved of investment funds in the contemporary socialist countries.

REPRODUCTIVE WAGE RATE

The problem of the subsistence of reproductive wage rate poses particularly difficult problems. Obviously, the standard of living of the masses in a developing country is far below what is tolerable to the moral sense of a socialist leadership. But if even labour were allowed to appropriate the whole of its value product the standard of living would still remain appallingly low. This would however have already eliminated the investable surplus in the community. But over and above that there is usually a desire to raise the standard of living even higher than what would be strictly justified by the productivity of labour. This is usually

attempted through systems of subsidy, etc. It is an enlightened policy; but it is not necessarily an incomes policy that will assist in the real fight against poverty.

Marx predicted the course of wages in a capitalist economy thus:

"The greater the volume of means of production which society possesses and the greater its productive power, the more precarious are the conditions of existence of the working class"

THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

Many developing countries like Ghana have chosen the mixed economy as the transitional system between their present situation, which does not correspond exactly to any stage in European history, and the socialist stage which is in Marxian analysis the historical next stage after capitalism as it existed in Europe. In the capitalist state it is the contradiction of increasing productivity, rising national income and larger profits on the one hand and the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat on the other which brings about the transition to socialism. The iron law of wages has at least a historical role to play. In a mixed economy in which the Government practices a socialistic policy the increase in the means of production should not be accompanied by an increase in distributed profits, or an increase in the share of profits in the national income, or an increase in the pool of unemployed, "the industrial reserve army". How then will the mixed economy with an enlightened wage policy turn into a socialist economy? Should a mixed economy practise a wage policy which ensures its transformation into a socialist society? Or if it does not then what degree of exploitation of labour will both satisfy the requirements of socialism, provide for its needs for capital accumulation, and also ensure that it does not settle down forever into a comfortable welfare, but not socialist state?

The transition from capitalism to socialism is bound up with the logical working out of the dialectical process in classical

Marxian theory. Accumulation may for a time push wages above subsistence level. But the dominant tendency of a bourgeois economy is progressively to push the level of wages down to or even below subsistence. It is implicit in this theory that capitalist inventions are predominantly labour-saving. The labour force has to be adequate to provide an unemployed margin which helps to keep down wage pressure even during periods of boom. This so-called industrial reserve army—the unemployed, the disabled, the sweated labour of women and children—provides the bitter core of proletarian discontent. As urbanisation progresses and industry becomes more concentrated the employed workers become better organised; their consciousness of their class interests is heightened.

On the other side, the tendency towards the falling rate of profit is aggravated by the very process of accumulation which is necessary for the continuance of the capitalist system. Increased exploitation of labour, depression of wage rates below subsistence levels, the exploitation of colonial possessions for the supply of cheap raw materials, a constant increase in the industrial reserve army, the expansion of foreign trade, financial manipulation which results in the increased monopolisation: all these are unable to reverse the tendency towards the falling rate of profit. This contradiction between increasing proletarian misery and spiralling capital accumulation leads to the final collapse of capitalism after a series of trade cycles.

For the revolt of the proletariat the *Manifesto* of the Communist Party lays out a specific programme: "The proletariat will use its political supremacy, to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e. of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. . . in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property. . ."


"These measures will of course be different in different countries.

"Nevertheless, in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.

Continued on page 7

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"The Spark" and the People of Ghana: SOCIALIST

(Continued from page 4)

fact there is the bitterest class struggle, only suppressed by the bloodiest methods.

Mensah's second main section is entitled: **The leading problems of Marxism, European Communism and Developing countries.**

We agree with his opening thesis that the form of social organisation needs to be changed in order to assist the development of the productive forces. What one then expects is some precise discussion of what changes are required in the key aspects of social organisation viz. the form of ownership of property and the question who holds state power. But what we get is some partly irrelevant quotations from Marx combined with a misunderstanding of the central Marxist thesis. We quote (Mensah p. 4): "The transition from bourgeois capitalism to socialism is needed in order to allow industrial technology to be applied faster than competitive capitalism will allow".

This is somewhat contradicted a few lines later where he argues that so far as the countries of Eastern Europe were concerned "there can be no question that the social re-organisation was necessitated by the incompatibility between the productive forces and the economic system. Specifically, in none of those countries had capitalism reached the stage of monopoly capital and imperialism which according to Lenin himself is the last stage of capitalism before the dialectical revolution will inevitably take place". In the first quotation the barrier is 'competitive capitalism', in the second 'monopoly capitalism'. The long passage from Marx quoted by Mensah is of quite general significance, referring to all changes from one social system to another. Marxists hold to the view quoted from Lenin that capitalism acted as a motor or generator of the productive forces, until its monopoly stage; with monopoly capitalism and its product, imperialism no longer allow the productive forces to develop their full potential, and even destroy large quantities of material (and human) productive resources.

MONOPOLY CAPITAL AND IMPERIALISM

It is really quite remarkable that Mensah can assert that monopoly capital and imperialism had not been reached in any of the countries in question. Perhaps this assertion lies at the back of a great deal of his thought. He is, of course quite wrong. With the development of monopoly capitalism in France and Germany and Britain, there was no part of the globe which was not connected with monopoly capitalism and, via the growth of trade and the export of capital, with imperialism. We have shown how what industry and banking there was in pre-revolutionary Russia, was large scale, owned by foreign monopolies, and that Russia, which was herself a prison of nations, was also in turn in a dependent position in relation to the highly industrial monopolistic capitalisms of Western Europe. This process was completed by Hitler's New Order, so that when the war against German imperialism was won, the majority of large scale industry in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Rumania was wholly or partially owned by Germans, and the

rest of the economy was subordinated to the needs of German imperialism. This fact is what made it so easy for vast majority of patriotic people in those countries to support what was in effect point 4 of the **Communist Manifesto** which Mensah quotes on p. 15: "Confiscation of the property of emigrants and rebels". For the majority of the large owners of capital and land had sided with the invaders against their own people. They were expropriated as traitors to the nation, not simply as capitalists.

Ghana, indeed the whole of Africa, is subordinated to foreign monopoly capital. It would be interesting to know how Mensah would describe UAC, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, the timber and shipping companies. Mr. Peter Bauer, an ultraliberal, would call them monopolies, and we know of no serious economist who would call them otherwise.

It is quite natural that having, through failure to understand facts, failed also to explain in economic terms, the need for a change in the economic system, he falls back on a political explanation, namely that "the economic system was rearranged in order to consolidate the position of Communist Parties after they had overthrown rival political parties". It is perhaps hardly surprising that he apparently thinks (we can see no other meaning to the words) the purpose of industrialisation in Ghana is "to buttress the position of a socialist political party after a successful coup d'etat". If not Ghana but Eastern Europe is intended by this phrase too, it seems a little inaccurate. Even if October 1917 were to be described as a coup d'etat, it was 10 years before the 'consolidation' began in any substantial way; during that ten years on at least one occasion six sevenths of the country of the USSR was occupied by the enemies of the 'coup d'etat'. It is indeed a little hard to understand why those who didn't like it did not take their chance.

But after this digression into the political field, we are told that "for Ghana the purpose of social re-organisation must be different. The economic system must be re-organised in such a way as to promote to the maximum degree the accumulation of capital and the growth of national output."

"These are the processes that will conquer poverty".

This seems very acceptable until one looks a little more closely. The process of social re-organisation established by 19th century capitalism in Europe certainly promoted capital accumulation and growth of national output. Whether they conquered poverty is quite another matter. Whose poverty? Has the accumulation of vast quantities of capital in the Middle East or Venezuela in the form of oil installations conquered poverty? In fact this brings us to the question of the accumulation of capital, which is the subject of Mensah's third part.

THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL

It is a pity that Mensah uses the term capital accumulation to describe the process of socialist accumulation. He could have borne in mind that means of production can be owned

by a private class of capitalists or they can be owned by the people who work with them, and that Marxists at least have been quite clear in distinguishing the two. To Marx 'capital' is not just a thing (physical means of production), it is also a 'relation' between the class of owners and the class of wage earners employed by them (who own no means of production). This is the basic social relationship under capitalism i.e. the relation between wage labour and capital, a relationship in which the minority buys the majority's ability to work, and is able to do so because the minority owns all the means of production and the majority own none.

If Mensah had kept this in mind a great deal of muddle, to put the kindest construction on it, would have been saved.

What we can agree on first is this. Every developing country needs to add as fast as possible to its stock of means of production as a necessary condition for ending poverty. But unless that stock of means of production is under social control (and experience shows that social control without social ownership at least of the key means of production is impossible) there is no guarantee whatever that those means of production will be used to "conquer the poverty" of the mass of the people.

"SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION"

We have used "socialist accumulation" advisedly because it makes clear that the additions to society's stock of means of production, which are made available by society's producing more than it consumes, belong to society. Society can therefore decide how to use it, how the benefits in the form of increased productivity of labour resulting from its use shall be distributed; and that in so doing it can have no motive other than the welfare of society. If the additions to the stock of means of production are privately owned by the capitalist class, and are used to employ a class of wage labourers who have no rights in and no control over how (or even whether) the means of production are employed, then there is no guarantee whatever that they will be used for the benefit of society. Since the motive for such private operations is profit maximisation, there is every reason to suppose the wage earners do not see an obvious self-interest in adding to their employers' stock of means of production. The class struggle in capitalist society was not invented or even discovered by Marx. It has been independently discovered by wage workers everywhere on the basis of their own experience.

The payment of 'wages' in a socialist economy where those who pay the wages are exactly the same people as those who receive them, namely the collective owners of means of production, the working people, there is clearly no useful parallel with capitalist society where wages are paid through one class to another. The working class can clearly have no interest in "exploiting" itself. It follows therefore that if in a socialist economy a part of the social product is not paid out in wages, it is quite absurd to call this 'exploitation'. This is immediately apparent as far as it concerns that part of the social product which is paid back to the workers collectively in the form of

roads, hospitals, schools etc. where it is difficult to identify the piece which each individual worker receives. And as for that part which is put as an addition to the stock of means of production, i.e. the portion which we have called socialist accumulation, that also belongs to the workers collectively. It is theirs, they have control over it, they decide what to do with it. They own it collectively because there is no other way of owning enormous and enormously expensive pieces of equipment except (a) private ownership concentrated in the hands of a few enormously wealthy people, or (b) collective ownership by those who work with the equipment.

It is, of course, a platitude that accumulation equals production minus consumption, and that this holds good for all economic systems. A great deal of Mensah's section on capital accumulation appears to be saying precisely that. It even appears to follow that, in a country where the whole population is at a low level of subsistence, accumulation is very difficult, especially as any reduction in the subsistence level in order to enlarge surplus may be partly self-defeating since lower nutritional standards may lower the product.

But such a picture is a pretty piece of abstract arithmetic. There are few, if any, poor countries in which a minority, be it of indigenous or expatriate property owners, is not comparatively rich. Wherever there is feudalism or foreign capital, experience shows that subsistence level for the majority goes alongside a very considerable slice of product (often half or more) to an extremely small minority. There is already a surplus in existence. The problem is how to use some for development in such a way as to increase productivity and raise both the surplus and the standard of consumption. Of course, out of the growth of the product, provided it is socially owned, a rational collective choice can be made between raising the rate of accumulation more or less rapidly — more rapidly means that consumption cannot immediately rise or quickly as it would with a lower rate of accumulation but that it will rise very much more rapidly within a comparatively limited time horizon. That there are choices to be made no one doubts. What is in doubt is whether they are the ones which Mensah postulates.

SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF ALTERNATIVES

He presents a considerably idealised picture of private capitalist accumulation in the 19th century, and from this proceeds to ask whether or not a developing country should proceed to have capitalist development first before it proceeds to have a socialist development. But first he closes the alternative road rather summarily by suggesting that state enterprises in developing countries usually lead to a minimisation rather than maximisation of margin between wage rate and productivity. "One has only to look round at Ghana to see that in practice state enterprise (my gloss, Mensah calls it quite incorrectly state capitalism) tends to overtax the managerial capability which is at the disposal of the Government of a non-industrialised country". We say 'summary dismissal' because the experience of Ghana

over a very short period, in which much of the managerial ability was borrowed from private enterprise, is hardly proof of anything except Mensah's parochialism on the one hand and on the other (and we believe this lies at the bottom of the whole paper) complete lack of confidence in the mass of the people to solve these problems. That is why we, as distinct from Mensah, regard the experience of Eastern Europe as very relevant. There were plenty of faint hearts there, plenty of political and other experts both inside and outside the country who said it could not work, who said: "After all they are only peasants and workers as compared with the middle class intellectuals... the managers and civil servants of the capitalist era". But they appear to have done rather well. From an economy in which the level of output was perhaps about one seventh of that of 1914, (and we have shown how low that was) they have managed in a comparatively short period of peaceful expansion (1928-37) and 1950-1964 to raise total output to about two thirds the American level of 1964 with a population rather more than 7/8 times that of the U.S.A. Hence per capita real income in the USSR must be around 7/8 times $\frac{2}{3}$ of the US level of about \$3,000 in 1963/4 i.e. USSR per capita income is rather more than half the U.S. level, which puts it about 1,500 dollars per annum, or perhaps 7 times Ghana's. Most Ghanaians would be reasonably happy we think, if they could raise their real income per head sevenfold in 25 years of socialism. The USSR had of course to do it alone, without external aid, and with great destruction from two wars. Ghana's task should be easier, and there is therefore all the more grounds for confidence.

SCHOLARSHIP AND OBJECTIVITY

We quote Mensah:

1. "The application of Hegelian dialectics to the economic history of Britain led Marx to the famous generalisation with which the 'Communist Manifesto' opens."

The *Communist Manifesto* was written in German (why not call it 'Der Kommunistische Manifest'?) by Marx and Engels in 1847. Marx did not spend more than about six weeks in Britain before 1850. He started his study of British conditions then and not till then. It is obvious that the 'Communist Manifesto' had nothing to do with his study of British conditions. Mensah has a quotation from the *Critique of Political Economy*. It is hard to believe he could have read it without noting Marx's own description of his activities. He did not begin to study political economy until 1844 when he was in Paris — the product of these studies being the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844". A cursory glance at these will tell the reader that they are a study of theory and only indirectly, and to a minor extent (to the extent that the British, French and German authors he is studying refer to them) of actual condition. The whole work is extremely brief and in many respects immature.

In short, Marx's study of the economic history of Britain came after the *Communist Manifesto*.

This cavalier attitude towards facts which are not difficult to check leaves one

with the impression that Mensah decided on a thesis without reference to the facts, and that 'facts' are to be invented at will in order to substantiate a thesis. This is hardly the serious scientific attitude one is entitled to expect from the President of an Economic Society.

2. Another example of the same reckless disregard for fact comes at the end. Discussing social relations within the socialist state, Mensah is attempting to ridicule the Marxist view that the proletariat is the leading force, in the building of a socialist society. He writes, "The proletarian movement is to be led by a party elite of enlightened proletarians. The fact is, of course, that every socialist party has been led mostly by non-proletarian intellectuals."

"INCREDIBLE EFFRONTERY"

It is hard not to write at this point "What incredible effrontery!" The words, "the fact, of course" clearly implies that the contrary view is so absurd as to be not worth serious consideration. In FACT it is Mensah's view which is not worth serious consideration. For he is entirely wrong. If he had not been so blinded by prejudice he could, in less than half an hour, from standard reference books (e.g. *International Who's Who*) have found out most of the following: (Since he is everywhere attacking Marxists, we have assumed that by socialist parties he means parties based on Marxism) USSR: Khrushchev, shepherd boy, and fitter in coal mines; Poland: Gomulka, worker; Czechoslovakia: Novotny, worker; German Democratic Republic: Ulbricht, worker; Bulgaria: Zhivkov, worker; Yugoslavia: Tito, worker. And in capitalist Europe the following: Britain: Gollan, worker; France: Thorez (died two weeks ago) worker; Spain (in exile) Ibaruri, worker; (In Germany W: Reimann, worker — up to the Hitler period Thaelmann, worker and after 1945 in GDR, Pieck, worker); Kwame Nkrumah, worker.

The conclusion that might have been drawn by Mensah from the facts, if he had been interested in finding

them, would be the conclusion that we will draw, namely that the leaders of all these parties, sprung from the class of manual, industrial workers, have emerged also as intellectuals. That is, the working class, even under conditions of capitalism, can produce from its own ranks revolutionary intellectuals who are capable of leading their countries to socialism. To the people of Ghana, who have been told by generations of colonialists that they were really incapable of running their own affairs, this piece of European history could be a source of great confidence. For what workers in one place can do so they can in another.

One of Mensah's favourite phrases 'classical Marxism is, of course, even minor acquaintance with Marxists literature would show, not used by Marxists. It would be interesting to know whether Mensah means by it e.g. Marx's early works of the first years of the 1840's or Engels' work of the late 1880's when monopoly capital and imperialism were already developing. Which of these is classical Marxism? And what of the 'classical Marxism of the imperialist period' namely Leninism? Most Marxists would regard Lenin as having begun for the imperialist period the same kind of Marxist analysis as Marx and Engels did for the earlier, and mainly competitive, capitalist period. Mensah should engrave on his soul, before undertaking to discuss Marxism the famous phrase 'Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action'. "Our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelians. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of different formations of society must be individually examined." Only a little has been done here up to now because only a few people have got down to it seriously. In this field we can utilise masses of help, it is immensely big and anyone who will work seriously can achieve a lot and distinguish himself." (Engels: letter to Conrad Schmidt, London, August 1890).



13th JULY, MONDAY:

GHANA: The Conservative "Daily Mail" in its editorial today said, "Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's proposal for setting up a Commonwealth Secretariat should not surprise those who thought that the Southern Rhodesian question would split the Commonwealth."

The proposal, the editorial said, had shamed those who had doubts about Osagyefo's intentions.

14th JULY, TUESDAY:

KENYA: Mr. Abdi Haji Ahmed, a Senator of Kenya's north-eastern region has called on the Kenya Government to remove immediately all whites serving the government in the region.

The Senator revealed that all whites now serving in the region have the same ideas as the recently deported British Assistant Police Commissioner, Leslie Pridgeon.

ALGERIA: President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria has announced the creation of a "People's Militia" to defend Algeria's socialist revolution against all enemies at home and abroad.

The Militia's task will be to help the public and the

Armed Forces to unmask and render harmless the agents of counter revolution.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Lord Mayor of Sheffield, has accepted a petition signed by more than 14,000 inhabitants of Northern England city of Sheffield calling for the release of Nelson Mandela, South African nationalist leader, and his seven colleagues, who are imprisoned for life in South Africa.

The petition was sponsored by "Save Mandela" Committee formed by students and trade union movement of the city.

ETHIOPIA: A Committee of nine African countries charged with making arrangements for the creation of an African Development Bank, has begun a six-day meeting in Addis Ababa.

One of the main items on the agenda is to prepare for the first meeting of the board of governors, due to take place within three months.

SENEGAL: President Leopold Senghor of Senegal has arrived in Paris from Dakar for a three-day visit before flying to Cairo to attend the Organisation of African Unity Conference.

J. H. Mensah: CAPITALIST

(Continued from page 5)

9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable distribution of the population over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc."

It is important to notice two things about this programme. The first is that according to Marx and Engels themselves the socialist programme in different countries must be different. The second is that the specific programme outlined in a programme for implementation in the most advanced countries when these move from the capitalist to the socialist state. This latter qualification follows quite logically from the Marxist method and its specific conclusions. The societies whose economic history was analysed to yield the Marxist generalisation were industrialised societies.

Therefore the action programme of the communist revolution assumes that the proletariat inherits an industrial economy.

DEFINING A SOCIALISTIC PROGRAMME

In Russia and the Eastern European countries this programme has been implemented with a varying set of modifications. In any event the economic status of these countries at the time of the communist take-over approximated more closely to the condition of Britain in the early 19th Century than the economic status of a typical developing country now does. Czechoslovakia and East Germany were indeed highly developed industrial economies. All these countries also at the time of the establishment of their socialist regimes had been through wars and civil wars. Their state of dislocation and economic collapse allowed of the institution of a degree of social re-organisation which cannot normally be introduced into a going economy.

The economic development of the present socialist countries during the 1950s was generally marked by an attempt to reproduce in each country a replica of the structure of industrial development implemented by the Soviet Union until the beginning of the Second World War. That these attempts have not been uniformly successful is reflected in some of the changes in economic policy that have accompanied the process of de-Stalinisation. The attempt to co-ordinate industrial planning for all the communist countries is one attempt to produce a solution to the problem of defining a specific development programme which can be called socialistic. The current divergencies in the way of getting co-ordinated planning among the Socialist Countries only emphasizes that the concrete programme of industrial development for a developing country with socialist ambitions cannot be simply based on precedent.

It is even more difficult to know how to handle agriculture. In the circumstances of 19th century Britain, the suggested abolition of property in land followed from Marxist logic. For, with the agricultural revo-

lution of Britain, land has become a form of capitalist property. It was an asset on which capitalist farmers employed the labour of landless peasants. In Russia and in Eastern Europe much of the land at the time of the communist take-over was held by individual peasants. It was therefore not capitalist property.

The collectivisation programme of Lenin was based on the hope of attracting the Russian peasant into a genuine co-operative movement by demonstrating the advantages of co-operative farming. Lenin quotes with approval Engels' prescription for agrarian reform in France and Germany:

"When we are in possession of the powers of the state, we shall not even dream of forcibly expropriating the poorer peasants, the smallholders (with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in relation to the large landowners. Our task as regards the smallholders will first of all consist in transforming their individual production and individual ownership into co-operative production and co-operative ownership, not forcibly, but by way of example, and by offering social aid for this purpose. We shall then have the means of showing the peasant all the advantages of this change—advantages which even now should be obvious to him."

Under Stalin Collectives became co-operatives only in name. In substance the peasants' land was expropriated except for their small garden plots.

Finally there is the question of the rate at which

the state should come to own the industrial capital in the nation, and the process by which it should do so. The Communist Manifesto, to judge by the programme quoted before, seemed to envisage the gradual nationalisation of productive capital. The 7th point of the programme refers to the extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state.

STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN

You will recall the strategy proposed in Ghana's Seven-Year Plan. The rate of productive investment by the State must be kept substantially ahead of the rate of investment by the private sector. As the Guide to the Implementation of the Plan says:

"The growth rate of the public sector must always exceed the growth rate of the private sector in agriculture and industry. This should not be done by hindering the growth of the private sector but by MAXIMISING THE GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR. Private enterprise will not be killed: it will be surpassed."

But to revert to the problem of an action programme for the implementation of socialism in a non-industrialised country. The first and most important point to emphasize is that the Marxist programme is aimed at the re-organisation of the ownership of existing property. This re-organisation is required because the existing property relations are frustrating the further development of productive capacity in a "matured industrial" economy.

In a developing country the ownership of the existing means of production is not the central issue. By and large the means of production do not exist. That is the definition of economic backwardness itself. Therefore the essence of the action programme of socialism in a backward country is not the rearrangement of the ownership of the means of production. The central concern must be with the building up of the nation's stock of productive assets.

A heavy progressive income tax as recommended in the Communist Manifesto is obviously not one of the best inducements for capital investment. Neither is the confiscation of property or the abolition of the rights of inheritance.

The industrialisation programme, the need to modernise agriculture and to build up the stock of social capital—all these may impose a necessity for encouraging private investment, making tax concessions and in extending state guarantees to private property as an integral part of the economic policy of a developing country despite its socialist ambitions.

CREATION OF SURPLUS-VALUE

As previously indicated the extraction of surplus value to provide an investable margin for the community has to be intensified rather than diminished if it is desired to increase the rate of economic growth. Far from acquiring the savings potential that in classical Marxist theory exists in the ownership of private capitalists before the socialist transformation a developing country has to ask the masses, who com-

mand no investable surplus value, to provide the savings for national development.

In the field of agriculture many different roads to socialism have already been tried by the contemporary socialist countries. As is well known, in countries like Poland, private ownership of farming land has as yet been relatively little disturbed.

Marx's own view of the farmer in a primitive economy deserves notice. He wrote in Das Kapital:

"The primitive forester is owner of the primitive forest, and uses the primitive forest as his property with the freedom of an orang-otang. He is not, therefore, a proletarian. This would only be the case, if the primitive forest exploited him, instead of being exploited by him. As far as his wealth is concerned, such a man would well bear comparison not only with the modern proletarian, but also with the syphilitic and scrofulous upper classes."

(Capital: Cap. 25)

For those who would like to imagine a capitalist proletariat class conflict in the farming economy of a country like Ghana perhaps these words should give some pause. Besides, it is obvious that as long as land remains relatively plentiful the capitalist expropriation of farming land and the forcible creation of a proletarian class cannot happen in Ghana in the way that it happened in Europe.

Even on the terms of the purest Marxism the state then is entitled to seek to promote an increase in the average holding of the Ghanaian farmer as a means of increasing agricultural productivity. But

the policy of increasing the size of the individual farmer's holding sooner or later brings up the problem of the use of wage labour in agriculture. A Ghanaian farmer hires co-operative tractors to plough up 40 acres which are more than family labour can cultivate. He then gives employment to people from Upper Volta whose soils are unable to provide them with an adequate livelihood. What should be the attitude of the socialist planner in Ghana towards this situation?

In Ghana we have instituted a state farms programme and the workers' brigade system as a spearhead for the modernisation of agriculture. But through these institutions the state itself is introducing a large element of wage labour into an agricultural economy which is at present mostly still based on non-wage family labour. Is this proletarianisation of agriculture consistent with socialist planning?

SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A SOCIALIST STATE

Marx's analysis is founded on class conflict. The Communist Manifesto envisaged co-operation between certain "enlightened" members of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Presumably the rest of the bourgeoisie is to be liquidated.

The proletariat movement is to be led by a party elite of enlightened proletarians.

The fact of course is that every socialist party has so far been led mostly by non-proletarian intellectuals. Experiments in working class leadership—for instance in the workers' management of industrial enterprises—have indeed been interesting. But in general a managerial and ideological elite has had to

lead the masses. In some of the Eastern European countries the socialist movement has arrived at the happy compromise that anybody who is not against the socialist revolution should be allowed to work in the nation's development. In China the employment of ex-capitalists as industrial managers and bureaucrats is still very widespread. But if middle-class intellectuals and ideological cadres, the managers and civil servants of the capitalist era, are to be invited to assist in the construction of the socialist state then the class conflict cannot be carried out in the classical manner.

This problem is of immense practical importance to a developing country. How is the choice of managerial personnel to be made? What is the position of the civil service machinery in the management of a socialist state? Which decisions in economic management can be left to technical considerations and which ones must be founded on the assumption that there are antagonistic class interests to be promoted at all times? Obviously, a country like Ghana cannot afford the luxury of not utilising some of its available trained manpower. Socialist thinking in a developing country like Ghana ought to move over from the concept of class conflict and increasingly emphasise the concept of nation-building through the joint efforts of all the citizens. We are using chiefs and other leaders of village society in laudable programmes of community development. Our political theory should not be on the assumption that the chiefly class is an antagonistic class.

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AFRICA IS ON THE MARCH

Continued from page 1

Angolan Provisional Government-in-exile. The work of the commission should bring about a unification of the liberation movements in Angola; pave the way for the recognition of the Provisional Government-in-exile by all Africa; and permit the progressive and revolutionary forces outside Africa to be more forthcoming in their aid to the people of Angola.

The setting up of a special commission to supervise sanctions on South Africa is a recognition of the inadequacy of the Committee of Nine for the handling of the South African problem. Indeed the time is ripe for all aspects of the South African struggle to be entrusted to a specialised commission of the O.A.U. On such a commission should sit a few states which, in conjunction with the fighting forces inside South Africa, can organise and direct the revolutionary struggle against apartheid. Any further temporising over the peaceful or the revolutionary approach to the South African problem should be seen, for what it is—an attempt to abandon our kith and kin in South Africa under a smoke-screen of academic verbiage resorted to because of deals with imperialism.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Southern Rhodesia is now largely outside the jurisdiction of the Committee of Nine. The O.A.U. has endorsed the London decisions of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference on Southern Rhodesia and has decided to keep up the pressure for early and full implementation of these decisions through the United Nations. Agreement has been reached about a Zimbabwe Government-in-exile in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority rulers in Southern Rhodesia. And Malawi, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) have been entrusted with the task of reconciling the various wings of the nationalist movements in Southern Rhodesia.

In short, imperialism can no longer push its Southern Rhodesia strategy by manipulating the Committee of Nine. The

imperialist technique of using the Committee of Nine as the vehicle for its colonialist policies now has to be abandoned. The vehicle is no longer the control panel for the national liberation movements.

Of course it is to be expected that imperialism will strive to gain control of other committees and commissions charged with one aspect or other of channelling assistance to the liberation movements. Imperialism may yet succeed with these new agencies. But it has to work harder than before. For it now has to deal with several committees in place of one, and it has to reckon with the fact that the states of radical nationalism will now play a greater role in the guidance of the liberation movements than was allowed them by the arrangements made in Addis Ababa last year.

Here a note of warning to the states of radical nationalism will not be out of place. A factor in the reversal of the policy of aiding the liberation movements solely through the Committee of Nine has been the unanimity of the freedom fighters over the ineffectiveness of that machinery. The new machinery must work efficiently and expeditiously in order to win the confidence of these same freedom fighters. The continued leadership of the states of radical nationalism in this regard will depend to a great extent on the sense of urgency, the shrewdness and the comradeship they bring into the programme of assistance to the liberation movements. These states must realise (and take swift remedial action!) that a tactic of imperialism has been and will continue to be the manipulation of the machinery for giving assistance to freedom fighters in their respective countries in a way that will make the freedom fighters lose faith in the states of radical nationalism. They must make absolutely certain that imperialist agents do not worm their way into the machinery for giving assistance to the liberation movements.

And now to the great debate.

Cairo 1964 will go down in history as the first occasion when African leaders faced squarely the

issue of a continental union government. Although no final decision has been pronounced on the proposals put forward by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah for a union government, a big step forward was taken when it was unanimously agreed that the specialised commissions of the OAU should study the proposals and report back to the Conference of Heads of State and Government next year in Accra. By this move, the African leaders have demonstrated to the world that a union government for Africa is not a wild and brash idea but a sound view that deserves close and sympathetic study. This alone is a big jolt to the imperialists.

VIEWS EXPRESSED

It is useful to review briefly the various views that were expressed at the Cairo Conference in the course of the debate on a union government for Africa.

First, the case for a union government. Dr. Nkrumah argued irrefutably that Africa can be truly independent and tread the path of self-induced development only if the *status quo* of a multitude of non-viable micro-states yield place to one strong continental federation. He pointed out that a union government handling foreign affairs, defence and economic development could solve the major problems facing Africa today. Such a government would prove the greatest single lever for self-induced development at the fastest possible rate, a pace of development much faster than any of the existing African states can generate. This arrangement will make it unnecessary for any African states to resort to abject dependence on the former colonial master as a condition for the very slow rate of progress which is all that existing African states can achieve.

Simultaneously, Dr. Nkrumah's proposals allow member states to retain their individual identity in all other spheres. Each will be free to have its own government together with all the paraphernalia of statehood. It is even possible, as is the case with the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia and the Ukraine, for the individual states to have diplomatic missions abroad, especially at the U.N., while leaving all major issues of foreign policy to the union government. By this way the patriotism generated by emergent statehood is reconciled with a realistic approach to the solution of problems posed by sovereignty recently acquired in a world dominated by economic and military giants.

INSTITUTIONS

The institutions of the union government are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a House of Representatives (set up on a population basis) and a Senate (where every state is equally represented). The military authority of the union government will be exercised through an African High Command. And the economic tasks facing the continent would be tackled through an African Common Market, an African currency or monetary zone and joint planning of economic development.

The next twelve months will be devoted to expert and detailed study of these proposals. It is to be hoped

that the O.A.U. Secretariat will allow itself to be advised by experts who believe in a union government and not by 'experts' who come to us with one set purpose—to prove to us that the idea is unworkable. Here our leaders should bear in mind this favourite saying by George Bernard Shaw:

"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

Two contrary views were however expressed in opposition to the idea of a union government. The first is that the idea of a union government is premature. This came principally from the group of states for whom Nigeria acts as the spokesman on many issues. This view was cut to bits by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah himself who roundly declared that the protagonists of such a view are out "to crucify Africa on the altar of neo-colonialism."

After this broadside which squares with the everyday experience of the African Revolution, the supporters of this premature theory degenerated into personal attacks and character assassinations unparalleled in the history of Heads of State meetings. These jibes, innuendoes and vilifications only revealed that these leaders had no answer to Dr. Nkrumah's proposals and therefore thought that abuse could serve better. They failed. For inspired write-ups in the Western imperialist press in praise of these leaders could only point out the fact that their stand is identical with or quite close to the standpoint of imperialism. What a shame! And can anyone miss the glaring fact that these assailants of Dr. Nkrumah left Cairo unsung; but Dr. Nkrumah got a grand send off at Cairo airport by all delegations of freedom fighters assembled in Cairo? The measure of our efforts in the service of our continent is not encomiums from the imperialist press but the reactions of the people of Africa.

FUNCTIONAL UNITY?

The other view at the Conference was not new. It called for increased cooperation between African states in restricted fields. This is the familiar plea for "functional unity". It is held that such limited association of African states could breed goodwill and good neighbourliness which in turn could permit a further advance towards political union. This looks good on the surface.

However, the advocates of this view lose sight of three important facts. Firstly, the passage of time will allow vested interests to crystallise and thus make political union even more difficult to attain.

Secondly, such limited associations could easily become sterile and ineffective if the states involved are not agreed on basic political objectives. For example, every modern state needs a central bank. But the operations of a central bank owe a lot to the political objective pursued by each government. How can African states successfully operate a common central bank if they are not agreed as to political objectives?

Thirdly, these inter-Afri-

can institutions, if left without political direction, could easily serve as channels for the increased, though disguised, exploitation of this continent by imperialist interests. For example, an African bank, if left without political supervision, could come under the control or influence of powerful imperialist banks and become a channel for promoting imperialist investments in all Africa. African leaders must face the bitter truth—inter-African institutions without political direction will prove mere stop-gap affairs and to this extent, will be insecure pegs on which to hang the economic development of the individual African states.

In order to bring out the truth that a good-deal of serious thinking has gone into this concept of a continental union government, it will be useful to draw attention to a few other points that arose in the debate. President Nasser called for "muscles" for the O.A.U. and quickly added that we need "unity of thought". President Sekou Toure emphasised the point that a union government for all Africa must be founded upon an ideology. These are significant utterances for they confirm our view that Africa needs a unifying ideology. And it is this conviction that gave birth to *Consciencism*. President Nkrumah's latest philosophical work.

WARM RECEPTION

The warm reception given *Consciencism* in Cairo and the speedy translation of the book into Arabic seem to indicate that at last African leaders who believe in African unity have come to the realisation that the foundation must be an ideology and not mere resolutions or partisan religious fanaticism. This realisation is a significant step forward in our quest for unity on the African continent.

The Cairo Conference was a clear victory for the progressive standpoint in two other respects—denunciation of Africa and the composition of the Secretariat of the OAU.

The resolution on military affairs is a significant advance on the position taken by Africa at Addis Ababa. We have gone further than condemn foreign military bases on African soil.

Africa now condemns all military ties with non-African powers. By this it is not just the stationing of foreign troops on African soil that must be condemned but also the growing practice of signing secret military pacts between a Head of State and a former colonial power—the terms of which military pacts are usually unknown even to the parliament of the African state.

Furthermore, Africa has refused to accept a mere verbal declaration of intention to live in peace as sufficient guarantee for peace in the world. Our position as set out at Cairo is that we have to destroy the conditions that breed war. Here we have called for an end to all nuclear tests, the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the use of fissionable materials only for peaceful purposes. In any case, we intend to respect these sentiments as regards Africa. That is why the Cairo Conference has called for the de-nuclearisation of all Africa. And by this we mean that all nuclear powers must respect

Africa as a nuclear free zone and refrain from storing nuclear weapons in African soil or in her territorial waters. In addition no nuclear weapons must be moved across any part of Africa.

VICTORY FOR RADICALS

As regards the setting up of a permanent Secretariat for the O.A.U., radical African nationalism has fared even better than some optimists would have dared to hope for on the eve of the Cairo Conference. In deference to Ethiopia, Addis Ababa has been chosen as the seat of the O.A.U. The composition of the Secretariat reflects a strong representation of radical African nationalism. The Secretary General went to Guinea, and the assistant secretaries went to U.A.R., Algeria, Kenya and Nigeria. It is pretty obvious that imperialism will do everything in its power to obstruct and, if possible, thwart the free action of such a Secretariat. However, we have in our hands the tools for forging ahead. If we fail, we shall have ourselves to blame.

What are the prospects for the next fourteen months before the Accra Summit?

The one certainty is that imperialism will re-double her efforts in the fight against the states of radical nationalism. Already the neo-colonialists section of the western press have launched a vicious attack on these states in general and on Dr. Nkrumah in particular.

Much as we have to take a serious view of these press attacks, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this propaganda barrage is meant to serve as covering fire for the attacks of imperialist forces on other fronts.

We must expect sharp attacks on the foundations of the states of radical nationalism.

Economic attrition or open sabotage will be staged by some imperialist enter-

prises still resident in these states. Violent attacks and assassination attempts on our radical leaders cannot be ruled out. Promises of economic aid will be used to undermine the solidarity existing between the states of radical nationalism.

Every effort will be exerted to influence and even corrupt some of the officers of the O.A.U. Secretariat. And we must expect imperialism to try some horse-trading especially with countries represented on the Secretariat in an effort to pressure the permanent machinery of the O.A.U. into pursuing a pro-imperialist line.

If we can unmask all these imperialist manoeuvres, if we can side-track the allurements of the money bags and check-mate the secret agents, the next fourteen months will register new successes for the African Revolution.

Two conditions however are essential to success. The first is solidarity among the African states of radical nationalism. The second and more important condition for success is that we involve the masses of Africa in the coming battles. They are the arbiters, the court of ultimate jurisdiction. If we bring them in at every stage and rely on their matter-of-fact judgement and on their revolutionary initiative we shall get the better of those leaders who rely on armies, subventions and back-room boys supplied by imperialism.

The conditions are ripe for mounting an all-out revolutionary struggle against imperialism whether it takes the form of colonialism or neo-colonialism or apartheid. But do we possess the ability to make full use of these opportunities?

"There comes in all political struggles rare moments, hard to distinguish but fatal to let slip, when even caution is dangerous; then all must be set on a hazard and out of a simple man is ordained strength."

—Kwame Nkrumah

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OUR APOLOGIES

We regret to announce that due to some unforeseen circumstances the publication of Obotan Awuku's series could not be started this week.

We shall not fail next week.

Editorial

Continued from page 1

ing socialist theory to provide a guide to action in Ghanaian conditions."

Second, if Mr. Mensah holds on to his office in spite of his convictions, it can only mean that he is either determined to use it to bend the will of the nation to his own or hold on to obstruct the Seven-Year Plan.

When at the referendum, the people overwhelmingly decided to choose the socialist path of development, they did so because they know that socialism aims at meeting their growing material and cultural needs by steadily developing and improving social production. They see that capitalism is obsolete and that it is giving way to the new and higher social order of socialism. They realise that socialism puts an end to the contradictions of capitalism by abolishing private ownership of the main means of production and placing them under public ownership. They are aware that there is no instance of an ex-colonial country which on the basis of capitalism has achieved an independent and viable economic growth since the imperialist epoch began.

It is quite probable that there is a number of people of Mensah's ilk in the nerve centres of affairs in this country. Perhaps they can be bold enough like him to come out openly.